UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO

Kant’s Theory of Images

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by

R. Brian Tracz

Committee in charge:

Professor Clinton Tolley, Chair
Professor Lucy Allais
Professor David Barner
Professor Jonathan Cohen
Professor Eric Watkins

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The dissertation of R. Brian Tracz is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically.
DEDICATION

For my parents and brothers
The power of imagination can, as it were, carry us out of this world and transfer us into another one. When it industriously plays its game, one hears nothing, sees nothing, and one can thus also drive away pain and procure enjoyment. It is the most necessary of all our powers, because, for instance with regard to the understanding, it provides us with an image, to which our abstract concepts can be applied in concreto. But the power of imagination does not substitute for us a lack of the senses. For if someone is blind from youth, for example, he will not be able to represent to himself, by means of fantasy, images that only the eye can see. But if someone had his vision and lost it later, he will be able to make enough images. For fantasy is much richer than the entire field of intuitions, indeed not in materials, but nevertheless in forms; fantasy is our good genius, but also our evil demon.

— Kant in lecture, *Menschenkunde*, 25:1261
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<tr>
<td>Anth</td>
<td>Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht</td>
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<td>AC</td>
<td>Anthropologie Collins</td>
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<td>AS₂</td>
<td>Anthropologie Starke 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Preisschrift über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik</td>
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<tr>
<td>FS</td>
<td>Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren erwiesen</td>
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<td>JL</td>
<td>Jäsche Logik</td>
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<td>KpV</td>
<td>Kritik der praktischen Vernunft</td>
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<td>KU</td>
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<td>LB</td>
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<td>MdS</td>
<td>Die Metaphysik der Sitten</td>
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MSI  De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis [Inaugural Dissertation]

MVī  Metaphysik Vigilantius

MVō  Metaphysik Volckmann

OP   Opus postumuum

MVś  Metaphysik von Schön

Prot Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können

R    Reflexionen

SDO  Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientiren?

TG   Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik

UE   Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll

UK   Über Kästners Abhandlungen

VKK  Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes

WF   Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnitzens und Wolf’s Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat?

References to the Kritik der reinen Vernunft [Critique of Pure Reason] follow the convention of citing the “A” (1781) and “B” (1787) editions of that work, with the convention (A[page number]/B[page number]). All other references to Kant’s work are drawn from the standard Akademie Ausgabe of his works, with the convention of [volume]:[page number]. (The Akademie Ausgabe is published by the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences, previously named the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences, the German Academy of Sciences of Berlin, and the Academy of Sciences of the DDR.) The abbreviations above precede these page numbers to indicate which work I am citing; in those passages that lack a name, I have simply preceded the page citation with ‘AA’. Though I have consulted the Cambridge edition English translations of Kant’s work, the translations in this dissertation are my own.
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VITA

2012 B.S. in Biology and Philosophy *summa cum laude*, Boston College

2013-2021 Graduate Teaching Assistant, University of California San Diego

2021 PhD in Philosophy, University of California San Diego

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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by

R. Brian Tracz

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Professor Clinton Tolley, Chair

Kant’s distinction between intuitions and concepts attracts perennial interpretive interest. To the extent that they discuss the imagination at all, most Kant scholars maintain that the imagination’s primary role is to generate intuitions. This dissertation argues that “image” (Bild, Einbildung) is an overlooked technical term in Kant’s work and that images—and not intuitions—are products of the imagination. The project explains how, for Kant, the imagination (as image-maker) and the senses (as intuition-maker) make distinct but essential contributions to cognition and perception. I begin by showing that “image” is a terminologically marked notion in Kant, and that the imagination is
responsible for generating images (chapter 1). I call these claims the Image Thesis. I then show that for Kant, intuitions are representations that depend only on the senses for their essential features (chapter 2). I call this the Strong Independence Thesis.

How should we understand Kant’s ubiquitous references to the imagination, then? I argue that we should understand the imagination’s activities as image-producing activities (chapter 3). I argue that images and intuitions are fundamentally distinct representations, which I label the Distinctness Thesis. Though intuitions and images are had by both rational and non-rational beings, the capacity for consciousness or apperception found in rational beings makes a difference in the structure of images but not the structure of intuitions (chapter 4). I call this the penetration view of the imagination. With this account of images in hand, I indicate why images are a necessary ingredient in theoretical cognition for Kant (chapter 5). I call this the Image-Centric Cognition Thesis. The result is a novel account of sensibility—the counterpart of the understanding—that recognizes Kant’s systematic discussion of mental imagery.
Introduction
0.1 Preamble

Imagine a pentagon with sides of equal length. Really picture it in your mind’s eye. When you imagine this pentagon, you don’t need to be viewing any pentagonal objects around you. Maybe you’ve never even seen a perfect pentagon before. Nor do you need to be reasoning about pentagons—remember, you are using your mind’s eye! This latter point can be expanded: think about a 1000-sided shape. As Descartes observed, this shape is impossible to imagine adequately in our mind’s eye. Can you really imagine a 1000-sided shape as opposed to a 995-sided shape? Probably not, but you can certainly think quite exactly about these two shapes and what makes them different. This train of observations lends itself to two conclusions: imagining is not seeing, and imagining is not thinking.

Kant appreciated these observations throughout his career. As I argue in this dissertation, for Kant, the imagination makes a contribution to human cognition that is irreducible to sensing or thinking. And I show that this contribution to cognition is an image. Though the intellect generates thoughts and what Kant calls concepts, the intellect does not generate images. Though the senses generate sensations and what Kant calls intuitions, the senses do not generate images. All the same, images are representations formed from representations of the senses. More specifically, images are representations in which copies of a sensible manifold are associated with one another in a particular way. This structure arises from the activities of the imagination that Kant calls apprehension and reproduction.

Moreover, this dissertation defends the stronger claim that image-generating processes of the mind are necessary for theoretical and empirical cognition as Kant understands it. Thinking about the objects that we sense requires images. Call this the Image-Centric Cognition Thesis. To cognize an object, it is not enough that we be given it by the senses and think it with the intellect. Kant thinks that we must also imagine those objects by engaging in a form of mental imagery. This point needs elaboration and defense, but Kant himself points us towards the Image-Centric Cognition Thesis. As Kant once said, “the understanding is all the more perfect the more universal
its rules become; but if it wants to consider things *in concreto*, there is nothing it can do without
the power of imagination.”¹ I argue that the best way to understand this claim is that the human
understanding depends *for cognition of objects* on images. Kant reportedly said as much in lecture:
the power of imagination “is the most necessary of all our powers, because, for instance with
regard to the understanding, it provides us with an image, to which our abstract concepts can be
applied in concreto.”² The understanding *does not* depend on images for thought as such. But the
understanding *does* depend on images in order to think about the objects presented by the senses in
sensibility. And the role of images in cognition partially explains why we cannot cognize objects
that cannot be given to the senses.

The idea that the imagination plays some sort of role in Kant’s theory of cognition and
judgment is not new. The imagination belongs among the most central human mental capacities in
Kant’s philosophy. The crucial arguments and core doctrines in both Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*
and *Critique of the Power of Judgment* rely heavily on a detailed account of how the imagination
interacts with both the senses and the intellect in human subjects. In the first *Critique*, imagination
is the faculty that organizes sensory representations in an activity called “synthesis” (A78/B103),
and the imagination generates the “schemata” that connect the categories of the understanding with
objects that appear to us through the senses (A142/B181). As such, the imagination is one of the
sources of human cognition through experience. In the third *Critique*, the imagination is one of
the key components of aesthetic judgment. The imagination “apprehends” sensible objects thereby
making them available for aesthetic appraisal.³ The imagination is thus central to Kant’s account
of both cognition and aesthetic judgment (and constitutes a part of what some have called his
“transcendental psychology”).⁴

¹*LDW*, 24:710. For discussion, see Caimi (2008, p. 47).
²*AM*, 25:1261
³See esp. *KU*, 20:220. Even in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, where Kant intentionally sidelines the imagination,
he provides systematic reasons for his choice that arise from his prior theory of the imagination. He claims that unlike
*natural* laws, which relate to the objects that appear through a schema or a “universal procedure of the imagination,”
the *moral* law applies to objects merely “by the understanding (not the imagination)” (*KpV*, 5:69).
⁴Kant’s German predecessors influenced by Christian Wolff distinguished between an “empirical psychology” and
a “rational psychology” of the soul. For a review of these distinctions, see Hatfield (1992). To my knowledge, Kant
never uses the term “transcendental psychology” to denote an inquiry distinct from empirical and rational psychology.
The very same faculty of imagination is also the subject of extensive empirical “observation” in Kant’s works—what he himself (likely following the categorization he found in the metaphysics textbook by Alexander Baumgarten from which he lectured) called “empirical psychology.” The investigation of the imagination in empirical psychology reveals that the imagination is home to various epistemic pathologies and illusions, as well as uncanny feats of creativity. Kant’s explanation of the possibility of human cognition and creativity thus relies heavily on the role of the imagination as described through such observations. Moreover, we find that non-human animals also possess an imagination, and the promotion of animal life itself relies on the power of imagination—a power that separates animal life from vegetative life.

Given all of these roles for the imagination, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is no interpretive consensus on the imagination’s exact contribution to cognition or aesthetic judgment in Kant’s philosophy. What is surprising is that many of the key issues surrounding the imagination have not been addressed in any systematic and sustained way. More generally, there is no interpretive consensus on how Kant’s transcendental psychology of the imagination relates to his empirical psychology of the imagination. This lack of consensus and lack of systematic treatment cannot be attributed to a failure on the part of Kant to characterize the imagination. He frequently cites what we can call the canonical definition of the power of imagination as the faculty for “representing an object even without its presence in intuition” (B151). But though Kant repeats this characterization of the imagination throughout his life, interpreters usually fail to relate it to the other things Kant says about the imagination. Some are skeptical that Kant really has such a unified account. Still

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5 As Kant says in lecture, in “empirical psychology < psychologia empirica >,” I must “presuppose observations [Beobachtungen] in order to say something about the soul” (MM, 29:756). Cf. ML, 28:222: “Empirical psychology < psychologia empirica > is the cognition of the objects of inner sense insofar as it is obtained from experience.” Kant suggests that the investigation of human psychology requires that we “notice” and “observe” ourselves and one another, even though this observation is very difficult to achieve due to cognitive biases “inherent in human nature itself” (see Anthropology, 7:120). An important influence on Kant, Johann Tetens promoted the idea that empirical psychology (an Erfahrungs-Seelenlehre) involves a systematic method of “observation [Beobachtung],” which he believes was exemplified by Locke (see Tetens, 1777, pp. iii-iv).

others turn a blind eye to the question.

Kant’s theory of images helps us see both how the imagination is a unified mental power and how the imagination does what Kant claims it does. His theory of images addresses the interpretive challenges standing in the way of a coherent account of the imagination. To get a grip of these interpretive challenges, let’s take a swift tour of some of the interpretive tendencies surrounding the imagination for Kant. I say “tendencies” because it is not clear that any of these conceptions of the imagination amounts to a full theory of the imagination, nor is it clear that all of these conceptions are mutually exclusive. As we shall see, each of these approaches focuses on particular roles that the imagination plays for Kant. In turn, each approach characterizes the imagination such that it plays such a role. So first, we can ask whether the imagination plays a certain role in the mind, which we can call a question of function. And secondly, we can ask, given that the imagination has a certain function, how it performs that function, which we can call the question of means. If a view of the imagination is to have any hope of affording a theory of the imagination, it must have an adequate response to both questions. It must tell us what the imagination does and how the imagination does it.

0.2 The Imagination: Some Interpretive Avenues

0.2.1 Deflationary Views

Our first stop brings us to the deflationary views of imagination in Kant. Deflationary views minimize the unique role of the imagination in Kant’s critical philosophy. There are two quite different flavors of this view: eliminativist and reductionist.

Eliminativists reject Kant’s theory of the imagination as an unfortunate part of an antiquated cognitive psychology. Some eliminativists take Kant’s story of imagination to be at odds with what is most philosophically interesting in his critical philosophy. P.F. Strawson often seems to have an eliminativist tendency in calling the first Critique “an essay in the imaginary subject of
transcendental psychology”—an account “obtained by thinking of the necessary unity of experience as produced by our faculties (specifically by memory and imagination controlled by understanding) out of impressions or data of sense themselves unconnected and separate.” The view Strawson criticizes is one on which an active understanding unites the passively received and isolated “data of the senses” in synthesis. On this picture, the understanding is ultimately the superior to a “no less active lieutenant, imagination.” And this picture of the imagination as synthesizer is simply to be discarded or seen as ancillary to the core aims of the Critique.

For eliminativists, there is no philosophically or textually satisfying answer to the question of function and the question of means simultaneously. As for the question of function, many eliminativists suggest that Kant gave the imagination the hopeless task of generating perceptual organization from completely disordered inputs. Some early reviewers praised Strawson’s critique of Kant’s alleged naive view that the senses provide the mind merely a “snowstorm of sensations.” These reviewers thought it highly unclear through what means—the imagination and its synthesis could perform the function of introducing structure into a radically unstructured jumble of visual, auditory, and tactile sensations. I agree that such a pessimism would be warranted if this were the correct answer to the question of function for the imagination. But we will see in due course that for Kant, the imagination does not have the function of introducing order into chaos, and that this naive conception of the senses is not Kant’s.

This eliminativist attack on Kant’s psychological theory has received significant criticism in

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7 Strawson (1966, p. 32). In fairness, Strawson’s view about transcendental psychology is qualified: “It is not that I think that nothing can be made of the latter. The attempt to reconstruct it would be, at least, a profitable exercise in the philosophy of mind” (Strawson, 1966, p. 11). This claim restricts the philosophical interest of Kant’s appeal to psychological faculties considerably, though, and Strawson’s remark that Kant’s cartography of the faculties of understanding and sensibility was “disastrous” certainly reflects a degree of ambivalence even on what profits we would stand to obtain in such an exercise (Strawson, 1966, p. 21).

8 Grant (1968, p. 85) claims that Strawson “doubtlessly rightly” criticizes “transcendental psychology,” largely because according to Grant, Kant assumes that all we are given in sense is a “snowstorm of sensations.” In his review of Strawson, when Bennett (1968, p. 340) claims that “[i]n [lost of the Critique of Pure Reason is prima facie dead, because prima facie dependent upon wholly indefensible theories,” he doubtlessly means to include what Strawson calls “transcendental psychology” as part of the dead matter. As a result of this conception, “the commentator’s dominant problem is to display the life below the surface,” and that the “dominant problem has been solved, in all essentials, by Strawson.”

9 See chapter 2.
recent scholarship, and rightly so. Indeed, despite his own distaste for transcendental psychology, Strawson seems to have occasionally engaged in it himself. Rather than eliminating the imagination, or else its activity of synthesis, from Kant’s account of cognition, we should instead seek to understand why Kant found it so important.

In contrast to eliminativist varieties of deflationism, reductionists grant that the imagination performs various essential activities. However, they wish to reduce the imagination’s activities to some other psychological activity, or to attribute them to another faculty. By far the most common reductionist strategy is to reduce the imagination to the intellect. It is common to read that the “imagination is nothing but understanding, insofar as it refers to sensibility.” Or again, that “the move from understanding to imagination is not so much a move from one faculty to another” but instead a difference in description from “an abstract description to a concrete description” of how the mind is able to “synthesize our intuitions in accordance with the categories.”

10Among Strawson’s critics on this point include Kitcher (1990) and Brook (1997), who both take Kant’s psychological theory to be both an interesting account of cognition in its own right and also (to some extent) philosophically defensible.

11For instance, Strawson appeals to the synthetic activity of the imagination to provide an account of geometric cognition. Moreover, Strawson claims that this account allows us to see that Kant’s theory of “pure intuition” provides a “perfectly reasonable philosophical account” of geometric knowledge Strawson (1966, p. 283). Strawson was also interested in Kant’s claim (explored in depth in this dissertation) that the imagination is an essential ingredient in perception (see Strawson, 1971). So perhaps in the end, Strawson’s “attack” on transcendental psychology is less a successful criticism of Kant, and more a failure of Strawson’s own self-description.

12Caimi (2012, p. 417). Caimi (2008, p. 49) also claims to find in Tetens the claim that “understanding and imagination are identical or, at least, that one can be transformed into the other.” What differentiates the understanding and the imagination is merely the “the quantitative increase of the spontaneous activity of understanding.” The view seems to be that imagination and understanding differ merely in the degree to which they are spontaneous. Caimi maintains that Tetens anticipates Kant’s own view. But as we shall see later in chapter 1, this mere difference in degree is not how Descartes, Arnauld and Nicole, Leibniz, or (in the end) Tetens understood the difference between images (of the imagination) and ideas (of the intellect). For now, I should note that some of Kant’s texts deny this “difference in degree” view of the difference between the imagination and the understanding. For instance, Kant is reported to have said in lecture: “Consciousness is entirely lacking in animals, their actions happen according to laws of the power of imagination, which nature placed in them—by analogy. ... Whoever imagines that animal souls are different from the human only in degree, not in species, errs, for consciousness effects total difference and the impossibility that with this lack an animal soul can ever raise itself to a human one” (MD, 28:689-690). These lecture notes claim that the imagination in the absence of apperception or “consciousness” is found in non-human animals, and that consciousness “effects total difference” between humans and animals by grounding the intellect. This passage speaks against the claim that there is a mere difference in “degree of spontaneity” between the two faculties, or that one faculty is “transformed” into another. Moreover, even stipulating Caimi’s interpretive claim, it is worth noting that this difference in degree in spontaneity does not show—without further argument—that the imagination is the understanding or “transformed” into it.

13Guyer (2010, p. 144). Or else, the synthesis of the imagination is just a “guise” of the understanding (Liang, 2020, p. 324). A similar tendency is present in Boyle (2016) and Conant (2017), though whether their accounts are
This type of reductionism responds to the questions of function by saying that the imagination’s function is identical to a function of the intellect. The view is reductionist because the imagination has no function that is not identical to a function of the intellect. For instance, a reductionist might simply claim that the function of the imagination is to engage in a certain kind of thinking. In turn, the reductionist responds to the question of means by pointing to the imagination’s sensible synthesis of intuitions. A reductionist might claim that such sensible synthesis is the means of having thoughts directed towards spatiotemporal objects.

This answer to the questions of function and means leads to a rift between the imagination characterized in transcendental philosophy and the imagination characterized in empirical psychology. From the perspective of Kant’s empirical psychology, imagining is not reducible to, a part of, or another way of characterizing thinking. In fact, the view seems to be a non-starter. Non-human animals lack intellects, and humans who are young, mentally ill, or simply asleep are unable to fully exercise their intellects. But Kant consistently attributes imaginations and imaginative activity to all of these beings. So reductionists need to provide a special account of what Kant is doing when he attributes imaginations to animals.

In fairness, reductionists generally have a different motivation for collapsing the imagination’s function with a function of the intellect. The main reductionist motivation derives from Kant’s transcendental psychology outlined in the Transcendental Deduction. Kant indeed emphasizes in the Transcendental Deduction that the understanding and the imagination are closely intertwined faculties. And some of his remarks seem to support a kind of reductionism. In an apparent about-face from his claim that synthesis is “the mere effect of the power of imagination” (A78/B103), Kant claims that “combination” is “an action of the understanding” (B130). He goes on to claim

“reductionist” is not clear to me. As several people have noted to me in conversation, Boyle argues for a “transformationist” view of the faculties in Kant, as opposed to an “additive” (or “layercake”) one. On the transformationist view (as outlined in Boyle, 2016), human rationality “permeates” the character of our “perceptual capacities” (p. 532) and “operations” (p. 530), such that there is not isolable “factor” that is common between rational animal perception and non-rational animal perception (p. 531). There are a number of claims to consider here. Chapters 3 and 4 will dispute two claims that could be extracted from these interpreters: first, that the imagination lacks laws governing its operation that are common between animals and humans, and second, that the imagination lacks a single function that is common between humans and animals. These arguments aside, I think that even if the imagination is “permeated” with rationality, one might still wonder what exactly the imagination is, such that it can be “permeated” by anything.
that the imagination and the understanding are two “names” of “one and the same spontaneity” (B162, note).

While it is of course true that Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Deduction draws the imagination and the understanding close together, I think we can resist the reductionist reading of these texts. Though the rest of the dissertation is an extended argument for this conclusion, there are two initial reasons to seek an alternative to the reductionist view. First, interpreters should aim to attribute a unified account of the imagination to Kant if possible. But if reductionism is true, then it seems that Kant’s view of the imagination in empirical psychology contrasts with his view of the imagination in transcendental psychology. For while empirical psychology denies that the imagination is reducible to or even dependent on the understanding, reductionism claims that the imagination either \( is \) or is ultimately reducible to \( or \) is dependent on the understanding. The conclusion is that “imagination” is said in many ways. At best, Kant lacks a unified account of the imagination; at worst, he was confused about his own theory. We should only accept the premises of the argument to this conclusion as a last resort.

Second, some of the key texts cited in favor of reductionism do not unambiguously support the reductionist conclusion. For instance, Kant writes:

\[
\text{The unity of apperception in relation [Beziehung] to the synthesis of the power of imagination is the understanding, and this very same unity, in relation to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, is the pure understanding. (A119)}
\]

Remarkably, the understanding is the unity of apperception, albeit in some relation (Beziehung) to the imagination’s synthetic activity. Similarly, Kant writes that the “transcendental synthesis of the power of imagination” is an “effect [Wirkung] of the understanding on sensibility” (B152). The understanding “imparts [erteilt] to the synthesis of the imagination in relation [Beziehung] to apperception” a synthetic unity (A237/B296, emphasis added). These passages support the idea, not that the imagination is the understanding, but that one of its activities—“transcendental synthesis” or synthesis with “synthetic unity”—is an effect of the understanding. Kant posits a relation between the imagination and the understanding.
These claims provide an important elucidation of the initial remarks from the Deduction that motivate reductionism. For the fact that imagination and the understanding stand in a relation necessary for experience does not imply a reductionist account of the imagination. Nor does the fact that a single “spontaneity” structures both the understanding’s thoughts and certain parts or aspects of the imagination’s activity. Merely taking these passages at face value is not enough to substantiate the reductionist conclusion about the imagination. In fact, these passages might actually contain a challenge to the reductionist view. For the relation that Kant posits between imagination and understanding seems to contradict any view on which the imagination is the understanding or an aspect thereof. Reductionism cannot make literal sense of the idea that some of the activities of the imagination are effects of the understanding due to a real causal relation between the understanding and sensibility.

0.2.2 Inflationary Views

Let’s continue our tour by contrasting deflationary views with inflationary views. Inflationary views maintain that the imagination is not merely a unique and important faculty for Kant, but also the most fundamental faculty of the mind. A classic inflationist is Martin Heidegger, who writes that for Kant, the “transcendental imagination” is “the foundation on which the intrinsic possibility of ontological knowledge, and hence of metaphysica generalis as well, is constructed.” And he claims that the “power of imagination” is not some “third stem” besides sensibility and understanding, but instead “part of the root itself” from which sensibility and understanding arise.

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14 As noted above, Kant remarks that “one and the same spontaneity” brings about synthesis, either intellectually “under the name of understanding” or sensibly “under the name of power of imagination” (B162, note). But even here, the reductionist reading is a maximalist reading of this passage. For the fact that two faculties have essentially related activities (both related to “spontaneity”) does not imply that either faculty is the other, or that either faculty is reducible to the other.

15 That is, assuming that the “relation” in question is not the one between two components of an identity statement. I assume that if “x causes y” or “x influences y,” then x is not identical to y.

16 Chapter 4 argues that we should construe these relations as causal in detail.

17 An inflationist could also reduce the scope of the claim: imagination is the most fundamental faculty for cognition of one kind or another. The differences are irrelevant here.


19 Heidegger (1997b, p. 64). Heidegger goes on to suggest that this “root” is ultimately the imagination as the generator of time: “Moreover, it will be shown that this root is nothing other than time, when radically conceived in its
Such a radical view of the imagination is also present in writers immediately succeeding Kant and heavily influenced by him. For instance, Fichte claims that without the “creative power of imagination [schaffende] Einbildungskraft,” human beings “would also never have possessed a single representation.” Fichte (1971, p. 284) Novalis writes that “all inner faculties and powers—and all outer faculties and powers—must be deduced from the productive power of imagination.” von Hardenberg (1977, p. 413, No. 746)

Of course, beyond Kantianism, there are numerous cases in the history of philosophy in which the imagination was considered fundamental to cognition. In that sense, on Heidegger’s reading of Kant, Kant ends up having unexpected philosophical allies. For one, David Hume famously considered the imagination to be the crucial psychological capacity for explaining human knowledge. Consider some of Hume’s most representative remarks:

[T]he ideas which are most essential to geometry . . . are far from being exact and determinate. . . . The ultimate standard of these figures is deriv’d from nothing but the senses and imagination. Hume (1739, Treatise, 1.2.4. emphasis added)

When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, it is not determin’d by reason, but by certain principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination. Had ideas no more union in the fancy than objects seem to have to the understanding, we cou’d never draw any inference from causes to effects, nor repose belief in any matter of fact. The inference, therefore, depends solely on the union of ideas. Hume (1739, Treatise, 1.3.6.12, emphasis added)

In the first passage, Hume emphasizes that the senses and the imagination serve as the sole standard for any idea pertaining to geometry. In the second passage, in which he discusses causal reasoning, Hume argues that ideas are united in the imagination via association, that the understanding cannot attain greater union than the union originally established by the imagination, and that causal inference depends solely on this original union. These two passages provide a picture

ownmost inner possibility.” In chapter 2, I shall contest the claim that the imagination generates the most fundamental representations of space or time at all.

Fichte (1971, p. 284)

von Hardenberg (1977, p. 413, No. 746)

Treatise, 1.2.4. emphasis added

Treatise, 1.3.6.12, emphasis added
of the imagination that is inflationary regarding both geometrical ideas and causal reasoning. To borrow Heidegger’s phrase, Hume’s view is that the imagination is the foundation of the intrinsic possibility of ontological knowledge.

It will take some work to see exactly how Kant departs from Hume on these matters later in this dissertation. Yet we can already see here that as a piece of Kant interpretation, the inflationary view faces two insurmountable problems. First, as many have already noted against Heidegger, Kant explicitly denies that we can know whether there is a common root to the understanding and sensibility. For Kant, “there are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding, through the first of which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are thought” (A15/B29). So even if there is a common root that unites sensibility and understanding, that root is “to us unknown.” To claim that Kant changed his mind on this matter—or that he seriously meant to qualify it—flies in the face of practically everything Kant wrote about human cognition after 1781. Kant’s contention was that the imagination was a basic power of the mind, but not the only basic power of the mind.24

Second, putting aside how we are to understand the “common root” claim, Kant could not have thought that the imagination is the most fundamental faculty of the mind. For Kant repeatedly claims in some central arguments of the first Critique that the imagination is simply insufficient to give rise to cognition. To my mind, this is the clearest point against the inflationary view. For instance, in his argument for the Second Analogy (that all events occur according to “the law of the connection of cause and effect,” A189/B232), Kant endorses something close to the negation of Hume’s inflationist view:

To all empirical cognition there belongs the synthesis of the manifold through the power of imagination, which is always successive; i.e., the representations always follow each other in it. But the order of the sequence (what must precede and what must follow) is not determined in the power of imagination at all, and the

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24 See Über den Gebrauch . . ., 8:180-1n, in which Kant claims that “the imagination [Einbildung] in the human being is an effect that we cognize to be not the same with other effects of the mind. Therefore the power related to this effect can only be called power of imagination [Einbildungskraft] (as basic power).” Kant thus maintains that the power of imagination has unique representational effects, and is in that sense basic. It is not basic in the sense that the senses or apperception can be derived from it.
series of successive representations can be taken backwards just as well as forwards. (A201/B246, emphasis added)

Kant clearly asserts here that the imagination is necessary for empirical cognition but not sufficient. What Hume calls the “union” of ideas in causal reasoning is not determined by the imagination at all. Instead, Kant thinks empirical cognition of a causal connection requires a rule, which in turn ultimately depends on the understanding and the “unity of apperception” (A210-211/B256). So the unity of apperception and the understanding—in addition to imagination—are required for empirical cognition.

Against the inflationist, the imagination makes some contribution to empirical cognition, but not the only contribution. In short, Heidegger’s inflationary account threatens to make the power of imagination nothing less than the single unified “power of representation” that grounds all of cognition and metaphysics. This is a reductionist view that Kant stridently rejected explicitly in his own lifetime. Both inflationist and deflationist forms of reductionism (reduction of faculties

25 Similarly, Kant claims in the Critique of Practical Reason that a mere “rule of imagination” never allows us to determine that a certain event must have a cause (KpV, 5:51).

26 We also should note that the senses too are required for empirical cognition, and it is unclear how the inflationist is to explain the cognitive role of the senses in terms of the imagination. Of course, Hume argues that both the senses and the imagination are cognitively basic.

27 Kant makes a similar point for the Third Analogy: without the concept of community, “the synthesis of the imagination in apprehension would therefore only present each of these perceptions as one that is present in the subject when the other is not, and conversely, but not that the objects are simultaneous” (B257, my emphasis). Kant is thus claiming that the imagination alone cannot represent simultaneously existing objects. Indeed, Kant concludes from just this point that “[c]onsequently, a concept of the understanding . . . is required . . . to represent the simultaneity as objective” (B257).

28 One might try to patch up Heidegger’s view by saying that what is fundamental is imagination plus apperception (and, perhaps, plus sense). But then we’re back where we started: what is special about the imagination itself? Why is imagination (and not apperception or apperception-cum-imagination) what is epistemically fundamental? We are left without an account of the unique role of the imagination.

29 The view that there is a single unified “power of representation” to which all other mental faculties reduce was defended by Wolffian philosophers directly preceding and contemporaneous with Kant (see Frierson, 2014, chs. 1-2). For instance, this view seems to have been defended by Alexander Baumgarten, who maintains that the three “partially different” faculties of cognition, desire, and aversion are “conceived through the one power of the soul for representing, in the strict sense” (Baumgarten, 2013, §744). Similarly, Karl Leonard Reinhold argues in his 1789 Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens that a fundamental “capacity of representation per se” provides a more straightforward presentation of Kant’s own arguments (see Reinhold, 2011, pp. 26ff., 98, 148). Yet Kant’s view is that there are two degrees of disunity: (a) desire and pleasure/pain are not reducible to representation (contra Wolff/Baumgarten), and (b) sense, imagination, and apperception are not reducible to another more basic capacity of representation (contra Reinhold). Cf. Hatfield (1992, pp. 202-3).

30 For Kant, the faculty of desire and the faculty of pain and pleasure are just as fundamental as the faculty of cognition. Kant acknowledges that some before him have attempted to “reduce all faculties to the mere faculty of cognition,”
to the imagination, or vice versa) suffer from similar bugs.

0.2.3 Mediation Views

Our tour continues to the mediation views. Mediation views maintain that the imagination is required for mediating between faculties or representations that Kant holds to be distinct. This view too comes in a weaker and a stronger variety—each of which is represented by the two most recent English monographs dedicated to Kant’s theory of imagination.

The weaker variety maintains that the imagination “mediates” between sensibility and the understanding and is rather widely held. Since intuitions and concepts do not differ in degree but in kind, the imagination is required to make them go together in cognition. The weak mediation view captures part of the eventual function of the imagination for Kant (see B151). The imagination is indeed a “meeting-ground of the understanding and the sensibility” in some sense.\(^{31}\) In a book appropriately subtitled “Bridging Gaps in Judgement and Experience,” Gibbons (1994, p. 2) argues that “one of the most general descriptions of the function assigned to imagination by Kant is that of mediation”; the imagination is “the capacity of a finite, discursive intelligence to work up the material of experience from its diverse elements into something which can be known or judged.”

Yet the weak mediation view is still not an informative answer to either the question of function or the question of means. For instance, between what representations does the imagination mediate exactly? Between intuitions and concepts? Or is it between sensations and intuitions? Or both? And to bring about such mediation, does the imagination generate its own representations? Does it generate states of belief-like pretense? Depending on what form of mediation one opts for, the imagination is tasked with quite different representational functions, and consequently different means for satisfying that function.

\(^{31}\) As Brann (1991, p. 90) describes Kant’s position in comparison to other figures in her historical account of the imagination in European philosophy.
These worries surface in Gibbons’ account of synthesis, which she takes to be the most fundamental activity of the imagination in Kant’s theory of cognition. She claims that “synthesis is the activity which gets us ‘in touch’ with the given in intuition and allows us to recognize it as a manifold so that we can apply concepts.”\(^{32}\) This gloss of the activity of the imagination is rather metaphorical and does little to explain how mediation occurs—how does synthesis get concepts “in touch with” intuitions? Why would the imagination be required for such a task? Gibbons wavers between different means for achieving such a mediation. She sometimes suggests that synthesis “operates on” appearances, which suggests that synthesis acts on the contents of intuitions, while at other times she claims that synthesis operates on “impressions.”\(^{33}\) It is not obvious that appearances—which have spatial and temporal form—are mere impressions. Though Gibbons generally thinks that synthesis produces “sensible intuition,” she at other times lapses into claiming that synthesis generates a representation of a sensible intuition (a “singular representation”).\(^{34}\) This lack of interpretive clarity arises from a failure to provide a specific answer to the question of means.

