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Leibniz’s *Egypt Plan* (1671–1672): from holy war to ecumenism

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At the end of 1671 and start of 1672, while in the service of the Archbishop and Elector of Mainz, Johann Philipp von Schönborn, Leibniz composed his *Egypt Plan*,¹ which sought to persuade Louis XIV to invade Egypt.² The circumstances surrounding the composition of this plan are widely known, and so may be sketched in brief: in the autumn of 1671, it was widely suspected in German states that the French would invade Holland in the spring of the following year.³ This was confirmed in December 1671 when Louis XIV despatched an ambassador to the Elector of Mainz, advising him of his intention to invade Holland, and to request that the Elector use his influence with the heads of other German territories to stop them entering the war. It was at this time that Leibniz began composing the *Egypt Plan*. Scholars have generally supposed that Leibniz’s rationale for devising the plan was to divert Louis XIV from his intended war with Holland, and ensure that the French armies were sent not just away from Holland but – crucially – from German territories also. This is what we might term the “diversion hypothesis”. It has a long history: a nineteenth-century scholar explains that Leibniz’s aim in writing the *Egypt Plan* was “that the storm gathering in France might be averted from Europe, and its energies directed to a distant object, the conquest of Egypt”.⁴ The “diversion hypothesis” remains popular today; for example, when discussing the genesis of the *Egypt Plan*, a contemporary scholar informs us that “In order to divert the King of France from his disturbing impulses to extend his kingdom, Leibniz has no alternative to a European war than a war against the Turks”.⁵ Although hard evidence for the diversion hypothesis is thin on the ground,⁶ it is not my intention here to challenge it, or even investigate it, though in what follows I will argue that, at best, it offers an incomplete account of Leibniz’s motives for advocating a French invasion of Egypt. But this is to get ahead of myself.

Now even if the desire to keep Louis’s armies at a comfortably safe distance from the Rhine was – in whole or in part – the real reason for devising the *Egypt Plan*, it was not one that is explicitly stated in the plan itself (or in any cognate writings). Instead, Leibniz identifies a number of political, economic and religious benefits that could be expected if the plan were to be successfully executed; notoriously, the identification of religious benefits prompted Leibniz to characterize the plan as a holy war.⁷ To date, the religious benefits Leibniz identified have received little attention from scholars. Moreover, those who do acknowledge them are often quick to downplay them, supposing that the “holiness” of invading Egypt was little more than a convenient religious motif added to a proposal that was essentially politically motivated. For example, Ian Almond suggests that the *Egypt Plan* involves “a rather cynical use of Christianity as a slightly superficial decoration, tacked on to an essentially strategic and thoroughly untranscendental project”.⁸ And
in a similar vein, Ivo Budil argues that the idea of holy war was not integral to the Egypt Plan at all, but that Leibniz presented the plan as a holy war in order to make the invasion of Egypt more palatable both to Frances’s allies and enemies. This tendency to downplay or even dismiss the religious benefits Leibniz claimed of the Egypt Plan is undermotivated and stems from a very superficial reading of the documents that together comprise the Egypt Plan. As such, it stands in need of correction. Accordingly, one of the aims of this paper is to offer a more balanced and plausible reading of the religious benefits of war that Leibniz outlines in his Egypt Plan.

In offering such a reading, I argue that we should take seriously Leibniz’s claim that a French invasion of Egypt would bring religious benefits and that, far from being superficial or superfluous features of the plan, these benefits are ones that Leibniz saw as important and intrinsically desirable inasmuch as he came to believe that the execution of the plan would lead to the flowering of co-operation and brotherhood among Christians in a show of inter-denominational koinonia, that is, fellowship with other Christians in the participation of shared goals. Although not ecumenism in its own right, this koinonia would nevertheless undergird and complement ecumenical projects such as those with which Leibniz was involved throughout his life, being “the greatest supporter of Church unity that the world has yet known”, as one scholar aptly put it. The Egypt Plan can thus be seen as promoting a sort of proto-ecumenism, the aim of which was to get Christians to unite in cause and act rather than in doctrine.

Before considering the religious elements of the Egypt Plan, some details of the history of the plan are in order. The Egypt Plan is not a single document, but rather a proposal outlined in series of documents that Leibniz composed between December 1671 and the summer of 1672. The documents are of varying lengths and written in a variety of styles. The first incarnation of the Egypt Plan, dated December 1671, is “Regi Christianissimo” [To the Most Christian King], which was followed by a series of short essays, including “Specimen demonstrationis politicae” [Specimen of Political Demonstrations], “De eo quod franciae interest” [On What Is in the Interests of France], “De optimo consilio quod potentissimo regi dari potest impraesentiarum” [On the Best Advice That Can Be Given to the Most Powerful King in the Present Circumstances] (all likely written in January 1672), and then, as the culmination of these studies, the lengthy “Justa Dissertatio” [A Just Proposal], which was the document Leibniz ultimately intended for Louis. Indeed, he was still working on the “Justa Dissertatio” when he arrived in Paris at the end of March 1672, having been sent there by his patron at the court of Mainz specifically to present the plan to the French King. However, events had moved faster than Leibniz could write and travel, and by the time he arrived in Paris the Dutch had already been attacked by the English, who had secretly joined forces with the French, and Louis declared war a week later, on 6 April. There is no evidence that Leibniz was able to present his proposal to Louis or to any member of the French court. However, it appears that Leibniz did not give up on it straightaway, for in the summer of 1672 he sketched out a relatively short summary of the plan, the “Breviarium” [Summary] intended for his masters in Mainz. At the time of writing, of course, France had already been at war with Holland for several months.

