CONSTRUCTIVE MEMORY AND DISTRIBUTED COGNITION: TOWARDS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK

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1. INTERDISCIPLINARITY IN THE SCIENCES OF MEMORY

Memory is studied at a bewildering number of levels, with a vast array of methods, and in a daunting range of disciplines and subdisciplines. Is there any sense in which these various memory theorists – from neurobiologists to narrative psychologists, from the computational to the cross-cultural – are studying the same phenomena?

In this exploratory position paper, I sketch the bare outline of a positive framework for understanding current work on constructive remembering, both within the various cognitive sciences, and across gulls between the cognitive and the social sciences. I preprint some lines of psychological theory and research which offer promising and compatible ways of thinking about individual memory and shared, social, or collective memory simultaneously. These are obviously ambitious projects, and this paper seeks more to elicit help in forging these connections than to present firm results. The aim is to draw out some consequences of empirical work on social memory and in developmental psychology.

I seek to integrate constructive memory with some broader movements in the cognitive sciences which can be called the "distributed cognition" framework. "Distributed cognition" labels a loose coalition of ideas from developmental psychology, cognitive anthropology, dynamical systems theory, robotics, and neuropsychology, ideas which have been influentially synthesized and extended by the philosopher Andy Clark (1997, 2001). As I acknowledge below, various strands of work in the psychology of memory have long been influenced, directly or indirectly, by theoretical and empirical ancestors of present ideas on distributed cognition, so the possibility of this integrative work should not be too surprising. But current research on constructive remembering has not yet been explicitly linked with this new consensus about distributed cognition. Constructive memory offers a rich domain and a vast fund of data to distributed cognition theorists, while distributed cognition may prove a useful forum through which constructive memory theorists can anchor their work in the broader cognitive sciences.

The mind, on the distributed cognition perspective, is not only embodied (in brain and body) and embedded (in a natural and social world), but is also extended beyond the boundaries of skin and skull. Much of our cognitive life depends on our abilities to construct and exploit what Clark calls "designer environments". For particular present purposes we characterize them temporally coupled systems, both with other agents and with non-biological resources: what's striking about human brains is that they "make the world smart so that we can be at peace" (Clark 1997, p.180, section 2 below).

In arguing that there are some strikingly convergent ideas in recent work on constructive memory and on distributed cognition, I'm not of course suggesting that every aspect of the cognitive psychology or the neuropsychology of memory can be helpfully recast in these terms. But I do think that both research areas independently encourage work which bridges individual and social memory, again both within the subdisciplines of psychology, and between psychology and the social sciences.

The idea is not, implausibly, to enforce a unified theory of memory along classical reductionist lines, but instead to delineate an integrated framework within which different memory-related phenomena can be understood. This is an exercise in descriptive (rather than prescriptive) philosophy of science, intended to systematize and elucidate existing loci of contact between subdisciplines, and to clarify key concepts whose empirical and theoretical basis already spans multiple levels of explanation.

Scientists working at "subpersonal" levels, investigating neural mechanisms of memory, or constructing better models of memory systems, tend to display either a respectful neutrality towards social science, or active disdain at its perceived anti-naturalism. Neuroscientists' rhetoric suggests that bridges between humanities and sciences will come from the bottom up, via the "molecular and cognitive study of memory" (Squire and Kandel 1999, p.215). Some who study "social" levels, in turn, think of cognitive and neuro-psychology as important but irrelevant, or as irretrievably marred by individualism or reductionism. Others puzzle over the unity of the phenomena of memory: Susan Engel notes that "in recent years the topic of memory has become so popular, it seems both ubiquitous and yet oddly invisible. People glide seamlessly from a discussion of childhood recollections to national memories, as if they were part of the same phenomenon" (1999, p.viii). Recent cross-disciplinary gatherings (Schacter 1995; Fara and Patterson 1998; Schacter and Scarry 2000) have succeeded more in helpfully juxtaposing excellent work from different disciplinary domains than in actively fusing concepts, methods, or results.

Psychologists of memory are increasingly aware of the need for empirically-sensitive synthetic overviews of the field. Clarity is to be sought not through detailed armchair evaluation of experimental work, but in careful immersed engagement with selected areas of the contributing sciences. Eidel Tulving, recommending new attention to conceptual clarity, recently complained that "our research community as a whole does not perceive much value in conceptual analysis; there is no promise of social reinforcement for any single individual who might be attracted to the enterprise" (2000, p.34). If we see interdisciplinarity and specialization not as competitors but as "mutually reinforcing strategies" for retaining flexibility and diversity in knowledge production (Weingart 2000, p.40; cf. Sterber 2003), then the identification and analysis of concepts which already fall across current disciplinary boundaries should provide one minor role for philosophers in the division of research labour on memory.