What about the stronger variety of the mediation view? Strong mediation views maintain that the imagination is a general mediating faculty—the “great mediator” between the dualisms that Kant was fond of positing. In her more recent monograph *Kant and the Power of Imagination*, Kneller (2007) argues that the power of imagination is the key to Kant’s strategy for connecting his moral theory to his account of human knowledge. The power of imagination is a “power (of mediation).”\(^{35}\) To some extent, Gibbons (1994, pp. 1-3) also has this interpretive aspiration.\(^{36}\)

\(^{32}\)Gibbons (1994, p. 18)

\(^{33}\)Gibbons (1994, p. 18)

\(^{34}\)Gibbons (1994, pp. 24, 29); she writes for instance that in the synthesis of apprehension, “the singularity of this representation of diversity must itself be intuited.” This sentence claims that singularity is in some sense the object of the intuition, which I find difficult to understand without positing another singular representation that is being intuited (an intuition of an intuition or the like). But this interpretation contradicts Gibbons’ other claim that the synthesis of apprehension produces sensible intuition.


\(^{36}\)It is possible that many interpreters in the German Idealist tradition are moved by the mediation view because it seemed to be prominent in Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s reworking of the Kantian system. For instance, in the *Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre 1794/95*, Fichte (1971, p. 216) suggestively writes that “the power of imagination is a faculty that hovers in the middle between determination and non-determination, between the finite and the infinite [Die Einbildungskraft ist ein Vermögen, das zwischen Bestimmung und Nicht-Bestimmung, zwischen Endlichem und Unendlichem in der Mitte schwebt].”
The stronger renditions of the mediation view have significant shortcomings. Positing a general power of mediation invites the worry that there is no unique, unified faculty of imagination. The role of the imagination as “grand mediator” does not sit well with the idea that the imagination has certain core activities that it performs. The imagination would be a placeholder for where two types of representations require some sort of reconciliation. Yet it is far from clear that the reconciliation required will be of the same general kind in all cases. In other words, if we assign such a broad function to the imagination, then we will likely have to posit a broad set of means to satisfy that broad function. At least, there is no a priori guarantee that there is a single one-size-fits-all means for achieving such a broad function of mediation.

Kneller does specify that the central role of the imagination is to transform our representations, such that the theoretical and the moral philosophy harmonize. Unfortunately, though Kant himself associates transformation with the imagination, the notion of “transformation (umbilden)” is left unanalyzed by Kneller. How are we to understand what it is to re-imagine or re-form (umbilden) something if we do not have a grasp on what it is to imagine or form (bilden) it? By mere thinking alone, we are able to alter how concepts are arranged in a proposition. So is the power for thinking a power of transformation? But if it is, then how is the imagination different from the intellect?

In short, the strong form of the mediation view fails to show that the imagination really has the means to carry out a broad mediation function. The weak form of the mediation view, though it captures an important aspect of Kant’s view of the imagination, leaves unanswered several key interpretive choices for adequately answering the question of function and the question of means.

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37 Kneller (2007, p. 12) takes the imagination to be essentially a “transformative power.” By this, she means to evoke Kant’s claim that the power of imagination “may even restructure [umbilden] experience; and though in doing so we continue to follow analogical laws, yet we also follow principles which reside higher up, namely, in reason” (KU, 5:314). As I understand it, this passage is dealing with the symbolic or analogical function of the imagination. However, it is puzzling why this should be taken as the essence of the power of imagination, since Kant claims that the capacity to entertain analogies and other symbolic representations is not entirely grounded in the imagination alone. Kant seems to think that such symbolic representation involves concepts (cf. KU, 5:351 ff.). If so, it is not clear what exactly the imagination contributes to the process of symbolization.

38 This is not helped by the fact that the root of transformation (umbilden)—image (Bild)—does not appear in the index and is never discussed in the text of Kneller (2007). Without an account of Bild, it is difficult to understand what an “um”-Bild or “re-image” would amount to.
0.2.4 Intuition Views

The next stop on our tour is a favorite amongst interpreters. According to the intuition view, the imagination produces sensible intuitions. The imagination does not merely interpret representations of objects generated independently of the imagination. Instead, the intuition view maintains that the imagination generates the very representations that give objects to the mind in the first place. So the intuition view has a straightforward answer to the question of function: the function of the imagination is to produce intuitions. Proponents of the imagination view still owe us an answer to the question of means, and indeed there are several different answers to the question of means that we shall explore in this dissertation. But at minimum, the intuition view provides us the first half of a theory of the imagination.

This view is so widely held that its popularity cannot be attributed to a single philosophical motivation. Support for the intuition view cross-cuts some of the great debates in Kant scholarship over the past 30 years. Textually, the canonical definition of the imagination has itself fueled such a view. The imagination is a faculty for representing objects “in intuition” even without their presence; the imagination is a “faculty of intuition.”

39 The intuition view would be compatible with the interpretation view described below, if the interpretation view were to maintain that the items that are subject to “interpretation” are not themselves objective representations but are instead mere sensations or impressions. As I define it, the interpretation view involves an interpretation of some given object, and since Kant thinks that only intuitions can give us objects, the interpretation view presupposes the intuitions that give an object for interpretation.

40 The most recent proponent is Rolf-Peter Horstmann in his “Cambridge Element” Kant's Power of Imagination (Horstmann, 2018), which I examine in more detail in chapter 2. Though Horstmann provides several non-equivalent glosses on what the imagination is, he consistently claims that the “characteristic feature” of the “power of imagination” is “the capacity to ‘apprehend’, to collect and connect sense impressions into intuitions” (Horstmann, 2018, p. 8). Against the reductionist views, Horstmann argues that “the imagination must play a self-standing role” distinct from the understanding (Horstmann, 2018, p. 2). Though I agree that the imagination has a special function for Kant, I dispute Horstmann’s claim that the imagination’s activities are entirely and always “self-standing.” In particular, I argue in chapter 4 that the cognitively significant activities of the imagination depend on the understanding in a central sense.

41 For “intellectualist” or “conceptualist” accounts on which the imagination’s synthesis “generates intuitions” or on which intuitions depend on our “imagining space,” see Land (2016, pp. 147-8, 157) and Longuenesse (2005, p. 73). See also Grüne (2016), Haag (2007), Waxman (2013), and Williams (2017, p. 3). For “non-intellectualist” or “non-conceptualist” accounts on which intuitions depend on the imagination, see Peter Rohs’s account in Wenzel (2005, p. 409) as well as Allais (2009) and Horstmann (2018), though Allais’s more recent account is largely consistent with the view I defend in chapter 2 (see Allais, 2017a). Support for the intuition view also spans both sides in the recent debate about the metaphysics of intuitions (and in particular, whether intuitions should be understood in a “representationalist”-friendly or “naive realist”-friendly way). See, e.g., Gomes (2017) and Gomes (2014, pp. 12, 14) for a naive realist account, and Stephenson (2015) for a representationalist account.
This view of the imagination’s function holds significant appeal. Moreover, many of Kant’s
texts seem to support the view. Yet this dissertation shall argue that it is false. Not only does the
imagination not produce all intuitions, but the imagination does not produce any intuitions as Kant
normally understands them. Notably, I shall argue, the imagination does not produce “empirical
intuitions” or “pure intuitions” that Kant discusses extensively in the first Critique. Defending
these claims is the work of the early chapters of this dissertation.

Yet there is an independent worry about the intuition view that stems directly from its re-
sponse to the question of function. An adequate response to the question of function should not
merely indicate some function of the imagination; an adequate response must also indicate the
essential function of the imagination. The essential function of the imagination is not only the
function that the imagination must perform in order to be what it is, but also the function that dif-
ferentiates the imagination from other faculties of the mind. With that in mind, it’s worth noting
that proponents of the intuition view must also commit to claim that non-human animals have intu-
tions. Non-rational animals have imaginations for Kant, but it is much less clear whether they have
intuitions; consequently, it is not clear that the imaginations that animals have can be essentially
characterized as producers of intuition. Even if an intuition view proponent accepted this conse-
quence, the intuition view fails to answer the question of function because it fails to differentiate the
imagination from the senses. For as we shall see, Kant also calls the senses a “faculty of intuition,”
and he mentions representations he calls “intuitions of the senses.” Perhaps the senses themselves
produce intuitions, in which case one cannot say what the imagination is by saying that it is an
intuition-maker. For such a characterization does not differentiate the imagination from the senses.

These points need to be explained by proponents of the intuition view. As I hinted above in
my description of deflationist views of the imagination, some proponents of the intuition view claim
that the senses provide the mind something less than intuition—mere sensations or impressions that
lack spatial or temporal structure.42 Others claim that the senses provide some sort of spatially or

42For proponents of this view, see chapter 2.
temporally organized representation, but that this representation is not an intuition. But then how are we to understand Kant’s claim that the senses are a “faculty of intuition,” that the “senses intuit,” and that we enjoy “intuitions of the senses”? Unfortunately, these questions are rarely addressed.

### 0.2.5 Interpretation Views

How could one set the senses apart from the imagination? *Interpretation views* seem to provide a promising answer. Interpretation views construe the imagination as a faculty for interpreting or otherwise amplifying the items provided in sensibility. Such views have the important virtue of providing a more specific answer to the question of function. On these views, the imagination is a faculty that processes intuition. From here we can ask what processes are performed on the intuition. Makkreel (1994) claims that the “imagination is a power that both exhibits and overcomes the limits of experience” by amplifying or interpreting what is given in experience. More specifically, Young (1988) claims that the imagination

injects the act of construing or interpreting sensible affection as awareness of something—something of which we might be sensibly aware in other ways and on other occasions, something which is not exhausted in our immediate awareness of it and which can thus be said to be ‘present in’ immediate sensible awareness only in the sense that that awareness can appropriately be construed as awareness of it.

Central to this idea is that we could be perceptually conscious of objects “in other ways and on other occasions.” Interpretation involves representing a certain object as an object that can manifest itself again or in different ways. This mental achievement is “ampliative” in that it goes beyond our “immediate awareness” of an object. I take it that for Young, this “awareness of something” cannot be achieved by the senses or “sensible affection” alone. So Young’s answer to the question of function sets the imagination apart from the senses.

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43 For proponents of this view, see chapter 2.
45 Notice that in the above quote, Young intimates that we have an immediate awareness of an object, upon which interpretation acts: we have an “immediate awareness of it,” where “it” refers to the object (an not, say, non-objective sensations).
The interpretation view gets something right in that the imagination is productive and active for Kant. So there is some amplitiative function of the imagination that “goes beyond” what is strictly “given” when we sense objects. So in some broad sense, the imagination involves interpretation. Yet the interpretation view engenders a particular kind of worry. Taking Young’s view as an example, it is not clear that the “act of construing or interpreting sensible affection” is anything other than an intellectual or cognitive achievement. One might simply come to form the belief that the items given in sensible affection could appear again and in different ways. Moreover, Young’s emphasis on the repeatability of our perception of an object invites the worry that what he calls “interpretation” is simply a conceptual capacity—a capacity to recognize the object of my immediate awareness as an instance of a more general kind. Yet for Kant, the faculty of concepts is the understanding, not the imagination. Without crucial supplement, then, the interpretation view leads us back to our original question: why is the imagination a unique and irreducible faculty of

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46 Young (1988, p. 142) explicitly rejects the possibility that the basic role of the imagination is to “entertai[n] mental images” of an object “as it might appear from other perspectives” or “circumstances.” Young thereby eliminates one way of demarcating the distinction between imagination and intellect, namely, the imagination’s capacity to generate mental images. Young also asserts that for Kant, “sensations and mental images are both merely states of immediate sensible affection” (Young, 1988, p. 143). But Young misses a key claim in the A120 note—which is surprising since he helpfully draws our attention to that note. There, Kant claims that the “senses” cannot “produce images of objects” (A120n). That is, mere affection of the senses cannot generate images. So Young passes up a view similar to one I defend below partially because he ignores this key part of the A120 note.

47 Dickerson (2003) puts forward a similar view that seems to avoid this worry. He writes that for Kant, when one views a certain figure on a piece of paper, “the spatially arranged colour patches (the modifications of sensibility) make up the representational medium, and the viewer does not simply apprehend the patches, but sees things in them. Hence on a model of representation like this the cognising mind is immediately conscious of its own modifications, but this reflexive grasp is not a grasp of them simply as internal modifications, but as representations. Crucially, this involves neither an inference nor a constructive act, but rather an exercise of the imagination akin to the act of ‘seeing in’ discussed above” (Dickerson, 2003, p. 22). Dickerson invokes the notion of “seeing-in,” and he takes synthesis to be analogous to seeing-in (Dickerson, 2003, p. 36). It is worrisome, however, that Dickerson does little to analyze the distinction between seeing-in and seeing-as, nor does he mention Wollheim’s theory on the topic, who is the originator of this distinction. Indeed, the exact difference between seeing-in and seeing-as is frequently interrogated by his critics (see Wollheim, 1998). Claiming that seeing-in is “the representationalist equivalent of the act of understanding a sign, or grasping its meaning” does not help (Dickerson, 2003, p. 36), since this act can seemingly be done in entirely intellectual and non-imagistic terms. At minimum, Dickerson’s conception of seeing-in seems to invoke the intellect here, inviting the worry that he has not answered the question of function for the imagination. As Wollheim himself maintains, whereas “seeing-in” is the exercise of a uniquely pictorial competence, “seeing-as” might be the exercise of a capacity acquired independently of pictorial contexts. Additionally, “seeing-in” requires that the artifact that is perceptually discriminated be situated before the subject, whereas “seeing-as” can often be given a gloss in terms of “interpreting-as” or “understanding-as.” This disambiguates interpretation that is merely belief-mediated and interpretation that is imagistically-mediated—a distinction that I stress in chapter 3 to 5. But it is unclear the extent to which Dickerson meant to differentiate seeing-as from seeing-in, so it is unclear whether he gives much of an account of the question of function.
My conclusion from this tour is that the dominant conceptions of the imagination are at best incomplete. Most of them simply do not amount to a theory of the imagination as such because they fail to answer the question of function or the question of means. Other views attempt to answer these questions, but in ways that either clash with Kant’s texts or else give rise to unresolved textual puzzles.

0.3 What is the role of the imagination for Kant?

A possible reaction to our tour is to simply reject the claim that the imagination is a unified faculty of the mind. Perhaps there is no satisfactory answer to the question of function. But I think that such a reaction is premature. Once we look more carefully both at Kant’s texts and his historical context, we are able to see the path to unification. For as I shall argue in this dissertation, the imagination is a faculty for producing images. The most fundamental function of the imagination is to produce images, and the function of image production sets the imagination off from other faculties. All imaginations produce images, and all activities of the imagination depend on image production in some way.

Such a view suggests itself when we compare the canonical definition of the imagination with Kant’s similarly canonical definitions of “images.” Kant writes that “image [Einbildung] is intuition even without the presence of the object.” The power of imagination generates “images [Bilder] of things that are not present” in order to “complete [vollenden] an incomplete similarity in the representation of present things.” This capacity for representing objects even without their presence is required for the broader task of “bring[ing] the manifold of intuition into an image,” as Kant describes in the first Critique (A120). Whereas the imagination is the faculty for representing

\[48\] A similar question arises in the contemporary literature, since one might ask whether imagination is fundamentally a capacity to entertain a kind of “pretense” or “supposition,” as opposed to a capacity for producing images or mental imagery. See Gregory (2016) for a review.

\[49\] AA 18:619

\[50\] VKK, 2:264
an object even without its presence, images are the *representational products* that represent such objects even without their presence. On my view, images are implicated in the canonical definition of the imagination itself.

Even though images can arise without the presence of the object, images nevertheless *depend on* both pure and empirical intuitions for Kant. Both kinds of intuitions in turn are products of sensing, not imagining. For Kant, imagining is not sensing; imagining depends on sensing. The images that our imagination generates “in our mind’s eye” are not viewed with real eyes, and having eyes (or even an entire system of outer senses) doesn’t suffice for viewing mental images. At the same time, images are not concepts, and you do not need an intellect to have images. For Kant, imagining is not thinking. Finally, images are not identical to what Kant calls “schemata,” though images and schemata are crucially related to one another. Schemata are required for judging—for subsuming objects under concepts—but schemata and images have different roles in judgment. For Kant, imagining is not judging.

The few commentators who consider Kant’s theory of images consider his mention of “images” to be a terminological variant of “intuitions.” Philosophers who do not specialize in Kant frequently assume that intuitions are mental images (and I have seen more than one introductory text or lecture on Kant construe intuitions as mental images). Typical of this interpretive tendency is Paton (1936), who seems to consider “images” to be equivalent to “complex intuitions.” Paton maintains that images are “phenomenal objects” apprehended by the imagination. Wilson (1975)

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51 With the exception of Matherne (2015), who I discuss throughout this dissertation.
52 E.g., in their work in philosophy of imagination, Kind and Kung (2016, p. 12) summarize Kant’s view like this: “Sensibility imposes space and time onto [sensations], thereby providing a series of discrete intuitions. Imagination transforms these discrete, static images into continuous wholes” (my emphasis). Kind and Kung are simply assuming here that intuitions are images; moreover, they are assuming that there are images that precede activities of the imagination.
53 He writes: “It is obvious that if the synthesis of imagination gives us a complex intuition or image, we can proceed to analyse the image, to make its parts and their relation to one another clear, and so to make the whole image distinct” (Paton, 1936, p. 267). In other places, Paton suggests that images are essentially pictures that the imagination produces (Paton, 1936, p. 270, note 2; p. 367). Paton also explains here that the imagination is a conscious activity, but not a self-conscious activity: with the imagination, “we have immediate awareness of the picture or image made, but not reflective awareness of our act of making it.”
54 Images are appearances on Paton’s view, and we recognize that appearances are not mere subjective states because of the involvement of the understanding: “The complex image apprehended in sense-perception is not an image of the real object (except in so far as it is the appearance of an unknown thing-in-itself); it is the real (phenomenal) object,
is one of the earliest commentators who notes the conflation of image with intuition explicitly, and he seems to gesture towards a distinction between images and empirical intuitions, though it remains a gesture.\textsuperscript{55} Some commentators invoke “images” but do not defend any particular view on them. Are they pictorial representations? Are they the objects of pictorial representations? Are they doxastic states of pretense or belief? Are they merely the name of whatever the imagination produces?\textsuperscript{56}

This dissertation seeks to answer these questions by developing a general account of images that answers the question of function and the question of means. I can answer these questions programmatically: the function of the imagination is to represent objects even without their presence. The imagination performs this function by means of generating images—indeed, these are the necessary means for performing this function. This dissertation shall show that these answers are Kant’s own, as well as what they ultimately mean. But we will not lose sight of the challenging question of how these could be Kant’s responses to the questions of function and means, given the many things that he says about the imagination. So I also aim to show that the imagination really is unified by this function and the necessary means for fulfilling that function.

\textsuperscript{55}Wilson reflects that “in the historical tradition underlying Kant’s use of ‘intuition’, as well as in Kant himself, an association is made between image (Bild) and intuition. . . . This association is natural . . . for mental images contain mereological relations in the same way as empirical intuitions upon which imagination must draw in order to produce an image” (Wilson, 1975, p. 262). He cites B278, in which Kant calls “products of the power of imagination” a kind of “intuitive representation.” As Wilson notes, others besides Kant thought of intuition imagistically. For instance, in his 1811 \textit{Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart}, Adelung (1811) writes of Anschauen: “in der Philosophie verstehet man durch die anschauende Erkenntniß, eine jede Erkenntniß, die wir durch Empfindung erlangen, oder da wir uns die Sache selbst oder doch ihr Bild vorstellen, die sinnliche, bildliche Erkenntniß, im Gegensatze der symbolischen, da man eine Sache unter Worten oder anderen Zeichen denkt.” As chapters 2 and 3 argue, Kant denies that intuitions are “bildliche Vorstellungen,” even if images are “anschauliche Vorstellungen.”

\textsuperscript{56}Bennett (1966, p. 143), for instance, tends to have a distinctly pictorial sense of image in mind whenever he discusses them. Chipman (1982, p. 47) criticizes Bennett on this point. Bennett maintains that “Kant means by ‘image’ . . . much the same as is meant by the same word in contemporary ordinary usage. He does not. The word as used by Kant functions as a noun for anything which is brought about as a result of the operations of the faculty of imagination. . . . Whenever synthesis or combination of the sensory data occurs, Kant calls the result an image.” Though Chipman is correct that Bennett’s conception of “image” is not general enough, Chipman’s view of images is too general. For Kant also maintains that schemata are products of the imagination (A141-142/B181), but he explicitly distinguishes them from images. So we are still in need of an account of images that is broader than mere “pictures” but not so broad as to be a label for “whatever the imagination produces.”
In chapter 1, I outline the textual case for images in Kant. I defend what I call the Image Thesis: the claim that Kant makes extensive use of the term “image (Bild, Einbildung)” and that Kant claims that the imagination generates images. In this chapter, I will also introduce the Distinctness Thesis: the claim that Kant took images and intuitions of various kinds to be fundamentally distinct representations. I leave the extensive defense of the Distinctness Thesis to both chapters 2 and 3. Yet I hope in chapter 1 to show that Kant did not merely appeal to images as an after-thought in his theorizing, or that his remarks on the topic are isolated to one particular text. Instead, Kant was interested in the role that images play in human psychology throughout his career. Moreover, this interest took on a particular significance for Kant’s theory of cognition in the critical period. Several texts suggest the Image-Centric Cognition Thesis, and the remainder of the dissertation articulates the implications of these texts.

Chapter 2 then turns to the function of the senses as distinct from the imagination. This chapter has two parts, the first largely positive and the second largely negative. The first part argues for a “robust” view of inner and outer sense on which they generate intuitions. The senses alone ground the essential features of pure and empirical intuitions, and features of the senses alone can explain how appearances are “given” to the mind in empirical intuition. I call this claim on which the essential features of intuitions depend solely on the senses the Strong Independence View, which I sketch in this first part. The second negative part of the chapter argues that some of the most common motivations for thinking that the essential features of intuitions depend on the imagination or the understanding fall flat. The senses, but not the imagination, generate our most fundamental empirical and pure intuitions.

Chapter 3 then addresses a natural question that arises from chapter 2: what, then, does the imagination do on Kant’s account? Chapter 3 shows how the core activities of the imagination—apprehension and reproduction—generate images from given representations of the senses. In short, images are representations in which copies of a sensible manifold are associated with one another. Chapter 3 shows that apprehension should be understood as a basic form of perceptual attention or selection, while the activity of reproduction should be understood as an activity of copying appre-
hended representations and recalling copies of representations. I argue that the “law of association”
governs these processes of reproduction that are merely associative. These relations are merely asso-
ciative because they are determined by one’s own psychological history. The resulting account of
images does significant work for Kant in his empirical psychology, and it is this account that Kant
takes up in his account of cognition.

I then turn to the role of images in cognition. Chapter 4 outlines a metaphysics of the pro-
ductive imagination. The productive imagination is a derivative faculty of the mind that arises when
the faculty of apperception is instantiated in a subject that also possesses a power of imagination. I
explain why Kant was led to posit a productive imagination due to the failure of the law of associa-
tion to adequately account for human cognition. Kant appreciated like few before him that special
relations of affinity are a necessary component of human cognition. The law of association is con-
stitutive of the imagination itself, but the power of imagination—now in its productive guise—is
subject to new rules when it is joined with the faculty of apperception. I argue that some images
themselves are generated by activities of the imagination that instantiate rules that are not derivable
from the laws of association—these rules instead find their source (in part) in apperception.

I spell out the notion of “affinity” by developing what I call the penetration view in Chapter
4. According to the penetration view, the imagination’s activities change in virtue of being related
to apperception and, in turn, the understanding. On the resulting account, the imagination’s image-
production activities are “influenced by” or “affected by” the understanding, even though it is the
imagination that nevertheless generates images. What we ultimately imagine and perceive changes
in virtue of our having apperception. Because we have a capacity of apperception, our imaginative
activities are subject to new laws that govern those activities of apprehension and reproduction.

Chapter 5 then provides an account of those images that figure in human cognition. I argue
that in the first place, synthesis generates images. I then show how synthesis generates such images.
With these points in mind, I go on to explain how arithmetic, geometric, and empirical images share
a common compositional structure. I show that the images are necessary conditions for the cog-
nition of the objects presented in intuition. Images are necessary conditions for cognition because
they specify particular ways that parts of a manifold belong together. Moreover, I indicate the limitations that Kant places on imagining. In brief, I shall argue that taken by themselves, empirical images do not represent actual substances (like dogs), because empirical images are not empirical intuitions. Only empirical intuitions essentially relate to actualities. Moreover, the empirical image does not represent (say) a dog as a dog, because the empirical image alone does not represent the dog as perduring and causally efficacious. On Kant’s view, I shall argue, the image itself is representationally non-committal regarding the actuality of what it represents.

In the conclusion, I briefly evaluate the view of images and the imagination that Kant leaves us. I also consider why Kant’s overall methodology—his faculty psychology—pays philosophical dividends.

In the end, the view I develop avoids the shortcomings of the tendencies outlined above. In contrast to the deflationary accounts of the imagination, the power of imagination generates images that neither the intellect nor the senses alone can generate. In contrast to inflationary accounts, I shall provide the imagination a discrete role in cognition as image-producer, but I will argue that images are not sufficient for experience. Instead, they are the contents of perception (Wahrnehmung), and it is only a further combination of images that gives rise to experience. Though I think there is a clear sense in which images are involved in connecting intuitions and concepts, I do not think that the imagination is a general mediator; any mediating role that the imagination plays can ultimately be traced to its role as image producer.

This account also distinguishes itself from interpretation views. The imagination does not generate attitudes that we take towards objects, the imagination is not merely the capacity to represent novel items (though it is this), and the imagination is not merely a synonym for “the capacity for sensory consciousness.”

57See chapter 4 and the discussion of the Analogies.
58Van Leeuwen (2013, p. 224) distinguishes several senses of imagination. According to the constructive sense, the imagination “refers to the capacity to form novel representations.” According to the attitude sense, the imagination “refers to one’s collection of fictional attitude imaginings.” According to the imagistic sense, the imagination “refers to one’s occurrent collection of imagistic imaginings.” On my view, Kant would only come close to endorsing the imagistic sense. Images of the imagination on my view are perceptual representations, not attitudes (against the attitude sense). Images need not always be novel—they might simply represent what is in front of our senses (against the
what is given in intuition, I provide a more concrete account of what this interpretation is. An image is not a cognitive, doxastic, or otherwise intellectual representation. As products of association, images reflect a particular form of perceptual organization; much like gestalt phenomena in perceptual psychology, images reflect particular ways that our imaginations organize the deliverances of the senses.

In contrast to the intuition view, my view shall give full voice to Kant’s claim that the senses are not merely a faculty of sensation, but a faculty of intuition. So in contrast to most renditions of the intuition view, my view of sensibility in Kant notes a fundamental distinction between the senses and the imagination. But I make this distinction without portraying the senses as mere generators of a sensation snowstorm.

Finally, I think that Kant’s account of the imagination is the culmination of a tradition of thinking about the imagination. That is, though Kant’s views on the imagination are highly original, it would be a mistake to overemphasize his difference in relation to past figures. Appreciating this tradition provides a helpful framing for why we should pay attention to Kant’s account of images in the first place. Chapter 1 provides a sense of this tradition.

0.4 Methodology

Before I establish the Image Thesis in chapter 1, there are a pair of methodological concerns regarding the word ‘image’ and Kant’s texts that need to be addressed.

0.4.1 Bild and Einbildung

The first methodological point concerns the German terms that can be translated “image”: Bild and Einbildung. The term “Bild” has a number of connotations in German that center around constructive sense). Images are indeed to due to the imagining as I explain. However, one reading of the imagistic sense of imagination commits us to the idea that all images are occurrently conscious representations. As I suggest in chapters 3 and 4, that does not seem to be Kant’s view. Instead, activities of association can assemble images of which we are unconscious.
images in the sense of “pictures,” including both artifacts like photographs and psychological states like mental imagery.\textsuperscript{59} The term \textit{Einbildung} also pertains to images, but has a much stronger connotation of an illusion, fictitious, or otherwise non-veridical representation.\textsuperscript{60} Moreover, the word \textit{Einbildung} relates more commonly in colloquial usage to the faculty of imagination itself, or to token acts of imagining.

Adelung’s dictionary of high German from 1811 suggests that current linguistic intuitions regarding \textit{Bild} are similar to those in the time immediately following Kant.\textsuperscript{61} The term \textit{Bild} encompasses several meanings, including “the shape [\textit{Gestalt}] of a body and its representation or imitation”\textsuperscript{62} and the “clear representation of a visible object, or an object thought to be visible.”  Adelung notes a “broad sense” in which \textit{Bild} can refer to “any clear or sensible representation,” though there is a “narrower sense” in which it refers to the “visible representation of an object, and indeed also the representation of the object through lines and traces, as on an embossed surface.”  So a \textit{Bild} denotes a vivid sensory representation of some kind and, like the contemporary English term “image,” has a visuo-centric connotation.

There is a greater divergence between the current use of \textit{Einbildung} and its use in and around Kant’s time. The entry for \textit{Einbildung} notes that it can be “the state in which one imagines something” and does not take the plural (to my ear, talk of “imaginings” is also somewhat marked or at least creative in English). The term can also stand for “the faculty of the soul to bring forth sensible representations.”  Yet Adelung then notes that “most commonly,” \textit{Einbildung} refers to “the representation itself” associated with the faculty or activity of imagining (note that he allows that this usage of the term can take the plural). As is the case with the contemporary use of the term, an \textit{Einbildung} has the connotation of “a false or ungrounded representation.”  But Adelung’s

\textsuperscript{59}The \textit{Duden} lists several current senses of \textit{Bild}: (1) something “depicted or reproduced by artistic means on a surface; painting or drawing”; (2) a “view”; (3) a “representation, impression”; (4) a part of a play involving stationary decorations; (5) an “pictorial expression; intuitive comparison; metaphor”; (6) in mathematics, “an element assigned to another element through a mapping.”

\textsuperscript{60}The \textit{Duden} lists fewer senses of \textit{Einbildung}: (1) “fantasy” or “deceptive or false representation”; and (irrelevantly) (2) “conceit or arrogance in relations with others.”

\textsuperscript{61}The following quotations are from the respective entries in Adelung (1811).

\textsuperscript{62}Adelung adds that it is archaic by his time to use \textit{Bild} to refer to the “shape of an thing [\textit{Sache}] itself,” but that this meaning was “very frequent” previously.
dictionary suggests that German speakers in Kant’s time were far more likely to use *Einbildung* to refer to veridical cases of imagining than is currently the case. Whereas nowadays, *Einbildung* almost entirely applies to cases of non-veridical fantasy, *Einbildung* in Kant’s time was frequently used for ordinary cases of mental imagery.

In Kant’s own time, the multiplicity of meanings was noted in the philosophical literature. At times, the ambiguity in the term *Einbildung* prompted confusion. As Crusius writes in the 1740s, the meaning of the word *Einbildung*

is exceedingly fluctuating. And because much confusion prevails in the explanation of the activities of the understanding also among the experts themselves: one uses the word ‘power of imagination’ [*Einbildungskraft*] almost everywhere, where one knows no other. Whoever gives heed precisely to usage will find that the word is taken in the following different meanings. . . . 1) *Einbildung* sometimes means the same thing as error [Irrthum], or an ungrounded delusion, e.g., if one says that things don’t stand thusly, but rather it is an *Einbildung*. 2) Sometimes one understands by *Einbildung* the power to form ideas of visible objects with liveliness, and to represent them with liveliness also still to the time when one no longer senses the objects. E.g., so one says that a painter requires a good power of imagination [*Einbildungskraft*], or that in spherical trigonometry, one needs much *Einbildung*. In this meaning, the power of imagination is a power of memory [*Gedächtnisses*] aimed at a certain class [*Art*] of ideas. Another outcome of this meaning is that one calls the ideas in which one represents something visible *ideas imaginativas*. 3) Sometimes one names in general the capacity of the understanding to be able to think something absolutely and positively the power of imagination, and contrasts it with what the understanding represents in undetermined, relatively, and negative concepts. E.g., if one says that the world is so large that its extent exceeds the powers of our understanding and our *Einbildung*: then it must . . . say so much as that the world is so large that we cannot think its extent with a wholly determinate, positive, and absolute idea, and that, if we want to represent its extent also in a relatively determinate idea, nevertheless our rumination over it is exhausting. This meaning is nearly more a misuse of the word than a proper use . . . 4) One also considers the capacity of the understanding to develop imperfect ideas, of which we shall shortly say more, a kind of *Einbildung*.\footnote{Crusius (1747, §101, pp. 177ff.).}

Crusius begins by noting that some “experts” are tempted to attribute a given idea or representation to the power of imagination “where one knows no other.” So the imagination was taken by some of Crusius contemporaries as a fudge or weasel faculty that stood for the source of an idea whose
origin was unknown. Crusius thinks such mysterious faculty is unacceptable, and I take it that most major philosophers of the 18th century agreed. I take it that sense (3) of *Einbildung* would be such an “improper” way of speaking about the power of imagination, while I take sense (4) to involve a different operation altogether of improvement of an idea or “learning” in the sense of the German root *Bildung*. Crusius acknowledges the merely illusory sense of *Einbildung* (sense 1), but also notes that *Einbildung* is a particular kind of “memory” (sense 2). As is clear later in his work (see chapter 1), Crusius takes sense (2) to be fundamental to what the power of imagination is, and it is noteworthy that sense (2) comes very close to Kant’s own canonical definition of the power of imagination.