Clearly, any scrutiny of the claimed religious benefits of invading Egypt needs to be mindful of the different documents in which the plan is presented, as well as the circumstances in which they were written. Indeed, given the clear diplomatic purpose of the documents of the Egypt Plan, one needs to consider not just what Leibniz says in these documents, but also whether the claims he makes in them can reasonably be taken to represent his own thinking as opposed to being made out of calculated expediency. The plan of the remainder of the paper is therefore as follows. In Sections 1, 2, and 3, we shall outline the religious benefits of the Egypt Plan that Leibniz identifies in the three main documents in which the plan is laid out, namely the “Regi Christianissimo”, “Justa Dissertatio”, and “Breviarium”. This is a valuable exercise in its own right, in that it will enhance scholarly understanding of the plan itself, which has attracted very little attention
from scholars in recent years. Having detailed these benefits and their development across the three texts, in Section 4 we shall consider the extent to which they can be said to represent Leibniz’s own views. I shall argue that the content and context of certain aspects of them – specifically those concerned with what I have called koinonia or proto-ecumenism – are a fair reflection of Leibniz’s own views, and should not be dismissed as mere expediency or diplomacy.

1. Regi Christianissimo

We begin with the first draft of the Egypt Plan, the “Regi Christianissimo”, written in December 1671. The piece is written as a straightforward letter from Leibniz to the French King, and in content it is little more than a string of reasons why France should invade Egypt rather than Holland. Invading Egypt would have clear political and economic benefits, Leibniz suggests, because the country is so situated as to confer domination of the seas, and almost that of the world, on any conquering force, which would thence control trade with the East. And strategically, Egypt represents a better target than Holland, since Holland is heavily fortified while Egypt is almost without defence. Hence Leibniz feels able to quite literally promise Louis the world: if the plan were carried out successfully, Louis would be crowned Emperor of the East, and France would become arbiter of the world.

Alongside these profane reasons for invading Egypt, Leibniz also offers the sacred. Not surprisingly, this is rooted in the fact that the plan involves war with the Turks, the sworn enemy of Christendom. The thought itself is not expressed as explicitly as one might expect, perhaps because calls to fight the Turks were so common at the time that the desideratum of vanquishing them in battle was scarcely one that needed spelling out. Nevertheless, Leibniz does describe Egypt as “a refuge of Mohammedan perfidy”, and states that one of the benefits of the plan is that it would lead to “the downfall of the Turkish Empire”. Leibniz explains:

There is a great proneness to revolt, not just in Egypt but in the East as a whole, and this would increase were there to appear some foreign force upon which the insurgents could rely. Thus the day of reckoning is approaching for the Turkish Empire, because it is certain that its ruin would follow the occupation of Egypt.

With its promise to lay waste to the Turkish Empire, Leibniz claims that his plan “is in the interests of the whole human race and the Christian religion”. The religious benefit Leibniz has in mind here – that his plan will spell the doom of the Turks, and for that reason should be undertaken in the interests of Christianity – was one that was often identified in Christian calls for holy war with Muslims both inside and outside the crusader tradition. For example, in his fourteenth-century work calling for a new crusade, Marino Sanudo Torsello explains that the proposal is made “for the common good of the whole of Christendom, present and yet to come”, because it involves “crushing and annihilating the principal enemies of the Catholic faith”. And John Foxe, in his Acts and Monuments (1583), after building a case for war with the Turks, begs God to

graunt to thy Church strength and victory against the malicious fury of these Turkes, Saracens, Tartarians, againste Gog and Magog, and all the malignaunt rabble of Antichrist, enemies to thy sonne Iesus our Lord and Sauior. Preuent their deuises, ouerthrow their power, and dissolue their kingdome, that the kingdome of thy sonne so long oppressed, may recouer and flourish ouer all.

In each case, the justification for war is the glory of Christianity through the destruction of its enemy. As we have seen, some scholars have supposed this form of justification to be nothing more than a convenient (and highly unnecessary) religious motif added to what was essentially a politically motivated proposal, and they condemn Leibniz accordingly.
But this is to move too quickly. For in the “Regi Christianissimo”, Leibniz identifies a second, independent, religious benefit of a French invasion of Egypt, namely its ability to secure peace among the Christian nations of Europe. Leibniz explains that “A campaign against the infidels will be desirous not only to those who love the Christian commonwealth, but also to those who hate France”.30 In a war with Holland – Leibniz insists – the only allies France would have are those it could bribe, and she runs the risk of other European powers siding against her, whereas in a war against the Turks there would be many allies, such as the Pope, Italy, Spain, and probably the Polish and Portuguese too.31 Leibniz even holds out the prospect that taking on the Turks could lead to the House of Austria (i.e., the Hapsburgs), which had been a thorn in Louis’s side, becoming a confederate (“If the matter is handled properly, we shall have the House of Austria not just subdued but even allied [to us] and a partner in the undertaking”).32 The catalyst for this almost pan-European alliance – and the European peace secured thereby – would be the proposed French offensive against the common enemy, the Turks. Seeing her unilateral action, Leibniz claimed that European nations would put aside their mutual squabbles and act in the common Christian interest; indeed, he asserts that any nation wishing to prevent France from carrying out his plan would be “overwhelmed by the universal hatred of Christians”.33 Hence a second religious benefit of invading Egypt is that it would bring about peace in Christian Europe.

This benefit of the plan is worthy of note. While it was commonplace in the medieval and early modern mindset to connect European peace with holy war against the Turk, the order of the two was typically the reverse of that presented by Leibniz. From the eleventh century onwards, it was often argued that there should be peace in Europe in order to make war on the enemies of Christianity. In his speech which launched the First Crusade (1095), Pope Urban II is recorded as urging that truce between European neighbours be kept in order to focus efforts on retaking the Holy Land.34 In the centuries that followed, European peace came to be seen as a precondition of a successful war with the Turks. Accordingly, to assist with the prosecution of the Fifth Crusade, the 71st decree of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) gave the following order:

But, since for the success of this undertaking [i.e., the Fifth Crusade] it is above all else necessary that princes and Christian people maintain peace among themselves, we decree with the advice of the holy council that for four years peace be observed in the whole Christian world, so that through the prelates discordant elements may be brought together in the fulness of peace, or at least to the strict observance of the truce.35