The subpersonal and the social

More specific needs for new ways of dealing with subpersonal and social aspects of memory at once are identified in two papers in the recent special issue of Memory on the functions of autobiographical memory. In his contribution, Martin Conway wonders how the work described in that issue on the self, social, and directive functions of autobiographical memory can be integrated with other highly productive current research on the relevant "cognitive-affective mechanisms and processes" which are "more internal to the entire system" (Conway 2003, p.223): we must seek a "unified account" to deal simultaneously with these subpersonal factors and with issues of the overt "use of memories in everyday life". So Conway is asking, firstly, for better integration of empirical methods and findings across the relevant subdisciplines of psychology; and, secondly, for better theoretical frameworks for thinking about mixed subpersonal, personal, and social levels of explanation simultaneously.

1 This hope for a unified account clearly sets a more productive agenda than any assumption that social and subpersonal work must be in competition. It is equally welcome that Conway dismisses the idea that models of memory must be either correspondence or cohere theories (2003, p.222).
As Schachter and his colleagues have themselves demonstrated, of course, neither 'accuray' nor 'reliability' is a transparent notion in this context, and 'truth' in memory, though not forever inaccessible, is neither a single nor a simple thing. I cite two general themes from work of the last ten years which I will then echo in outlining the distributed cognition framework.

Among the multiple causes driving even simple cases of remembering, psychologists increasingly focus on the context of recollection, rather than solely on encoding or on the nature of encoded traces. Contrary to some direct realists' assumptions, representational theories of memory do not have to assume that recall is fully determined by the nature of the stored representation. On Tulving's notion of 'synergetic expectancy', memory traces are "merely potential contributors to recollection": the engram is not the memory, and instead "the [current] cue and the engram combine" in any act of episodic remembering (Schacter 1996, pp.56-71, 105). As Susana Engel puts it, "one creates the memory at the moment one needs it, rather than merely pulling out an intact item, image, or story", so that specific features of any context of recall may be direct causes of the structural and format of the memory-as-retrieved (1999, p.6).

Secondly, cognitive psychologists have come to accept more flexible and dynamic pictures of long-term storage. This is partly due to the influence of connectionist or Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) models, but also to a rich array of empirical studies on misinformation, bias, and the role of schemas in memory. This internal plasticity is one of the main characteristic features of human memory, and one which clearly differentiates our cognitive systems from current digital computers. It's pretty useful for the contents of our files to remain exactly the same from the moment I close them at night to the moment I open them again in the morning. But various kinds of reorganization and realignment often happen to the information retained in my brain over the same period. And in certain contexts, particular individuals are significantly susceptible to suggestion, or to failures of source memory (Mitchell and Johnson 2000), even in relation to autobiographical memory (Hyman and Loftus 1998). Distortion and misattribution, as Schachter firmly argues, is not necessarily adaptive (1999, p.190); various memory errors sometimes result, for instance, from vital forms of generalization on the basis of similarity and theme which ‘may give rise to distortions as an inherent byproduct’ (McClelland 1995, p.547). Engel may overstate a little in writing that "it is the norm rather than the exception to be unable to distinguish between what happened, what you feel about what happened, and what others may have said about what happened" (1999, p.16). But the source monitoring framework at least suggests that understanding the conditions in which such confusions occur will require attention to a large range of motivational, social, affective, and temporal contextual factors which influence the mapping of information to source.

But a psychology which deals with such complex causal webs needs explicit accounts of the relations between inner and outer states such that cognitive psychology studies the individual in his social processes to be treated by the social sciences, hence looks harder to maintain. What are the routes for memory theory to move beyond skull and skin?

2. DISTRIBUTED COGNITION AND THE EXTENDED MIND

Although memory is an obvious example for theorists of distributed cognition, and the extended mind, few of them have sought to connect their claims with mainstream psychological research. This is partly due to the entrenchedness of this consensus, after the bitter controversies of the early 1990s over ecological versus laboratory approaches to memory, may have been the political and institutional climate over recovered memories in mid-1990s, which encouraged many academic psychologists to forget and some clear research programmes in constructive remembering by the late 1990s. Obviously, this speculation on the recent history of the discipline needs careful sociological and historical support.