As I show in chapter 1, Kant uses both *Bild* and *Einbildung* extensively throughout his career. There is an interpretive question, then, of how to relate these two terms. This question becomes more urgent given the fact that *Einbildung* does not always refer to an image as a representational type, but instead to the “faculty” or “activity” of imagining. Additionally, one might worry that the non-veridical connotation of *Einbildung* should caution us against treating *Einbildung* and *Bild* as on a par.

My stance in this dissertation is that every instance of *Bild* can be translated “image,” while every instance of *Einbildung* requires contextual interpretation. Kant sometimes refers to the “imagination” simply as *Einbildung*, though his more frequent term for “imagination” is *Einbildungs kraft*. Yet I have made no assumptions on this front. I only translate *Einbildung* as “image” when it is clear that Kant means to denote a representational type akin to intuition, sensation, or concept (not acts like sensing or thinking, or faculties like imagination or intellect). I have also found that several native German speakers voiced varying degrees of skepticism in conversation that *Bild* and *Einbildung* could refer to an “image” or *phantasma* in the same sense, given the non-veridical connotation of *Einbildung*.64 In our survey of Adelung’s dictionary entries, we saw a reason for why current

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64 One response to this worry is that English philosophical prose has the same problem. In the history of Anglophone philosophy, many writers have referred to the imagination as “fancy” or “fantasy.” But despite the obvious connotation that such terms have to non-veridical representation, I do not think we should assume that they only apply to non-veridical perception. Still, unlike *Einbildung*, when “fancy” or “fantasy” are used to refer to the representational product of imagination, they invariably refer to non-veridical, future, or counterfactual states (‘My fantasy is to
linguistic intuitions about *Einbildung* would diverge from linguistic intuitions about *Einbildung* in the time of Kant. Nevertheless, in chapter 1, I directly argue for the claim that in many contexts, Kant and his contemporaries used *Bild* and *Einbildung* in functionally equivalent ways. I argue for this claim directly because it directly opposes the practices of most English translators of Kant and (as a consequence) opposes the intuitions of readers that rely on them. For most translators and readers seem to assume that Kant never meant to denote a particular representational type in such cases. This assumption blinds us to the regular reference Kant makes to both *Einbildungen* and *Bilder* as representational *products* of the imagination.

### 0.4.2 Kant’s precritical philosophy

The present work makes extensive reference reference to Kant’s unpublished work and student lecture notes in order to elucidate Kant’s published assertions about images. I take this to be standard operating procedure, particularly in the recent boom of work on Kant’s metaphysics. I have kept in mind, however, that distinctions like the one I intend to draw between intuition (*Anschauung*) and image (*Bild*) should either (a) be asserted by Kant in his published works or (b) solve or clarify textual puzzles present in his published works. Otherwise, the worry arises that the distinction was either not really one Kant endorsed, or else not one that Kant put to philosophical use.\(^{65}\) In fact, I believe that the distinction between images and other representational types satisfies both requirements, as I shall argue in the coming chapters. Not only does Kant require images as a distinct kind of representation, but Kant also *knew* that he required images as a distinct kind of representation.

I shall also refer to published texts, lecture notes, and reflections from both before and after 1781. There has been a resurgence of interest in Kant’s pre-critical metaphysics, and many commentators have focused on Kant’s pre-critical positions as useful comparisons to Kant’s critical

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\(^{65}\) The fact that Kant taught a broad range of university courses, for instance, means that some of the distinctions that Kant drew in lecture might have been for the benefit of the student, or as an elucidation of some view that was not his own.
doctrines regarding modality, the existence of God, and logic. It seems that less has been written on how Kant’s account of the faculties of the mind varies between the critical period and the pre-critical period.\textsuperscript{66} This dissertation is not a work that analyzes Kant’s historical philosophical progression. However, I do not think that we should assume without argument that Kant’s view of the imagination did “progress” between the pre-critical period and the critical period. I will in fact argue that Kant’s conception of the imagination does indeed undergo progression in the critical period—particularly in how the imagination relates to perception and the imagination.

Even though Kant’s later views on the imagination build on his earlier views, many of Kant’s pre-critical texts remain useful resources for his considered views. Some of Kant’s considered views regarding images receive more extensive treatment in his pre-critical works. When accompanied with careful analysis and cross-checking with Kant’s views on images in the Anthropology and in his lectures, I think these texts give us insight into Kant’s empirical psychology of images. Empirical psychology does not treat different faculties of the mind from transcendental philosophy, even though it does treat those same faculties differently and with a different emphasis. As a result, I think Kant’s pre-critical texts help us to better understand his views on images and the imagination.

\textsuperscript{66}Cf. Leland (2018) for a start on such a project.
1

Images in Kant
1.1 Introduction

This chapter argues for what I call the Image Thesis. This thesis has two components. The first component is that Kant has a technical conception of images (Bilder and Einbildungen). The second component is that a particular mental capacity—the power of imagination—is required to produce these images. The Image Thesis thus commits Kant to talk of a particular representational type (an image) as well as a proprietary, unified capacity of the mind (the power of imagination) that generates those representations. Establishing that Kant uses “image” in a consistent and technical way is no trivial task. Indeed, several commentators explicitly deny that Kant talks about mental images in the way his predecessors did.1 Most other commentators simply overlook Kant’s many references to “images.”

I suspect that the Image Thesis has been neglected amongst Kant scholars for two main reasons. Firstly, as we saw in the introduction, interpreters have had trouble placing the imagination in Kant’s cartography of faculties of the mind. In turn, and partially due to the terminological difficulties surrounding “Einbildung” and “Bild,” interpreters have not been able to match images to the mental capacity for generating representations of that type. This chapter brings the Image Thesis into relief by introducing what I call the tripartite model of the mind. According to the tripartite model, the senses, imagination, and intellect are distinct mental capacities. Because Kant adopted the tripartite model, the Image Thesis gains even more substance. For the Image Thesis claims that the power of imagination is required for generating images. Perhaps surprisingly, the senses do not generate images on their own. Though the imagination generates representations besides images, we shall see that they are all systematically related to image formation.2

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1 As a recent monograph puts it, “the notion of phantasm”—the Greek term for “image”—as a representation “produced by the imagination on the basis of sensible species delivered by our senses, is foreign to Kant” (Pollok, 2017, p. 151). Pollok then proceeds to suggest that Kant does have a theory of schemata as products of the imagination, and that these schemata are distinct from “phantasmata.” I agree with him that these are indeed distinct notions, though I disagree with him on the claim that Kant never speaks of “phantasmata” in the sense of “images.” Another scholar claims that despite Kant’s repeated insistence on the centrality of intuition to our representation of numbers and magnitudes, Kant maintains that “we have no image of numbers” (Axinn, 2013, p. 98).

2 The imagination also generates schemata (Schemata), though I shall argue that these too depend on the imagination’s capacity for image production. While “schema” as a technical term in Kant’s work has been common fodder for discussion since the publication of the first Critique, the term “image” is almost never seen as a separate technical term.
Secondly, interpreters neglect the Image Thesis because they are unable to locate the term “image” in Kant’s representational taxonomies. To be fair, “image” (Bild or Einbildung) is not one of the divisions of representation in the oft-quoted Stufenleiter passage (A320/B376). And similar to the Stufenleiter passage, Kant’s logic lectures give much more airtime to talk of “concepts” and “intuitions.” Yet as I shall argue in this chapter, these interpretive cues are deceiving. On the one hand, Kant does mention a “pure image” in the Stufenleiter taxonomy in a seemingly technical sense, and images figure in some of the central passages of the first Critique. On the other hand, talk of images is not wholly absent from Kant’s logic lectures, particularly when Kant describes the “common cognition” of objects. What’s more, Kant’s metaphysics lectures and his more recently published anthropology lectures provide a wealth of support for the Image Thesis. As these lectures make clear, Kant made frequent reference to mental images in his explanation of the imagination and various aspects of human psychology.

This chapter shows that the textual evidence for the Image Thesis is overwhelming. Yet the Image Thesis leaves open exactly how images relate to other representations of the mind. For one might accept the Image Thesis, but then dismiss its interpretive importance by identifying images with intuitions, sensations, or a subset thereof. This strategy is natural for those interpreters tempted by the Intuition View of the imagination outlined in the introduction. Maybe images are intuitions by another name. However, I reject this way of making sense of the Image Thesis. This chapter sets up an alternative view—the Distinctness Thesis—that I defend at length in the next chapter. According to the Distinctness Thesis, intuitions are fundamentally distinct from images. This chapter shows that the Distinctness Thesis is an available interpretive option, and it establishes that rejecting the Distinctness Thesis is not a trivial interpretive commitment.

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3 At, e.g., JL, 9:91.

4 Kant writes: “A concept is either an empirical or a pure concept, and pure concept, insofar as it has its origin solely in the understanding (not in a pure image [Bild] of sensibility), is called notio” (A320/B377).

5 JL, 9:27; see below for a discussion.

6 Alternatively, adherents to the Intuition View might maintain that images are parts of intuitions, and that intuitions depend on the imagination because the imagination generates essential parts of intuitions.
Here’s the plan of this chapter. I begin by establishing that imagination plays a central role in the tripartite model of the cognitive faculties of the mind, both among Kant’s predecessors and in Kant’s works (section 2). I then show that Kant’s own development of the theory of imagination directly prior to the publication of the first Critique strongly supports the Image Thesis (section 3). From there, I argue that the first Critique and other critical writings expand on this framework of the power of imagination in important ways, and that images remain an important part of his philosophy during this period (section 4). I then summarize the textual case for the Image Thesis (section 5).

1.2 Imagination and the Tripartite Model

Broadly speaking, the tripartite model distinguishes between three faculties of the mind: sense, imagination, and intellect. In turn, each of these faculties gives rise to a division of activities and representational types. Corresponding to these faculties is a division between sensing, imagining, and thinking. When these activities are brought about, they generate certain representational types, namely, sensations, images, and concepts (or thoughts). Though the tripartite model was not developed by any single thinker, this section shows that it is a backdrop to the “theory of ideas” that came to characterize theorizing on the mind up to Kant’s time.

1.2.1 Ancient to early modern philosophy

Aristotle emphasizes the divisions characteristic of the tripartite model. Aristotle distinguishes between sensing or aistethesis, imagination or phantasia, and the intellect of nous. “Imagination takes place in the absence of” sensing, as when we “dream.” What’s more, Aristotle seems to have had a conception of an image as a representation distinct from sensation. He writes that when we sense something, our mind generates a “sensory percept [aisthema]” (450a27-32). However, through a process of “memory,” the imagination proceeds to form a “cast [tupos]” of this.

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sensory percept. Aristotle considered at least some of these casts to be images (phantasmata):

Each of these [phantasmata] is, as has been said, the remains of the actual percept. And it remains when the real thing has gone.

Aristotle equally distinguishes such images (phantasmata) from thoughts or universals, which are more properly attributed to our capacity for nous. In Aristotle, we thus see roots of the tripartite model. Our senses generate sensations or sensory percepts (aisthema), the imagination generates a “cast [tupos]” or “image [phantasma]” from that sensory percept, and these images necessary but not sufficient for intellectual knowledge of universals.

In late classical and early medieval philosophy, the earliest conceptions of “representation (repraesentatio)” invoke images, not concepts or sensations. In Quintillian’s theory of oratory, the capacity to generate a “vivid illustration, or, as some prefer to call it, representation” is a necessary skill of any orator. Such “illustration” contrasts with descriptive “statements of facts,” largely because the “the latter merely lets itself be seen, whereas the former thrusts itself upon our notice.”

Consider Quintillian’s own remarks on imagining:

That which the Greeks call phantasai and we may call clear visions are those things through which the image of things not present are so represented to the soul that we seem to see them with our very eyes and have them before us.

Quintillian did not apply his conception of “representation” more generally to a philosophical theory of knowledge or of the mind. But it is striking that several late-Classical philosophers directly related the “image of things not present” to the notion of “representation”—the notion of a re-

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8See King (2018, p. 17) for an extensive discussion.
10See De Anima, Book III, chapters 3-4.
11Quintillian, Institutio oratoria, 8.3.61 (c. 95 AD); translation in Butler (1977, p. 245).
12Quintillian, Institutio oratoria, 8.3.61. As Lagerlund (2007, p. 14) puts it, “the orator describes a situation with words and tries to effect another person’s imagination with these words in order to create an inner picture, that is, the orator is re-presenting the situation for us or for our mind.”
13Quintillian, Institutio oratoria, 6.2.29-30; translated in Butler (1959, pp. 433-435). It’s worth noting that Quintillian is providing an account of how we represent other people’s emotions here. Seemingly for Quintillian, mental imagery extends both to sensory imagery (in a “vision”) and also to imagining “what it is like” to have a certain experience.
presenting of an object as if we saw that object “with our very eyes.”\textsuperscript{14}

Eventually, particularly after Avicenna began to use the notion of “representation” in his theory of cognition, the term took on a broader meaning in early modern philosophy. But even then, pre-modern philosophers tended to view “representation” as a notion strongly tied to the imagination.\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, the notion of “representation” was related to a mental image more than a millennium before the term \textit{sensatio} is first attested in the Western philosophical canon.\textsuperscript{16} These facts drive a wedge between the first two components of the tripartite model—the senses and the imagination. They also drive a wedge between their respective representations, sensations and images.

The tripartite model was preserved and elaborated in later Scholastic philosophy. Thomas Aquinas already makes several distinctions regarding the imagination in his \textit{Summa Theologiae}. He claims that both the “proper” senses like sight and touch and the “common” sense are faculties for the “reception of sensible forms.”\textsuperscript{17} In contrast, the “fantasy [\textit{phantasia}]” or “imagination [\textit{imaginatio}]” is responsible for the “retention and preservation of these forms” and thus serves as a “storehouse [\textit{thesaurus}] of forms received through the senses.”\textsuperscript{18} What’s more, Thomas Aquinas carries over the idea that images \textit{represent} objects. For he refers to the “individual matter” of a particular object “which images represent [quam \textit{repraesentant phantasmata}].”\textsuperscript{19} The images that

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{14}] Others soon after Quintillian endowed representation with a theological dimension: representation became a power to perceptually “represent” the second coming of Christ as if the second coming were actually “before us,” that is, before the mind. See Tertullian (1977, §30, pp. 300-301) in \textit{De spectaculis} (c. 197-202 AD): “And yet all these [goods associated with the second coming of Christ], in some sort, are ours, represented through faith in the imagination of the spirit [\textit{Et tamen haec iam quodammodo habemus per fidem spiritu imaginante repraesentata}].” As Lagerlund (2007, p. 16) describes Tertullian’s thought here: “We have by the power of the Holy Ghost already before Christ’s return a representation or some mental image of this arrival.” This “representation” was a kind of perceptual presentation, not a merely intellectual thought about the second coming of Christ.
\item[\textsuperscript{15}] See Lagerlund (2007, p. 29): “Avicenna finally began using the notion of a representation to describe human cognition.” Lagerlund claims that for Avicenna, “we are aware of objects external to us through our sensation of their sensible forms, which we receive via our external senses. These are collected and then represented to us in the imagination.”
\item[\textsuperscript{16}] See King (2007, p. 189). King maintains that the first use of \textit{sensatio} was in Michael Scotus’ Latin translation of Averroes’ commentary of Aristotle’s \textit{De anima} (c. 1220-1230). “Sensatio” was used to render the Greek \textit{aesthesis}, not terms related to fantasy or representation.
\item[\textsuperscript{17}] Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa Theologiae}, I, qu. 78, art. 4 (c. 1260).
\item[\textsuperscript{18}] Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa Theologiae}, I, qu. 78, art. 4 (c. 1260).
\item[\textsuperscript{19}] Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa Theologiae}, I, qu. 85 (c. 1260). The following translations are found in Hyman and Walsh (1983, pp. 552ff.).
\end{itemize}
the imagination generates are “likenesses [similitudines] of individuals,” and images do not have “the same mode of being as the human intellect.” Aquinas thus adopts the tripartite model by distinguishing the senses, the imagination, and the intellect.

The tripartite model was kept alive and well in early modern philosophy, starting with Descartes himself. For Descartes, the relationship between image and idea, and correspondingly between imagination and intellect, became crucial. Descartes introduces into philosophical discourse an example that illustrates a crucial difference between the senses, the imagination, and the intellect:

But suppose I am dealing with a pentagon: I can of course understand the figure of a pentagon, just as I can the figure of a chiliagon, without the help of the imagination; but I can also imagine a pentagon, by applying my mind’s eye to its five sides and the area contained within them. And in doing this I notice quite clearly that imagination requires a peculiar effort of mind which is not required for understanding; this additional effort of mind clearly shows the difference between imagination and pure understanding.

Firstly, Descartes allows that one could imagine a pentagon, even if one is not sensing a pentagon. This continues the tradition of seeing the imagination as a faculty for representing objects when they are not present. Secondly, Descartes makes the striking observation that even though I cannot imagine the chiliagon, I can still understand and think about the chiliagon. This “shows the difference” between two different faculties: “imagination” and “pure understanding.” Whereas I can distinguish in thought between a 999-sided figure and a 1000-sided figure, I am not able to produce an image that distinguishes between both figures. For imagining requires an “additional effort of mind” that thinking does not. Descartes’ commitment to the tripartite model is clear in his other writings when he claims the intellect is “alone capable of cognition,” even though there are exactly two other “instruments of cognition [instrumenta cognoscendi]” beyond the intellect: “imagination and sense [phantasia et sensus].”

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21 Descartes (1985a, pp. 50ff.).
22 Descartes, *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, Rule 8 (1701). Translation in Descartes (1985b, pp. 30, 32); translation modified. Descartes also differentiates the activities of the intellect from that of the imagination. For
Hobbes provides a somewhat deflated distinction between the senses and the imagination, but a distinction nonetheless:

For after the object is removed, or the eyes shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latines call Imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it Fancy; which signifies apparence, and is as proper to one sense, as to another. IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men, and many other living creatures, as well sleeping, as waking. // The decay of Sense in men waking, is not the decay of motion made in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner, as the light of the Sun obscureth the light of the stars; ... the longer the time is after sight, or Sense of any object, the weaker is the Imagination. ... Imagination and Memory are but one thing.[.]23

Hobbes provides an influential description of the relationship between the senses and the imagination. Images are fundamentally decaying impressions provided by the senses. This allows Hobbes to simply identify memory and imagination, thereby restricting imagination to the recollection of past impressions.

Hobbes departs from the tripartite view more substantially in his account of the intellect. In the introduction, we already saw how Hume adopted an inflationist view of the imagination by reducing the intellect to activities of the imagination. On this point, Hume is simply repeating a critique of the tripartite view voiced by Hobbes. For Hobbes, “the Imagination that is rysed in man (or any other creature indued with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signs, is that we generally call Understanding; and it is common to Man and Beast.”24 Hobbes thus rejects a strict distinction between the imagination and the intellect—a faculty that humans share with animals. Yet though Hobbes rejects the fundamental distinctness of the intellect and the imagination, he nevertheless saw it necessary to explain the etiology of the intellect. Hobbes took there to be at least a nominal distinction between sense, imagination, and intellect.

instance, concerning number, “we imagine some subject which is measureable in terms of a set of units” and in turn “the intellect of course may for the moment confine its attention to this set” of items imagined (Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule 14).

23Hobbes (1996, I, §2)
24Leviathan, I, 2
Yet the lineage of philosophers after Descartes that most influenced Leibniz and, eventually, Kant did not critique the tripartite model but, instead, accepted and elaborated it. So Arnauld and Nicole’s _Port Royale Logic_ enshrined the importance of the distinction between images generated by the imagination and the broader class of ideas involved in “conceiving.” They emphasize that the word “idea” should not be taken to be limited to include only “images”:

> Whenever we speak of ideas, then, we are not referring to images painted in the fantasy, but to anything in the mind when we can truthfully say that we are conceiving something, however we conceive it.\(^{25}\)

Images are thus a species of ideas. Leibniz draws out this point by showing that one can have an idea without having an image, making more explicit a point already made by Descartes:

If I am confronted with a regular polygon [i.e., a chiliagon], my eyesight and my imagination cannot give me a grasp of the thousand which it involves: I have only a confused idea both of the figure and of its number until I distinguish the number by counting. . . . The upshot is that I have this idea of a chiliagon, even though I cannot have the image of one: one’s senses and imagination would have to be sharper and more practiced if they were to enable one to distinguish such a figure from a polygon which had one side less.\(^{26}\)

For Leibniz, one can thus produce an _idea_ of a polygon, but one cannot produce an _image_ of a polygon.\(^{27}\) As with Descartes, the argument for a division between idea and image relies on the claim that the imagination cannot _distinguish_ between a 999-sided figure and a 1000-sided figure, whereas the intellect can easily do so. As Leibniz put it, one might have a “clear idea” of such a polygon, but only a “confused image” of it. As a result, “a mathematician may have precise knowledge of the nature of nine- and ten-sided figures, because he has a means for constructing and studying them, yet not be able to tell one from the other by sight.”\(^{28}\)

\(^{25}\) _Logic or the Art of Thinking_, part 1, section 1 (Arnauld and Nicole, 1996, p. 26).


\(^{27}\) Leibniz makes a similar point about very small objects: having an image of minute corpuscles “is impossible, given how our bodies are constituted” (Leibniz, 1996, pp. 263).

\(^{28}\) Leibniz (1996, pp. 261-2). Leibniz also allows that the opposite is often true. Through “long practice,” an “empiric’s kind of knowledge” can generate “clear images” of objects like 10-sided shapes and 99-pound weights (Leibniz, 1996, pp. 262).
1.2.2 Kant’s German predecessors

This brisk overview is enough to show that by the time Christian Wolff’s Leibnizian philosophy became popular in the German-speaking world in the 18th century, there was already in place a view on which sensations (or impressions), images, and ideas (or concepts) were separate mental items. Roughly, there was historical precedent for a distinction between sensation (or “impression” or “percept”) and image, because images were held to be “casts” or “copies” of previous sensations. This distinction obtained even despite the fact that different thinkers—from Aristotle to Hobbes to Leibniz—had contrasting conceptions of this distinction. In turn, there was historical precedent for a distinction between image and idea (or “conception”), because many philosophers followed Descartes in recognizing cases in which we have ideas by which we can distinguish objects, even though we lack images by which to distinguish those same objects.

Leibniz’s *Nouveaux Essais*, which contains much of Leibniz’s discussion of images, was not published until 1765, nearly half a century after Wolff ascends to popularity in Germany. However, Leibniz’s *Monadologie* was well-known to Wolff and to other philosophers of the time, and the translation of this work provides two helpful points of guidance moving forward. First, regarding images, Leibniz writes that “souls, in general, are living mirrors or images [images] of the universe of creatures” while “minds are also images [images] of the divinity itself.” In the first German translation of the *Monadologie* by Heinrich Köhler in 1720, Köhler renders “image” as *Abbildung*—roughly, a picture, copy, or illustration.29 In Wolff and post-Wolffian philosophy, as we saw in the introduction and as we shall now see in more detail, the most common words in German for “image” are *Bild* and *Einbildung*—words that obviously share an etymology with *Abbildung*. Second, the translation of the *Monadologie* also provides orientation regarding the tripartite model. In that same translation, Köhler translates the French *images* as ‘*Abbildung,*’ while he translates the French *perception* as ‘*Empfindung* oder *Perception*’ and the French *apperception* as ‘*Apperception* oder *Bewust seyn*’.30 Apperceiving, as a verb, is translated both as ‘*sich bewusst sein*’ and

29Leibniz (1720, p. 42)
30See the complete analysis in Tolley (2017a).
‘wahrnehmen’. That is, the German word usually translated “sensation” (Empfindung) corresponds to Leibniz’s perception, while the German words usually translated “consciousness” (Bewußtsein) or “perception” (Wahrnehmung) corresponds to Leibniz’s apperception. These terminological clarifications are important to keep in mind because we will see that by the time Crusius and Tetens pen their critical responses to the prevalent Wolffian psychological theory, (a) sensations (Empfindungen) are differentiated from (b) images (Bilder, Einbildungen), and (b) images are differentiated from (c) ideas (Ideen), thoughts (Gedanken), and even concepts (Begriffe).31

**Wolff**

We can first turn to Christian Wolff’s very influential work that has come to be known as the *German Metaphysics*. There, Wolff describes a faculty of imagination that produces images:

> The representations of such things that are not present, one tends to call images [Einbildungen]. And the power of the soul to bring forth those representations, one calls the power of imagination [Einbildungs-Krafft].32

Since images [Einbildungen] do not represent everything clearly that was contained in the sensations [Empfindungen], there is a great obscurity [Dunkelheit] in them.33

Wolff thus claims that there is a certain kind of representation, an image (Einbildung), that is different in some way from sensation and that is produced by a special power of the mind (Einbildungs-Krafft). Furthermore, he suggests that we have a “power to invent [erdichten]” that involves the production of images. He describes two different deployments of this power:

> The first manner consists in the fact that we take apart [zertheilen] as we please those things that we either have actually seen or had before us only in the image [im Bilde] and compose [zusammen setzen] the parts of various things as we please: whereby something results that we have not yet seen. In this way, one has brought forth the form of Melusine, who is half human and half fish; the form of the angel, if they are painted as flying humans. . . . And herein consists the power to invent, through

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31 See also chapter 3.
32 Wolff (1720, §235)
33 Wolff (1720, §236)
which we occasionally bring forth something that is not possible, and for this reason is called an empty image [eine leere Einbildung].

This passage illustrates that both Bild and Einbildung designate a kind of representation we form of certain (often impossible) objects. Wolff thus thought that our power to “invent” or “imagine” resulted in special representations distinct from sensations: images.

### Baumgarten

This general terminology was later adopted by Georg Friedrich Meier in his German translation of Alexander Baumgarten’s textbook Metaphysica—a book that Kant frequently used in lecture courses. Baumgarten characterizes “sense” as a “faculty of sense” that generates “sensations” that are “the representations of my present state.” He goes on to differentiate sense from the imagination. Baumgarten writes that “the representation of a past state of the world, and hence of my past state . . . is an image (imagination, a sight, a vision) [phantasma (imaginatio, visum, visio); Meier: Einbildung]. Therefore I form images [phantasmata; Meier: Einbildungen], or imagine [imaginor], through the power of the soul for representing the universe according to the position of my body.”

More specifically, “images [Imagines; Meier: Bild[er]]” are “signs of the figure of something else [signa figurae alterius; Meier: Zeichen der Gestalt des andern Dinges].” Baumgarten thus distinguishes sensations (as representations of my present state) from images (as representations of my past state), which in turn funds a distinction between sense and imagination.

Baumgarten characterizes the imagination (“the faculty of imagining [imaginandi], or the faculty of imagination [phantasian] [Meier: Einbildungskraft oder das Vermögen der Einbildungen]”) as a faculty involved in acts of imagining that generate images as representational products. He writes that “since my images [imaginationes; Meier: Einbildungen] are perceptions [percep-

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34 Wolff (1720, sec. 242)
35 Baumgarten (2013, §534)
36 Baumgarten (2013, §558). It is also worth noting here that Kant himself wrote in his copy of the Latin text next to “phantasma” the term Einbildung, suggesting that he took Einbildung to be a representational type—an image—in the way that a phantasma also denotes a representational type. See the marginalia to Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, AA 15:19.
37 Baumgarten (2013, §558)
tiones] of things that were formerly present . . . they are perceptions of the senses that, while I imagine [imaginor; Meier: ich sie mir einbilde], are absent.” Just as the imagination is distinct from sense, so too is the imagination distinct from “judgment” as the capacity to “perceive the perfection and imperfection of things” and the “intellect” as the “faculty of knowing something distinctly.” Images (Einbildungen) are thus a product of an act of imagining (einbilden) that is made possible by a special faculty for having images (Vermögen der Einbildungen). And following Wolff’s German usage, Meier’s translation of Baumgarten chooses both Einbildung and Bild as German terms to indicate representations produced by the faculty of imagination.

**Crusius**

In his *Weg zur Gewissheit*, Christian August Crusius (1715-1775) characterizes the “understanding,” that is, “the set of powers of a spirit through which it represents something.” His description of the main powers (Hauptkräfte) of the mind indicates his intent to distinguish the power for *sensation* from the power for *images*. The first main power is the power of sensation (Empfindungskraft). Sensation allows us to represent a thing “as existing and present [existierend und gegenwärtig].” While various “outer sensations” correspond to our different outer senses, “inner sensation” is the “power of consciousness.” Here, we thus have a distinction between (a) outer sensation and the outer senses and (b) inner sensation or consciousness and inner sense. Importantly, and in keeping with the tripartite model, inner sense is a capacity that only humans possess and that makes possible the intellect.

Crusius goes on to enumerate additional main powers beyond the faculty of sensation, including “memory,” “judicum,” and “ingenium” or “power of invention.” In turn the power of imagination (Einbildungskraft) is a “derivative power,” a “faculty of the understanding, which flows

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38 Baumgarten (2013, §558)
39 Baumgarten (2013, §§606, 624). The intellect in turn engages in the activities of attention, abstraction, reflection, and comparison, and in that order of logical priority.
41 Crusius (1747, §64, p. 111)
42 Crusius (1747, §65, p. 113)
43 Crusius (1747, SS88-100)
from memory and *ingenio* simultaneously."\(^{44}\) Whereas the “imagination of memory” is “that by means of which an idea, by being thought with liveliness, also makes other ideas lively which have previously been thought with and next to those ideas,” the “imagination of ingenii” is “that by means of which an idea, if it becomes lively, also makes certain others lively which have a possible agreement with that idea.”

Crusius explicitly distinguishes images and sensations as distinct representation types, and it is notable that neither “faculty of inference” nor the “faculty of judgment”—both of which are basic powers of the mind for Crusius—are required for or involved in image formation. Images (*Einbildungen*) are not sensations (*Empfindungen*)—even though it is possible to confuse one for the other, as we shall see in chapter 3.\(^{45}\) These images and sensations are distinct from propositions (*Sätze*).\(^{46}\) Thus, both in terms of mental faculties and in terms of the representations those faculties produce, Crusius distinguishes the imagination from both (a) outer sensation and (b) consciousness in conformity with the tripartite model.

**Tetens**

Finally, one of the most direct influences on Kant’s theory of the imagination was Johannes Nikolaus Tetens. I will not discuss the exact details of Tetens’ account and its influence on Kant here.\(^{47}\) Still, it is not difficult to discern a similar terminological tendency in Tetens that we found in Wolff, Baumgarten, and Crusius.

To begin, Tetens distinguishes “sensations” from “representations of sensation [*Empfindungs Vorstellungen*],” and he calls representations of sensation “phantasmata or images [*Einbildungen*].”\(^{48}\)" 

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\(^{44}\)Crusius (1747, §§101-2, pp. 176-9). Imagination is divided “into the *imagination of memory* and that of *ingenii.*”

\(^{45}\)Crusius thus writes an entire section with the heading “How true sensations [*Empfindungen*] are distinguished from images [*Einbildungen*] of the wake and healthy” (Crusius, 1747, §436, p. 773). Crusius explicitly distinguishes sensations from ideas of memory (*Gedächtnisideen*), which can arise either from the imagination or from judgment (Crusius, 1747, §118).

\(^{46}\)See Crusius (1747, §117ff.). It is worth noting that in this passage (the beginning to the third chapter, “On the differences and relations of concepts”), Crusius seems to equate concept (*Begriff*), representation (*Vorstellung*), and idea (*Idee*).

\(^{47}\)See Allison (2015, ch. 5) for a review. See also Tolley and Tracz (2020) for an account of Tetens’ view of “experience.”
Tetens thus distinguishes sensations from images; likewise, he distinguishes the senses that produce sensations from the imagination that is responsible for images. Tetens also distinguishes images from ideas. As he puts it, “the idea [Idee] is, if this word is taken still in its restricted meaning, a representation with consciousness, an image [Bild] that is distinguished from other images. Ideas arise only when images are “distinguished” from one another. Moreover, Tetens maintains that these conscious ideas are required to perceive (gewahrnehmen) objects, and he claims that this sort of consciousness involves “imagistic clarity” of the representation.

Beyond these distinctions between representations, Tetens put forth a rich cartography of the imagination. He describes “the activities of representation [Vorstellungstätigkeiten]” as “comprehended under these three” different steps that are worth quoting at length:

We **first** take up into ourselves the original representations from sensations, and entertain these representations by post-sensing [nachempfinden], and we store these post-sensations as taken-up sketches [aufgenommene Zeichnungen] of the sensed objects into ourselves. This is perception [Perception] or the power to grasp [Fassungskraft]. **Second**, these representations of sensation are reproduced, even if the first sensations have ceased, that is, they hitherto are brought forth again, so that they can be perceived [gewahrgenommen] with consciousness. One ascribes this effect generally to the power of imagination [Einbildungskraft] or to fantasy [Phantasie]. In particular, the representations pulled out again from the outer senses are called images [Einbildungen], or phantasmata. In general, they are summarized, along with those among inner sense, under the name of re-representations [Wiedervorstellungen].

**Third**, [the power of representation] also produces new images [Bilder] and representations from the material taken up in the sensations. These effects were already displayed above. The soul can not only order and place its representations, as the custodian of a gallery places and orders images [Bilder], but rather it is itself a painter and invents and completes new paintings. These performances belong to the fictive faculty [Dichtungsvermögen].