Similar thoughts were expressed in 1305–1307 by Pierre Dubois,36 in 1575 by Thomas Newton,37 and 1638 by the Duke of Sully,38 each insisting that the European states should stop their in-fighting so that they could turn their gaze back to their traditional enemies – the barbarian and infidel. Hence, from the advent of the Crusades all the way to the seventeenth century, peace in Christian Europe was proposed in order to wage war with the Turks. Conversely, Leibniz’s plan proposes war with the Turks in order to make peace in Christian Europe. As such, Leibniz turns the old crusader logic on its head. He does this by supposing that a holy war with the Turks would galvanize the leaders of European territories into putting their differences aside and working together, spurred on by public opinion, which would be overwhelmingly in favour of such a war. For when it comes to a war with Egypt, Leibniz claims, “no one can want to dare oppose it, against the stream of public approbation and universal applause”.39 France is therefore assured that its operations against the Turks would not be unilateral for long, as Leibniz all but promises that the other European territories would support it once its designs are clear.
As one might expect, the two religious benefits of invading Egypt outlined in the “Regi Christianissimo” – that it would lead to the destruction of the Turks, and bring about peace in Christian Europe – are also to be found in the “Justa Dissertatio”, which is the lengthiest presentation of Leibniz’s Egypt Plan, and the one he carried with him to Paris to present to the French King. But as we shall see, these two benefits are embellished there, and also joined by a third. It is to that text that we now turn.

2. Justa Dissertatio

The “Justa Dissertatio” is a sprawling and meticulously researched document, filled with quotations from travel reports to support the various claims Leibniz there makes about Egypt’s geography, defences, and people. In this piece, Leibniz offers a suite of reasons in favour of an invasion of Egypt, claiming that it is the most efficacious way for the French to attain supremacy, that it is easy, safe, timely, and – most importantly of all – just. The plan is a just one, Leibniz explains, because it involves the Most Christian King training his fire on Christianity’s eternal foe, the Turks. Leibniz explains that Egypt is the key to the whole Turkish Empire, and if it were to fall into Christian hands then the Turkish Empire would be ruined. In the “Regi Christianissimo” this claim is made on the basis that the Turks are prone to revolt, but in the “Justa Dissertatio” it is made on economic grounds: the wealth of the Turks is channelled through Egypt, so to seize that country is to bring about the impoverishment of the enemy. Leibniz argues that the ruin of the Turks would have the further benefits of freeing the Christians of the East (who had been long harassed by Muslims), and making it possible to “bring the Christian religion to the furthestmost limits of the world”. Nor was this intended as an idle boast, for Leibniz insisted that with the French installed in Egypt, “The Christian religion will flourish again in all of Asia and Africa”, and even that Christianity would be able to reach parts of the world that at the time had been largely untouched by it, such as Japan, China, and Australia. With such an anticipated result, it is no wonder that he informs Louis, “The salvation of a great part of the human race depends upon this resolution: if ever something concerned God and the soul, this certainly does”. As such, the plan “is in the interest of the human race and the Christian religion and, which comes to the same thing, because it is in conformity with the divine will, is just and pious”, which leads Leibniz to repeatedly describe it as a “holy war”.

There is in the “Justa Dissertatio”, then, a more worked-out version of the first religious benefit of the Egypt Plan identified in the “Regi Christianissimo”. In addition to the desideratum of destroying the Turks, Leibniz also insists that executing the Egypt Plan would benefit Christians who were suffering at the hands of the infidel, bring Christianity to places it has hitherto not reached, and that the plan is (for all these reasons) in conformity with God’s will. The first and last of these are common tropes in the work of those who advocated holy war with the Turks. For example, in 1095, Urban II predicated his call to retake the Holy Land in part upon the fact that the Christians of the East should be freed from the Muslim yoke. In the fourteenth century, Torsello likewise insisted that his plans for a new crusade “will bring about the consolation and the liberation of the children of the Christians who live in these parts [viz., Armenia, Egypt, and the Holy Land]”.

The belief that to engage and defeat the Turks was God’s will was also a fixture in the Christian holy war tradition from the very outset. Indeed, a war could hardly be considered holy unless it was carrying out a divinely sanctioned plan. This thinking was enshrined in the battle cry that Urban II urged upon his soldiers when faced with the enemy: “God wills it! God wills it!”

As for the spreading of Christianity, this was not always a fixture of Christian holy wars, taking root only in the thirteenth century following St. Francis’s attempt to convert the Sultan al-Kamil at Damietta in 1218, during the Fifth Crusade. Prior to that, missionary work was
typically carried out independently of holy wars. This remained the case afterwards too; during the medieval and early modern periods, Christian proselytizing was often carried out in conjunction with European expansionism (which helped make such proselytizing possible) rather than its holy wars as such, though the ability of holy wars to open up previously inaccessible lands for such missionary work was certainly recognized. Writing in 1245, on the eve of the Seventh Crusade, Innocent IV defended the right of Christian missionaries to preach without interference from infidels, though also acknowledged that infidels were under no obligation to convert.59

The other religious benefit of the Egypt Plan that was discernible in the “Regi Christianissimo” – namely that it would bring about peace in Christian Europe – is also to be found in the “Justa Dissertatio”. There it is prefaced by Leibniz drawing a very bleak picture of what would be likely to happen if France were to invade Holland as planned: because of the pre-existing alliances and sympathies between its member states, Leibniz suggests that Europe would likely be split into two great factions, with England, Portugal, Sweden and some of the German territories supporting the French, and Spain, Denmark and other German territories siding with Holland.60 The prospect was that of a long, bloody and ultimately unwinnable war that would pitch Christian nation against Christian nation. In contrast with this, a war against the Turks “is rightly in the interest of France, Austria, Italy, Spain, England, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, the Empire, Europe, and the Church”,61 such that “the interests of Christian Europe can be put in harmony with the interests of France”.62 Holland would be the lone exception to this unified front, because an invasion of Egypt would threaten her trading interests in the East. Consequently, should France invade Egypt, her actions would win approval from almost the whole of Christian Europe, with only the Dutch expected not to rally behind the French, which Leibniz suggested would be no great loss given the poor reputation of the Dutch among other European nations. Hence Leibniz writes, “The invasion of Egypt would be fatal to the Turks, and would be applauded by Christians, so long as the Dutch alone are dispossessed”.63 and as such “the expedition against the Turks will be regarded not as satisfying its [France’s] own particular desires but as being for the benefit of Christianity”.64 Peace in Christian Europe would therefore be the likely outcome of the execution of the Egypt Plan.