4 This point is relevant to philosophical views on memory's role in maintaining continuity of personal identity over time. When many theories of identity scene agree in maintaining continuity of personal identity over time. When many theories of identity scene agree in maintaining continuity of personal identity over time. When many theories of identity scene agree in maintaining continuity of personal identity over time. When many theories of identity scene agree in maintaining continuity of personal identity over time. When many theories of identity scene agree in maintaining continuity of personal identity over time. When many theories of identity scene agree in maintaining continuity of personal identity over time. When many theories of identity scene agree in maintaining continuity of personal identity over time. When many theories of identity scene agree in maintaining continuity of personal identity over time. When many theories of identity scene agree in maintaining continuity of personal identity over time. When many theories of identity scene agree in maintaining continuity of personal identity over time. When many theories of identity scene agree in maintaining continuity of personal identity over time. When many theories of identity scene agree in maintaining continuity of personal identity over time. When many theories of identity scene agree in maintaining continuity of personal identity over time. When many theories of identity scene agree in maintaining continuity of personal identity over time. When many theories of identity scene agree in maintaining continuity of personal identity over time.
logical discussions (but see Rowlands 1999, chapter 6). Here I describe core claims of the distributed cognition framework in order to show that constructive memory exemplifies the approach. This will stretch the stage for a broader account of relations between individual and shared or social memory phenomena.

AndrY Clark writes that "we humans are natural born ecologries, fact-assembly and primed so as to participate in cognitive and computational architecture whose bounds far exceed those of skin and skull" (2001, p.138).

Many cognitive processes – writing an academic paper, finding my way around a complex environment, producing an abstract artwork – are hybrids, involving brain processes, bodily dynamics, and external resources such as notes, maps, and sketchpads². Cognitive depends on multiple loops between brain, body, and (physical and social) world. Focusing on the embodied skills needed for flexible and appropriate action, theorists of distributed cognition suggest that in particular contexts it is essential to learn on the technological or social resources of external symbol systems or other people (Hutchins 1995). So in some circumstances, things can have a cognitive life: notebooks, incised sticks, slide-rules, software down the fingers, public languages and other symbol systems, rituals and monuments, as well as friends or family members become components in a broader coupled systems, with cognitive tasks performed by the brain alone simplified and plugged in to this wider network.

² These distributed cognition claims have stronger and weaker versions, and both metaphrasal and methodological strands. Most philosophical discussion so far has focused on the metaphysical issue of whether cognitive processes "really" are partly external. But for present purposes the methodological claims defended by Clark, Rowlands, Harnad and others are sufficient: the best way to investigate and explain any cognitive processes, suggest, will be to understand the extended systems in which embodied brains are embedded. The best introduction to the field is Clark 1997, which also analyses relevant work in robotics which I don’t mention here. See also Clark and Chalmers 1998.

Even this rough sketch confirms the radical context-sensitivity of distributed or extended cognitive processes. Because we are skilled in locating and exploiting specific external resources for particular action-oriented processing, we do not need to hold full and detailed internal representations of all relevant aspects of the world: much information can be left out in the environment, as long as we are able to find the relevant scaffolding or symbol systems when required. Linked in various forms of ‘continuous reciprocal causation’, brain and world are often engaged in an ongoing interactive dance from which adaptive action results (Clark 1997, pp 163-6). Tim van Gelder explains the motivation for seeing genuinely cognitive processing as extending out of the skull: "since the nervous system, body, and environment are all constantly changing and simultaneously influencing each other, the true cognitive system is a single, unified system embracing all these. Interaction between the inner and the outer is a matter of coupling, such that both sets of processes continually influence each other’s direction of change" (van Gelder 1993, p.373). Further, the same stress on the plasticity of internal representation as we saw in the constructive memory framework is maintained here. It’s just because, as the connectionist maintains, isolated items are not stored distinctly and permanently in the brain that our relatively unstable biological memories are supplemented by more stable external scaffolding and props.