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48 Tetens (1777, pp. 37-8)
49 Tetens (1777, p. 97)
50 The following passage is representative: “Representations are only images [Bilder] of the objects for us, insofar as they possess the thought, imagistic clarity [bildliche Klarheit] and distinctness; and no further. Insofar as they cannot be perceived [gewahrgenommen] with attention, and thus not sufficiently distinguished and separated from one another for this purpose, < then > they are for us mere modifications in the soul, which lack an analogy with objects, through which alone they can only be representations of objects [Sachen]” (Tetens, 1777, p. 98).
51 Tetens (1777, pp. 105-6)
52 Tetens (1777, p. 107)
Here, Tetens claims that the power of imagination (\textit{Einbildungskraft}) “reproduces” sensations “so that they can be perceived with consciousness.” Sensation (\textit{Empfindung}) bears the relation to consciousness (\textit{Bewusstsein}) for Tetens that perception bore to apperception for Leibniz. The power of imagination is crucial at least for generating perception of past items that are “reproduced.” Furthermore, in this process, images (\textit{Einbildungen}) are “representations pulled out again from the outer senses,” and the power for images or imagination (\textit{Einbildungskraft}) produces these images. Yet as Tetens goes on to note in the third step, reproducing what occurs in sensation does not exhaust the possible content of images. For through the fictive faculty (\textit{Dichtungsvermögen}), we are able to form “new images” just as a painter is able to form new images.

From this brisk history, we can draw two important lessons for our present purposes. First, Kant’s predecessors and contemporaries took images—\textit{phantasmata}, \textit{Bilder}, and \textit{Einbildungen}—to be representational types. Several German authors explicitly gloss the traditional Greek term for image (\textit{phantasma}) and the traditional Latin term for image (\textit{imago} and its derivatives) as \textit{Bild} and \textit{Einbildung}. These immediate predecessors to Kant introduced the faculty of imagination by routinely indicating that it is a faculty for producing a special representational type, an image (\textit{Einbildung}, \textit{Bild}). The \textit{Einbildungskraft} is literally a power of the mind for having images. Second, Kant’s predecessors adopted the tripartite model. They universally posited (a) \textit{senses} that are distinct from (b) \textit{imagination}, but they also regularly distinguished (b) the imagination from (c) the \textit{intellect} or else a more sophisticated form of \textit{consciousness}. Though some authors like Hume and Hobbes attempted to revise this framework, it is clear that Kant’s immediate German predecessors were committed to a version of the tripartite model.

1.2.3 Kant and the tripartite model

On the tripartite model, the imagination is thus pulled into two different directions. On the one hand, it differs with the \textit{senses} in that it involves representing things that are absent to the senses. On the other hand, it differs from the \textit{intellect} because it is perceptual or sensory. The imagination involves a special capacity to hold on to what I have sensed, but also to represent what
I have never sensed. Indeed, imagination is also required for making sense of what I sense. It is this complex web of job descriptions for the imagination that Kant inherits from his predecessors.

Kant fundamentally preserves the tripartite model from his predecessors, though Kant also makes a number of specific claims that carve out his own brand of the tripartite model. When Kant enumerates the “original sources [ursprüngliche Quelle]” that “contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience” (A94), he asserts that there are three such original sources that “cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind”: “sense, power of imagination, and apperception.”

Against interpreters who try to argue to the contrary, I think that this division of sources is central to both editions of the Critique.\(^{53}\) And as we shall see, the tripartite model animates Kant’s views beyond the Critique. Still, Kant’s distinguishing of the three sources of experience is complicated by his foundational distinction between “sensibility” and the “understanding.” Famously, Kant claims that for humans, the understanding is the faculty of concepts, whereas sensibility is the faculty of intuitions. Sensibility is “the capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects” (A19/B33), while the understanding is the “faculty for thinking of objects of sensible intuition” (A51/B75). Just as experience depends on the three “original sources,” so too does experience depend on sensibility and understanding.

These two sets of distinctions can thus seem redundant. The tripartite model seems to cross-cut the distinction between sensibility and understanding. But I think a close look at Kant’s texts reveals that Kant is actually very explicit about how sensibility and understanding, on the one hand, relate to sense, imagination, and apperception, on the other. First, sense and imagination are both

\(^{53}\)In the second chapter of the Analytic of Principles, Kant again argues that his proof of the principles will proceed “from the subjective sources [aus den subjektiven Quellen] of the possibility of a cognition of an object in general” (A149/B188). For Kant, the a priori principles of the understanding are “not themselves grounded in higher and more general cognitions,” which prohibits them from having a proof that is carried out “objectively” (A149/B188). But Kant’s point in the passage above is that they can still have a proof from these subjective sources, just not a proof that proceeds from an antecedent cognition or principle. Moreover, when Kant announces the “supreme principle of all synthetic judgments,” he again emphasizes that synthetic a priori judgments are possible “if we relate the formal conditions of a priori intuition, the synthesis of the power of imagination, and its necessary unity in a transcendental apperception to a possible cognition of experience in general” (A158/B197). He is again alluding to the three subjective sources “from which” all a priori principles will be proved: sense, power of imagination, and apperception.
the constituent sub-faculties of sensibility. The heart of the B Deduction reasons that “since all of our intuition is sensible, the power of imagination [Einbildungskraft], on account of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the concepts of understanding belongs to sensibility” (B151). As Kant frequently states, “sensibility involves two things, sense and power of imagination.” Moreover, he also refers to both sense and imagination as constituents of the “faculty of intuition.” The main difference between sense and imagination comes in the fact that the senses represent present objects, whereas the imagination is “the faculty to represent objects in intuition even without their presence” (B151).

Second, for Kant, the understanding essentially involves a relation between apperception and the imagination. I shall have more to say about this point in chapter 4. But it is worth noting that Kant at least once claims that the three “original sources” are actually the very basis of the understanding. For he claims that “three subjective sources of cognition” actually “make possible even the understanding” (A97). Such a claim suggests that a full explication of the human understanding is only possible once we take into account certain features of these three original sources. So Kant did indeed coordinate his rendition of the tripartite model with his famous distinction between sensibility and understanding.

As I hope to show, Kant’s view of images is the result of a creative application of this tripartite model. He takes there to be a fundamental difference between sensations and empirical intuitions; but as I argue in the following chapters, he also takes images to be distinct from both sensations and empirical intuitions. This latter distinction between representations tracks the distinction between the faculties senses from the imagination. If we take this tripartite model se-

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54 LDW, 24:753; cf. Anth, 7:153
55 Cf. MM, (1782-1783): “The faculty of intuition, insofar as it begins from the presence of the object, is sense [Sinn]; insofar as it is without object, but yet is in respect to time, is power of imagination [Einbildungskraft]; and without any relation of the object in time, the fictive faculty [Dichtungsvermögen]. These three faculties constitute the intuition of objects” (29:881). And again in ML2, (1790-1791?): The senses [Sinne] give the faculty of intuition. The faculty of intuition without presence of the object, but as in the past of future time, is the power of imagination [Einbildungskraft]. The faculty of intuition entirely without any time is the fictive faculty [Dichtungsvermögen]. The senses are the faculty of intuition through the presence of the object” (28:585). See also MD, 28:672; Anth, 7:153.
56 Kant seems to preserve this position in the B-edition. He claims that what he goes on to call the “qualitative” unity of apperception is “the ground of the unity of different concepts in judgments, and hence of the possibility of the understanding, even in its logical use” (B131, my emphasis).
riously as Kant’s own, then I think we are led to distinguish the cognitive role of *intuition* from the cognitive role of *images*—both of which are distinguished from the cognitive role of essentially intellect-dependent representations like schemata and concepts.

### 1.3 The Early Framework of Image Production in Kant

Now that we have established that Kant maintains a version of the tripartite model, we can now appreciate the significance of claiming that the imagination is the unique faculty of the mind responsible for producing images. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to establishing the Image Thesis while also motivating the Distinctness Thesis. This section focuses on Kant’s view of images and the imagination that began in his pre-critical work and was developed in his lecture courses in anthropology and metaphysics.

The connection between images and the imagination as a mental capacity to represent objects even without their presence is not an innovation of Kant’s critical period.\(^{57}\) In his pre-critical *Essay on the Maladies of the Head* (1764), Kant writes:

> The soul of every person is even at work in a healthy state, to paint [malen] various images [Bilder] of things that are not present, or also to complete [vollenden] an incomplete similarity in the representation of present things through this or that chimerical feature that the creative fictive capacity [schöpferische Dichtungsfähigkeit] draws into the sensation [in die Empfindung einzeichnet].\(^{58}\)

The soul of mature humans in a “healthy state” is thus “at work” in producing “images of things that are not present.” Moreover, image formation is not limited to the representation of absent objects. For the “creative fictive capacity” might also represent absent properties of objects that actually are present. So even in this early text, Kant provides a role for images in representing absent objects and absent properties of present objects.\(^{59}\)

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\(^{57}\)As Makkreel (1994, chapter 1) and Lohmar (1993) describe at length, Kant’s views on the imagination became significantly more complex in the 1770s up to the publication of the first *Critique*.

\(^{58}\)VKK, 2:264

\(^{59}\)To be clear, Kant is not claiming in either case that we represent these objects or properties as absent, or that an “absence” is part of the content of the image. Instead, he is claiming such images represent objects that are absent—
In his pre-critical polemic *Dreams of a Spirit Seer* (1766), Kant makes a similar distinction between “fantastical images” and “real sensation as an impression of the senses.”60 I shall return to these pre-critical texts in chapter 3 when we discuss the constitution of images in greater detail. For now, it is clear that Kant had a relatively traditional account of images prior to the 1770s that he used to explain psychological ailments and to criticize “spirit-seers” who were in the throws of metaphysical illusion.

Kant’s lecture courses provide extensive support for the Image Thesis. In his pre-critical metaphysics courses from the 1770s, Kant develops an account of what he calls the “formative faculty” (*Bildungsvermögen*) or “formative power (*Bildungskraft*).” This formative faculty is “a faculty for making out of itself cognitions which in themselves nevertheless have the form according to which objects would affect our senses” and that it “actually belongs to sensibility.”61 Kant then divides this formative faculty into three parts:62

1. the faculty of illustration (< facultas formandi; G: Vermögen der Abbildung >), whose representations are of present time;

2. the faculty of imitation (< facultas imaginandi; G: Vermögen der Nachbildung >), whose representations are of past time;

3. the faculty of anticipation (< facultas praevidenti; G: Vermögen der Vorbildung >), whose representations are of future time.

Kant continues to maintain that the imagination represents both present, past, and future items.63

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60TG, 2:343
61ML1, 28:235; cf. R 331, 15:130
62This taxonomy is also present in other of Kant’s lectures from this period. E.g., MM, 29:880; AF, 25:211ff.
63On *Abbild* and *Abbildung*, see Kant’s remark regarding physiognomy in the *Anthropology* and how we cognize human character traits: “... the uniqueness of a human form, which indicates particular tendencies or capacities of the intuited subject, can be understood not through description through concepts, but rather through illustration [Abbildung] and exhibition [Darstellung] in the intuition [die Eigenthümlichkeit einer menschlichen Gestalt, die auf gewisse Neigungen oder Vermögen des angeschauten Subjects hindeutet, nicht durch Beschreibung nach Begriffen, sondern durch Abbildung und Darstellung in der Anschauung oder ihrer Nachahmung verstanden werden kann]” (AA 7:296; cf. AA 18:51). He also speaks of an “illustration of that holy monogram [Abbildung von jenem heiligen Monogramm]” (AA 10:155).
As Kant puts it in notes from this period, “the faculty of illustration of a sensible, present object is fundamental” while imitation and anticipation occur “according to” the faculty of illustration.\textsuperscript{64}

Here’s an example of how “illustration” of the present is supposed to work:

My mind is always busy with forming the image \([\text{Bild}]\) of the manifold while it goes through [it]. E.g., when I see a city, the mind then forms an image of the object which it has before it while it runs through the manifold. Therefore if a human being comes into a room which is piled high with pictures and decorations, then he can make no image of it, because his mind cannot run through the manifold. It does not know from which end it should begin in order to illustrate the object. So it is reported that when a stranger enters St. Peter’s church in Rome, he is wholly disconcerted on account of the manifold splendor. The cause is: his soul cannot go through the manifold in order to illustrate it \([\text{es sich abzubilden}]\). This illustrative faculty is the imaging faculty of intuition \([\text{Dieses abbildende Vermögen ist das bildende Vermögen der Anschauung}]\). The mind must undertake many observations in order to illustrate an object so that it illustrates the object differently from each side. E.g., a city appears differently from the east than from the west. There are thus many appearances of a matter according to the various sides and points of view. The mind must make an illustration from all these appearances by taking them all together.\textsuperscript{65}

Images are formed by “going through” a sensory manifold. In the case of certain objects, like St. Peter’s Church, the imagination needs to bring together parts of the manifold as presented from “various sides and points of view.” The “formative faculty” is thus important for providing us particular types of unified representations of objects.

Now in this lecture, Kant suggests that this formative faculty \textit{contrasts} with the “power of imagination \([\text{Einbildungskraft}]\).” For instance, the faculty of imitation is the “faculty of reproductive imagination \([\text{Vermögen der Imagination}]\).”\textsuperscript{66} However, “elsewhere it is falsely called the faculty of imagination \([\text{Einbildungsvermögen}]\), which is however of a wholly different sort, for it is one thing when I imagine a palace that I have seen earlier and something else when I make new images \([\text{Bilder}]\).”\textsuperscript{67} At some points, Kant seems to align \textit{Bildung} with the representation of past,
present, and future objects, whereas he aligns Einbildung with the representation of objects that are invented and that have never been perceived before.  

Yet in both passages, Kant maintains that the faculty for Bildung and the faculty for Einbildung both involve the generation of images (Bilder).

Closely associated with the faculty of Einbildung, the “facultas fingendi” is the Latin term for what is rendered in German as the Dichtungsvermögen, the “fictive faculty.” This faculty allows us to produce new representations in which we “fabricate not the matter, but rather the form.” This is, in turn, what Kant ends up calling the “productive power of imagination”: the power of imagination (Einbildungskraft) “with respect to objects” can “either be merely reproductive (mere memory); productive (fictive faculty [Dichtungsvermögen] < facultas fingendi >) with respect to form, though it is slow in that and requires much practice.”

Unlike memory of the past and anticipation of the future, the fictive faculty is a “use of the power of imagination, but without regard to time.” It is important to keep in mind going forward that both Bildung and Einbildung fly under the heading of what Kant comes to call the power of imagination (Einbildungskraft) in the critical period. This is so, even though what Kant associates with Bildung is largely transferred to what he calls the “reproductive power of imagination,” while what he associates with Einbildung is largely transferred to what he calls the “productive power of imagination”—though this simplification bears

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68 As in the following cases: (1) “The faculty of imagination [Vermögen der Einbildung] is the faculty for producing images [Bilder] from oneself, independent of the actuality of objects, where the images are not borrowed from experience. E.g., an architect pretends to build a house which he has not yet seen. One calls this faculty the faculty of fantasy, and [it] must not be confused with reproductive imagination [Imagination]” (ML, 28:237). (B) “The imagination [Einbildung] distinguishes itself from the formative power [Bildungskraft] in that the former makes an image without the presence of the object [ohne Gegenwart des Gegenstandes ein Bild macht] (indeed from materials from the senses), either fingendo or abstrahendo” (R 331, 15:130). See Makkreel (1994, pp. 12-13).

69 Cf. R 331, 15:130
70 MD, 28:674
71 MD, 28:674; cf. AF, 25:211
72 AS2, VWe13
substantial elaboration.\textsuperscript{73}

Thus, for Kant, images play a role in the representation of objects that are present to the senses. Kant also suggests that the power of imagination \textit{(Einbildungskraft)} is a faculty of representing objects that need not have been present to the senses. What Kant eventually calls the “power of imagination” in the critical period encompasses the power both to represent objects in the past, the present, and the future \textit{(in Bildung)} and also to represent objects that are not in time at all \textit{(in Einbildung)}. These lecture notes support the Image Thesis: Kant, like his predecessors, took the power of imagination to be a producer of images.

\section*{1.4 Images in the Critical Philosophy}

Let’s now turn to how this narrative plays out in Kant’s critical period. As I will show, and as is consistent with the history above, images and various acts of imagining play a fundamental role in representing objects both when they \textit{are} and when they \textit{are not} present to the senses. Additionally, we will see that it is far from obvious that Kant ever meant to assimilate the role of intuition to that of image in the critical period. That is, I want to show that the Distinctness Thesis is compatible with Kant’s texts.

\subsection*{1.4.1 Transcendental Deduction}

An initial place of interest is Kant’s Transcendental Deduction in the first \textit{Critique}. Even though the Transcendental Deduction was entirely rewritten between the A and B editions of the \textit{Critique}, images and the power of imagination play important roles in both versions of the Deduction. I will consider the A edition first since it provides a nice general framework for situating images in Kant’s overall theory of empirical cognition.

The first place we see Kant speak of images in the A Deduction is in his “preliminary reminder” section that outlines the “threefold synthesis.” In accordance with the tripartite model,
Kant lays out the “three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely sense, power of imagination, and apperception” (A94). Corresponding to these three “original sources,” Kant describes three different syntheses or mental acts. Here are the section headings in table form:

3. On the Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept [Rekognition im Begriffe] (A103)

Kant is thus noting a progression of three representational types that correspond to three mental acts (or parts of one act)\(^{74}\) that in turn are due to three faculties of the mind. What is usually ignored is the first claim: that each of these syntheses corresponds to a different representational type.\(^{75}\) If we look carefully, we see that Kant is marking a progression from intuition (Anschauung) to image (Einbildung) to concept (Begriff). We should read Einbildung here as “image” or “representation of the imagination” for the sake of consistency and parallel structure: just as concepts and intuitions are representational types, so too are the images of the synthesis of reproduction.\(^{76}\) It is inaccurate, then, to take Kant only to be talking about the faculty of imagination here. Furthermore, the representational type Einbildung is set off from the activity of reproduction. Given that Kant’s predecessors use Einbildung to denote a representational type, it is unsurprising that Kant invokes the

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\(^{74}\)I do not want to prejudge the important question of whether the threefold synthesis is comprised of separable acts, or whether it is one act with three “partial acts.” Kant suggests that the power of imagination is itself responsible for at least the first two syntheses of apprehension and reproduction (cf. A102), even if apprehension involves sense (Sinn) in a way that reproduction does not. Cf. Kitcher (1990), Longuenesse (1998), and Matherne (2015) for contrasting accounts.

\(^{75}\)Longuenesse (1998, p. 35) also acknowledges the reading of Einbildung in the threefold synthesis that I want to provide. Yet she seems to think that the synthesis that produces an image also produces an intuition, which I reject; furthermore, she says little about images as distinct from intuitions.

\(^{76}\)Kant’s notes support this claim. In a note, Kant provides a gloss of “synthesis” and claims that it occurs as follows: “Entweder der apprehension als empfindungen oder der reproduction als Einbildungen oder der recognition als Begriffe” (AA, 18:268). This passage strongly suggests that Einbildung is being used to note countable representations, just like sensations and concepts. Kant could not be using Einbildung to note multiple faculties (“faculties of power of imagination [?]”), and it seems very unlikely that he is counting mental acts (“acts of imagining [?]”).
term in this way. In all, Kant seems to be marking a distinction here between intuition (Anschauung) and image (Einbildung) in his map of synthesis in the A-edition Transcendental Deduction.

In fact, this suggestion is supported by the crucial section known as the deduction “from below” or the “subjective deduction.” There, Kant’s aim is to explain how our mind produces cognition from the manifold given in intuition. Though the details will have to wait until chapter 2, one of Kant’s central claims is that we must apprehend the manifold given in intuition in order to form an image. That is, “the power of imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition into an image [Bild]; it must therefore antecedently take up the impressions into its activity, i.e., apprehend them” (A120). Thus, Kant thinks that the first synthesis of apprehension is required for image production. From here, and as we would expect from the preliminary reminder section, Kant then claims that reproduction is also required for image production. He writes:

It is, however, clear that even this apprehension of the manifold alone would bring forth no image [Bild] and no connection of the impressions were there not a subjective ground for calling back a perception, from which the mind has passed on to another, to the succeeding ones, and thus for exhibiting [darzustellen] entire series of perceptions, i.e., a reproductive faculty of the power of imagination, which is then also merely empirical. (A121)

Images are formed when we apprehend a manifold and reproduce the “perceptions” that we generate in apprehending the manifold. Thus, just as the Einbildung depended on a synthesis of reproduction, so too does the Bild in this passage depend on the “reproductive faculty” of the power of imagination. The natural interpretation is that Bild and Einbildung are being used synonymously in both of the passages we have discussed so far.

There is another important passage in the subjective deduction in which Kant seems to correlate images with perception (Wahrnehmung) and to sever both images and perception from the faculty of sense (Sinn). Kant writes:

No psychologist has yet thought that the power of imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception [Wahrnehmung] itself. This is so partly because this faculty has been limited to reproduction, and partly because it has been believed that the senses [Sinne] do not merely afford us impressions but also put them together, and produce
images [Bilder] of objects, for which without doubt something more than the receptivity of impressions is required, namely a function of the synthesis of them. (A120, note)

Whether Kant’s criticism of his predecessors is accurate is an interesting question that I shall not consider. It is clear, though, that Kant thinks it critical that the power of imagination is required for perception. Furthermore, he sets off his own position from one on which the senses produce images of objects. Kant’s claims in this footnote thus cohere with his claims about Einbildung: we cannot form a Bild of an object merely via the senses. Rather, in order for a Bild to arise, the power of imagination must perform a “function of synthesis,” that is, a synthesis of apprehension and reproduction. In all, the power of imagination is uniquely functionally related to the production of images in the A Deduction.

Turning to the B Deduction, Kant actually provides an important example of an image:

time, although it is not itself an object of outer intuition at all, cannot be made representable to us except under the image [Bilde] of a line, insofar as we draw [zeichnen] it, without which sort of presentation we could not cognize [erkennen] the unity of its measure at all[.]. (B156)

This is a passage echoed in Kant’s earlier Inaugural Dissertation:

Thus, space is also applied as an image [typus] to the concept of time itself, representing it by a line and its limits (moments) by points. 78

In both cases, Kant seems to be suggesting that to “cognize the unity of the measure” of time, we must produce an image. In the Inaugural Dissertation, Kant argues that a spatial typus is “applied” to the “concept” of time (typus is often translated Bild in German; typus equally means “bas-relief” or “surveyor’s ground plan” in English). 79

Setting aside for now the questions such passages prompt, I want to point to one more passage where Kant seems to view images as important for cognition. This passage comes from the

77 Allison (2015, chapter 3, appendix) reviews whether this claim is a actually true for Tetens, concluding that Kant’s account lives up to its claim in this remark. Cf. Dyck (2014, pp. 56ff.).
78 MSI, 2:405
79 See Ameriks’ translation of this passage (p. 399).
third Critique in Kant’s famous discussion of the divine understanding—the *intellectus archetypus*—and its contrast to the human understanding—the *intellectus ectypus*. Here again, we see the root “*typus*” in the adjectives modifying what kind of understanding is in question. The understandings in question differ in the kind of *typus* proper to each faculty. What is important for our purposes is Kant’s summary statement:

> it is not at all necessary here to prove that such an *intellectus archetypus* is possible, but only that in the contrast of it with our discursive, image-dependent understanding [*unseres discursiven, der Bilder bedürftigen Verstandes*] (*intellectus ectypus*) and the contingency of such a constitution, we are led to that idea (of an *intellectus archetypus*), and that this does not contain any contradiction.\(^{80}\)

Thus, Kant claims that an “ectypal” understanding requires images in a way that the divine “archetypal” understanding does not, and he seems to think that this is important for providing an account of our particular understanding. Kant elsewhere describes the “common use of reason” as “cognition of the universal *in concreto,*” which contrasts with the “speculative use of reason” as “cognition of the universal *in abstracto.*” Though metaphysics and philosophy in the proper sense is an exercise of the speculative use of reason, Kant nevertheless claims that the common use of human reason proceeds “*through images in concreto.*”\(^{81}\)

Of course, the exact way in which the human understanding requires images is unclear in these passages. Yet given the important role that images play in explaining how cognition is possible in the Transcendental Deduction, I think it is an interesting possibility that *our* understanding requires images for its *cognition*, whereas non-discursive or archetypal understandings do not require images in this way (even though both forms of understanding might involve *intuition*, be it intellectual or sensible). I return to this point in chapter 5.

\(^{80}\) *KU*, 5:408
\(^{81}\) *JL*, 9:27
1.4.2 Schematism

On its own, the Transcendental Deduction provides us with a number of very suggestive passages regarding the place of images in the syntheses of the power of imagination. The Deduction also suggests that images play an important role in human cognition. Yet when we turn to the Schematism, we find that images are in fact part of the topic of the chapter. This has been underappreciated in the literature and is, I will argue, a missed opportunity to understand this very puzzling chapter of the first *Critique* and how it relates to the Transcendental Deduction. For while Kant never mentions a “schema” or “schemata” in the Transcendental Deduction, he mentions “images” many times in *both* the Deduction and the Schematism. Indeed, the term *Bild*—much more so than the term *Schema*—offers an opportunity to bridge our accounts of these two very puzzling chapters of the *Critique*.

The Schematism refers to images in a variety of ways. One of the most striking references appears in what is the closest Kant comes to defining what a schema is. Here, he claims that a schema is a “representation of a general procedure of the power of imagination [*Verfahren der Einbildungskraft*] for providing a concept its image [*Bild*]” (A140/B180). This agrees in general terms with the progression of the threefold synthesis outlined above: just as we progress from reproduction *in the image* to the recognition *in the concept*, so too we progress from image to the concept that is provided with the image. The schema, in turn, is a representation of some routine of the power of imagination for providing that image to the concept.

Kant’s introduction of schemata (and his definition of them) is motivated by what he sees as fundamental differences between schemata and images. Consider the entire passage that culminates with the definition I just mentioned:

The schema is in itself always only a product of the power of imagination; but since the synthesis of the latter has as its aim no individual intuition but rather only the unity in the determination of sensibility, the schema is to be distinguished from an image [*Bild*]. . . . [I]f I only think a number in general, which could be five or a hundred, this thinking is more the representation of a method for representing a multitude (e.g., a thousand) with a certain concept than the image [*Bild*] itself, which
in this case I could survey and compare with the concept only with difficulty. Now this representation of a general procedure of the power of imagination for providing a concept its image [Bild]. (A140/B179-180)

Kant asserts that schemata, unlike images, are representations pertaining to more than a single intuition—hence their being representations of a general procedure. In contrast to forming an image of a number, thinking a number in general—in particular a large number like one thousand—is difficult to match or “compare” with a particular image. Instead, one is thinking about “the representation of a method for representing a multitude,” and not the representation that is the output of following that method in a particular case. The passage concludes with Kant’s claim that schemata perform this role of matching images and concepts. This quick sketch motivates the idea that Kant takes images are distinct from concepts just as much as they are distinct from schemata.

Later in the Schematism, Kant claims that schemata provide images to concepts by representing the procedures that produce them. So he writes:

[T]he image [Bild] is a product of the empirical faculty of productive power of imagination, the schema of sensible concepts (such as figures in space) is a product and as it were a monogram of pure a priori power of imagination, through which and in accordance with which the images first become possible [wodurch und woranach die Bilder allererst möglich werden], but which [images] must be connected with the concept, to which they are in themselves never fully congruent, always only by means of the schema they [the images] designate [bezeichnen]. (A141-2/B181)

Images are thus associated with a part of the power of imagination, its “empirical faculty.” And even though schemata are associated with a different part of the power of imagination, its “pure a priori” part, Kant’s positive remark about what schemata are invokes images. In some way, schemata make images possible by being a “monogram” for them. Given the above claims, it seems that schemata make images possible by governing their production in some way, a point I explore in chapter 4.

Now if one conflates images with intuitions, or thinks that both are simply stylistic variants on one technical notion, then one is likely to hear the above passage as entailing that schemata govern procedures of the imagination for producing intuitions. Yet as section 4.1 showed, Kant’s map of synthesis in the A-Deduction seems to distinguish intuitions from images. I argue extensively
against this conflation in the following two chapters. As a result, the above passages will receive a new and quite particular interpretation, one on which it is images, not intuitions, that depend on schemata.

We can take stock by listing examples of images that Kant provides in the Schematism and Deduction chapters:

- “[I]f I place five points in a row, . . . . . , this is an image of the number five.” (A140/B179)
- The “image of a line” (B156)
- The “image of a triangle” (A141/B180)
- The “object of experience” and the “image of it” (A141/B180)
- Space and time as the “pure image[s] of all magnitudes (quantorum)” (A142/B182).

The image of number is a key example from the schematism. In the B-edition Introduction, Kant already refers to an “image” involved in addition during his description of the syntheticity of arithmetic propositions (B15-16). This example is similar to the image of five provided above. In these cases, the image is generated by “placing” or “adding” units together. As I shall argue in the coming chapters, such images actually have a common structure and etiology to the other examples of images that Kant provides. Images constitute a unified class of representations for Kant.

### 1.4.3 Refutation of Idealism

I will close our survey of images in the first Critique by noting the occurrence of images both in the Refutation of Idealism and in Kant’s subsequent elaborations of the Refutation in unpublished manuscripts. The passages of interest in the Refutation suggest that images also do not suffice for having intuitions.

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82 The way Kant talks about the generation of magnitudes in image formation bears a close resemblance to how Segner (1773, pp. 2ff.) (whom Kant cites) describes the process.
Recall that *Einbildung* can mean three different things: the *representation* of an image, the *act* of forming an image, and the *faculty* for forming an image. Kant considers whether “we have only an inner sense but no outer one, rather merely outer *Einbildung*” (B276-277, note). Kant goes on to argue that we have not merely outer *imagination* but outer *sense*:

But it is clear that in order for us even to imagine something as external, i.e., to exhibit it to sense in intuition, we must already have an outer sense, and by this means immediately distinguish the mere receptivity of an outer intuition from the spontaneity that characterizes every *Einbildung*. For even merely to imagine an outer sense would itself annihilate the faculty of intuition *[Anschauungsvermögen]*, which is to be determined through the power of imagination *[Einbildungskraft]*. (B276-277, note)

The first occurrence of *Einbildung* seems to denote the *faculty* use of the term in order to contrast the faculty of imagination with the faculty of sense. The second occurrence, however, seems to denote the *representational* use of the term in order to distinguish the “spontaneity” involved in every image from the “mere receptivity” involved in outer intuition. In this passage, Kant even suggests that outer *Einbildung* actually *depends* on outer sense and the faculty of intuition.

Kant thus intends to make a technical distinction between the acts and representations of the power of imagination and the acts and representations of sense. There has been extensive terminologically motivated debate about whether this is the case. I shall thus defend the idea that once we look at Kant’s unpublished manuscripts relevant to the Refutation, we can see that he is marking a substantive distinction between two types of representation.

Kant’s “Kiesewetter” manuscript discusses images (*Einbildungen*) and intuitions of sense (*Sinnenanschauungen*) at great length. What’s also important, Kant thinks that these notions must be distinguished if the argumentative framework of the Refutation is going to work. Thus, Kant writes:

We have two sorts of intuition: intuition of sense [*Sinnenanschauung*], for which the object must be represented as present, and an image [*Einbildung*] as intuition

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83 See Bxl-xli, where Kant speaks of the reality of outer sense “as distinct from *Einbildung*” and then contrasts experience (*Erfahrung*) with *Einbildung*. 
without the presence of the object. The image [\emph{Einbildung}], if one is conscious of it as such, can also be considered as inner intuition of sense [\emph{Sinnenanschauung}].\footnote{AA 18:619. McLear (2017) mistranslates the last word of this quotation as “inner sensible intuition [\emph{sinnliche Anschauung}]” (McLear notes the terminological between sensible intuition [\emph{sinnliche Anschauung}] and inner intuition of sense [\emph{Sinnenanschauung}], only the latter of which clearly marks a type of intuition that actually belongs to the senses themselves). Note that McLear takes the last sentence to support the view that images are \emph{inner} intuitions of sense—and that such images have merely temporal form. Moreover, McLear seems to construe \emph{Einbildung} in this passage not as a representation, but as an act. I think that both assumptions are mistaken, however. Kant is contrasting \emph{Einbildung} with \emph{Sinnenanschauung}, so if the latter is to be understood as a representational type, then so should the former. The fact that images can themselves be the objects or contents of inner sense does not imply that they have a \emph{merely} temporal form (or indeed, any temporal form at all). See chapter 3.}

Given that the power of the imagination is the capacity to represent an object even in its absence, the \emph{representational type} proper to that faculty is an “image [\emph{Einbildung}].” That is, an “intuition without the presence of the object.” This passage clearly refers to images as a representational type that is \emph{distinct from} “intuitions of sense.”

Consider Kant’s further elaboration:

[C]onsciousness can accompany all of my representations, hence even the representation of an image [\emph{Einbildung}], which is . . . itself an object of inner sense, of which it must be possible to become conscious as such, since we really distinguish such things as inner representations, hence existing in time, from the intuition of the senses.\footnote{AA 18:621}

Again, this passage suggests that we can become conscious of an image \emph{because} it is one of my representations. So if Kant were not using \emph{Einbildung} in the sense of a representational type, then the inference he makes would not be valid. Kant repeats his claim from before that \emph{Einbildungen} must be distinguished from intuitions of sense.

In a surrounding passage, Kant also associates \emph{Einbildung} with the reproductive power of imagination, as we saw above with both \emph{Bild} and \emph{Einbildung} in the Transcendental Deduction. As he writes, “these images [\emph{Einbildungen}]” are

reproduced intuitions of sense of outer objects only according to form, images which can indeed be fictions, but not in the sense that they do not have outer objects at all [\emph{nur der Form nach reproduirte Sinnenanschauungen äußerer Gegenstände, die}]}
Images involve reproducing intuitions “according to form,” such that images also have outer objects in the way that intuitions of sense do. Though there is much to be said here, Kant is contrasting a representational type—an image—from another representational type—an intuition of sense.