All this is familiar from the “Regi Christianissimo”. Yet in the “Justa Dissertatio” a further religious benefit of the Egypt Plan can be found, namely that the invasion would lead to the close co-operation of Christians of different nationalities and sects, not just within Europe, but also in Africa and even Asia. Here, Leibniz envisions Christians across the Turkish Empire rising up against their oppressors, and consequently assisting the French against the infidel.65 This was not token assistance either, as Leibniz believed that Christians formed at least a third of the Turkish Empire of his day.66 He explains that the French troops which seized Cairo would be supported by the local Christians, “who fill at least half of the city”.67 Moreover, once the invasion is complete, “Christians subject to the Turks, along with neighbouring Ethiopians, Numidians, and Arabs hostile to the Turks, will join with us”.68

Developing the theme, Leibniz goes into considerable detail identifying Christian populations in the wider region, e.g., in Bulgaria, Greece, Bosnia, as well as in the East, such as in Syria, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan, etc., presenting them as likely allies to the French.69 He explains, for example, that the Christians in Albania – although belonging to a different branch of Christianity – would follow the French in rising up against the Turks.70 The picture Leibniz paints, then, is of a potential Christian army spread across mainland Europe, Africa and Asia that just needed the catalyst of a French invasion of Egypt to band together and fight as one. Although the thought that a French invasion of Egypt would trigger widespread co-operation and collaboration among Christians, both of Europe and the East, is a motif that recurs throughout the “Justa Dissertatio”, it is not a traditional theme in the Christian holy war tradition, and may even be peculiar to Leibniz. While it was not uncommon for Christian authors who called for holy war with the Turks to mention
Christian populations in Turkish lands, they typically did so in order to call for the liberation of these populations rather than see them as potential recruits to a broad Christian army.

3. **Breviarium**

We turn now to the final document of the Egypt Plan, the “Breviarium”, which was written in the summer of 1672, for Leibniz’s employer in Mainz, Baron Christian von Boineburg. At the time of writing, France had already been at war with Holland for several months. Nevertheless, in the “Breviarium” Leibniz presents the same plan as had been laid out in the “Justa Dissertatio”, albeit in abbreviated form, for the “Breviarium” is around only one-eighth of the length of the “Justa Dissertatio”. In producing this summary, Leibniz had to omit many details and claims found in the larger document, but chose not to compromise on the discussion of the religious benefits of the plan, or at least the proto-ecumenical ones, which are even more apparent in the “Breviarium” because they occupy a much greater percentage of the text than they had in the earlier, lengthier documents which outlined the same plan. But while the religious benefits are retained in the “Breviarium”, the way in which they are presented is considerably different from what we find in either the “Regi Christianissimo” or “Justa dissertatio”. Whereas those documents had made much of the importance and virtue of utterly ruining the Turks, this thinking is much less apparent in the “Breviarium”. There, Leibniz states only that the Turks’ failure to move the seat of their Empire from Constantinople to Cairo could be seen as “providence willing that a channel remain open to Christians to undermine the [Turkish] Empire”.

Instead, large parts of the “Breviarium” are devoted to the more koinonical or proto-ecumenical elements familiar from the “Justa Dissertatio”. Thus having laid out the plan for the conquest of Egypt, Leibniz goes on to outline the assistance France could expect from Christians in the Turkish Empire who “will unite for the success of such great affairs”. He tells of a great number of Christians in Constantinople, Cairo, Jerusalem and Smyrna, and all across the regions of Mesopotamia and Medea, who would not dare act by themselves in spite of their subjugation by the Turks, but would follow a strong leader. In addition, Leibniz identifies a large number of Christians living in the wooded, forest and mountain regions of Armenia, Cappadocia and Syria, such as the Maronites and the Kurds, and suggests that these could be potential allies too. He tells also of large numbers of Christians living in Peloponnesia, Albania, and Bulgaria, but like their brethren living under Turkish rule, they lack a strong leader to take on the Turks.

Having outlined the assistance France could expect across Africa and Asia, Leibniz then outlines the allies France could expect in Europe if she were to turn her sights to Egypt: the Holy Roman Emperor, Leopold I, would support an invasion of Egypt as he had already fought against the Turks himself (in the Austro-Turkish war of 1663-1664); Poland would probably assist France as it had been menaced by the Turks, and Russia would follow the Poles; Portugal would offer assistance and Spain would approve of the plan once she realized France’s ambitions; Sweden and Italy would be supportive, as would the Pope, and Leibniz again suggests that the House of Austria could act in concert with France.

Having made the case that the plan would lead to peace in Europe, near the end of the “Breviarium” Leibniz writes, “What war is more just than a holy war? It is undertaken for the good of the human race, for the progress of the Christian religion, the liberation of the wretched who beg for our help” and at stake is “the salvation of a million souls”. In the “Justa Dissertatio” these thoughts are presented as corollaries of destroying the Turkish Empire, but in the “Breviarium” they are not; in fact, Leibniz does not elaborate on them further. With its long passages devoted to showing the benefits of the plan in bringing together the Christian nations of Europe and Christian populations outside Europe, and paucity of remarks about destroying the Turkish Empire, the general tone of the “Breviarium” is much more koinonical than its
predecessors. Indeed, if we read the “Breviarium” alongside these earlier documents, we might be inclined to suppose that, while Leibniz was clearly still happy to refer to the Egypt Plan as a holy war, his grounds for thinking it holy were now based more on the plan’s koinonical potential than its promise to crush the Turks.