The idea that ‘external memory’ is neither merely metaphorical, nor a straightforward expression of more fundamental mental representations, does not rest on the idea that some external representations are identical to internal mental representations. Instead, the core idea is that quite disparate internal and external elements are simultaneously coopted into larger integrated systems, which have capacities distinct from those of either inner or outer elements alone. The external media on which we rely as cognitive scaffolding are, as Clark argues, "best seen as alien but complimentary to the brain’s style of storage and computation. The brain need not waste its time replicating such capacities. Rather, it must learn to interface with the external media in ways that maximally exploit their peculiar virtues" (1997, p.220). For example, our internal working memory, with its limited capacity and unreliability, is not duplicated in the various systems of 'exorgrams' which humans have produced: "rather the constantly moving and fading contents of biological working memory, the contents of this external-driven processor can be frozen in time, reviewed, refined, and reformatted" (Donald 1991, p.316).

This ‘complementarity’ argument opens the way to the idea that cognition is (at least) doubly distributed, across internal neural networks and across external artifacts and social groups. As sciences of the interface, theories of memory won’t legitimately stop at the boundaries of the individual. A general metaphysics of traces inside and outside the brain would not collapse the differences between internal and external representation and processing, but would offer a framework for investigating how our interactions with different forms of external social and information systems might affect the format and processing of individual memories.

But different external media for the storage, transmission, and transformation of information have their own peculiar virtues. The various kinds of memory scaffolding which humans have used, from knots, rings, codes, and sketches to artificial memory techniques, photographs, books, and computers each have different properties. The resources of the historic and social scientific community may again be included in cognitive science (Sutton 1998). While the enduring and expandable nature of many external symbol systems has indeed altered the informational environment in which brains develop, media theorists and cognitive anthropologists remind us that not all such systems are designed to hold information permanently in context- or medium-independent fashions, and that not all those systems which are-
3. CONSTRUCTIVE MEMORY AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY

In connectionist work on constructive memory in different contexts of reconstruction condition the constructed internal representation (McClelland and Rumelhart 1986, p.193; McClelland 1995, pp.69-70). How can the connectionist mechanisms of transformation and distortion on internal representations be set into a broader picture of the operation of personal memory as an intricate interpersonal and cultural world? Experience attunes us to certain information or regularities or artefacts which we can exploit for particular present purposes (Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton 1986). This is not to deny, as earlier Gibsonians realised about memory often did (Wilcox and Katz 1981; see Sutton 1998, pp.283-290), the importance of our capacity sometimes to remember experiences which are not retained in some external medium, but to suggest that we may only understand such capacities fully by attending also to our habitual uses of present resources on which to anchor our versions of the past. Cognitive scientists will not always be able legitimately to ignore the transmission and transformation of external representations, while (conversely) some explanations in the social sciences of memory will refer to appropriately flexible internal processes of schematicisation or reconstruction.

A autobiographical memory is thus a key domain for distributed cognition theorists. Our abilities to think about events which are not current, or the people and objects of long ago, show that mental life isn’t wholly determined by the current environment and the immediateness of the present moment. People who have the ability to think about the past can therefore suggest different ways to handle the present. This gives us a general motivation for postulating mental representations, with which to counter anti-representational proposals by radical enthusiasts of dynamical and distributed cognition. But the increasingly sophisticated analyses of the context of recollection in the psychology of autobiographical memory do list at the variety and significance of environmental and social framing triggers with which personal and action-oriented (in)ternal traces must coexist.

For a synthetic critical analysis of philosophical objections to memory representations see Sutton 2003a, section 2.

Bunt claims like these no doubt strike many psychologists as not simply anti-individualist, but as anti-cognitive: how can there be a cognitive science of memory which includes or even allows for such a displacement of explanatory relevance from the individual mind/brain to the natural or cultural world? But what should be questioned in this reaction is the assumption that information-processing commitments automatically rule out notions of external or collective memory. Some flagship work in distributed cognition explicitly requires broadly computational/representationalist assumptions: Edwin Hutchins’ influential analyses of the distributed processes of navigation on a modern ship, for example, rely on the possibility of tracing the flow and transformation of representations over a series of machines, media, and human agents (Hutchins 1995). Mainstream cognitive-scientific investigation into representational distortion and transmission is here simply being extended onwards.