1.4.4 Kant’s Dispute with Eberhard

Kant’s dispute with Eberhard reveals the importance of distinguishing between images and intuitions. As background, one of the sections of Kant’s “On a Discovery” deals with Eberhard’s arguments regarding the objective reality of simple substances. As he argues in the Second Antimony, Kant denies that we can represent simple substances intuitively, whereas Eberhard tries to show that Kant is wrong. Key for our purposes, as Kant reports, Eberhard claims that because the simples that form the composite of space “are beings of the understanding [Verstandeswesen], unimageable [unbildlich], they cannot be intuited under any sensory form.” Yet Eberhard’s implication is space and time have simple parts, and we might even be able to intuit those objects, just not sensibly. Kant thinks that this is a basic confusion on Eberhard’s part, stemming from his conflation between intuitions and images.

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86 AA 18:619
87 Kant repeats the distinction later by distinguishing experience form image: “Experience is cognition of the objects that are present to the senses. Image [Einbildung] is intuition even without the presence of the object, and the object then is called a phantasma, which can be a production (invention [Dichtung]) or a reproduction (recollection [Erinnerung]) of a previously had intuition” (AA 18:618). We saw above that Kant’s predecessors took phantasma to indicate a representational type. Though Kant seems to take a phantasma to be the object of an image in this passage (a distinction he nowhere else makes), it is clear that an Einbildung is either the representation of a phantasma or the act that produces the representation of a phantasma. Elsewhere, Kant claims that Einbildungen are “produced [erzeugt],” which further suggests that he has in mind a representational type that can be tokened several times, and that is distinct from the act from which it is produced (R 314, 15:314). These passages cumulatively suggest that Kant was trying to differentiate his account of outer intuition from his own account of images and the acts of the imagination. Cf. Stephenson (2017, p. 115).
88 Cf. UE, 8:200
89 UE, 8:223. Kant thinks Eberhard is confused about what exactly is contained in intuition. For instance, Eberhard claims that time and space have simple parts. Yet Kant points to two passages that display a “manifestly absurd confusion”: Eberhard claims both that “the elements of concrete time (as well as of concrete space) do not lack this intuitive quality,” but nevertheless “they cannot be intuited under any sensory form.” This allows that for Eberhard, we do intuit the parts of space and time, but not via sensible intuition.
Eberhard claims that simple substances are nonsensible because they are “the unimageable \[ unbildlich \], of which no image \[ Bild \] is possible, and which cannot be represented in any sensory form (namely, in an image \[ Bild \]).”\(^{90}\) According to this conception of “nonsensible,” if “no image” of an object can be produced, then that object is nonsensible. Kant thinks that this is not an acceptable definition of “nonsensible.” Thus, he writes:

The Critique always understands by the nonsensible only that which cannot at all, not even the least part, be contained in a sensory intuition, and it is a deliberate deception of the inexperienced reader to foist upon him in place of that something in the sensible object, because no image \[ Bild \] of it (meaning thereby an intuition containing a manifold in certain relations, and thus a shape) can be given.\(^{91}\)

As I understand this passage, Eberhard’s conception of “nonsensible” runs into trouble because he does not distinguish the contents of “sensory intuition” from the contents of an “image.” The sensory intuition can, it seems, contain very minute parts (which represent very minute parts of objects), even if it does not contain a “manifold in certain relations.” As I argue in the following chapters, the claim that an image contains a “manifold in certain relations” should be understood as claiming that images represent determinate relations—such as the specific relations that parts of a shape have to one another—whereas intuitions need not have such determinate content. Yet we can already tell from this passage that Kant wishes to distinguish what it takes to have an “image” from what it takes to have a “sensible intuition.”

From this important point, Kant draws further conclusions later in his discussion of our original intuitions of space and time. Eberhard thought that a plausible reading of Kant’s doctrine was that sensory intuition was “grounded” on either the contingent human limit of our power to imagine or grasp the parts of what we sense or on the alleged images of space and time themselves. Kant’s harsh rebuke emphasizes the importance of the distinction between intuitions and images:

[W]here have I ever called the intuitions of space and time, in which images \[ Bilder \] are first of all possible, themselves images (which always presuppose a concept

\(^{90}\) UE, 8:201
\(^{91}\) UE, 8:201
of which they are the exhibition [Darstellung], e.g., the indeterminate image for the concept of a triangle, wherein neither the ratios of the sides nor those of the angles are given)? He has become so inured to the deceptive ritual of using the term ‘imagistic [bildlich]’ instead of ‘sensible [sinnlich]’ that it accompanies him everywhere. The ground of the possibility of sensory intuition is neither of the two, neither limit of the cognitive faculty nor image [Bild]; it is the mere receptivity peculiar to the mind, when it is affected by something (in sensation), to receive a representation in accordance with its subjective constitution.\footnote{UE, 8:222}

In this passage, Kant claims that the “intuitions of space and time” are representations “in which images are first of all possible.” Furthermore, he claims that intuition is grounded on the “mere receptivity of the mind,” whereas images require the actual intuitions themselves (as a representational type) in order to exist. This passage motivates both the Distinctness Thesis and the Image Thesis.

The discussion of images in On a Discovery is extensive and illuminating because it brings out important contrasts between the Wolffian/Leibnizian notion of images outlined above and the doctrine of intuition that Kant wishes to introduce. A general and crucial claim in On a Discovery that I shall develop in the next chapter is that we can represent objects in intuition, even without representing those objects in an image.

1.4.5 Anthropology

To conclude this chapter, let us turn to Kant’s discussion of the imagination in the Anthropology. In this work, he again suggests that the power of imagination is a power that produces images. For instance, when Kant introduces the imagination, he writes that images are often produced involuntarily by the productive power of imagination. Thus, he writes:

The power of imagination, in so far as it also produces images involuntarily [so fern sie auch unwillkürlich Einbildungen hervorbringt], is called fantasy [Phantasie]. He who is accustomed to regarding these images [Einbildungen] as (inner or outer) experiences is a visionary. – An involuntary play of one’s images in sleep (a state of health) is called dreaming.\footnote{Anth, 7:167. Translation of Einbildung here as “image” follows the translation of the Cambridge Edition.}
Concepts of objects often prompt a spontaneously produced image [*selbstgeschaffenes Bild*] (through the productive power of imagination), which we attach to them involuntarily [*unwillkürlich*].

Notably, the productive power of the imagination produces certain kinds of images “involuntarily.” As Kant puts it in the third *Critique*, the power of imagination “knows” how to “reproduce the image [*Bild*] and shape of an object out of an immense number of objects of different kinds,” and can, even “if not consciously,” then “superimpose one image [*Bild*] on another” to find a “common measure” among them.

Kant thinks it important to delimit the degree to which we are able to produce new images by distinguishing the *form* of an image from the *matter* of an image—a distinction that we encountered above:

So, no matter how great an artist, even a sorceress, the power of imagination may be, it is still not creative, but must get the material for its images [*Bildungen*] from the senses. But these images, according to the memories formed of them, are not so universally communicable as concepts of understanding.

In the Cambridge English translation, the occurrences of *Einbildung* and *Bildung* in the previous two block quotations are both translated “image.” Given our look at Kant’s early theory of images put forth in the metaphysics and anthropology lectures, such a translation is appropriate, since both *Bildung* and *Einbildung* fall under a general power of imagination.

### 1.5 Conclusion

I have argued that Kant adopted a tripartite model on which the imagination is a distinct faculty of the mind distinct from the senses and from the understanding and apperception. I then argued for the Image Thesis: Kant both invokes images systematically in his works and claims that the imagination is uniquely responsible for producing images. Finally, I motivated the Distinctness

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94 *Anth*, 7:173.
95 See *KU*, 5:234, as well as chapter 5.
96 *Anth*, 7:168-169
Thesis. Not only does Kant invoke images, but he seems intent on not conflating them with intuitions. In the next chapter, we consider this latter thesis further by more carefully considering the role of the senses for Kant and, in turn, their relationship to intuition.
2

Intuitions as Representations of the Senses
All our intuition happens only by means of the senses; our understanding intuits nothing, but only reflects.

_Prof_, 4:288

### 2.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I established the Image Thesis, the claim that Kant had a doctrine of images as products of the imagination in his critical philosophy. We also saw that there is good evidence for the claim that images are distinct from intuitions—the Distinctness Thesis. This chapter begins to describe the positive view that accounts for the Image Thesis and the Distinctness Thesis.

We need to explain the imagination’s role as image-maker. My aim is to provide an account of the power of imagination that is robust—that explains the imagination’s role as image-maker—while simultaneously providing a robust account of _sense_. Once we accept the Distinctness Thesis, then I think a particular view suggests itself that I will call the _Strong Independence View_. According to the Strong Independence View, the Distinctness Thesis has a ready explanation: intuitions do not depend on the imagination for any of their essential features. Instead, the _senses_ are responsible for the essential features of intuitions, and the _senses_ are the direct producers of intuitions.\(^1\) This emphasis on the duality of intuitions and images—of the senses and the imagination, respectively—is a motivation for the Strong Independence View. Yet we shall also see in this chapter that there are textual and philosophical motivations for it, too.

The Strong Independence View is very controversial. The dominant interpretive tendency is to claim precisely the opposite: that some of the essential features of intuitions depend on the imagination. That idea is the heart of the prevalent Intuition View of the imagination outlined in the introduction. In this chapter, my ambitions regarding the Strong Independence View are modest. My intent is to show that this view is both plausible and, in fact, implicitly maintained by various interpreters.

\(^1\)The sense in which other faculties could _indirectly_ cause the production of intuitions is explained in section 3 of this chapter.
I show that the Strong Independence View is plausible in two strokes, one negative and one positive. In section 2, I consider interpretations of Kant’s account of the senses. Then, in section 3, I sketch a positive proposal on which Kant’s views of the senses explain the essential features of intuitions. This proposal includes an explanation for how intuitions relate to or “give” objects to the mind merely in virtue of the senses and not in virtue of imaginative or intellectual activities. My argument does not entirely exclude the possibility that some intuitions depend on the imagination or the intellect. But I do show that Kant’s conception of the senses alone has the resources for explaining the essential features of intuitions.

However, in my negative argument in section 4, I argue that the imagination and the intellect lack the explanatory virtues touted by many commentators for explaining the essential features of intuitions. Maintaining that some of the essential features of intuitions depend on the imagination or the intellect actually saddles Kant with philosophical puzzles that he avoids on the Strong Independence View. The imagination and the intellect do a poor job at explaining why intuitions have the essential features they have. According to both these positive and negative arguments, Kant provides a coherent picture of intuition on which the senses are the powers of the mind for generating intuitions.

Of course, the argument of this chapter is incomplete as a reading of Kant’s views on perception and experience. For the interpretive pressure to assign to the imagination an intuition-generating function seems overwhelming if there is no other way to make sense of Kant’s ubiquitous reference to the imagination and its activities in the first Critique. Why does Kant constantly appeal to the imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason to account for cognition and experience? And how could the imagination be so important, if intuitions are entirely independent of the imagination? A proponent of the Strong Independence View owes us an account of the imagination that answers this question. Answering these questions is the task of the chapters to come.
2.2 Intuition and the Senses: A Menu of Options

In this section, I start by canvassing the essential features of sensible intuitions for Kant. The Strong Independence View emerges as an option that contrasts with several different families of views on which the senses fail to explain one or more of the essential features of intuition.

2.2.1 The Essential Features of Sensible Intuition

For Kant, the broadest sense of intuition (Anschauung) does not immediately denote a representation of human sensibility. Early in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant notes that a non-human or divine form of intuition is conceivable—even though we don’t know exactly what it would be like or whether it is even really possible. Yet Kant does distinguish our human or “derivative” intuition from a divine or “original” intuition by one key feature: derivative or “sensible” intuition is intuition that is “dependent on the existence of the object,” whereas original intuition is “one through which the existence of the object of intuition is itself given” (B72). When Kant says that sensible intuition depends on the existence of the object, he means that “it is possible only insofar as the representational capacity of the subject is affected” by the object (B72). So both forms of intuition relate to an existing object, but with opposite directions of dependence. Whereas original intuition brings those objects into existence, sensible intuition depends on the existence of the object. We shall return to this point shortly.

From here, we can turn to some familiar points that Kant makes about sensible intuition. In particular, there are three important contrasts that Kant makes between intuitions with concepts.

First, Kant maintains that the way that intuitions relate to objects is different from how concepts relate to objects. As constituents of judgments, concepts are “mediate” because they are “representations of representations” of objects (A68/B93). Generally speaking, intuitions are “immediate” in that their relation to objects does not depend on another representation of that object. Notice that this immediacy of intuition is defined in the first case merely negatively: intuition lacks the mediation characteristic of concepts. Still, Kant does specify here that the relation in question
is a representational relation, and he does not analyze it (at least in the first instance) as a causal relation or dependence relation. His idea is that intuitions represent objects in a different manner from how concepts do. What’s more, the relation that intuitions have to objects is in some sense fundamental for cognition, for Kant thinks that “through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them . . . is intuition” (A19/B33).

Second, Kant frequently contrasts the singularity of intuitions with the generality of concepts. In his inventory of representation, Kant claims that intuitions are singular (einzeln), whereas concepts are general in that they relate to objects “by means of a mark that can be common to several things” (A320/B377). There is a debate about how singularity and immediacy relate to one another, and I shall not enter into that discussion here.

Third, Kant claims that intuitions, but not concepts, give objects to the mind. In contrast to concepts, intuition takes place “only insofar as the object is given to us” (A19/B33). Moreover, intuitions don’t merely depend on an object having been given to the mind, but they are the very representations that give those objects to the mind. So Kant writes that there are two conditions on the cognition of an object: “first, intuition, through which it is given, but only as appearance; second, concept, through which an object is thought that corresponds to this intuition” (A92-3/B125).

Similarly, all experience (as a kind of cognition) has two conditions: “the intuition of the senses [Sinnenanschauung], through which something is given” and a “concept of an object that is given in intuition, or appears” (A93/B126). These passages claim that sensible intuitions give objects “as appearance” or objects that “appear” to the mind. As Kant writes in the aesthetic, the “undetermined object of an empirical intuition” is called “appearance” (A20/B34).

Now it is clear that “giving” is a metaphor of sorts, though perhaps a useful one. I shall

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2It is important to remember that Kant makes this distinction between sensible intuition and concepts. Even on Kant’s view, it does not seem incoherent to speak of the non-sensible intuition of universals. Among other philosophers, for instance, Bertrand Russell claims that we humans are immediately acquainted with universals (in Russell, 1912, ch. 5).

3The singularity of intuition is contrasted with the generality of concepts throughout Kant’s lectures on logic, and his views on this distinction appear remarkably stable. See, e.g., LV, 24:805-806, 905; JL, 9:91.

4See especially Grüne (2009) for a discussion of this debate, originally inspired by Hintikka (1972) and Parsons (1964).
not adjudicate the debates surrounding how to understand the claim that intuitions give objects as appearances to the mind—a debate that has largely reverted to how we should understand Kant’s initial claim that sensible intuitions depend on the existence of their objects.\(^5\) But I shall assume a piece of common ground to the parties of this debate, namely, that the objects that are given in intuition are the same objects to which we are immediately related in intuition.\(^6\) In particular, I shall assume that an intuition gives \(o\) to the mind only if that intuition is an immediate representation of \(o\).\(^7\) This characterization leaves open for the time being whether intuitions are conscious representations and how exactly intuitions depend on objects.

These three features—immediacy, singularity, and object-giving—are essential features of sensible intuition. Now Kant thinks that human sensible intuition has two further features that he characterizes using his hylomorphic conception of representation.\(^8\) All human intuitions have a “form” that is either spatial (which comprises “outer intuition”) or temporal (which comprises “inner intuition”) (A20/B34ff.). All intuitions also contain a “manifold,” be it a manifold of spaces or a manifold of times.\(^9\) Moreover, some intuitions merely possess this spatial or temporal format, which Kant calls “pure intuitions.” However, some intuitions are “empirical” in that beyond this spatial or temporal form, they also involve sensation (A50/B74). At points, Kant suggests that sensations are the “matter” that complements the spatial or temporal “forms” of intuition (A20/B34, B34).

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\(^5\)For strong forms of existence-dependence, see Allais (2015, ch. 7), Watkins and Willaschek (2016), and McLear (2017); for critical push back, see Stephenson (2015) and Grüne (2017).

\(^6\)Importantly, I am not assuming from the outset that being given an object entails anything about the existence of the object given.

\(^7\)This biconditional does nothing to settle the question of whether giving an object to the mind is analytically prior to immediate representation, or vice versa. For a helpful discussion, see Smyth (2015, p. 558).

\(^8\)Kant claims that “in every being its components (essentialia) are the matter; the way in which they are connected in a thing, the essential form” (A266/B322). Here, we should understand “being” and “thing” in a broad sense to include representations. We can thus ask of a particular representation (a) what its components are and (b) how they are “connected” or arranged. And once we specify these, we have specified the essential form and matter of the representation.

\(^9\)Kant suggests that space and time contain a manifold of spaces and times when he writes that “space and time and all their parts are intuitions, thus individual representations along with the manifold that they contain in themselves” (B136, note). We thus should not immediately equate the manifold of sensations with the pure spatial manifold, since empirical intuitions plausibly contain both structures. As Matherne (2015, p. 755, note 44) has suggested, while sensations are “contained in” empirical intuitions (A50/B74), this manifold of sensations is distinct from the manifold of intuition. Additionally, as we will see below, I’m skeptical that we can make much sense of an “intuitive manifold” that lacks a form for Kant.
A50/B75, A86/B118, A167/B208-9). In a moment, I will turn to exactly how the form and the matter of an intuition relate to one another.

2.2.2 Sense

Given this menu of features of human sensible intuition, we can begin our discussion of how the essential features of intuition relate to the senses. Focusing again on the human case, intuitions depend on either inner or outer sense. Inner sense has a temporal form, while outer sense has a spatial form. The senses are capacities of the mind to be affected and, as a result, to undergo a change of state. In such cases, the senses generate sensations that constitute a kind of sensory matter. This much is uncontroversial.

From here, there is interpretive disagreement—albeit often unexpressed and implicit—regarding how intuitions relate to the form of the senses, on the one hand, and the matter of the senses, on the other. We can characterize four broad views of how sensory representations relate to the senses:

1. **Sensation-Only View.** On one proposal, the senses suffice for providing us sensations or impressions, but they do not suffice for providing us intuitions. We can label this the Sensation-Only View. For example, Wayne Waxman maintains the Sensation-Only View: products of sense “cannot consist of any representational content over and above sheer ‘primary matter’ of sensation.”

10Waxman (1991, p. 223). Waxman believes that this is an expression of Kant’s anti-innatism, though as I note before, it is not clear why the senses are unable of producing representations via synopsis and affection that are not “innate” in Kant’s sense.

11In particular, synopsis does not produce the “representation of a single sense-divide spanning object” (Waxman, 2013, p. 102). In fact, Waxman thinks that synopsized sensations are robustly independent of the form that they ultimately take: “if our pure intuition was not space but Z, these same [tactile and visual] sensations would be pressed into service for the intuition of Z-ial appearances” (Waxman, 2013, p. 93). Waxman seems to maintain here that the same visual sensations could give rise both to spatial intuitions and Z-ial intuitions, depending on whether the sensations of vision are (to use his words) “utilized for outer intuition.” And Waxman maintains that this spatial structure is imposed on the deliverances of the senses (sensations) by the synthesis of the imagination. My arguments that follow put pressure on the idea that we should reduce the function of the senses to the providing of mere “primary matter.” Instead, the senses are faculties of the mind that ground both a form and a matter because they produce intuitions with both a form and matter.
sense provides us merely a set of “sense impressions” that are “completely concealed” from our awareness, and whose properties are not cognizable.\textsuperscript{12} On these views, what is given in sense is not spatial or temporal, but merely “amorphous material, preconsciously present, out of which sensible representations might be formed.”\textsuperscript{13} In addition, these sensations or impressions do not amount to an intuition in any way.\textsuperscript{14} Even though (say) spatial intuitions depend on outer sense because spatial intuitions depend on outer sense for their form, nevertheless outer intuitions do not come to have that form \textit{merely} due to outer sense. As the Sensation-Only View has it, some other faculty of the mind (such as the imagination or intellect) is involved in the production of spatial intuitions \textit{with} that spatial form contributed by outer sense.

(2) \textbf{Formal Manifold View.} On another proposal, the senses suffice for providing us sensations \textit{in} a spatial/temporal manifold. (Perhaps sense provides us with a “pure” manifold as well.) But the senses do \textit{not} suffice for providing us intuitions. I shall lump these views under the \textit{Formal Manifold View}. The Formal Manifold View claims that the senses by themselves can provide us with representations with \textit{spatial or temporal form}, whereas the Sensation-Only View denies that the senses by themselves can provide us with anything other than a formless (non-spatial/non-temporal) manifold of sensations.\textsuperscript{15} A natural understanding of the Formal Manifold View is that the manifold provided by the senses is indeed both \textit{sensation-}

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\textsuperscript{12}Haag (2007, p. 246)  \\
\textsuperscript{13}See Horstmann (2018, p. 14). Horstmann’s extensive analysis of the imagination in this work straightforwardly assumes the Sensation-Only View. He writes: “This Kantian view that ‘raw’ or unprocessed sensations have no space and time determinations and that these determinations do not emerge before the level of conscious representations is reached has not been appreciated, either within Kant scholarship (except W. Waxman) or within modern sense datum theories” (p. 14). I am somewhat puzzled by Horstmann’s diagnosis: interpreters including Brook, Falkenstein, Grüne, Matherne, and Tolley (to name but a few) have discussed this point extensively. He discusses none of their work in the Element, and only Grüne is mentioned (once). Instead, Horstmann seems to simply adopt Waxman’s view on this point. (If he used Waxman (2013) as guide to the literature, then Horstmann’s omission is understandable: that 608-page book contains less than 10 works in its bibliography.) These quibbles aside, I shall argue against this construal of the “Kantian view” directly in what follows.  \\
\textsuperscript{14}Other exemplars include Nuzzo (2013), who explicitly claims that sense provides “matter” (sensations) but not “form” (spatial/temporal features).  \\
\textsuperscript{15}E.g., Blomme (2013, p. 34) claims, for instance, that “originary space” is provided prior to synthesis of the power of imagination. He writes that prior to the activity of the power of imagination, the senses provide a “subjective form of outer intuition.” For him, space given by the senses “is not an intuition, but rather the pure outer intuiting itself, and cannot be represented intuitively without synthesis of the manifold delivered through the mere form.”
\end{flushright}
containing and spatial (or temporal), even though it is not an intuition. For instance, perhaps the spatial representations provided by the senses alone fail to give objects to the mind, and consequently fail to immediately represent any object. Or perhaps the spatial representations provided by the senses fail to be singular. This proposal also denies that pure intuitions of space or time are provided by outer or inner sense alone.\footnote{Other apparent exponents of this view include Longuenesse (1998), Grüne (2009), Friedman (2012), Griffith (2012, p. 201) and Williams (2017).}

3) \textbf{Weak Independence View.} In contrast, one might maintain that the senses suffice for providing us sensations in a spatial manifold \textit{and} at least some intuitions. According to this view, sensations are not the only representation types provided by sense; rather, sense is itself a faculty that produces intuitions. Let’s call the view on which the senses suffice for producing at least some intuitions the Weak Independence View. A few recent commentators accept the Weak Independence View.\footnote{E.g., Allais (2017a, p. 38) argues that all of the activities of the imagination and understanding act \textit{on} intuition, but are not required to \textit{produce} intuition. Note that Allais’ earlier view maintained that intuitions \textit{do} depend on the imagination (Allais, 2009), but in a way that does not involve concepts or the understanding (a view defended by Rohs as discussed in Wenzel (2005)). Similarly, Tolley (2016, p. 278) writes that synopsis “appears to be that which is responsible for bringing about an empirical intuition by ordering sensations into spatial form.” Matherne (2015) accepts a similar view. She writes, in contrasting her view to Grüne’s: “I take Kant’s view to be that intuitions are formed on the basis of sensibility alone and do not depend on the sort of synthesis Kant describes in the Deduction. This is not to deny that within an intuition, the manifold of representations are connected together; rather it seems to me that this is accomplished through the ‘synopsis’, which Kant ascribes to sense, and which does not, as Grüne would have it, depend on synthesis” (Matherne, 2015, p. 771, note 78).}

4) \textbf{Strong Independence View.} Note that the Weak Independence View does not entail that all intuitions depend \textit{only} on the senses. The Strong Independence View takes this additional step: \textit{only} the senses—not the intellect or imagination—ground the essential features of all intuitions. Activation of the senses is thus the necessary and sufficient condition on intuition production. Table 1 below summarizes these views.
Table 2.1: Views on what the senses produce independently of other mental faculties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senses suffice for:</th>
<th>Sensations</th>
<th>S/T manifold</th>
<th>Some intuitions</th>
<th>All intuitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sensation-Only View</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Manifold View</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak Independence View</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Independence View</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before I continue, a quick note about how I will use the concept of “dependence” or “ground” in what follows. We saw that intuitions are singular and immediate representations that give objects to the mind and that have a matter and form. These are the essential features of sensible intuitions. If an intuition depends on X, then at least some of its essential features depend on X. Similarly, if an intuition is partially grounded in X, then at least some its essential features depend on X. If an intuition depends only on (is fully grounded in) X, then all of its essential features depend only on (are grounded fully in) X. So if an intuition is independent of X, then none of its essential features depend on X. This dependence claim should not be understood in terms of temporal priority, and though I will sometimes adopt the facile “input/output” and “before/antecedent/prior” language to explain dependence relations, this is just a convenient metaphor. Our goal is to determine what activities and faculties are responsible for the essential features of intuitions.

2.3 A Robust Account of Sense

I now turn to the sketch of a positive proposal on which Kant’s views of the senses explain the essential features of intuitions. When I say “positive,” I do not mean exhaustive. My primary goal is to show that the senses can fully ground the essential features of intuition. There are several contrasting views that seem compatible with the view I develop in this section, and I will note them as we go along. The key ambition of this positive proposal is to show how intuitions can
relate to or “give” objects to the mind merely in virtue of how the senses react to things that affect them. This proposal does not immediately exclude the possibility that some intuitions depend on the imagination and apperception (in accordance with the Weak, but not Strong, Independence View)—the topic of the next section.

I begin by arguing that in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first Critique, Kant provides a robust characterization of intuitions as representations of the senses and not of the imagination (section 3.1). I then claim that Kant’s account of affection shows how the senses can generate representations that give objects to the mind (section 3.2). Put briefly, empirical intuitions relate to objects because they are sensory profiles that are causally situated in respect to those objects. The senses are powers of the mind to react to powers distinct from the senses—be they powers of the mind itself (in inner sense) or powers in the external world (in outer sense). Moreover, I sketch how pure intuition relates to this construal of empirical intuition. I conclude by showing how my positive proposal is well suited to diffuse a worry regarding how intuition could constrain cognition—a worry engendered by both the Sensation Only View and the Formal Manifold View (section 3.3). I argue not only that the senses by themselves can generate intuitions, but that the senses make a unique contribution to cognition by generating such intuitions.

2.3.1 Kant’s Aesthetic as a Doctrine of the Senses

Let’s begin by considering how the senses and intuition relate to the Transcendental Aesthetic. In his pre-critical Inaugural Dissertation from 1770 entitled De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis, Kant talks extensively about intuition (Anschauung, intuitus), just as he does in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first Critique. In both works, intuition plays a central role in Kant’s theory of space and time.18

It is notable that in neither the Transcendental Aesthetic nor the Inaugural Dissertation does Kant invoke the imagination or images to explain the key features of space and time. He speaks of

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18See Falkenstein (1995, pp. 28-52) for an extensive discussion of intuition in the Inaugural Dissertation, as well as a discussion of its comparison to the view of space and time in the Critique of Pure Reason.
the imagination only once in the Aesthetic, and this mention of the imagination occurs when Kant denies the imagination a role that some of his readers might have thought it had. He criticizes and rejects a view of certain “metaphysicians of nature” on which “the a priori concepts of space and time are only creatures of the power of imagination [Geschöpfe der Einbildungskraft]” (A40/B57). Despite this passage, some commentators point to Kant’s claim later in the Critique that space and time are entia imaginaria or “beings of the imagination” as evidence that the imagination generates the pure intuitions of space and time (A291/B347). But elsewhere, Kant undercuts this interpretation: “one can and must admit that space and time are merely things of thought and beings of the power of imagination, which have not been invented [erdichtet] by the power of imagination, but must underlie all of its combinations and inventions.” This claim allows, and even suggests, that space and time are more fundamental than any activities of the imagination.

Thus, the Transcendental Aesthetic denies the imagination a role in generating space and time or our pure intuitions of them. Furthermore, Kant’s positive arguments in the Transcendental Aesthetic regarding the characteristics of space and time, as well as their ideality, do not invoke images or the power of imagination. The arguments do not seem to depend on the nature of the imagination or images, but instead on how (among other things) sensations relate to spatiotemporal representations, how space and time relate to their parts, and how the infinity of space and time is inconsistent with their being fundamentally conceptually represented.

In contrast, Kant speaks repeatedly of intuition (Anschauung) in this section, as well as both inner and outer sense (Sinn). The Transcendental Aesthetic describes “inner sense,” “outer sense,” “objects of the senses” (A35/B52), objects “given . . . through the senses” (A35/B52), the “form of inner sense” (A37/B54n), and the “form of outer sense” (B41). It never speaks of inner and outer imagination. Kant is seemingly making specific claims about parts of the faculty of sensibility. Sense should not be read as equivalent to sensibility here, but as a subfaculty of sensibility to the exclusion of imagination. After all, Kant names the “Transcendental Aesthetic” a “transcendental

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19 See, e.g., Longuenesse (2005, p. 73). Longuenesse does not discuss the critical passage I cite in the next sentence.
20 UE, 8:203. Emphasis added.
doctrine of the senses [transzendentale Sinnenlehre]” (A15/B30), which suggests that the focus is on sense, not imagination.\footnote{See also MK\textsubscript{2}, 29:983, which calls the Transcendental Aesthetic a “Sinnen Lehre.” Some interpreters seem not to notice the importance of sense in the Aesthetic, even those who seem sensitive to the passages I have noted. Nuzzo (2013), for instance, develops an interpretation of the Transcendental Aesthetic as a Sinnenlehre, but does little to bring out the role of the senses themselves in the Aesthetic.}

Now it needs to be noted that Kant nevertheless calls the Transcendental Aesthetic the “science of all principles [Principien] of a priori sensibility” (A21/B35). Immediately afterwards, Kant announces that space and time are the two “principles [Principien] of a priori cognition” that will be explored in the Aesthetic (A22/B36). One might think that such glosses broaden the scope of the Transcendental Aesthetic to include all of sensibility, including the imagination. However, given Kant’s focus on the senses to the exclusion of the imagination in the Transcendental Aesthetic, I think there is a better way to understand Kant’s conception of the Transcendental Aesthetic. For we can read Kant as claiming that the senses, to the exclusion of the imagination, serve as the ground of the a priori principles of sensibility. The senses serve as the source of the fundamental features of space and time, which in turn condition any exercise of sensibility, \textit{including} the activities of the imagination. On this point, it is striking that when Kant does claim that the imagination is (at least in part) a source of a further “formal and pure condition of sensibility” on which cognition depends—namely, schemata—he does so in a different part of the Critique, namely, the Schematism chapter (A140/B179). But it is also clear that these schemata do not arise \textit{merely} from sensibility, since they are at least partly “intellectual” (A138/B177). So though the imagination is involved in Kant’s story about the a priori conditions for cognition, the Transcendental Aesthetic is not the place where he explains its involvement. For the Transcendental Aesthetic is an account of the a priori principles of cognition that derive \textit{only and entirely} from sensibility independently of the intellect. These a priori principles that are derived only and entirely from sensibility are grounded in the senses alone.

Such a clarification itself already addresses the common interpretive claim that the Aesthetic needs to be reread in light of Kant’s later arguments.\footnote{Proponents of this approach include Longuenesse (1998, 2005), Ginsborg (2008), Griffith (2012), and McDowell (1994, 2013a); a particularly clear and terse statement of the motivations for this reading is provided in Rosenberg (2005, pp. 62ff.).} On such readings, Kant’s account
of sensibility is incomplete in the Aesthetic because Kant brackets a subfaculty of sensibility, the imagination, entirely in the Aesthetic. Indeed, if we think the aim of the Aesthetic is to provide a complete doctrine of sensibility—and not merely the principles that derive only and entirely from sensibility—then it would be incomplete and in great need of supplement in the Transcendental Analytic. But I think that it is not Kant’s main aim in the Transcendental Aesthetic to provide an account of sensibility. His main aim is to show that because of certain metaphysical features of space and time as forms of our (outer and inner) senses, space and time are transcendentally ideal. The arguments for this claim require us to scrutinize only a part of sensibility, the senses. In all, Kant’s aim in the Transcendental Aesthetic is restricted to what we can know about sensibility (a) a priori and (b) merely from sensibility.