4. From holy war to ecumenism

In the three principal texts in which Leibniz outlines his Egypt Plan, then, we can discern a clear trajectory vis-à-vis its religious beneﬁts. In the first text, the “Regi Christianissimo” (December 1671), Leibniz argues that the plan would enhance the glory of Christianity through the defeat of its foe, as well as secure peace in Christian Europe. In the second text, the “Justa Dissertatio” (March 1672), he repeats and elaborates both of these claims, while also adding that the plan would bring about cooperation between Christians all over the globe. In the third text, the “Breviarium” (summer 1672), he says little about the virtues of destroying the infidel, but a great deal about how the plan would bring about peace in Christian Europe and lead to widespread collaboration and cooperation of Christians elsewhere. The koinonical elements thus become more pronounced in each document. On the surface, it looks as though Leibniz increasingly came to realize and value the koinonical potential of the Egypt Plan over the months he spent working on it, and accordingly lay greater and greater stress on it.

Needless to say, this conclusion is reached by taking Leibniz’s remarks about religious beneﬁts at face value, treating them as faithful representations of his own (evolving) beliefs. Whatever initial appeal this might have, such an approach is surely highly problematic, not least because the diplomatic aims of the Egypt Plan may have prompted Leibniz to make claims that were not his own, in an effort to ensure the plan would be warmly received by the French king. Patrick Riley takes this line when he writes:

A strange piece, the Consilium Aegyptiacum! It wavers between antique violence and Christian charity in a way that can be explained only by its immediate practical purpose – to flatter Louis XIV into imitating Alexander [the Great] while not completely forgetting Christ. 77

The dangers of taking the Egypt Plan as a reliable indicator of Leibniz’s views have been highlighted by Daniel J. Cook, who points out that the plan contains a number of bigoted remarks about the Dutch which are not found elsewhere in Leibniz’s work. 78 This suggests, according to Cook, that Leibniz was prepared to make claims he himself did not accept in order to ingratiate himself with the French King, whom Leibniz could reasonably expect to harbour anti-Dutch sentiment given his desire to invade Holland. This might make us wonder whether the claimed religious beneﬁts of the Egypt Plan were cut from the same cloth, that is, whether they were woven into the plan only in order to increase Louis’s receptiveness to the proposal contained therein.

There is some evidence that this may have been the case. When writing the Egypt Plan Leibniz certainly assumed Louis’s piety, and sought to exploit it. Nowhere is this clearer than in the text “On the best advice that can be given to the most powerful king in the present circumstances” (January 1672), which is written in the form of a narrative, and was most likely intended as an inspiring postscript to the “Justa Dissertatio” (in the end, Leibniz decided to use an inspiring poem as a postscript instead). 79 The story begins with Louis and his ministers debating the political/military/economic rationale for invading Holland. Realizing that the risks of a Dutch war are great, Louis postpones the discussion, and wanders into a church dedicated to his crusading ancestor, Saint Louis. Inspired by the example set by his ancestor, Louis decides to make a vow to God to use his power for the benefit of Christendom and the salvation of the human race. That same night, Louis dreams that he is commanding a fleet of ships against the Dutch but, before he can
engage them, a storm tosses him out on the open sea. His boat then drifts, until eventually arriving at a distant land. On the shore, Louis meets a strangely dressed old man, who tells him that God has directed him there. The old man explains that previous attempts to conquer this land were unsuccessful, but that a fresh attempt would be propitious because it would have heaven’s blessing. The name of the land is not given, but from the description a seventeenth-century reader would easily identify it as Egypt. When writing this curious document, Leibniz clearly assumed that Louis’s piety was sufficiently strong that it could motivate an invasion of Egypt, if only Louis could be convinced that the invasion was desired by God, and carrying it out would be an act of piety. The story was designed to do just that. Although Leibniz elected not to use it in the “Justa Dissertatio”, he did employ similar devices, for example describing the Egyptian enterprise as holy and just and in accordance with God’s will, all of which could be expected to inflame a reader of great piety, as Leibniz believed Louis to be.

In a similar vein, in the “Justa Dissertatio” we find Leibniz suggesting that should Louis be successful in his efforts against the Turks, “The golden age of Christianity will return, and we shall draw near to the primitive Church. And we shall begin the most true millennium, without all the folly of the Fifth Monarchists.” As Cook and Strickland have noted, the millenarian thinking here is not to be found in any of Leibniz’s other writings, before the Egypt Plan or after, though one would expect it to be if Leibniz possessed any millenarian sympathies himself. They therefore conclude that:

Leibniz’s extravagant claim about Louis instigating (or at least hastening) the onset of the millennium was a calculated one, intended to ensure a warm reception for the Egypt plan from a man who might reasonably be expected to respond to promises of glory (and in a sense immortality) by playing a key role not just in earthly history, but cosmic history.

There is little doubt, then, that some of the texts were written to appeal to – and exploit – Louis’s piety and presumed religious leanings. As such, it is tempting to conclude that Leibniz’s claims regarding the religious benefits of war were made merely to motivate Louis to execute the plan, rather than as genuine reflections of Leibniz’s own views and leanings. I suggest, however, that we would be entitled to such a conclusion only once we have considered the different kinds of religious benefit that Leibniz identifies, and determined the extent to which these cohere with the views found in Leibniz’s broader oeuvre. Such an analysis will show that while some of the claimed religious benefits arguably do not coincide with Leibniz’s own views (namely his call to defeat the Turks in a holy war), others do (namely the koinonical or proto-ecumenical claims about securing peace in Europe and fostering cooperation among Christians worldwide). Demonstrating this will be the task of the remainder of the paper.