Currently engaged in a detailed review of applications of notions of social and collective memory in history, sociology, and anthropology, I find much work which is entirely compatible with cognitive science, even if it might sometimes be improved by analysis in terms of memory systems or constructive remembering. Michael Schudson has classified forms of collective memory, arguing for distinctions between three kinds: socially mediated individual memories, cultural forms and artifacts which hold and interpret the past for social mediation, and individual memories which are transmitted from the cultural forms (1995; compare Zeitlin 1995, and the review by Olick and Robbins 1998). The main concern for a naturalist about this social-scientific work should not, I suggest, be the danger of seeing collective memory as floating free of individual actors, but rather the temptation to overinterpretize the form of the internal representations which construct and are permeated by collective memories. Hallwachs sometimes wrote like this, arguing for instance that one cannot think about the events of one’s past without discovering upon them” (1925/1992, p.53), and the powerful influence of Russian psychology on Anglophone developmental theory often has the same result (Balburt 1990). This is to project too quickly the format of external, expressed memories back inwards onto internal memory. But this linguistic-constructivist conception of mental representation, which is at odds with the post-connectionist cognitive science I’ve described, is not necessary: my memories can be called forth socially, moulded and formed by external influences, without having themselves to be, in their internal aspect, linguistic.
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One way to confirm this point is through an examination of the history of the concept of 'schema' in 20th-century psychology of memory. This reveals cognitive anthropologists and psychologists struggling to find a vocabulary for relations between internal and external memories which neither collapses the distinction nor sees the internal as simply the reflection of the social. When Bartlett imported the term into the field from neurophysiology, he worried about its implications of static: "I strongly dislike the term 'schema'. It is at once too definite and too sketchy. ... It suggests some persistent, but fragmentary 'form of arrangement', and it does not indicate what is very essential to the notion, that the organised mass results of past changes ... are actively doing something all the time' (1932, p.201; compare chapter 18 on Halfwachs). So a 'schema' is not, in one sense, a definite cognitive structure at all. For Bartlett, a schema has both a conservative and a creative aspect, tending both to homogenise or conventionalize the new, and to support innovations around established themes.

The concept of a schema need not imply a settled structure in order for it to play its required explanatory role. As an enduring but modifiable set of tendencies or dispositions, a schema may usefully be invoked to explain, for example, the way a story may be normalized in the remembering and retelling, with the schema driving easy inferences to uncertain or untold parts of the story. Cognitive-psychological accounts of the schema were implemented in connectionist models in the 1980s. The history of past processing is 'stored' in the (enabling but modifiable) matrix of interconnection weights of the neural network, and thus influences the processing of new and related input (Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland and Hinton 1986). Cognitive anthropologists have found this a useful way to model, simultaneously, both the centripetal forces of cultural reproduction and the competing centrifugal forces of variation and inconsistency. Claudio Strauss and Naomi Quinn, for example, employ the connectionist version of schema theory to show how cultural learning produces responses which are permeated by tradition and yet not rigidly repetitive. Remembering occurs on the spot, in a context, and yet can be guided (without being determined) by cultural identities. Cross-cultural argumentation empirically rejects a linguistic model of internal memory; it's easier to see that the traces culture leaves on and in individual brains and bodies are not downloaded copies of any specific cultural instructions, but rather flexible and particular action-oriented responses (Strauss and Quinn 1997, chapter 3).

The dynamics of interpersonal thoughts, feelings, and motives may be quite different from those of extrapersonal messages and practices, even if we deliberately focus attention on cases in which the boundaries between the two realms are permeable.

DISTRIBUTED COGNITION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY

I address, finally, a body of research close to the heart of the constructive memory framework. The developmental psychology of memory, especially the social-interactionist tradition on which my brief remarks here focus, should be of great interest to theoreists of distributed cognition; and in turn, the distributed cognition framework may offer developmental psychologists some useful pluralist tools for embarking their research in a broader cognitivistic scientific context.

Social-interactionists argue, in the extreme, that "early remaining begins as an interpersonal process and only becomes intrapersonal over time" (Engel 1999, p.27). They thus see the study of interpersonal dynamics, cultures, and narrative genre in the child's linguistic environment at the heart of the study of the origins of autobiographical memory. Children develop from using generic event memories implicitly, like scripts, to understand regular routines and generate expectations, to commanding perspectival temporal

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frameworks in which to locate memories of idiosyncratic events. Memory sharing practices initiated by adults encourage the idea of different perspectives on the same once-occupied time, which bind memories as objects for shared attention and negotiation (McCormack and Hoel 1999, pp.173-4). Following the Yogsonian inspiration for the distributed cognition framework, developmentalists look for traces left in more mature cognitive capacities by the idiosyncrasies of the particular trajectory across interpersonal scaffoldings which has been gradually internalised in development (Clark 1997, chapter 2). This is an enabling cultural sculpting of the child's mind, which runs alongside and is intimately tangled with the productive cultural shaping of their body, skills, and behaviour. In the case of memory, children start to talk and then think autobiographically in ways in which are shot through with their local narrative constructions (Fivush 1991; Nelson 1993; Nelson and Fivush 2000). Impressive empirical research, including recent cross-cultural work, shows how variations in narrative practices reappear in subjective idiosyncracies of early remembering, as children begin to be able to tell others about their past, and to develop a life history (Engel 1999, Macdonald, Unluşana, & Payne 2000, Waig 2001, Reese 2002a).