Though the arguments in the Transcendental Aesthetic signal a revolutionary break with orthodoxy, Kant’s invocation of the Greek derivative “aesthetic” is supposed to be quite orthodox: Kant is observing the properties of aesthesis (sensing) in contrast to phantasia (imagining) in the Transcendental Aesthetic. In fact, Kant himself was keen to resurrect the orthodox meaning of “aesthetics” as a “science of sense,” as opposed to the meaning that Baumgarten provided it as a “science of beauty.” As Kant puts it, it is advisable “to desist from the use of this term [“aesthetics”] and preserve it for that doctrine which is true science (whereby one would come closer to the language and the sense of the ancients)” (A21/B36, note). Though aesthetics as Baumgarten uses it might involve both sense and imagination, aesthetics as Kant intends it—following Aristotle and the “sense of the ancients”—is precisely a doctrine of sense. In short, this understanding of the

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23One signal of this fact is that Kant provides a much more complete accounting of sensibility in the Anthropology and in lecture—an account more closely resembling a psychological of the senses and the imagination. There are two different accounts of the senses: a transcendental account and an empirical account. Kant provides both accounts, but in different writings and with different purposes. For more on this difference, see Jankowiak and Watkins (2014).

24There is more to be said here, particularly since other “geometrical” or “physical” representations of space are also ideal, but for seemingly a further reason that does involve the imagination. Kant elsewhere calls such representations of space “derived” (UK, 20:419). So more precisely, I take Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic to be querying what space and time most fundamentally or originally are. On my view, his answer is that space and time are most fundamentally pure intuitions generated by the senses.

25Nuzzo (2013, p. 27) is sensitive to the Greek etymology of aesthesis, only then to suggest that imagination is subsumed under aesthesis. But this is etymologically and historically incorrect: as we saw in chapter 1, thinkers prior to Kant regularly distinguished sensing (aesthesis) from imagination (phantasia). Indeed, this is a fundamental distinction for Aristotle himself (see De Anima, Book 2).
Transcendental Aesthetic makes room for the Weak Independence View. And this reading places literal significance in Kant’s claim that “it never occured to anyone that the senses might intuit a priori.” Kant’s insight is that the senses do intuit a priori, and that this fact has consequences for what principles can be known a priori about theoretical cognition.

2.3.2 Affection and the Relation Between an Intuition and Its Object

Now in virtue of what do the senses give objects to the mind? In the next two subsections, I argue that the senses generate intuitions in virtue of how the senses respond to affection. This view has two components. First, affection activates the senses in what I call a causal situation. The senses are powers of the mind to respond to powers distinct from them, and these powers distinct from the senses activate the senses in a particular way. The senses are powers that are causally situated because they are powers of the mind that are sensitive to, and react to, other powers. Second, when powers affect the senses, the senses react by generating representations with a specific form. In particular, empirical intuitions arise when the activity of synopsis orders sensations in that form. I will call the resulting representation of sensory features in space a sensory profile. Empirical intuitions are thus causally situated sensory profiles of objects. This framework also helps to explain some of the peculiar features of our pure intuitions of space and time. Though pure intuition does not depend on affection in the same way as empirical intuitions do—pure intuitions give space and time themselves to the mind, not appearances—nevertheless the pure intuitions of space and time can arise solely via the activation of the senses in affection.

To begin, Kant himself draws our attention to affection as central to sensible intuition. Sensible intuition takes place “only insofar as the object is given to us” (A19/B33). However, an object can be given in intuition (“at least for us humans”) only if the object “affects [affiziere] the mind in a certain way” (A19/B33). Thus, Kant suggests that the object-giving feature of sensible intuition depends on affection. Kant repeats this point later when he contrasts human intuitions from the intuitions available to an intellect that could generate intuitions independently of affection. He

26 Prol, 4:375n (emphasis added)
writes there that “all intuitions, as sensible, rest on affections [Affektionen],” while concepts rest on “functions” (A68/B93). The object-giving nature of intuitions depends on the fact that our senses are passive in respect to some object that affects the mind.

Kant interpreters often discount the role of affection in giving objects because they maintain that Kant’s project in the first *Critique* casts doubt on the idea that affection is sufficient for relating a representation to an object. These interpreters emphasize passages later in the Analytic in which Kant claims that “relation to an object” is established by the rich cognitive achievement Kant calls the “unity of consciousness” (B137) or else by our conceptual representations at work in representing causal relations (A197/B242ff.). Kant writes that without the categories, “no cognition of any object at all remains,” and he claims that an intuition as an “affection of sensibility” is “in me” but “does not constitute any relation of such representation to an object” (A197/B137). While it is not clear which representation Kant is referring to by the phrase “such representation” in the latter passage, one might read such passages as entailing that even the relation between *intuition* and its object depends on the unity of consciousness or on concepts.

Several interpreters have recently suggested this reading is not compulsory. They distinguish the relation of *intuition* to the object from the relation of *cognition* to the object. The relation of *cognition* to its object depends on the unity of consciousness or on concepts; the relation of *intuition* to its object does not. While I agree with this approach, the view I am about to sketch posits a more representationally minimal conception of the relation between an intuition and the object than some of these interpreters posit between intuition and its object. For instance, on the conception of intuitions as causally situated sensory profiles, we are not committed to the claim that intuitions are representations with consciousness (*Bewusstsein*). Moreover, the view that intuitions

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27See the interpretations discussed in the next section.
28I thank Max Edwards for pressing me on this passage.
30I also take the view of empirical intuitions as causally situated sensory profiles to be compatible with various conceptions of transcendental idealism.
31Tolley (2017b), for one, distinguishes between (a) the relation of *intuition* to its object and (b) the relation of *consciousness or perception* and the objects intuited. My view accommodates such a view, because the view below does not assume that the relation between intuition and its object is identical to the relation of consciousness in Kant’s sense of *Bewusstsein.*
are causally situated sensory profiles is not committed to the claim that intuitions are structured like “visual demonstratives” or like representations that “single out” or “track” particulars. Instead of such views, we could adopt a more minimal notion of empirical intuition as (say) establishing a *sign* relation to objects.

Regardless of the specific view we take, empirical intuitions as causally situated sensory profiles are indicators of actualities. Spelling out this idea, and seeing its philosophical and textual payoffs, is the work of the rest of the chapter. But note that however this view takes shape, the relation that intuition has to its object is a distinct intentional relation from the relation that cognition has to objects. In the contemporary idiom, cognition institutes a *new* form of intentionality beyond the intentionality of intuition alone.

Let’s begin the textual case for this view. In his agenda-setting 1772 letter to Herz, Kant states the basic problem that he addresses in the first *Critique*: how can our a priori representations relate to objects? Why aren’t our a priori representations simply illusory idols of the mind like our concepts of “fortune” and “fate”—representations that don’t refer to any real object (A84/B117)? Stated in this way, the problem of how a representation relates to an object arises from a specific skeptical barrier: how could concepts that we generate independently of experience nevertheless relate to the objects that we experience? In the letter to Herz, Kant actually *contrasts* these experience-independent “intellectual representations” with sensible representations that rest on affection. He claims that “if a representation comprises only the manner in which the subject is affected by the object, then it is easy to see how it is in conformity with this object, namely, as an effect accords with its cause, and it is easy to see how this modification of our mind can represent something, that is, have an object.” Kant’s idea, I take it, is that the senses are ways of being “affected by the object.” Our senses are thus causal powers that generate “modifications” as a result of being affected by an object, and these modifications “represent something.”

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32 I discuss this topic in greater detail in chapter 4.
33 This idea was developed by several post-Kantian philosophical psychologists, especially Hermann Lotze and Hermann von Helmholtz. See Tracz (2018) for a discussion.
34 Letter to Herz, *AA* 10:130
The skeptical barrier arises for “our understanding,” not the senses, because the understanding “is neither the cause of the object (save in the case of moral ends), nor is the object the cause of our intellectual representations.”

Because the relation between the understanding’s representations and their objects is not grounded in affection, the skeptical worry arises that the understanding’s representations might not relate to real objects after all. In 1772, Kant concludes retrospectively that his previous work had ignored this “question of how a representation that refers to an object without being in any way affected by it can be possible.”

In the Critique, there are two key classes of intellectual representations that refer to objects without being the result of affection by those objects. As a result, both of these classes of representations require a “transcendental deduction” or defense that they do relate to objects. The first class of concepts is our concepts of space and time, which are pure and a priori concepts for Kant. Kant claims to provide an account for how those a priori representations relate to objects (via a “transcendental deduction”) in the Transcendental Aesthetic (A87/B119-20). The second class of concepts are the pure concepts of the understanding or categories, and Kant devotes an entire dense chapter to their transcendental deduction. This general sketch suggests that Kant answers precisely the question that he poses himself in the letter to Herz: how could a concept (an intellectual representation) refer to objects without being the result of affection by those objects? And the key corollary of this reading is that Kant never really questioned whether our affection-dependent intuitions give objects to the mind or relate to them.

To sum up thus far, Kant maintains that affection grounds the relation between intuitions and their objects. Because sensible intuition depends on an affecting object, sensible intuition “is dependent on the existence of the object” in some important sense (B72). Kant thus clearly thinks that affection is a necessary condition on having an intuition, and that the object-giving function of intuition depends on affection.

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35Letter to Herz, AA 10:130
37In the Prolegomena, Kant claims that he has provided a “transcendental deduction” for both (a) our concepts of space and time and (b) the categories (4:285).
Now is mere affection sufficient for the production of an intuition? On a very sparse conception of affection, the answer is clearly no. What is also required is that the senses, when affected, react in a particular manner. Thus, for Kant, we need to treat the senses as powers of the mind that are affected by other powers. Kant’s lecture courses consistently have a section dedicated to the “faculties” or “powers” of cognition or of the soul.\(^{38}\) In turn, the concept of power involves the concept of cause (Ursache).\(^{39}\) As we saw in the letter to Herz, the notion of “affection” is a causal notion: an affecting object (as cause) relates to a representation of the senses (as effect). It is thus unsurprising that Kant individuates the senses partially in virtue of the items that affect them: outer sense produces representations when it is “affected” by “physical things,” whereas inner sense produces representations when it is affected by the “mind” itself.\(^{40}\)

The language of causal affection and causal powers is at work in Kant’s own glosses on sensation in the first Critique.\(^{41}\) Sensation is “a representation through sense” and is “the effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it” (A20/B34).\(^{42}\) In affection, these sensations convey qualities to the mind like colors and tastes (A175/B217).\(^{43}\) Moreover, Kant’s conception of sensation as a “perception [Perzeption] that refers [bezieht] to the subject as a modification of its state” invokes his framework of powers (A320/B376, emphasis added).\(^{44}\)

\(^{38}\) For several references to Erkenntniskräfte, see R399, 15:160; LDW, 24:710; R5553, 18:229; Anthropologie Dohna-Wundlacken, passim. Kant refers to the “sensible” and “intellectual” parts of the faculty of cognition as “powers” (MM, 29:881, 889, et passim).

\(^{39}\) ML2, 28:564

\(^{40}\) Anth 7:153

\(^{41}\) Cf. Anth, 7:153. I am also agnostic here on whether there are unique inner sensations.

\(^{42}\) See Anth, 7:154, where Kant claims that sensation is “a representation through sense of which one is conscious,” which directly mirrors his claim at A320/B376 (since “perception” in this passage is simply defined as a “conscious representation”). I should note that the A320/B376 should be treated carefully, for as we shall see, Kant denies that all sensations are conscious or that all intuitions are conscious. For more discussion, see Tolley (2017a,b).

\(^{43}\) Colors and tastes are examples of the “quality [Qualität] of sensation” that cannot themselves be “represented a priori” (i.e., they are empirical) (A175/B217). Waxman (1991, p. 222) has suggested that sensations are themselves transcendentally real, not ideal (cf. Waxman, 2013, p. 221). While this is an interesting suggestion, it is important to distinguish a sensation from the quality of sensation. While the sensation might be transcendentally real, the quality of sensation is certainly transcendentally ideal. As a representation, any contents it has are mind-dependent.

\(^{44}\) Whether all sensations are conscious representations, or perceptions, is a topic I shall take up in chapter 5. I will assume here that sensation and impression are synonyms in Kant’s corpus. For an alternative view that makes such a distinction, see Haag (2007). I also remain agnostic on what exactly the “impressions” or “sensations” of inner sense would be. Kant thinks that we are able to apprehend the “impressions [Eindrücke] of inner sense” (Anth, 7:142). Though Kant does not speak very often of sensations of inner sense, some have argued that he is committed to their presence; see Kraus (2016) and Indregard (2018) for different accounts.
Modifications inhere in substances, and alterations of the state of a substance are due to how the powers of a substance interact with other powers (or else inner principles of the substance, in which case the substance has spontaneous powers).

The senses, as powers of the soul, are “passive” powers because they are acted on by distinct powers—be they mental or physical. To say that a power is passive is to say that there is “determination of the power” in question “by an outer power.” For Kant, this means that some aspect of the “accidents” or modifications of the passive power are grounded in the active power. Since representations are modifications or accidents of a mental faculty, some aspect of those representations is grounded in the active power. For instance, the particular quality of a color sensation (say, its being red instead of blue) is partially grounded in the physical object affecting one’s eyes (say, a rose).

Yet as Kant stresses, the sensation is only partially grounded in the outer power, since our own senses make their own contribution to the nature of sensation. Thus, “a representation of a trumpet sound inheres in me through an external power, but not alone, for had I no power of representation, then it could be sounded forever and I could not have a representation.” Kant thus takes sensing to be a case of reciprocal causation: “If two substances affect one another reciprocally: then the suffering, the inherence of the accident, happens not merely by its own but rather also by external power: for otherwise it would not be a suffering [Leiden]. E.g., I hear music: that requires the external power of the music, and the distinct representation of the notes requires one’s own power of hearing.” Sensing is reciprocal because two powers are required to explain why a given representation comes about in the mind of a subject (that is, why a given accident inheres in the power).

As a result, sense cannot produce representations independently of affection, and affection cannot produce representations independently of the senses (both conclusions that Kant himself draws).
What’s more, sensations seem to be dependent on affection in a rather strong sense: in order for a sense to generate a sensation at time $t$, an object must be affecting that sense at time $t$.$^{51}$ This point will serve as an important contrast between the senses and the imagination below. So for Kant, the senses are passive mental powers causally related to other powers.

What about the spatiotemporal form of an intuition? Spatial and temporal form are essential aspects of outer and inner sense as powers (respectively). So Kant claims in lecture that space and time are “formal conditions” of the power of sense. Kant says that what is “subjective in the representation” of sensibility is the “form of the subject to be affected in a certain way.”$^{52}$ This way of being affected is a feature of the senses. So Kant says, for example, that “the eye of the fly” has a certain “polyhedral (many-sided)” constitution, whereas “the human has an entirely different eye.”$^{53}$ The difference in the “form” or way that these two creatures see gives rise to different ways “through which the object as matter is intuited.”

Similarly, when Kant explains the generation of spatial intuitions, he thinks it appropriate to appeal to formal differences between different senses. So touch “inform[s] us about the shape of the object,” while “the shape of the object is not given through hearing.”$^{54}$ Kant would not be entitled to such claims if the senses of sight and touch did not provide us spatial representations. The fact that he does make such claims draws the Sensation Only View into serious doubt: how could space and time be merely an imaginative addition to otherwise amorphous deliverances of the senses, if the senses themselves “inform” us of the shape of an object?

The next consideration is how these sensations are “ordered” in a spatial or temporal array. If what I have said is correct, then upon affection, the senses deliver us sensations plus spatiotemporal form. Moreover, I think Kant actually endorses the stronger claim that the very way that outer sense

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$^{51}$Chapter 3 discusses how intuitions depend on past and present affection in detail.

$^{52}$MVi, 29-972. I am indebted to Michael Oberst’s recommendation to consider this passage. For more on the suggestion that the senses themselves have “formal conditions”—that the “constitution of the senses to our perceptions is probably best explained as a dependence on our senses as formal conditions”—see Oberst (2019, p. 123, note 69). Indeed, Kant does call “time” the “formal condition of inner intuition of the subject,” and he says that “apprehension (apprehensio)” actually “presupposes” that formal condition; apprehension does not generate it (Anth, 7:142).

$^{53}$MVi, 29-972

$^{54}$Anth, 7:155
reacts to affection involves the generation of sensations *in* a spatial or temporal form. The senses are not an “anteroom” in which sensations are stored prior to being ordered spatially or temporally; instead, the very generation of sensations is subject to a form.

I take Kant’s gesture towards “synopsis” to denote this manner in which the senses react to affection. On my reading, *synopsis* is responsible for organizing sensations generated by affection *at the same moment at which* they are generated by affection. In the case of outer intuition, synopsis is responsible for providing a single supramodal spatial framework in which the sensations due to the various senses are generated. It is because of synopsis that particular outer *senses* (plural)—what Kant calls the “senses of intuition”—amount to an *outer sense* (singular), and that the disparate kinds of mental events are ordered in an *inner sense* (singular).

Let’s unpack this reading. The origin of the word “synopsis” itself is obscure, even though it wears a suggested meaning on its sleeve: a “seeing-together.” Synopsis is “grounded in [gründet sich auf]” and occurs “through” sense (A94). Kant claims that the synopsis was discussed “with regard to the senses in the first part above,” that is, in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Synopsis is explicitly *contrasted* with the synthetic activity of the imagination (A97). These points suggest that some activity of the senses explains how a priori cognition is possible. On my view, this activity of “seeing together” indicates the ordering of a multiplicity of sensations in a single cross-modal spatial/temporal form, as well as the representation of a multiplicity of spaces/times in a spatial/temporal form. Therefore, at least some of the representations that the senses generate have a *hylomorphic unity* that we should understand as relationship between the form and the matter of a sensory manifold.\(^{55}\)

This conclusion rules out the Sensation Only View, but not the Formal Manifold View. The proponent of the Formal Manifold View will ask why we should take the additional step to say that the senses provide full-blown *intuitions*, and not merely a spatiotemporal manifold.\(^{56}\) In response,
as we saw above, affection can ground a relation between a representation and its object. And we are now able to see in virtue of what affection can relate our minds to objects. Kant’s answer is that affection relates our mind to objects in virtue of sensations generated by the senses in the manner described above. When sensations are generated in a spatiotemporal form by the senses due to affection—when the senses generate a causally situated sensory profile—the result is an empirical intuition.

An important corollary here is that sensations that are not generated in this manner—“mere” sensations—do not relate to objects. Kant thinks some sensations are not in a position to present objects, while others are—some sensations can figure in sensory profiles of objects, while others cannot. Some of our outer senses, like smell and taste, are merely “senses of sensation” because even though they are affected by objects, they do not represent objects in space or time. In contrast, the “senses of intuition” actually “present objects to us.” For Kant, sight and touch enable us to spatially discriminate objects, while hearing does not provide us spatial information but nevertheless allows us to perceive objects “at a distance” and to “divide time.” In contrast to mere senses of sensation, senses of intuition represent spatial and temporal features of appearances. When Kant refers to “outer sense,” he is referring to the outer senses which, taken together, have a spatial aspect to their representations. Kant understands outer sense—in the singular—as a supramodal faculty that is itself grounded in the outer senses of intuition—in the plural. It is outer sense in the singular that is responsible for generating empirical intuitions.

When sensations are generated in a spatial or temporal format as part of a sensory profile, it is in virtue of the sensation component of the empirical intuition that the empirical intuition relates to a real object. Since empirical intuitions “relate to their object through sensation” (B34), empirical intuitions give objects to the mind in virtue of these spatially or temporally arrayed sensations. In

57 AF, 25:493
58 AF, 25:493-4; cf. Kant’s claim that touch, vision, and hearing are “more objective than subjective,” while taste and smell are “more subjective than objective” (Anth, 7:154).
the context of intuition, “sensation is that which designates an actuality in space and time” (A374). Although mere sensations do not give us objects, sensations synopsized into an empirical intuition do. Sensations ground the object-giving function of empirical intuitions because sensation “presupposes the actual presence of the object” (A50/B74). So when “matter” acts on the “senses at a distance,” the “object” is “presented immediately to sensation and empirical intuition.” Put differently, sensory profiles are indications of actualities in virtue of sensations generated in a causal context.

For Kant, inner and outer sense are faculties for intuiting objects that are actually present. Kant consistently distinguishes the “power of imagination” that represents objects “even without the presence of the object” (A100; B151) from “sense” as the “the faculty of intuition of the present” or “sensation [sensatio].” Kant writes in notes that “we really distinguish” what he calls an “image [Einbildung]” from “intuitions of the senses [Sinnenanschauungen].” He writes that to have an empirical intuition of sense, “the object must be represented as present,” which sets it off from “an image [Einbildung] as intuition without the presence of the object.”

These passages enrich the story I have been telling thus far. For Kant suggests that the senses do not merely generate sensations, but also that the senses—in contrast to the imagination—generate intuitions (Sinnenanschauungen or äußere Anschauungen) that originally give objects to the mind. In central texts, Kant reiterates that in contrast to the imagination, the senses of intuition fundamentally relate to objects. Kant writes:

[O]uter sense can also contain [enthalten] in its representation only the relation

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59See Jankowiak (2014) for an account of the representationality of sensation, albeit one on which empirical intuitions are Imagination-Dependent. Allais (2017b, p. 50) also discusses how intuitions cannot be merely affection dependent in the way that sensations are, though I think she underplays the role that sensations play in anchoring intuitions to real objects.

60OP, 22:530. “Light and sound” are “transitions” that make such “action at a distance . . . representable as immediately possible.” However, we do not represent the “intermediate matter affecting the subject”—“we see or hear light and sound,” but not “as immediately in contact with our eye or our ear.” These interesting reflections by Kant raise important questions about how a representation represents its cause, given contemporary worries about causal theories of representation.


62R 6315, 18:621

63AA 18:619
Verhältniß of an object to the subject, and not that which is internal to the object in itself. It is exactly the same in the case of inner sense. (B67)

Outer sense is already in itself a relation [Beziehung] of intuition to something actual outside me; and its reality, as distinct from imagination [Einbildung], rests only on the fact that it is inseparably bound up with inner experience itself, as the condition of its possibility [i.e., of the possibility of experience, – RBT]. (Bxl)

But it is clear that in order for us even to imagine something as external, i.e., to exhibit it to sense in intuition, we must already have an outer sense, and by this means immediately distinguish the mere receptivity of an outer intuition from the spontaneity that characterizes every image [Einbildung]. For even merely to imagine an outer sense would itself annihilate the faculty of intuition [Anschauungsvermögen], which is to be determined through the power of imagination [Einbildungskraft]. (B276-277, note)

What is remarkable in these passages collectively is that Kant attributes to sense and explicitly not to the imagination a relation to an object. In the case of outer sense, these objects are “actual” objects “outside me,” which complements Kant’s claim that the sensation in empirical intuitions “designates an actuality in space and time” (A374). And Kant thinks this general model is also true of inner sense according to the first passage. Finally, Kant marks the distinction between sense and imagination at the level of representational type by distinguishing (a) outer intuitions (Anschauungen) grounded in outer sense as “mere receptivity” and (b) outer images (Einbildungen) grounded in the “spontaneity” of the power of imagination.\(^{64}\)

Given the explicit contrast here between sense and imagination, these passages put pressure on the idea that the imagination is involved in establishing the original relation between an empirical intuition and the object.

Kant’s description of sense as the “faculty of intuition” that involves the “presence of the object” is thus quite fitting. The senses ultimately explain how intuitions are anchored to actual, existing objects. As Kant claims, both inner and outer intuitions, as sensible intuitions, are “dependent on the existence [Dasein] of the object” and are “possible only insofar as the representational capacity of the subject is affected through that” (B72). Both inner and outer intuitions represent affecting objects “as they appear.”\(^ {65}\)

\(^{64}\) Cf.: “Imagination and understanding are the only two active faculties of cognition of the human mind. But the senses are wholly passive, they necessarily require an object[;] imagination provides objects for itself” (LDW, 24:706).

\(^{65}\) There are a number of ways of characterizing “inner sense,” and Kant himself seems to change his mind on this
What I have said so far pertains primarily to empirical intuitions that relate to actual objects. But what about pure intuitions? On my view, pure intuitions cannot depend on their objects in the same way that empirical intuitions do, for the simple reason that pure intuitions do not contain sensation. According to Kant’s idealism, space and time do not affect our senses. Nevertheless, the pure intuition of space, like all intuitions, “rests on affection.” But how?

On my view, sensations depend on the particular items that affect the mind. Thus, an empirical intuition of a red object depends on a particular object that causes a red (not a green) sensation in me. However, the pure intuitions of space and time do not depend on the particular item that affects outer or inner sense, but instead on whether outer or inner sense are affected in general. Space and time thus express the form or way in which outer and inner sense, respectively, respond to any affection at all. So while it is true that we would lack a pure intuition of space absent affection—the representation of space described in the Transcendental Aesthetic—the particular character of space as such is entirely independent of what kind of individual powers distinct from the senses that affect the senses. In the idiom of powers I developed above, whereas the features of sensations are partially grounded in the senses and partially in the powers affecting the senses, the features of pure intuitions are grounded only in the senses. Space and time depend merely on the

“formal constitution of sense” (NB: not imagination). So pure intuitions do indeed give objects

faculty over time (see Ameriks, 2000, ch. 7). Ameriks (2000, p. 247) states Kant’s distinction between inner sense and apperception quite nicely: “Given Kant’s language in his distinction between inner sense and apperception (B154), it seems clear that he wants inner sense to be understood not as the active consciousness reflecting on or judging the self but rather as the conveyer of the data of the self which are thus acted upon.” Moreover, there are good reasons for maintaining that “inner sense need not be thought of as taking place only when there is actual apperception” (Ameriks, 2000, p. 248, see also Anth, 7:127). There are several parallels between inner and outer intuition on this point: “the mind is affected by its own activity” (B67); “If the faculty for becoming conscious of oneself is to seek out (apprehend) that which lies in the mind, it must affect the latter, and it can only produce an intuition of itself in such a way, whose form, however, which antecedently grounds it in the mind, determines the way in which the manifold is together in the mind in the representation of time; there it then intuits itself not as it would immediately self-actively represent itself, but in accordance with the way in which it is affected from within, consequently as it appears to itself, not as it is” (B68). So just as in the spatial case, the temporal form itself “determines the way in which the manifold is together in the mind in the representation of time.” So when our mental activities are registered by inner sense so that they can be (to follow Ameriks) “conveyed” or made available for consciousness and acts of apprehension, there is a way that these representations are “together in the mind” in the inner intuition that is merely intuitive—that is, that is merely represented in a way that “precedes any act of thinking something.” This togetherness precedes an activity that acts upon the inner intuition. But we need to be careful: of course inner intuition registers our own thinking, so it is not in that sense prior to thinking. The point is that the togetherness of my thoughts merely as they appear to me is prior to any additional reflection or “thinking” on those thoughts as they appear.

66The full passage: “The form of the object, as it can alone be represented in an intuition a priori, is therefore
(space and time) to the mind, and they do so merely in virtue of sensibility being affected.

This is not the final word on pure intuition, though I think that seeing how all of intuition relates to affection on the senses lessens the despair felt by some commentators that Kant does not have a unified account of intuition. Kant has a unified account of intuition on which all intuition is generated by the senses as a result of affection.

### 2.3.3 The Senses as Constraints on Cognition

I have argued that Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic provides us an account of intuitions of the senses, and I have sketched how the senses could indeed ground the essential features of intuition. I now show that this account has an upshot in explaining how the senses serve to contribute to and constrain cognition.

Those interpreters who recognize the senses as a distinct subfaculty of sensibility puzzle over how the senses make a unique contribution to cognition. If, as Kant famously maintains, cognition depends on a combination of intuitions and concepts, then how are we to understand the role of the senses in contributing to such cognition? Consider a series of questions that Andrew Brook raises regarding how the categories relate to the manifold of intuition:

If on arrival the manifold of intuition has no temporal or spatial structure and no properties that the categorial concepts name, what structure could it have? Yet without such structure, how could it guide us in determining which propositions and other experiences to accept and which to reject as expressing “capricious and incongruous fictions” (A96, A376)? ... In virtue of what can we decide that some orderings and applications of concepts are warranted, others not? We cannot localize and conceptualize elements in the manifold of intuition as we please—this is part of what Kant had in mind when he said that we are passive or merely receptive to intuitions. So what is it that controls, what could possibly control, how we do so?

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67 E.g., Grüné (2017, p. 68, note) notes in her discussion of object-dependence that “as I see it, Kant does not have a unified account of intuition.”

68 Brook (2018, p. 92)
Brook queries why the elements of a sensory manifold are spatially or temporally ordered in one way rather than another. For instance, why can’t two elements of a manifold switch places? Brook finds this problem to be particularly acute for Kant since Kant “insist[s] . . . that intuitions have nothing spatio-temporal or conceptual about them on arrival,” from which he concludes that “[t]here must be something else in intuitions as they arrive that resists some forms of organization and facilitates others.” In other words, if the sensory manifold is to have any “role in controlling the truth status of experiences,” there must be some non-spatio-temporal, non-categorical feature of intuitive manifold that plays this controlling or constraining role.

Brook seems to be making two claims here. They generate the worry he articulates given a third assumption:

(P1) The intuitive manifold lacks spatiotemporal structure “on arrival.”
(P2) The intuitive manifold lacks categorical structure “on arrival.”
(P3) There exists some feature $M$ of an intuitive manifold that constrains synthesis and concept application.

Brook accepts P1, P2, and P3. Therefore, he reasons, if the manifold constrains synthesis, then there must be some non-spatiotemporal and non-categorical mystery feature $M$ of the intuitive manifold itself that constrains synthesis and concept application. From here, it is highly unobvious what $M$ might be.

I think we should reject P1. As an initial point, it is odd for Brook to claim that an intuition “on arrival” might lack a form, since Kant seems committed to the claim that all intuitions have a form. Perhaps he means that the manifold “on arrival”—before it is an intuition—lacks a form. But let’s put this point aside. However we construe P1, it faces textual challenges.

The general textual problem is easy to state: Kant doesn’t merely think that the senses give a sensory manifold. Instead, he maintains that the senses give a sensory manifold to the mind by means of generating an intuition. Kant’s texts bear out this claim. Consider an elaboration of what I already argued in the previous section regarding synopsis. Kant states that “I ascribe a synopsis to sense, because sense contains a manifold in its intuition” (A94, emphasis added). Importantly, this
passage claims that sense has “its” intuition, and that this intuition delivers the manifold. If Kant believed P1, then he was confused when he wrote this passage.

The idea that the senses give a sensory manifold to the mind by means of generating an intuition pervades the B-edition of the *Critique*, too. The B-edition Transcendental Deduction begins with the claim that “the manifold of representations can be given in an intuition that is merely sensible, i.e., nothing but receptivity” (B129). The part of sensibility that is “nothing but receptivity”—that is, the part of sensibility that does not involve spontaneity at all—is *sense*, not the power of imagination. Consequently, the *senses* give us “an intuition that is merely sensible.”

The claims above that introduce the A- and B-edition Transcendental Deduction are more committal than the claim that the *manifold* is given. They both assert that the *intuition* is what gives the manifold. This claim is inconsistent with the idea that only the matter (the manifold of sensations or impressions, say) is given, but not the form (since all intuitions have form). It is also inconsistent with the idea that the pure manifold is the input to an imagination-dependent process whose output is intuition. For then Kant should have *denied* that the intuition is what provides the manifold to the mind; he should have instead said that the manifold is given independently of intuition, and that intuition is made from this manifold by the imagination. But the above passages claim otherwise.

Once we consider the framing of the Transcendental Logic, we see further reasons to deny Brook’s P1. Kant’s contention is that the most basic presupposition of Transcendental Logic is, not a manifold of sensations, but a *spatial (or temporal) intuition* that gives the manifold. Thus, transcendental logic possesses a “manifold of sensibility” that is not present in general logic, this manifold “lies before it *a priori*,” and “the transcendental aesthetic has offered” this manifold to transcendental logic “in order to provide the pure concepts of the understanding with a matter [*Stoff*], without which they would be without any content, thus completely empty” (A76-77/B102). If, as I argued above, the Transcendental Aesthetic is a doctrine of space and time as “conditions of the receptivity of our mind,” then Kant is claiming that the senses provide this spatial and temporal manifold that is the starting point of Transcendental Logic.
Kant also suggests that *synthesis* or combination presupposes such an spatial or temporal intuition. “The first thing that must be given to us *a priori* for the cognition of all objects is the **manifold of pure intuition**,” not a manifold of sensations (A78-9/B104, italics added). It is only from this starting point that “synthesis of this manifold” can occur (A79/B104). Similarly, §15 presupposes that such a spatial/temporal manifold is given; the understanding and the imagination are invoked in §15 to account for something done to this intuition, namely, the “combination” of its manifold, which can “never come to us through the *senses*” (B130, emphasis added). The unity for which the understanding is responsible is applied to an *intuition*, not to a group of non-spatial/non-temporal *sensations*.

Therefore, Kant’s own reflections on the presuppositions of Transcendental Logic seem to count against P1. And if we look further into Kant’s account of the senses, we see that Kant rejects P1 almost verbatim. For one, Kant argues in the First Metaphysical Exposition of Space:

> For in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside me (i.e., to something in another place in space from that in which I find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as outside and next to one another, thus not merely as different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground. (B38, my emphasis)

This passage claims that space must “already” be the “ground” for sensations, if those sensations are to be represented “outside and next to one another” and “in different places.” My account of the senses as powers made sense of how the form of the senses serves as a ground of sensation: sensations of outer sense are generated in a spatial structure in response to affection. P1 is false: the manifold that outer sense provides to thought is spatial.