As we will recall, in the “Regi Christianissimo” and “Justa Dissertatio” (and to a much lesser extent the “Breviarium”), Leibniz stressed the importance of destroying the Turks. The first question we should ask is whether it is reasonable to think that in the “Regi Christianissimo” and “Justa Dissertatio”, texts that were intended for Louis, Leibniz deliberately sought to emphasize the aim of destroying the Turks because that is precisely what he thought would motivate Louis into executing the plan? I submit that it is. As it happens, Leibniz had grounds to suppose that Louis harboured animosity towards the Turks. For Louis had been happy to take up arms against them when it suited him: in 1664, when Emperor Leopold asked him for assistance against the Turks in Hungary, Louis provided 4000 foot soldiers, and 2000 on horse. Leibniz was well aware of this, making an explicit reference to it in the “Regi Christianissimo” (“Some time ago Your Majesty adopted nobler plans […] by sending auxiliary forces into Hungary”). Plausibly, then, Leibniz’s suggestion that the Turks should be destroyed was motivated by an unfortunate overestimation of the King’s animosity towards the Turks, an overestimation based on Louis’s willingness to engage them in a limited fashion almost a decade beforehand.
As confirmation of this, we should note that nowhere else in his voluminous writings did Leibniz suggest that the Turks should be destroyed. He did from time to time express the desire that European powers engage the Turks on the battlefield, though these appeals were made when the Turkish threat to Europe was at its greatest (for example, during the siege of Vienna in 1683).\(^4\) Moreover, his remarks at these times were motivated by a desire to stop the threat to Europe rather than by a desire to wipe out an entire religion and its peoples; hence he never suggests that offensive action be taken against the Turks in their own territories, only that defensive action be taken to protect European lands. And at the times when the Turkish threat had receded, Leibniz did not call for military action against them at all. Indeed, as others have noted, in peacetime, Leibniz emphasized his universalistic belief that all humans – Turks included – were made in God’s image,\(^5\) a belief that in 1697 led him to describe himself as “neither a phil-Hellene nor a philo-Roman but a phil-anthropos”,\(^6\) that is, as someone who loves all human beings. So far as we can glean from Leibniz’s broader oeuvre, then, it seems he did not personally desire the destruction of the Turks, or that a holy war be fought against them.

We might plausibly suppose from this that the “Regi Christianissimo” and “Justa Dissertatio” were pitched as a holy war because Leibniz felt that such language could stir Louis’s passions and spur him to invade Egypt. But as we have seen, the religious benefits identified in those texts had distinct koinonical or proto-ecumenical elements as well. Were these also included to make the proposal appealing to Louis, or are they more plausibly a reflection of Leibniz’s own tastes and predilections? In this case, the latter seems most likely.

Certainly there is little reason to suppose that Leibniz would have considered Louis to have strong koinonical or ecumenical leanings, not least because of the French king’s persecutions both of the Jansenists and the Protestants throughout the 1660s, which were widely known outside of France.\(^7\) Moreover, the proto-ecumenism discernible in the Egypt Plan accords with that to be found in Leibniz’s other work. Although his ecumenical activities are well known, they are worth rehearsing in brief. In the years preceding the composition of the Egypt Plan, Leibniz had been working on a project, the “Catholic Demonstrations” (1669–1671) that was designed to show the central doctrines of Christianity “to be thoroughly holy and thoroughly rational”,\(^8\) making it a truly universal religion acceptable to all humans qua rational creatures.\(^9\) If successful, the “Catholic Demonstrations” would have had the potential to unite all Christians, philosophically and doctrinally, and thus eliminate sectarianism. Leibniz revisited the project in the late 1670s and again in the mid-1680s.\(^10\) From the 1680s onwards he contributed to the church reunification efforts which sought to unite Catholic and Protestant. Leibniz’s input in the reunion effort was initially limited to behind-the-scenes advising and counselling, and attempting to generate support for the enterprise through his acquaintances and correspondents. But as efforts floundered, he took on a more active role in the 1690s, pressing the case for reunion through his correspondences with Paul Pelisson (1624–1693), the court historian of Louis XIV, and the Bishop of Meaux, Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627–1704). From 1697 to 1706 Leibniz was engaged in talks aimed at reuniting the Lutheran and Reformed churches, which he saw as involving mutual civic understanding, then ecclesiastical toleration, and finally doctrinal agreement.\(^11\) And in the last decade of his life, Leibniz directed his ecumenical impulses eastwards, seeing the opportunity of a religious meeting ground between Christian Europe and the peoples of both China and Russia.\(^12\) Thus whenever he saw the opportunity to do so, Leibniz keenly promoted ecumenism in various ways, both before the composition of the Egypt Plan, and long after.

Put in this context, then, the proto-ecumenical sentiments Leibniz espouses in various documents of the Egypt Plan reflect a consciousness on the issue that flowered often throughout his career, both before and after the composition of the Egypt Plan.\(^13\) And it is testimony to the strength of his ecumenical impulses that he managed to give a proto-ecumenical twist to what might seem, on the surface, a project that would afford scant opportunity for one. This would
suggest that even if the principal motivation for the Egypt Plan was to divert Louis from war with Holland, it is unlikely to have been the only motivation that Leibniz had for advocating the plan during the time in which he did so.

We have reason to doubt, then, the oft-peddled view that the religious benefits Leibniz identified in the Egypt Plan were nothing more than cynical flourishes added merely to motivate Louis to execute the plan; while that is surely true of one of the claimed benefits (namely ruining the Turks), it is not true of the others (namely peace in Christian Europe, and co-operation of Christians across the world). In fact, the inclusion of these latter benefits seems not to have been made with Louis in mind at all, as Leibniz could not reasonably have expected the French king to be sympathetic to them. They are therefore better thought of as genuine reflections of Leibniz’s own views and leanings.