Intercultural issues in interpreting this flourishing research tradition arise in working out how to study longer-term effects of these individual and cultural variations on later autobiographical memory; and in understanding the precise role of language in shaping internal representations. Although Fivush, for example, occasionally writes as if the format of autobiographical memory is itself linguistic or language-like (1994, p.138), this is not essential to the social-interactionist tradition. The tradition might be better served by the distributed cognition theorists' idea of language as a public artifact which shapes and transforms quite different kinds of internal representations and computations (Clark 1997, chapter 10). The potential utility of this perspective is apparent when we ask how language, culture, and narrative genre interact with other relevant factors such as the development of a 'self-schema' and of meta-representational capacities. Some who stress these alternative perspectives see their work as in direct competition with the social-interactionist framework (Howe and Courage 1997, Perper 2000). Howe and Courage, for example, argue that the individual differences in autobiographical memory studied by social-interactionists are likely to be "related to maturation, not social or experiential, factors" (1997, p.515). Although other proponents of more 'internal' factors have taken a more pluralistic line (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000, p.279), and although some integrative models have been developed from within the social-interactionist tradition (Witche-Ross 1995; Reese 2002b), there is a need for positive unified accounts to show just how social and sub-personal factors might be entangled.

A key idea here from the distributed cognition literature is that regular routes often result from reciprocal interaction between different elements of extended developmental systems. Any 'inherence' of cognitive capacities would thus itself be extended (Griffiths and Stove 2000). Like the physical and social environments, narrative environments are usually reliably recurrent, within certain ranges, under normal conditions; the major cultural shifts in norms relating to autobiographical memory hinged at in Nelson's programme of grand historical narrative (2003) are then periods where, unusually, there have been sharper alterations in these narrative environments. So the idiosyncratic features of individual autobiographical memory are constructed anew in each generation, through complex interactions of many inner and external parameters. Reference to 'mate' or 'maturation' processes in the study of cognitive development is then little more than a promissory note for the future progress of developmental sciences of the interface (compare Griffiths 2001).

And an intriguing specific empirical application of this developmental systems framework to the case of autobiographical memory is suggested by some recent longitudinal studies. Harley and Reece (1999; compare Reese 2002b) claim that their evidence
shows the existence of different pathways to early autobiographical memory. Children who are early self-recognizers (according to the self-recognition tests described by Howe and Courage) may find their way to autobiographical memory in a fashion that is rather more independent of the linguistic environment. Late self-recognizers, in contrast, may need to use linguistic and narrative scaffolding more extensively to achieve similar autobiographical memory capacities. Self-recognition and parental reminiscence style, then, may predict different aspects of children’s talk about the past (Harley and Reese 1999, p.345).

Whatever the empirical facts of this particular pluralist idea, the general line of thought is highly suggestive. For some children more than others, early talk about the past shapes the particular ways in which thoughts about the past are gradually stabilized, rendered less dependent on context, and opened up for repeated inspection and manipulation. For them, the verbalization of thoughts about the past, either in family recounting or (later) in private inner speech, may change their content, as locally-available cognitive props and pivots come to anchor and structure the representational system. Integrative options for investigating such proposals might in future include neuroimaging studies to test specific developmental hypothesizes about the causal pathways of autobiographical memory acquisition; and cognitive neuropsychological case studies of specific patterns of breakdown in the relation between individual brains and the narrative environment.

While these proposals are as yet loose and over-general, they do at least illustrate how the aims of this paper might be put into practice. Like the case of social and collective memory, the example of the development of autobiographical memory, finally, suggests how constructive memory and distributed cognition share a range of theoretical commitments which can usefully be rendered more explicit. Secondly it offers hints that, even if neurobiologists and narrative theorists are not studying the same phenomena, the idea of constructing a positive framework in which their different investigations into memory might be located could one day look a little less hopeless.

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