In the Inaugural Dissertation, Kant claims that *some* temporal structure is given by the senses. He writes:

> But as for relations or connections of any kind: *insofar as they confront the senses* they [objects, -RBT] contain nothing which tells us whether they are simultaneous or successive to each other, *apart from their positions in time*, and those positions
have to be determined as being either at the same or at different points of time.\textsuperscript{59}

Notice that \textit{insofar as they confront the senses}, objects have “their positions in time.” In contrast, the senses are incapable of determining “those positions . . . as being either at the same or at different points of time.” This determination of positions \textit{as} different—representing a relation of temporal difference—occurs on the basis of “positions in time” provided by the senses. This passage challenges the assumption that temporal structure is something “super-added” to non-temporal representations provided by inner sense.\textsuperscript{70}

We can now return to Brook’s original point. According to his P1, the intuitive manifold lacks \textit{spatiotemporal structure} “on arrival.” We saw that Kant’s texts do not unambiguously support P1. And since P1 lacks unambiguous support, we are not led to posit a mystery \textit{M} property, in virtue of which the manifold constrains synthesis and concept application. The spatial and temporal manifold provided by the senses performs at least part of this constraining role. How the manifold is structured “on arrival” is not up to our spontaneous mental activities—it depends on neither the spontaneity of imagination nor the spontaneity of concept application.

Of course, Brook’s initial point went further than this. For one might worry that spatial and temporal structure do not suffice to constrain synthesis and concept application. Or to put the point differently, one might worry that the spatial and temporal structure of an intuition must \textit{itself reflect} categorical structure in order to constrain synthesis or concept application. If one made this latter claim, then accepting P2 would obviously be worrying. For then the manifold would lack one of the \textit{M} features, in virtue of which it can constrain experience in any way.

But why must a representation have conceptual \textit{contents}, in order for one to aptly apply con-

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{MSI}, 2:400, emphasis added. Kant makes a similar argument in the \textit{Critique}: “The original representation time must . . . be given as unlimited. But where the parts themselves and every magnitude of an object can be determinately represented [\textit{bestimmt vorgestellt}] only through limitation, there the entire representation cannot be given through concepts, for they contain only partial representations, but immediate intuition must ground them” (A32/B47-48). Kant contrasts the “determinately represented” parts represented through “limitation” from the “original representation” of time.

\textsuperscript{70} Ameriks (2000, p. 253) similarly emphasizes that “\textit{qua} representings capable of being reflected upon by us, representations belong to inner sense and as such can be already temporal. But only upon apperception do we genuinely cognize their temporality as such, and then upon further comparative reflection we can assign a temporal order to our acts of representing which fits a general objective picture of events.” Ameriks thus distinguishes the temporal representation itself from several layers of \textit{determination} of parts of time.
cepts to the object of that representation? Many who reject the Weak Independence View simply assume this principle, but it is neither something that Kant clearly asserts nor obvious in its own right. On a common view of perception, sensory states represent objects in virtue of the contents of those sensory states. These sensory states are in turn conceptualized when we form perceptual judgments on the basis of those sensory states. The conceptualization step is a distinct and downstream process from the sensory state with its contents. The sensory state represents its object in virtue of its content, even though the content of that sensory state can only be conceptualized with additional mental labor. If my proposal in the previous section is correct, then causally situated sensory profiles are precisely these pre-conceptual contents that are subject to conceptualization. As I argued, in virtue of their causal situation involving affection and sensation production, these sensory profiles do indeed relate to objects—they relate to the powers that brought them about. But it does not follow that the contents of the sensory profile represent the object as a power or as a body or as an object in causal interaction with other objects.

There are doubtlessly several systematic philosophical questions surrounding this model. All I wish to show in the remainder of this section is that Kant did indeed find it natural to claim that an uncomposed, unsynthesized spatial intuition could serve as an input to and constraint on compositional and synthetic activities of the understanding and imagination. In other words, Kant actually is committed to the picture I just outlined on which (a) the senses generate sensory states whose “undetermined” contents represent an object and (b) the mind only subsequently conceptualizes the contents of that sensory state. The sensory states in question are intuitions, and the conceptualization process is a kind of synthesis.

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71 For a brief account of a transition from a non-conceptual mode of representation to a conceptualized mode of representation, along with how such transitions are epistemically sanctioned, see Peacocke (2001, pp. 253-60).

72 In fact, I think that a related worry—how the categories could aptly apply to the non-category-dependent intuitions given by the senses—simply is the deep philosophical worry that Kant tries to address in the Transcendental Deduction. For some discussion, see the next section.

73 The following proposal cuts against the claim by Pippin (2013, p. 102) that “there are no blind intuitions, waiting to be conceptualized. Kant means to be rejecting the idea of nonconceptual content, not specifying its initial blindness. Blind intuitions are no more determinate intuitions than dead eyes are eyes.” It is not clear to me why blind intuitions are not intuitions that could constrain or inform experience. In what seems to be the programmatic argument for this assertion, Pippin (2013, p. 102) celebrates the conflation between the role of experience and sensation: “It is thus also a mistake to ask a question like ‘how do sensations guide or constrain the application of concepts’, the same mistake as
Kant frequently suggests that intuitions themselves are not synthesized or composed. As Kant writes in his *Preisschrift*, “the representation of the composite [Zusammengesetzten], as such, is not mere intuition, but rather requires the concept of composition, insofar as it is applied to intuition in space and time.”\(^{74}\) So the “mere intuition” does not represent the composite as a composite.\(^ {75}\) An “uncomposed” or “undetermined” intuition represents elements in space or time, but does not represent the relations between or the “composition” of those elements.

This is a point that Kant repeats in the *Critique* when he writes that “[c]ombination does not lie in the objects” but is instead “an operation of the understanding” (B134/B135). The “object” Kant is referring to here must be the object empirically intuited. Later on, Kant distinguishes the “empirical intuition” from the “synthesis of intuitions.” He then claims that “representations” do not “necessarily belong to one another in the empirical intuition”; rather, “they belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of the apperception in the synthesis of intuitions” (B142). So empirical intuitions do not themselves involve the synthesis of parts together into necessary relations, but instead precede such synthetic and compositional activity. Empirical intuitions do not themselves represent their parts as standing in certain necessary relations to one another.

Kant makes a similar claim about the pure intuition of space. He distinguishes “given [gegeben]” space from “made [gemacht]” space. Kant writes in his essay on Kästner’s Treatises that, in contrast to “made” space, “given” space is “before all determination of it in conformity with a certain concept of object.”\(^ {76}\) The pure intuition of space “long precedes the determinate concepts asking ‘How do we compare our judgments about states of affairs or our experiences of states of affairs with the states of affairs’? Experience is not guided by sensations; it is sensory awareness and can only be sensory awareness.” In contrast, and with Brook, I think the question “what is the role of sensation in experience?” is perfectly intelligible. In fact, I don’t even see how Pippin’s assertion that experience is always awareness involving sensation cuts against the idea that sensation could play a distinct epistemic or semantic role in experience. After all, it is true that all mammals have hearts, but the question “what is the role of the heart in a mammal?” is a perfectly intelligible (indeed, vital!) question. See Schulting (2016, pp. 235-238) for another response to Pippin.

\(^ {74}\) *FM*, 20:271. Cf. *AA* 18:688

\(^ {75}\) Golob (2016) explains how uncomposed “mere intuitions” are complementary with the aims of the Transcendental Deduction.

\(^ {76}\) The entire text: “Metaphysics must show how one can have the representation of space, geometry however teaches how one can describe a space, viz., exhibit one in the representation a priori (not by drawing). In the former, space is considered in the way it is given, before all determination of it in conformity with a certain concept of object. In the latter, one [i.e. a space] is constructed (gemacht). In the former it is original and only one (unitary) space, in the latter it is derived and hence there are (many) spaces, of which the geometric however, in accord with the metaphysician, must
of things that are in accordance with this form.”⁷⁷ This passage suggests that the pure intuition of space can serve as a ground for categorical “determination,” even though the pure intuition of space itself is not determined.

Similarly, in a letter to Beck, Kant claims that “composition” cannot be “given as such” but that we “must always make it ourselves.”⁷⁸ Even though a composite “cannot be given,” nevertheless the “form” in which the manifold is composed “must be given a priori”—it is “what is merely subjective (sensible) of the intuition [das blos Subjective (Sinnliche) der Anschauung]” but “is not thought.” Strikingly, this form is itself a representation, and “it must be a singular representation and not a concept (a general representation).” Thus, sensibility provides us with uncomposed and unsynthesized singular representations, namely, intuitions.

Now if intuitions are not determined or composed representations, then we have an initial reason for thinking that the imagination is not involved in the production of intuition. For Kant claims that the power of imagination is the “faculty for determining sensibility a priori” (B152) and is responsible in the first case for synthesis (A78/B103). Thus, if the pure intuitions of space and time are given “before all determination,” and if appearances are “undetermined” objects of an empirical intuition, then it seems that the imagination is not involved in giving these appearances to the mind.

To sum up, the senses themselves provide the mind with spatially and temporally structured data—data that is entirely independent of “spontaneous” involvement on the part of the imagination or the understanding (or its concepts). As a result, such a spatial or temporal manifold serves as a constraint on any spontaneous activity that can contribute to cognition.

Before I continue, I want to address a likely objection. One might object that the above account of intuition shows too much: it shows that as they are intuited, objects already have their position in space and time. This can then seem to make the role of concepts (and the understanding) admit as a consequence of the foundational representation of space, that they can only be thought as parts of the unitary original space” (UK, 20:419).

⁷⁷ UE, 8:222
⁷⁸ Letter to Beck, AA 11:347-8
and synthesis (and the imagination) entirely epistemic. That is, one might worry that my view entails that we intuit an objective spatial and temporal order of physical objects, and that intellectual and imaginative synthesis merely “reads off” these objective spatial properties. Kant is a transcendental idealist, after all. He thinks that the understanding and the imagination are conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience. And this claim is metaphysical, not merely epistemic. But how could this be, if synthesis merely “reads off” features of antecedently given objects?

In response, on my view, since intuitions are uncomposed and undetermined, intuitions (as sensory profiles) have basic spatial and temporal structure, but intuitions do not represent the features of objects that are due to the understanding and the imagination. For instance, for any object \( x \) that intuitions represent, intuitions don’t have accuracy conditions like “\( x \) is a body” or “\( x \) is a cause” or even “\( x \) is a triangle.” Nevertheless, empirical intuitions represent bodies without representing those objects according to their categorical features (i.e., according to cause and effect, substance, determinate magnitude, etc.). For the contents of intuition can still represent bodies in virtue of the causal relation that obtains between intuitions and the bodies that affect the senses and, consequently, produce intuitions. This point is simply a reiteration of what I noted above: that the objects of intuition can (essentially) exhibit categorial structure, even though the contents of intuition merely involve sensations and spatiotemporal structure (at least, that is, the imagination-and category-independent spatiotemporal structure). The contents of intuition relate to bodies in virtue of affection in the manner I explained above. Put briefly, we might say that appearances are “undetermined objects” of empirical intuitions because empirical intuitions have appearances as objects, even though the contents by which intuitions represent appearances (sensory profiles) are undetermined. Space and time are the undetermined objects of pure intuitions in precisely the same

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79Plausibly, in the case of empirical intuition, the senses provide the mind with an “ego-centric” representation of how space is filled around them. This is quite similar to Christopher Peacocke’s notion of “scenario contents.” This representation is ego-centric because it does not represent the absolute location of bodies in space, nor does it represent how physical objects relate to one another. Since empirical spatial intuitions are only one-sided parts of the pure intuition of space (cf. B136, note), it should not be surprising that empirical intuitions in isolation are unable to provide these rich representations of physical objects—even according to all of their spatial and temporal features. Nevertheless, even though the empirical intuition itself does not contain these rich representations, the empirical intuition still “relates to” actualities.
This concludes my positive argument for the Weak Independence View. To sum up, the senses generate at least some intuitions independently of other faculties of the mind. The senses can generate objective representations that depend on affection for their object-giving function. I ended the section by arguing that so construed, intuitions of the senses make a unique contribution to cognition.

2.4 The Strong Independence View: A Defense

The previous section argued that at least some of our intuitions are produced by the senses independently of other mental faculties (the Weak Independence View). It did so by challenging a deflationary conception of “sense” on which the senses merely provide us non-spatiotemporal sensations or something less than an intuition. This section argues that all intuitions depend on sense alone, not on imagination or apperception (the Strong Independence View). In sections 4.1 and 4.2, I argue that imagination and the intellect (respectively) are ill-equipped for explaining any of the essential features of intuitions. These arguments complement the argument from the previous section that the senses are sufficient for explaining the essential features of intuitions.

There are two broad approaches interpreters have adopted for maintaining that intuitions depend on faculties besides the senses. First, some interpreters maintain that intuitions are Imagination-Dependent. On such a view, at least one of the imagination’s activities—such as apprehension, reproduction, or sensible synthesis—ground some of the essential features of some intuitions. Second, some interpreters maintain that intuitions are Understanding-Dependent or Apperception-Dependent. These views include the view that some of the essential features of intuitions depend on concepts, as well as views on which intuition-producing synthesis depends on

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80It is similarly the case that intuitions represent space in a different way from how “physical” space is represented in experience. The “metaphysical” representation of space that serves as the form of intuition is a “subjective” representation of space. The fact that the pure intuitions of space and time are subjective or “in me as subject” needs to be stressed. See, e.g., Prol, 4:282. Kant calls the pure intuition of space a “subjectively given” representation that contrasts with the “objectively given” representation of space in geometric construction (UK, 20:419-420; see Tolley, 2016).
either the understanding or apperception more generally. I will focus on concrete proposals that exemplify each approach, and I have organized my exposition in terms of Kant’s tripartite model of the three sources of experience—sense, imagination, and the intellect (or apperception).

### 2.4.1 Against Imagination Dependence

According to the Strong Independence View, the essential features of intuitions do not depend on imagination. So we need to consider the most common modes for establishing that intuitions are imagination dependent. We can quickly survey four activities of the imagination upon which intuitions might depend: apprehension, reproduction, association, and synthesis. For Kant, apprehension is an activity of the imagination involving the “running through and taking together” of certain representations (A99). In doing this, apprehension “takes up” given representations “into the activity” of the power of imagination (A120). In turn, as the name suggests, reproduction involves the repeating of a representation had previously (A100; A120)—even though (as we shall in chapter 3), the specifics of this process are more complex than they might first seem. Closely related to reproduction is association, an activity that the imagination carries out (e.g., A100, B155). Finally, Kant claims that the activity of “synthesis” is “the mere effect of the power of imagination” (A78/B103), and interpreters frequently take intuitions to depend on synthesis.

In what follows, and following interpretive practice, I will assume that all of these activities of the imagination fundamentally depend on apprehension by the imagination. After all, apprehension is what “takes up” representations into the imagination’s activity in the first place, such that without apprehension, the imagination would not have materials to reproduce, apprehend, and synthesize. Moreover, Kant thinks that reproduction and apprehension are in some sense “inseparably bound” to one another (A102). In what follows in this subsection, I argue that some of the most common reasons for thinking that intuitions depend on imaginative apprehension are not persuasive.

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81 See, e.g., Waxman (1991, pp. 184-193) and Longuenesse (1998, pp. 36-44) for accounts on which representations that the imagination reproduces depend on previously apprehended representations.
Apprehending Intuitions

A first consideration against imagination dependence stems from a number of passages that suggest that apprehension is *aimed at* intuitions. Consequently, intuition is not produced by apprehension, but instead is the *input* to apprehension.

Kant frequently claims that the imagination apprehends an appearance or intuition. For instance, he claims that apprehension “is only a placing-together [Zusammenstellung] of the manifold of empirical intuition” (A176/B219).\(^82\) This passage does not explicitly say that apprehension *produces* empirical intuition. But if one were friendly to the imagination dependent view of intuition, one might think that we do indeed apprehend the (pure or empirical) *manifold*, but that this manifold is not itself contained in an intuition. This might seem to allow that the intuition is produced from the manifold that is apprehended.

However, Kant at several points speaks not merely of apprehending the manifold, but of apprehending a *manifold that is in the intuition*. He claims that the “synthesis of apprehension . . . is *aimed directly at* the intuition,” and that what “come[s] from this manifold” is the “*unity* of intuition” (A99, emphasis added). Kant also provides an illustration: “I make the empirical intuition of a house into perception through apprehension of its manifold” (B162). Both of these passages explicitly state that what we apprehend is the *intuition*. These passages also complement my argument in the previous section that the senses give the manifold *by means of* generating an intuition. Kant’s view of apprehension in the third *Critique* doubles down on this view of apprehension. For he refers to the circumstance in which “apprehension has gone so far that the partial representations of the intuition of the senses *that were apprehended first* already begin to fade in the imagination as the latter proceeds on to the apprehension of further ones.”\(^83\) Plausibly, in such a circumstance, apprehension is *acting on* intuitions of the senses (NB: not of the imagination) or parts thereof, and some apprehended intuitions that are not successfully retained begin to “fade in the imagination.”

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\(^82\)Cf.: “Our *apprehension* of the manifold of appearance is always successive, and is therefore always changing” (A182/B225); “Thus, e.g., the apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house that stands before me is successive” (A190/B235); “the apprehension of this appearance” (A193/B238); “a synthesis of apprehension (of the manifold of a given appearance)” (A201/B246)

\(^83\)KU, 5:252
These passages also make sense of Kant’s claim (reviewed in the previous section) that the intuition does not provide composed contents to the mind, but that composition is introduced by the imagination’s apprehension. The senses give us a spatial or temporal intuition, even though we lack “perception” or a “unified” representation of that manifold prior to synthesis. These themes suggest that we should distinguish (a) intuition from (b) items that result from what is done to intuition by the imagination. Apprehension is involved in producing these items that result from intuition, not the intuition itself.

**Apprehension as Attention**

Still, interpreters in favor of imagination dependence point to passages in which Kant suggests that apprehension acts, not on intuitions, but on sensations. Indeed, Kant sometimes claims that when we apprehend, we “take up” certain “sensations” or “impressions” (e.g., A120, A167/B209). Interpreters then reason that apprehension is the action of the mind in virtue of which sensations first of all occupy any spatial or temporal structure. On such a view, empirical intuitions are imagination dependent: the matter of an empirical intuition (sensation) can only be joined to its form (space or time) through apprehension by the imagination.

One way to understand this view is to suggest that apprehension is a kind of attention. Attention would then be a condition on the generation of empirical intuition. Rolf Peter Horstmann has recently suggested such a view. For him, “sense impressions” are “non-specified content” that “have no space and time determinations.” (I read Horstmann’s claim that impressions lack “space and time determinations” simply as the claim that impressions are not parts of a spatial or temporal representation.) At the “level” of the “manifold of sensibility,” the sense impressions are “disconnected, unordered, random, and meaningless occurrences within the general flow of consciousness, dependent on the passivity characteristic of receptivity.” But “whenever I make a sense impression

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84 The list of items that result from activities performed on intuition includes “determinate representation” and “composition,” to which we can now add “unity of intuition” and “perception.”
85 See Merritt and Valaris (2017) for this view; I adopt a related view in chapter 3.
86 Horstmann (2018, p. 14). I should note that many besides Horstmann have articulated this view in conversation.
87 Horstmann (2018, p. 10)
the object of my attention, I thereby create a sensible representation” or “perception”—a “conscious sensible representation.”\footnote{Horstmann (2018, p. 14)} It is only these “conscious sensible representations” that are no longer “amorphous”; they “conform to the conditions of sensibility, which means that they represent their content as having some definite position in space and time.” Thus, Horstmann endorses a Sensation Only View: the senses provide sensations (or impressions), but not sensations (or impressions) with any spatial or temporal structure. Attention via the imagination is that in virtue of which sensations have any spatial structure.

I have two objections to this view, one systematic and one textual. I will begin with the systematic objection. The basic problem is that it is not clear why attending to a sensation would endow it with spatial or temporal content in the first place.\footnote{Notice that Horstmann is not claiming that attention makes \textit{determinate} spatial contents from \textit{indeterminate} spatial contents; he is instead claiming that attention makes \textit{spatial contents} from \textit{non-spatial} contents or items.} Horstmann’s view posits a transformation from (a) non-spatial sensations to (b) spatially ordered sensations. The transition occurs as follows: when I \textit{attend} to (a), I become aware of (b). But this seems wrong. If I attend to (a), then I would merely become aware of (a). If I attend to a non-spatial item, then I become aware of a non-spatial item. The intuition behind my objection is that attention is at bottom a \textit{selection} procedure. If I attentionally select a mountain, then the mountain is what occupies the center stage of my attention—I give it more priority than my other representations.\footnote{E.g., Watzl (2017) provides an account of attention in terms of a general priority relation that certain of one’s mental states have over all of one’s other mental states.} If I attentionally select a non-spatial sensation, then that non-spatial sensation occupies the center stage of my attention. But then attention has done nothing to explain how sensations come to have spatial or temporal structure.

Horstmann assumes that precisely \textit{because} sensations are pulled onto the center stage, they are endowed with spatial structure. The idea seems to be that attention itself has (say) a spatial “form” to which it is subject. However, this claim is unobvious. I might attend to my joyful mood while ignoring the bird I view outside my window. My attention might be fixed by a difficult metaphysical quandry, causing me to ignore what I am currently sensing. If these observations are
correct, then it is false that attention is necessarily subject to spatial or temporal form. For though
the bird is spatially represented, the mood is merely temporally represented. And though moods are
temporally represented, the metaphysical quandry is not temporally represented. If this is true, then
the transformation between (a) non-spatial sensations and (b) spatially ordered sensations cannot
be explained by attention.

I thus think that the attentional account of apprehension does nothing to explain the spa-
tiality of the manifold. The attentional account is led to posit a “brute” spatiality or temporality to
certain acts of attention, just as much as my account of intuition is led to posit “brute” spatiality
or temporality to the representations that the senses provide. On my view, the problem is not with
positing bruteness as such; the problem is that the attentional account locates the bruteness in the
wrong place. Moreover, the attentional account gives the impression that it is explaining spatiality
in a less brute fashion than the Strong Independence View. But that impression is an illusion. On
my view, the spatial or temporal intuitions to which we attend explain why certain acts of atten-
tion juxtapose spatial features, and why other acts of attention juxtapose temporal features. These
spatial or temporal intuitions are indeed brutally spatial or temporal: for Kant, there is no available
explanation for why humans have these forms of sensing and not others.\(^{91}\) But given that we have
such forms, our senses provide to the imagination sensations in that form.

I now turn to a textual point regarding attention. In several texts, Kant maintains that we
have empirical intuitions of objects that we do not apprehend or notice. Consider several examples
of what Kant calls “unconscious” or “obscure” intuitions.\(^{92}\) Kant provides the following example:

No microscope has yet been able to detect Newton’s lamellae, of which the colored
particles of bodies consist, but the understanding cognizes (or assumes) not only
their existence, but also that they really are represented, albeit without conscious-

\(^{91}\)In respect to other beings with sensibilities, our forms of sensing are contingent. Ameriks (2000) takes this fact
to be central to what makes the forms of sensing ideal in his “species” view of the ideality of space and time. Similar
to my view, his view is that self-cognition (and in turn cognition generally) depends on “conditions (temporal forms)
beyond my doing”—conditions from which other types of beings . . . might be free” (Ameriks, 2000, p. 279, emphasis
added). My specification of this view is that “beyond my doing” implies beyond any activities of the imagination, and
especially beyond any personal-level activities like attention.

\(^{92}\)Kant’s views on these matters were similar to Leibniz’s doctrine of “minute perceptions.” See e.g., LB, 24:41;
Anth, 7:135.
ness, in our empirical intuition.\textsuperscript{93}

By hypothesis, Newton’s lamellae are microphysical particles that are the basis for color. Thus, according to Kant, whenever we intuit colored objects, our empirical intuitions actually represent the miniscule “lamellae” underlying color.\textsuperscript{94}

Next, consider Kant’s remark in the Anthropology:

The field of sensuous intuitions and sensations of which we are not conscious, even though we can undoubtedly conclude that we have them—that is, obscure representations in the human being (and thus also in animals)—is immense. Clear representations, on the other hand, contain only infinitely few points of this field which lie open to consciousness. . . . Everything the assisted eye discovers by means of the telescope (perhaps directed toward the moon) or microscope (directed toward infusoria) is seen by means of our naked eyes.\textsuperscript{95}

This passage suggests that we do indeed sense objects like “infusoria” (small single-celled organisms), just as Newton’s lamellae really are contained in empirical intuition “albeit without consciousness.” In contrast, “only infinitely few points of this field” of unconscious representations are “open to consciousness.”

Plausibly, Kant is claiming that our empirical intuitions can represent objects in space to which we are not attending. That is, even if we are not occurrently apprehending an object, our sensory contact with the object in virtue of affection can still generate an empirical intuition of that object. Our empirical intuitions represent those objects, “albeit without consciousness,” even if we do not notice those objects. Kant himself puts the point this way. He says that our inability to notice certain objects is due to our limited “power of imagination,” which is not able to “apprehend [aufzufassen] the manifold of the intuition” of minute objects “with consciousness.”\textsuperscript{96} Kant emphasizes that such objects are nevertheless represented in intuition, even though the contents of those

\textsuperscript{93}UE, 8:205. For further discussion, see Langton (1998, pp. 192ff.).

\textsuperscript{94}Note that Kant’s claim is not that the lamellae could be represented in empirical intuition, but that they are so represented “without consciousness.”

\textsuperscript{95}Anth, 7:135

\textsuperscript{96}UE, 8:217; Kant also seems to think that the senses themselves would need to be “sharpened” in order to facilitate our imagination’s apprehension. Cf. UE, 8:212, where Kant makes a similar point about our limited “faculty for grasping [Fassungsvermögen].”
intuitions do not stand in the relation to consciousness that Kant calls “perception.”\(^97\)

This textual observation cuts against the attentional account of the spatiality of empirical intuition. Kant’s view is that attention or apprehension is required for “perception” or “consciousness,” but he denies that apprehending a sensation or attending to it is *what makes it the case* that such a sensation inhabits a spatial or temporal structure.

**The Mereology of Apprehension**

A final argument against imagination dependence is that the imagination’s activity of apprehension has the wrong structure for generating the pure intuitions of space and time. As I argue here, the part-whole structure of apprehension cannot account for the essential features of the pure intuition of space or time. Given that interpreters often argue that intuitions depend on the imagination precisely because all intuitions depend on pure intuition, the argument of this section blocks an important avenue for demonstrating that intuitions are imagination dependent.

The starting point of this argument is that the pure intuition of space is a representation in which the whole is prior to the parts. As Kant writes in the Transcendental Aesthetic, the spaces and places as *parts* of space “cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would be possible), but rather are only thought in it. It [space] is essentially single [*eineig*]” (A25/B39). The intuition of space cannot be produced by assembling it from its parts. Instead, space must “precede” its parts and must be the “single” representation that makes possible all of our concepts and determinate representations of spaces and places.

Colin McLear exploits this feature of the pure intuition of space to produce an argument against the *understanding* dependence of intuition. He summarizes these considerations as follows:

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97 See *UE*, 8:217, footnote, where Kant claims that such intuitions lack “aesthetic clarity.”
that of its component parts (cf. CJ 5:407–8, 409). Hence, Kant’s position is that the pure intuitions of space and time possess a unity wholly different from that given by the discursive unity of the understanding (whether it be in conceptual judgment or the intellectual cum imaginative synthesis of intuited objects more generally). The unity of aesthetic representation—characterized by the forms of space and time—has a structure in which the representational parts depend on the whole. The unity of discursive representation—representation where the activity of the understanding is involved—has a structure in which the representational whole depends on its parts.  

The idea is that our pure intuition of space cannot arise from a discursive activity that assembles parts into a whole. For Kant’s argument in the Metaphysical Exposition is exactly the opposite: we have a pure intuition of space as a whole that precedes its parts. If all discursive representation proceeds from parts to wholes, then the pure intuition of space cannot depend on discursive representation.

We can adapt McLear’s argument into an argument against the imagination dependence of the pure intuition of space. Consider two basic features of apprehension. First, apprehension is an activity that unfolds through time. Kant claims that “our apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive, and is therefore always changing” (A182/B225). The apprehension of both subjective and objective phenomena is a successive activity that involves an ordering of “states.” Even the apprehension of spatial magnitudes is a “successive synthesis” (B154-5). So apprehension unfolds over time.

Second, apprehension is characterized by a particular mereological structure. The most prominent mereological structure of apprehension involves the cognition of wholes from their parts. As Kant writes, “every appearance as intuition is an extensive magnitude, as it can only be cognized

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98 McLear (2015, p. 91)
99 When I combine two representations in the imagination, “I am therefore only conscious that my imagination places one state before the other after, not that the one state precedes the other in the object” (A188/B233, my emphasis). This amounts to a distinction between the successiveness of subjective states and the successiveness of objective states. “Insofar as” appearances “are, merely as representations, at the same time objects of consciousness, they do not differ from their apprehension, i.e., from their being taken up into the synthesis of the imagination, and one must therefore say that the manifold of appearances is always successively generated in the mind” (A190/B235).
100 See also Kant’s claim that it is because the “apprehension” of sensation “is not a successive synthesis” that it “therefore has no extensive magnitude” (A167/B209, my emphasis).
through successive synthesis (from part to part) in apprehension” (A163/B204, emphasis added).\textsuperscript{101} So the primary mereological structure of apprehension involves cognition of appearances and magnitudes by apprehending parts of appearances and magnitudes.\textsuperscript{102}

With these two points in mind, it is not clear how a process with both of these characteristics could generate the pure intuitions of space or time that are described in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Clearly, as he argues in the Metaphysical Expositions in the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant denies that we intuit infinite space by means of apprehending parts of space. Equally clearly, Kant would need to deny that we intuit infinite space by apprehending finite wholes within space. For selecting a finite whole by apprehending it merely yields a representation of a finite spatial region. So both of these ways of making the pure intuition of space dependent on apprehension seem to be non-starters. Similar points also tell against thinking that the pure intuition of space depends on reproduction or association.\textsuperscript{103}

Perhaps Kant thinks the pure intuition of space is apprehension dependent in a different way. Perhaps he thinks that an infinite magnitude (like space or time) is indeed given in intuition by means of apprehension. Instead of apprehending a finite part, the story would go, the imagination is capable of apprehending or synthesizing infinite wholes like space and time. The process would fundamentally differ from successive apprehension of finite wholes, and one would need to spell out how such apprehension comes about. Such apprehension would need to be “simple” apprehension, in that it would not represent the composition of space, but rather the infinite whole of space in which composition is possible.

\textsuperscript{101}This contrasts with the apprehension of intensive magnitudes, which “takes place by means of the mere sensation in an instant and not through successive synthesis of many sensations, and thus does not proceed from the parts to the whole; it therefore has a magnitude, but not an extensive one” (A168/B210).

\textsuperscript{102}Of course, we could consider each item that we apprehend itself a whole, and Kant actually does so in the Second Antinomy. Sparing the details, it is possible to decompose a whole appearance that is “enclosed within its boundaries” (A524/B552). This process of decomposition involves apprehending a given finite whole, and then finding its various parts and separating them out from one another. What’s relevant for us is that even the initial whole that the imagination apprehends is a finite whole, and is indeed a whole that could in turn be considered a part of some further whole. Though the parts that the imagination apprehends are themselves wholes, these wholes are not spatially or temporally infinite.

\textsuperscript{103}though Kant claims that both apprehension and reproduction are required for a “whole representation” to arise, or for our “most fundamental representations of space and time” to arise (A102), I shall argue in chapter 4 that these passages express cases of image production, not intuition production.
Now I want to allow that the imagination could play a role in representing the infinity of space in some way. Kant himself suggests that the geometer’s successive construction procedures can serve to represent the infinity of space. But we should distinguish merely representing the infinity of space from the manner in which infinite space is originally given in pure intuition. That is, perhaps there are several ways of representing the infinity of space; however, on my view, there is only one way that infinite space is originally given. On the Strong Independence View, space is originally given by the senses only, not by the imagination. This distinction between representing infinity and giving infinite objects refines our discussion. For now the question facing the imagination dependence view is this: is apprehension (even of the special sort we just countenanced) involved in giving infinite space in intuition?

Kant’s answer is no. Recall that for Kant, the pure intuition of space gives an “infinite given magnitude” to the mind (A25/B39). However, he denies that the infinity of this magnitude can be given by apprehension. This seems to be the implication of Kant’s remarks in his essay on Kästner’s treatises. Additionally, in a note, Kant also claims that infinite space is not given by means of apprehension:

The question is whether a given magnitude is infinite. The condition is that it be given. Now the being given [gegeben seyn] is indicated through the at the same time [das zu irgend]. However, it is not given in apprehension or in the determination.

This passage asserts that an infinite magnitude—space and time—cannot be originally given “in apprehension.” As a result, the infinity of the pure intuitions of space and time do not depend on apprehension. An infinite magnitude also cannot be originally given “in the determination.” To repeat my refrain, since the imagination is a “faculty for determining sensibility,” the infinity of pure intuitions of space and time is not imagination dependent. So even if the imagination is ultimately important for providing a particular way of representing the infinity of space, the imagination (at least in its apprehension) is not involved in giving infinite space to the mind.

\[^{104}\text{See UK, 20:419.}\]
\[^{105}\text{R 4707, 17:682}\]
2.4.2 Against Understanding Dependence

In the previous section, I argued that intuitions are not imagination dependent. Yet by far the greatest motivation among Kant scholars for accepting imagination dependence is that intuitions are understanding dependent. For as we saw in the introduction, many interpreters argue that the imagination either is the understanding or else serves to mediate between sensibility and the understanding. And, they argue, intuitions must depend on the understanding for one reason or another.