5. Concluding remarks

By way of a conclusion, it is worth noting that in scholarly discussions of the Egypt Plan, commentators often focus on the “Justa Dissertatio”. This is understandable inasmuch as it is the lengthiest account of the plan, as well as the document Leibniz intended to present to Louis in Paris. But in terms of a more faithful reflection of Leibniz’s own views, it would be better to focus on the “Breviariurn”, the one text not written for the French king. This is because the “Breviarium” is Leibniz’s summary of a diplomatic project rather than a diplomatic project itself, and as such is free of the histrionics and artifice of the “Regi Christianissimo” and “Justa Dissertatio”. For instance, in the “Breviariurn” Leibniz makes no scurrilous remarks about the Dutch, or says anything about Louis instigating the second coming. Moreover, the presentation of the plan is much more muted in tone in the “Breviariurn”. To illustrate, consider the matter of glory. Leibniz was well aware of Louis’s desire for glory (indeed, glory obtained through conquest), and in the “Justa Dissertatio” – addressed to Louis – he seeks to exploit this very overtly.\textsuperscript{94} Hence in that work Leibniz tells Louis that success in Egypt would make him “Emperor of the East”;	extsuperscript{95} which would increase his power over the Pope. Leibniz also tells Louis that if the Egypt Plan were prosecuted successfully, it would win him immortal glory in the manner of Alexander the Great\textsuperscript{96} and would very probably lead him to be elevated to the sainthood, putting him on a par with his crusading ancestor Louis IX (1214–1270), who was later canonized (“Hereafter, the name of Louis will be destined for holy kings, and pious posterity will honour the same name twice”).\textsuperscript{97} The “Justa Dissertatio” was therefore written with the King’s predilections squarely in mind. In the “Breviariurn”, however, Leibniz says nothing about Louis winning immortal glory, becoming Emperor of the East, or joining the ranks of the saints. He does explicitly acknowledge that “The [French] King strives for the glory of a great prince”\textsuperscript{98}, but says little about what this glory would amount to, noting only that one benefit of following the plan would be its “paving the way to posterity for the Most Christian King himself, for Alexandrian exploits”.\textsuperscript{99} Needless to say, the reason Leibniz played up the promise of glory and titles in the “Justa Dissertatio” and downplayed it in the “Breviariurn” was because the former document was addressed to Louis and the latter was not.

The difference in tone and content between the “Regi Christianissimo” and “Justa Dissertatio” on the one hand, and the “Breviariurn” on the other, means that the “Breviariurn” is probably as close as we can get to seeing Leibniz’s Egypt Plan as he saw it in his own mind, without the adornments added for Louis’s benefit. This is no minor point either, for as we have seen, in relation to the other texts the “Breviariurn” lays greater stress on the koinonical (i.e., proto-ecumenical) aspects of the Egypt Plan and downplays destroying the Turks. Thus to suppose that the “Breviariurn” is a better reflection of Leibniz’s own views and predilections than the texts written for Louis reinforces our conclusion that Leibniz was much more personally committed to the proto-ecumenical religious benefits of the Egypt Plan than he was the idea of ruining the Turks.
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Notes
1. This is sometimes referred to as the Consilium Aegyptiacum [Egyptian Plan], though this is not the title of any of the documents that together comprise the plan. It is, however, the subtitle of the final document, the “Breviarium”; see Leibniz, Sämtliche schriften und briefe, Series 4, Vol. 1, 383. The Akademie editors use the title Consilium Aegyptiacum to refer to the whole series of documents in which Leibniz develops and articulates the Egypt Plan; see ibid., 215.
2. The plan was composed by Leibniz under the auspices of his patron at the Mainz court, Johann Christian von Boineburg. It is likely that Schönborn was unaware of it. See Thompson, Lothar Franz von Schönborn, 52.
3. For details of the build-up to the war, see Sonnino, Louis XIV.
5. Saouma, “Leibniz et l’idée,” 112. See also Fenves, “Imagining an inundation,” 76; Haran, Le Lys, 303; Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit, 30; Jordan, The Reunion, 29; Manuel and Manuel, Utopian Thought, 394, 405; Partner, God of Battles, 207; Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence, 246.
6. The best evidence for the diversion hypothesis is circumstantial, namely the timing of the composition of the Egypt Plan, since work on it began immediately after the court of Mainz was informed of France’s intention to invade Holland in the spring of 1672. The best written evidence for the diversion hypothesis comes not from the Egypt Plan itself, or even any of the papers or letters written over the time in which it was composed, but from an earlier document, the “Securitas publica”. This piece was written in August 1670, following a meeting the previous month between the Archbishops of Mainz and Trier in order to discuss the threat posed by France and to formulate a strategy for maintaining peace in Europe. Leibniz was present at this meeting also, and offered his thoughts on the matter in the “Securitas publica”, which recommended European powers unite to wage war on common enemies such as the Turks. In this document, Leibniz envisaged the French contributing to the European cause by invading Egypt. See Leibniz, Sämtliche schriften und briefe, Series 4, Vol. 1, 166–7. It should be noted, however, that those who endorse the diversion hypothesis often do not put forward any evidence for it.
7. E.g., “If Egypt were invaded, the war would be in character, acclamation, and consequence, a holy war”. Leibniz, Sämtliche schriften und briefe, Series 4, Vol. 1, 274. All translations in this paper are my own.
8. Almond, The History of Islam, 16. Almond draws this conclusion on the basis of the (apparent) lack of religious content in the main body of the Egypt Plan: “The Consilium Aegyptiacum is a treatise which begins with a promise to Christianise the East, ends with the declaration that ‘never was God’s honour and our own more narrowly intertwined’, and spends large amounts of text in between describing naval facilities, army sizes, grain stores and trade routes”. What Almond presents here, however, is a gross caricature of the Egypt Plan, ignoring as it does the frequent comments about religion found therein. Moreover, Almond seems to imply that the stated religious aims of the plan should be taken less seriously, or given less credence, because of the plan’s detailed strategic and mercantile elements. But what Almond overlooks is that it was commonplace for solemn calls to holy war to focus on such things. To give just one example, Torsello’s fourteenth-century work, Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis, which calls for a new crusade, devotes most of its space not to a case for the holiness of the endeavour but instead to the military strategy needed to prosecute it successfully. See Torsello, The Book.
9. “From a psychological point of view, the war with the infidels could be acceptable or even welcomed not only by the allies, but also by the enemies of France”. Budil, “Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz,” 77.
10. See Thayer, A Greek-English Lexicon, 352, where koinonia is defined as “fellowship, association, community, communion, joint participation, intercourse”.
13. Ibid., 242–6.
15. Ibid., 267–382.
Historically, of course, many of the Christian calls for holy wars with Muslims have been calls for what are now referred to as crusades. And some scholars have described Leibniz’s Egypt Plan as a crusade; for example Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit*, 30 and Riley, *Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence*, 246. However, such a description is problematic, in part because it is unclear what definition of “crusade” is being used, but also because Leibniz’s plan is a bad fit under any of the definitions that are taken seriously by historians. For example:

(1) The traditionalist account describes a crusade as an attempt to recover or defend Jerusalem. However, the Egypt Plan is focused squarely on Egypt, and does not suggest or even envisage any further incursions into the Holy Land, let alone Louis’s armies marching on from Egypt to take Jerusalem.

(2) The pluralist account describes a crusade as penitential war, undertaken as a pilgrimage, and initiated and authorized by the Pope. However, the Egypt Plan is designed to be launched by the French King, not the Pope (or any other recognized Church figure). While Leibniz thought the Pope would end up being supportive of Louis’s designs, he did not suggest that Louis seek the Pope’s permission or approval before invading Egypt. The notion of the expedition serving as a pilgrimage is also absent from Leibniz’s plan. Likewise, there is no penitential aspect to it: those taking part in Church-sponsored expeditions were typically granted the crusader indulgence, which offered a full remission of all sins they had already committed, thus enhancing their prospects of salvation; in the Egypt Plan, however, Leibniz does not mention any soteriological benefits accruing to the soldiers of the French army for their invasion of Egypt.

(3) The popularist account describes a crusade in eschatological terms, as an attempt to hasten Christ’s return, which was driven by great religious fervour, usually of the poorer classes. Interestingly, Leibniz does on occasion describe the Egypt Plan in eschatological terms, writing that if the plan is successful, “The golden age of Christianity will return, and we shall draw near to the primitive Church. And we shall begin the most true millennium, without all the folly of the Fifth Monarchists”. Leibniz, *Sämtliche schriften und briefe*, Series 4, Vol. 1, 380. However, while Leibniz undeniably avails himself of millenarian language here, there are grounds to think that he did not do so sincerely. I shall consider this passage again in Section 4, and show that it is most likely a sop to Louis’s desire for glory and immortality than it is a reflection of Leibniz’s belief about what would happen should the French be successful in a campaign against the Turks.

Consequently, we should be wary of describing the Egypt Plan as a crusade. It is also worth noting that Leibniz never once describes the Egypt Plan as a crusade. For more details of the various definitions of “crusade”, and the problems associated with them, see Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, 1–23.

31. Ibid., 221.
32. Ibid., 221.
33. Ibid., 224.
34. See the two different accounts of Urban II’s speech in *Sources for the History*, 338 and 340. Note that these accounts were written several years after the speech they claim to record, and so may not be reliable.
35. Translation from Schroeder, *Disciplinary Decrees*, 295.
36. See Dubois, *De recuperatione terre sancte*, 3.
37. See Newton, *A Notable Historie*, preface (no page number).
40. Ibid., 273–9.
41. Ibid., 279–367.
42. Ibid., 368–76.
43. Ibid., 376–8.
44. Ibid., 378–82.
45. Egypt was often identified as an important target; from the beginning of the thirteenth century onwards, every plan to defeat the Muslims in the east proposed that they must first be defeated in Egypt.
47. Ibid., 310.
48. Ibid., 379.
49. Ibid., 279.
50. Ibid., 279.
51. Ibid., 379.
52. Ibid., 379.
53. Ibid., 272.
54. See, for example, ibid., 267 and 274.
55. See *Sources for the History*, 338.
58. See Partner, *God of Battles*, 89–90 and 177.
61. Ibid., 367.
62. Ibid., 371.
63. Ibid., 360.
64. Ibid., 369.
65. Ibid., 336.
66. Ibid., 333.
67. Ibid., 297.
68. Ibid., 307.
69. Ibid., 335.
70. Ibid., 337.
71. It was finished in November 1672, and sent to Boineburg on 11 November. See Leibniz, *Sämtliche schriften und briefe*, Series 1, Vol. 1, 286.
73. Ibid., 393.
74. Ibid., 393.
75. Ibid., 395–8.
76. Ibid., 399.
77. Riley, Leibniz’ *Universal Jurisprudence*, 250. Going even further, Paul Ritter once warned that “one should be cautious before utilizing Leibniz’s political writings as sources for his views”. Ritter, *Leibniz’ Aegyptischer Plan*, 149, note 2.
80. See Ibid., 240.
81. Ibid., 380.
83. Leibniz, *Sämtliche schriften und briefe*, Series 4, Vol. 1, 223. In *Instructions pour le Dauphin*, based on Louis’s own memoires and sometimes even attributed to the King himself, Louis reveals that he was no admirer of the Turks, believing them to have unpolished manners. See Louis XIV, *Oeuvres de Louis XIV*, 168. However, Leibniz would not have had access to this text, which was first published decades after Louis’s death.
84. See, for example, Leibniz, *Political Writings*, 121–45.
87. Any faint hopes Leibniz may have entertained about Louis’s desire to act in the interests of Christendom were surely dashed by the French king’s continued aggression towards Germany and the Netherlands even when the Turks – whom Leibniz thought a more obvious enemy – were threatening to take Vienna. See Leibniz’s bitterly satirical work *Mars Christianissimus* [Most Christian War-God], written in 1683 at the height of the Turkish siege of Vienna: Leibniz, *Political Writings*, 121–45.

89. For the texts of this project, see Leibniz, *Sämtliche schriften und briefe*, Series 6, Vol. 1, 489–559.
93. But perhaps with this key difference: with their focus on minimizing or eliminating doctrinal disagreements, virtually all of Leibniz’s ecumenical projects had the aim of getting Christians to *think* together. However, as I have construed it, one of the aims of the Egypt Plan was to get Christians to *work* together. The Egypt Plan may thus be a read as promoting Christian unity through *actio* rather than *doctrina*.
94. As did Boineburg in fact, when first mentioning the plan to Louis XIV in a letter addressed directly to him. See Leibniz, *Sämtliche schriften und briefe*, Series 1, Vol. 1, 249.
96. Ibid., 267, 279.
97. Ibid., 380.
98. Ibid., 398.
99. Ibid., 383.

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