Originally, a group of Sellars-inspired interpreters claimed that intuitions have conceptual content.\(^{106}\) In a softening of this position, others agree that intuitions depend on the understanding in some way, but not on concepts. As we shall see, some maintain that intuitions are apperception dependent—that they depend on a capacity for consciousness or self-consciousness (cf. B132). Alternatively, Longuenesse (1998) has defended and popularized the claim that the understanding has some pre-conceptual but still discursive function. If such views are workable, then the fact that a representation depends on the understanding or apperception does not mean that the representation depends on concepts.\(^{107}\) For concepts themselves depend on apperception (e.g., A103, B131), and two items can depend on the same faculty without depending on each other. So in all, there are three ways in which intuitions might depend on something beyond the senses and the imagination: concept dependence, understanding dependence, and what we might call mere apperception dependence.

I take it that concept dependence entails understanding dependence, and understanding dependence entails mere apperception dependence. But my arguments do not hang on this chain of dependence. This section argues that each link in this chain of dependence faces substantial textual

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\(^{106}\) John McDowell is perhaps the most prominent proponent of this view, and he maintains the imagination is responsible for generating conceptual sensory contents. He writes that on Sellars’ reading and his own, “the productive imagination generates representations with conceptual content partly expressible by phrases of the form ‘this such’” McDowell (2013b, p. 124). Detailed interpretations of Kant along strictly Sellarsian lines—including Haag (2007) and Landy (2017, ch. 3)—similarly maintain that intuitions are conceptually structured, and these accounts both connect this conceptual account of intuition to Sellars’ account of “image models” and (in turn) Kant’s account of productive imagination.

\(^{107}\) McLear (2014) provides a helpful discussion of this point.
and philosophical stresses. We will first turn to considerations against both concept dependence and understanding dependence, and I end the chapter by considering the thinner apperception dependence.

**Giving Appearances**

In several texts, Kant suggests that empirical intuitions give appearances to the mind, and that appearances can be given to the mind independently of apperception or the understanding. I begin with the relevant passages, consider a critical objection, and provide a response to the objection.

A number of texts suggest empirical intuitions and their objects—appearances—are given to the mind independently of the understanding. Here is a sample:

[A] The categories of the understanding . . . do not represent to us [stellen uns gar nicht . . . vor] the conditions under which objects are given in intuition at all, hence objects can [können] indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding, and therefore without the understanding containing their a priori conditions. (A89/B122)

[B] Were it [synthesis, -RBT] not grounded on a transcendental ground of unity, it would be possible for a swarm of appearances to fill up our soul without experience ever being able to arise from it. But in that case all relation of cognition to objects would also disappear, since the appearances would lack connection in accordance with universal and necessary laws, and would thus be intuition without thought, but never cognition, and would therefore be as good as nothing for us. (A111)

[C] That representation that can be given prior to all thinking is called intuition. (B132; cf. B67)

[D] The manifold for intuition must already be given prior to the synthesis of understanding and independently from it[.] (B145)\(^{108}\)

[E] Both extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must necessarily be connected by means of this transcendental function of the imagination, since otherwise the former would to be sure yield appearances but no objects of an empirical cognition, hence there would be no experience. (A124)

\(^{108}\)The rest of the passage fleshes out this point: “They [the categories] are only rules for an understanding whose entire capacity consists in thinking, i.e., in the action of bringing the synthesis of the manifold that is given to it in intuition from elsewhere to the unity of apperception, which therefore cognizes nothing by itself, but only combines and orders the material for cognition, the intuition, which must be given to it through the object” (emphasis added).
On a natural reading, these passages suggest that appearances are “given” in intuition independently of concepts, apperception, and the understanding. According to [A], neither the “categories,” nor the “functions” of judgment, nor the “understanding” tell us “the conditions under which objects are given in intuition at all.” According to [B], without apperception, “it would be possible for a swarm of appearances”—not mere sensations—“to fill up our soul,” though we would never enjoy “experience” or “cognition.” But we would still have “intuition without thought.” According to [C], intuitions are given “prior to all thought.” Moreover, according to [D], the manifold must be given “prior to” and “independently from” the “syntheses of the understanding.” The manifold is “given to” the understanding “in an intuition.” Finally [E] asserts that without the understanding, sensibility “would to be sure yield appearances,” but no objects of empirical cognition.

Taken together, these passages have a surface-level reading on which intuitions and appearances are given to the mind independently of the understanding and the categories. I think that the surface-level reading is the correct reading. However, proponents of understanding or concept dependence reliably contest this surface-level reading. They maintain that Kant (perhaps unknowingly) adopted a sophisticated style of exposition that undermines the surface-level reading, and that these passages should not be taken as stating Kant’s considered metaphysical views. I will visit two variants of this objection and address them.

According to the first reading, Kant’s claims in (A), (B), (C), and (D) are meant in the subjunctive. According to this subjunctive reading, Kant is not stating that it is metaphysically possible for appearances to be given by intuitions independently of the understanding. Rather, he is temporarily voicing an epistemic possibility that is subsequently shown to be a metaphysical impossibility. The subjunctive reading reasons that if appearances really could be given independently of apperception or the understanding, then the argument of the Transcendental Deduction would fail. The Transcendental Deduction would fail, such interpreters claim, because it is a non-starter to

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109 As Allais (2017b, p. 42) puts it, “again, what we would have without conceptually-governed synthesis would be appearances, not a blooming, buzzing mass of sensations.” Interpreters frequently read Kant’s claims about appearances in the Transcendental Deduction as if ‘appearance’ and ‘sensation’ were terminological variants, which they surely are not. For one reading that makes such a conflation at a key interpretive moment, see Waxman (1991, p. 186 et passim).
claim both that (a) categories necessarily apply to the appearances given in intuition (a conclusion of the Transcendental Deduction) and that (b) it is metaphysically possible for appearances to be given to the mind independently of the categories. The subjunctive interpretation urges us to reject (b).

The subjunctive reading is usually motivated by the context of passage (A). Here is the entire passage:

[A*] The categories of the understanding . . . do not represent to us [*stellen uns gar nicht . . . vor*] the conditions under which objects are given in intuition at all, hence objects can [*können*] indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding, and therefore without the understanding containing their a priori conditions. . . . For appearances could [*können*] after all be so constituted that the understanding would not find [*fände*] them in accord with the conditions of its unity, and everything would then lie [*läge*] in such confusion that, e.g., in the succession of appearances nothing would offer itself that would furnish a rule of synthesis and thus correspond to the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would therefore be entirely empty, negatory, and without significance. Appearances would [*würden*] nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires [*bedarf*] the functions of thinking. (A89-91/B122-B123)

On the subjunctive reading, “though things might be as this passage suggests” for all we know prior to the Transcendental Deduction, “fortunately, that is not how things stand.”110 Instead, “there is an argument—call it the transcendental deduction—which shows that this possibility does not in fact obtain.”111 As others have put the point even more strongly, if intuitions are not understanding dependent or apperception dependent, then this would “undermine the very purpose, not only of the B-Deduction, but of the positive project of the First Critique.”112 In short, the Transcendental Deduction allegedly excludes an epistemic possibility that Kant floats in the above passage.113 Thus, we should reject the surface-level reading: Kant is *not* asserting that intuitions give appearances to the mind independently of the understanding.

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110Conant (2017, p. 132). Similarly, Ginsborg (2008, p. 69) maintains that intuitions must depend on the understanding if “the Transcendental Deduction is to have any hope of success.” See also Griffith (2012, pp. 199-200).
111Conant (2017, p. 132)
112Bowman (2011, p. 421)
113Gomes (2014, p. 6) defends the feasibility of reading of the passage as expressing an epistemic, not a metaphysical, possibility.
I want to point to two issues with the subjunctive reading that show that the reading is inconclusive. I think there is a reading of these passages that is squarely consistent with the Strong Independence View.

First, the passage [A*] above does contain verbs in the subjunctive mood, but they do not illustrate the point that the subjunctive reading wants them to. Kant claims that for all we know prior to the Transcendental Deduction, appearances “could [können]” be such that the understanding “would not find them” in accordance with its “unity,” which “would” result in “confusion.” The Strong Independence View could agree with the subjunctive view that this sentence states a merely epistemic possibility and that Transcendental Deduction excludes this epistemic possibility. Maybe all of the subjunctive verbs here express merely epistemic possibilities. Perhaps appearances really couldn’t disagree with the understanding’s “unity.” But so what? The Strong Intuition View insists that this is all compatible with the claim that intuitions give appearances independently of the understanding, concepts, and apperception. The Strong Independence View is not committed to the existence of appearances that are not subject to the categories. It’s plausible that the Transcendental Deduction purports to exclude the epistemic possibility above. The Strong Intuition View simply points out that it does not do so by arguing that the understanding is a necessary condition on appearances being given to the mind.

In [A*], Kant states twice in the indicative mood that the understanding and concepts are not conditions on intuition. He says that the categories “do not represent to us [stellen uns gar nicht . . . vor] the conditions under which objects are given in intuition at all,” and he also says that “intuition by no means requires [bedarf] the functions of thinking.” The Strong Intuition View can thus contend that the epistemic possibility that the categories do not apply to intuitions is grounded on the metaphysical fact that intuitions are given independently of the understanding.

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114 A similar point is made by Allais (2015, ch. 7).
115 Nor is the Strong Independence View committed to the real possibility of appearances that are not subject to the categories. That is, the Strong Independence View is not committed to the “filtration view,” associated with Salomon Maimon, according to which categorical synthesis “filters” out those appearances that in fact do not conform to the categories. Hanna (2011) claims that Kant must be committed to “rogue objects” that evade our capacity to understand them if intuitions do not depend on concepts—a claim I consider in a later footnote.
and the categories. Of course, it is incumbent upon proponents of the Strong Independence View to explain how the categories could apply to intuitions, even if the categories are not required for intuitions to give appearances to the mind. That idea is the central interpretive commitment of the Strong Independence View regarding the Transcendental Deduction. But that is a project, I take it, that proponents of the Strong Independence View are eager to accept.\footnote{For starts, see Allais (2015, ch. 11), de Sá Pereira (2017), Golob (2016), and Onof and Schulting (2015). A recent paper by Indregard (2020) argues that these non-intellectualist views of the Transcendental Deduction are inadequate. Ultimately, Indregard argues, these views “leave the scenario sketched in the subjunctive mood by Kant as a live possibility.” I agree that more needs to be said in favor of the non-intellectualist view of the Transcendental Deduction, if we are to resist successfully the conclusion by Hanna (2011) that the Transcendental Deduction simply fails at its goal. When it comes to this debate, I think that we need to be more careful about our metaphysics of the understanding—a point already taken from my emphasis of the tripartite model in Kant. I think a bottom-up account of the Transcendental Deduction can secure the necessary agreement of appearances with the categories. This bottom-up account appreciates that Kant’s arguments in the Deduction run through claims about how abstract features of the senses and imagination serve as conditions for human thinking. Moreover, I argue, Kant seems to assert that these features secure the necessary agreement between intuitions and the categories (i.e., that the categories do apply to intuitions).

Second, however we understand (A) and its surrounding text, it is not clear how the subjunctive reading deals with passages (C), (D), and (E).\footnote{I take this to be a major shortcoming of the reading in Gomes (2014, pp. 6-7). For if he thinks that Kant’s use of the indicative is indecisive in (A), then it takes additional interpretive strain to see (C) and (D) as expressing a merely epistemic possibility.} These three passages do not occur in Kant’s set-up to the Transcendental Deduction; instead, they occur in the central argument of the Transcendental Deduction itself. (C) and (D) are in the indicative mood, and they state categorically that intuitions are given “prior to thought” and “independently from” the understanding. Moreover, towards the end of the Transcendental Deduction, (E) simply repeats the claim that sensibility “would to be sure yield” appearances without the understanding. If the Transcendental Deduction was meant to argue that this possibility is not a real possibility, then presumably Kant would either stop asserting this possibility, or else would claim that sensibility (in the end) really would not provide appearances without the understanding. To my knowledge, he does neither. So these passages tell against the subjunctive reading.

There is a second yet related reading of (A) through (D). According to this reading, we can allow that Kant is speaking literally when he claims that intuitions give us objects. However, on this alternative reading, Kant’s claims should all be understood as an anticipation of what is to come in
the Transcendental Deduction. Henry Allison articulates this view, inspired by W. H. Walsh:

Kantian sensible intuition is only “proleptically” the awareness of a particular. The point here is simply that, although intuitions do not in fact represent or refer to objects apart from being “brought under concepts” in a judgment, they can be brought under concepts, and when they are they do represent particular objects. ... Thus ... it is really necessary to draw a distinction between determinate or conceptualized and indeterminate or unconceptualized intuitions.  

In other words, the object-giving character of intuitions is dependent on concepts, and intuitions give objects to the mind. When Kant says in the Transcendental Aesthetic that appearances are the “undetermined objects of empirical intuition,” he is making a claim that will be enriched later in the Critique. We view intuitions as object-giving only in light of the results of the Transcendental Deduction.

Nevertheless, it remains unclear how the proleptic reading is compatible with (A) through (E). For these involve claims that do come later in the Critique, just when Kant would allegedly be “enriching” his conception of intuition. But these passages seem less like an enriching of Kant’s previous conception of intuition, and more like a doubling-down on that previous conception.

The proleptic reading proponent might reason as follows. “Undetermined” appearances that are given by “indeterminate intuitions” do not give objects to the mind unless they are determined by the categories. We are owed an account of what it means for a representation to “give” an “undetermined” object to the mind. One might think, after all, that the object is at least determinate in the sense that it either is represented by the intuition or is not represented by the intuition. But if a representation’s object is “undetermined,” then how could the representation also immediately represent an object and give it to the mind? The proleptic reading draws into question whether there is a coherent way of spelling this out for Kant.


\[119\] Conant (2017, p. 129) argues that we should not view Kant’s initial statement of what an “appearance” is as a definition. He thinks that since for Kant, “philosophy” does not “imitate mathematics by beginning with definitions, unless it be by way of experiment” (A730/B758), we only “fully understand philosophical terms like ‘appearance’ once “we have completed our task of critique” (p. 130). The problem with this reading is that as Conant has it, Kant’s initial characterization of appearance is not incomplete but incorrect. For I do not see how Conant can claim that appearances are “undetermined” in any substantive way. I think the best way to make sense of this undetermined aspect of the objects of empirical intuition is to maintain that empirical intuitions are prior to determination by the imagination.
But as I argued in section 3, Kant does have an account of how uncomposed or undetermined empirical intuitions relate to objects, on which the senses play a crucial role in establishing that relation. So the view that uncomposed or undetermined intuitions give objects to the mind is not a non-starter. When Kant works through the Transcendental Deduction, he is not enriching a previous notion—the notion of intuition. Instead, he is introducing a new notion—the notion of experience. Indeed, Kant’s claims beyond the Critique suggest that “judgment” is required to make intuition into a “cognition” suitable for experience; but in those same texts, Kant also seems to suggest that “judgment” is not a condition for the original relation between an intuition and an object.

To close, the Strong Independence View need not be read as deflating the ambition of the Transcendental Deduction. In his summary remark to §26 of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant concludes that “laws exist just as little in the appearances, but rather exist only relative to the subject in which the appearances inhere, insofar as it has understanding, as appearances do not exist in themselves, but only relative to the same being, insofar as it has senses” (B164, emphasis added). So though intuited appearances exist only “insofar as” the subject “has senses,” appearances are law-governed because appearances exist relative to a subject that also has an understanding. As we will see in chapter 3, the mere fact that the subject in which appearances inhere also has an imagination has an enormous impact on perceptual representation. The impact of apperception and the understanding is the subject of chapter 4.

120 Other interpreters have explicitly asserted as much against Allison’s interpretation. For instance, Ameriks (2000, p. 254) claims that Kant “says that prior to apperception there may be ‘no determinate intuition of the self’ (B154) — not that there may be no intuition at all.”

121 This point is familiar to those who think that Kant makes a principled distinction between intuition, perception, and experience.

122 E.g., in a letter to Kant, J.S. Beck claims that on his reading of Kant, “both intuitions and concepts acquire objectivity only after the activity of judgment subsumes them under the pure concepts of the understanding.” In an annotation to this letter, Kant seems to correct Beck on this point: “The determination [Bestimmung] of a concept, by means of intuition, into a cognition of an object is indeed the work of judgment; but the reference [Beziehung] of intuition to an object in general is not” (annotation to a letter from J.S. Beck, 1791, AA 11:311). Kant explicitly claims that the “reference of an intuition to an object” is not dependent on “judgment.” Instead, the relation of a concept to an object depends on judgment—the resulting representation is a “cognition.” In line with what I argue here, Kant claims later in this passage that intuition absent judgment is not a “piece of cognition [Erkenntnisstück],” even though it is a “singular representation.” Kant also suggests that beings without an understanding can still have intuitions: “Animals cannot make concepts, there are mere intuitions with them” (ML2, 28:594).
Mere Apperception Dependence?

In the previous subsection, I argued that intuitions depend neither on concepts nor on the understanding. Moreover, if one thinks that mere apperception dependence entails understanding dependence, then these previous considerations tell against mere apperception dependence (by modus tollens). However, some might suggest that apperception grounds the categories and the understanding, and also argue that apperception grounds intuitions. On this more nuanced mere apperception dependence view, apperception is a “common cause” of both intuitions and concepts. This position is often introduced with the suggestion that there is a pre-conceptual discursive synthesis, and that apperception or the “unity” of apperception is required for this synthesis.

Some of the extant proposals on which intuition is merely apperception dependent might be compatible with my view of images, even if those proposals will disagree on certain points regarding the nature of intuition. But my approach will require proponents of mere apperception dependence to reconsider how they view the relation of apperception to synthesis and to the imagination. For my argument in the next chapter shall be that image-producing processes cannot be construed as intuition-producing processes, and that image-producing processes actually presuppose the presence of intuitions. Thus, proponents of mere apperception dependence will need to show how non-image producing processes are involved in the production of intuition.

Beatrice Longuenesse and Michael Friedman, and more recently Jessica Williams, have come the closest to providing an apperception-dependent account of intuition that meets this challenge. To take Williams’ account as an exemplar, Williams takes seriously objections to imagination dependence pertaining to the mereology of synthesis (particularly as put forth by McLear). She agrees that the pure intuition of space represents space as a whole prior to its parts, and that any process that runs from parts to wholes is not capable of producing the pure intuition of space. From here, she thinks that “the key to salvaging the conceptualist interpretation of the unity of intuition is to challenge the assumption that all synthesis has a part-whole priority.”¹²³ Let’s consider this proposal.

¹²³Williams (2017, pp. 9-10)
On Williams’ view, our pure intuitions of space and time are “given” in a way that “does not depend on any particular act of categorial synthesis,” that is, on any “particular acts of figurative synthesis.” However, the pure intuitions of space and time do depend on the “original synthetic unity of apperception” (“OSUA”). So she writes that

the OSUA must be realized in relation to some manifold or other. In our case, that manifold is spatio-temporal. . . . It is not through any particular action of synthesis that consciousness encompasses all of sensibility; instead, it is through the subject’s consciousness of her own capacity to determine her sensible nature that the pure manifolds of space and time are given to the subject as singular wholes.

So on Williams’ view, the pure intuitions of space and time actually depend on the original synthetic unity of apperception. However, they do not depend on apprehension—they depend on the “a priori figurative synthesis,” not (as Williams puts it) the “empirical synthesis of apprehension.” This is Williams’ way of putting a point from Longuenesse that the intuitions of space and time are “prior to any specific synthesis,” but not prior to the unity of apperception. On the view supported by Friedman, Longuenesse, and Williams, intuitions depend on synthesis and apperception, but not on apprehension.

I will now indicate two objections to this apperception dependence claim. The first objection critiques Williams’ account of the “realization” of the OSUA in the manifold. The second objection argues that Williams’ response does not adequately address the heart of McLear’s argument.

First, Williams and Friedman claim that the OSUA is “realized” in the “spatio-temporal” manifold. The OSUA is “realized” in a set of “local spatial perspectives.” I think it is most

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124 Williams (2017, pp. 9-10)
125 Williams (2017, pp. 11, 13)
126 Williams (2017, p. 11, note 17)
128 The “realization” language is used extensively by Friedman (2015, pp. 290-291). He claims that “the representation of space as a formal intuition—as a single unitary (metaphysical) space within which all geometrical constructions take place—is a direct realization, as it were, of the transcendental unity of apperception within our particular pure form of outer intuition. For this form of intuition originally consists of an aggregate or manifold of possible local spatial perspectives, which the transcendental unity of apperception then transforms into a single, unitary, geometrical (Euclidean) space in the way that I have sketched above.” Friedman’s view is subject to the same criticisms I launch against Williams below, insofar as a spatial perspective is itself spatial. However, an alternative understanding of
natural to read Williams (and many others) as maintaining a Formal Manifold View, on which this manifold is spatial/temporal, not merely a heap of sensations. My basic complaint is that if one endorses the Formal Manifold View, then the “realization” relation is an unsuitable relation for explaining how intuition arises. For consider this model:

Pure apperception, when applied to the pure intuition of space, *realizes* the original synthetic unity of apperception.

This formulation claims that the pure intuition is part of the realization base of the OSUA. A kind of “unity” is realized when pure apperception is applied to the pure intuition. In short, both (a) the pure intuition and (b) pure apperception are the realization base. Thus, when (b) pure apperception is applied to (a) the pure intuition, a certain unity (OSUA) is realized. The “unity” of the pure intuition is realized. The Strong Independence View seems entirely compatible with this account.

Now compare the previous model with the following model:

Pure apperception, when applied to the pure spatial manifold, *realizes* the original synthetic unity of apperception. The result of this realization is the pure intuition of space.

Here, both (a) the pure spatial manifold and (b) pure apperception are the realization base. Then, when (b) pure apperception is applied to (a) the pure spatial manifold, both a certain unity (OSUA) and the pure intuition of space are realized. The pure intuition of space is thus dependent on the realization of pure apperception in some spatial manifold.

But I do not see how this latter model can be made to work. As far as I can tell, Williams and Friedman are trying to bake a cake that is an ingredient in itself. For it cannot be the case that something antecedently spatial serves as the realization base for the pure intuition of space. In that case, something spatial would be metaphysically prior to the pure intuition of space. And that strikes me as contrary to Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Aesthetic that all spatial features depend on the pure intuition of space—the there cannot be any mental item that represents spatial features, Friedman would be that the formal intuition is itself a higher order unity of the original pure intuition. In that case, his view coheres with mine: he is thus presupposing that there is an intuition prior to apperception and apprehension.
unless that mental item is grounded in the pure intuition of space. Positing a spatial manifold as the realization base for the pure intuition would clearly violate Kant’s theory.

I see the impetus for positing such a “brutely spatial” manifold on their view, however. For one might think that the realization base for a pure intuition would need to be spatial in order for a pure intuition of space to arise on their model (as opposed to a pure intuition of time, or space*, or some other alien form of intuition). But the Metaphysical Exposition of Space denies that our fundamental pure intuition of space is produced from ingredients that are themselves spatial.

Notice that if Williams and Friedman retreat to a Sensation-Only View of sense, then their views are not coherent. For instance, a sensation is not itself a “perspective” on anything, and it is certainly not a spatial perspective. “Running through” and “taking together” a bunch of sensations does not a space make. In short, it is hard to see how a “unified” space can be represented, without presupposing “spatiality” from the outset. And if we presuppose spatiality from the outset, we must also presuppose the pure intuition of space from the outset.

The Strong Independence View avoids this problem. The Strong Independence View suggests that the senses themselves provide a manifold of spaces that is not itself unified by several “perspective takings.” Instead, the whole of space in which this manifold of spaces is contained is a “brute” given: its bruteness is reflected in the fact that it is grounded in sense, not imagination. As we saw earlier in the chapter, Kant argues that the “ground of the possibility of sensory intuition” is “the mere receptivity peculiar to the mind, when it is affected by something (in sensation) to receive a representation in accordance with its subjective constitution.”\(^\text{129}\) Kant never calls apperception a “ground of the possibility of sensory intuition,” and the Strong Independence View does not need to assign apperception any role in explaining the features of intuition.\(^\text{130}\) The original containment of the spatial locations in space explains why synthesis of perspectives represents spatial relations between parts of one space. The original containment of parts of space in the pure intuition of space

\(^\text{129}\)\textit{UE}, 8:222

\(^\text{130}\)In fact, Williams’ and Friedman’s account seems to work better on the assumption that the unity of apperception is “instantiated” or “realized” in a spatial intuition whose essential features do not depend on apperception itself. They would still be able to claim that a “unity” of both apperception and intuition is generated when apperception is applied to an intuition.
explains why the relations the imagination represents between perspectives are spatial relations, and not temporal relations or non-spatial and non-temporal relations.

Turning to the second objection, I do not think Williams succeeds in countering McLear’s objection. I take her suggestion to be that the synthesis of apprehension proceeds from parts to wholes, while a particular synthesis associated with apperception proceeds from wholes to parts.

I want to make two comments about this. First of all, if Williams turns out to be correct that a figurative synthesis has this whole-to-parts structure, then her view still entails that the pure intuitions of space and time are independent of the core activities of the imagination, namely, apprehension and reproduction. After all, absent apprehension and reproduction of representations, how can imagination contribute to pure intuition? What about the imagination (as opposed to apperception) makes the pure intuition depend on it? I’m skeptical that there are answers to such questions. Figurative synthesis without the apprehension or reproduction of times and spaces seems to be no synthesis of the imagination at all.\(^\text{131}\)

Second, however we ultimately resolve these issues, the synthesis that Williams associates with apperception does not start from wholes and go to parts in the first place. Kant does indeed claim that one consciousness must be appended to synthesis in order for the OSUA to arise (e.g., B132 ff.). But in those passages, to borrow Williams’ and Friedman’s terminology, Kant seems to suggest that the OSUA is realized by means of a part-to-whole synthesis. As Friedman himself puts it, the “manifold of possible spatial perspectives” (i.e., parts) is “transform[ed]” into a “single unitary space” by means of synthesis, which he thinks of as a “sequence of translations and rotations.”\(^\text{132}\) Well, this understanding of synthesis is itself one on which we proceed from parts to wholes (or else parts to parts).\(^\text{133}\) The fact that we are conscious of the possibility of encountering

\(^\text{131}\)As Haag (2007, p. 259) puts it: “We do not have the faintest idea of what productive synthesis simpliciter should actually be, insofar as it is not the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction. And we also do not know, which purpose it is supposed to fulfill.”

\(^\text{132}\)The entire quotation: “For I understand the pure form of intuition of space as a mere (not yet synthesized) manifold of possible spatial perspectives on possible objects of outer sense, where each such perspective comprises a point of view and an orientation with respect to a local spatial region in the vicinity of a perceiving subject. The unity of apperception then transforms such a not yet unified manifold into a single unitary space by the requirement that any such local perspective must be accessible to the same perceiving subject via (continuous) motion—via a (continuous) sequence of translations and rotations” (Friedman, 2015, p. 290).

\(^\text{133}\)Even if we understand the translations and rotations as operating on an arbitrary part of space, such that we can
further perspectives does not change the ultimate nature of synthesis as a part-to-whole process. When I engage in rotations and translations, the imagination is presumably not first apprehending the whole of infinite space, and then from there engaging in a “decompositional” synthesis or division in order to construct objects in space.\footnote{134}

Williams does claim that no actual synthesis is involved in generating the pure intuition of space. She claims that “it is the subject’s recognition of the possibility of accessing any part of boundless space in this way that is doing the work, not the procedures themselves.”\footnote{135} But this view does not contradict the view that “all synthesis”—the procedure in question—“has a part-whole priority.” The fact that I recognize the “possibility of accessing any part of boundless space” does not mean that the accessing itself (which I take to be the imagination’s synthesis) proceeds from wholes to parts. An attitude about a procedure is not itself the procedure.

Put differently, recognizing that there is a possible synthesis is a second-order judgment about first-order acts of synthesis. But McLear’s objection still stands if those first-order acts of synthesis run from parts to wholes (or else from finite wholes to parts), for the reasons I gave above. It remains unclear how those first-order acts of synthesis are uniting spatial perspectives if the output of synthesis is supposed to be space itself (i.e., the pure intuition of space). As a result, even sophisticated views on which intuitions are merely apperception dependent seem to fall victim to the original set of problems regarding the mereology and infinity of space.

\footnote{134}It is true that we decompose space when we (say) decompose an object into its constituent parts. As Marschall (2019, §4.4) has argued, we are both able to compose and decompose space. This claim is consistent with and complementary to my view: for this claim does not require that we antecedently apprehend all of space. Marschall only requires that we first intuit all of space, which he correctly takes to be a condition of decomposition, not itself a form of decomposition.

\footnote{135}Williams (2017, p. 14)
2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we examined several objections to the Weak and Strong Independence Views. I argued that these objections are not convincing, and I provided positive reasons for thinking that the essential features of intuitions depend on the senses alone. The Strong Independence View is a viable interpretive option. In the next three chapters, we will see what role the imagination plays in this view.
3

Images as Representations of the Imagination
O fantasy, you that at times would snatch
us so from outward things—we notice nothing
although a thousand trumpets sound around us—
who moves you when the senses do not spur you?

Dante Alighieri, *Purgatorio*, 17

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I defended the Strong Independence View—the thesis that empirical intuitions and pure intuitions depend on the senses alone for their essential features. We saw several ways in which the senses ground the essential features of intuitions, and various reasons for why the imagination and the intellect do not. But the Strong Independence View raises the question of what exactly the imagination does, and why Kant appeals to it throughout his entire corpus. This chapter begins to answer that question.

My short answer to this question is that the imagination’s activities are organized around the generation of images. Chapter 1 showed *that* the imagination generates images. Building off of this point, I explain in the following three chapters how the imagination generates and structures images, why Kant’s appeals to the imagination are centered around image production, and why Kant’s account of images has implications for his theory of cognition.

This chapter argues that, in the broadest sense, images are *representations in which copies of a sensible manifold are reproduced or associated with one another*. I show that image production depends on both apprehension and reproduction, albeit in different ways. Moreover, I shall characterize these image-producing acts without presupposing that every image is itself a product of “synthesis” in Kant’s technical sense of an activity of the mind that contributes to cognition. The characterization of image-producing acts in this chapter will leave open the possibility that non-rational animals and young humans have images, even though these beings lack the rich cognitive states that most adult humans possess.
In sections 2 and 3, I develop the view that images are representations of objects “even without their presence.” I begin in section 2 by analyzing a number of Kant’s texts to reconstruct a view of what I label *apprehension in the strict sense*. As I shall explain, apprehension poises representations for reproduction. Then in section 3, I argue for what I call the Copy Model—the view that images are *copies* of representations that are provided by the senses and apprehended by the imagination. In reproduction, these copies of representations are set into relation to one another, as well as in relation to items that the imagination is currently apprehending. I then explain how in the absence of any other laws to which reproduction is subject, these relations are constitutively governed by the “law of association” or “law of reproduction.” The imagination can configure those copies into images of objects that we have never sensed before. Moreover, Kant suggests that this association process plays a role in perception itself, that is, in the perception of objects that are also present to the senses.

The view of images I develop provides conclusive support for the Distinctness Thesis: even in beings that lack an understanding altogether, images and intuitions are numerically and qualitatively distinct representations of sensibility. On the one hand, the Copy Model provides a crucial way of distinguishing images from empirical intuitions. On the other hand, empirical intuitions are representations of objects that depend on their presence. One of the major upshots of the account of reproduction that I provide in this chapter is that empirical intuitions depend on the presence of objects, while images do *not*, due to the role of sensation in either representation. The activities of reproduction and association upon which images depend do *not* depend on the presence of any particular object, partially *because* those activities do not depend on occurrent sensation.

In its own right, this chapter suggests that Kant has a more robust theory of mental imagery than is normally supposed. It is a theory on which mental imagery plays a role in perception and influences what we perceive. The imagination is not *merely* interpretive, but always perceptual or (as Kant puts it) *sensible*. “Image” is not just another term for whatever the imagination produces, nor are images propositional states or “judgments” as some commentators have supposed.¹ Sec-

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¹For instance, George (1981, p. 236) states that images are a kind of propositional state or “judgment,” not an
3.2 Apprehension

To understand the psychology of image formation, we need to appreciate how the activity of imagining differs from the activity of sensing that we outlined in the previous chapter. This distinction between sensing (or, less precisely, “perceiving”) and imagining is sometimes simply assumed to be lacking in Kant. But as we shall now see, Kant’s account of imagining, when combined with his account of intuition production in sensing, gives rise to a view of perceptual representation on which the senses and the imagination make distinct representational contributions.

We shall begin with an analysis of apprehension. Apprehension is a central activity of the imagination and, with reproduction, one of its defining features. Chapter 2 excluded various understandings of what apprehension could be—in particular, it is not responsible for producing a spatial or temporal manifold or our original spatial or temporal intuitions. In this section, I argue that apprehension is a perceptual selection procedure akin to a minimal form of attention (I shall explain the sense in which it is “minimal”). Kant maintains that apprehension is a selection of a representation that takes that representation “into the activity” of the imagination so that it can be subject to further mental acts. In the next section, I argue that for Kant, apprehension poises representations to be copied or registered for further use by other faculties of the mind (like desire and pain/pleasure).

To start, the imagination is required for “the apprehension [Auffassung] (apprehensio) of the manifold of intuition,” and Kant suggests that this activity sets the imagination apart from both the understanding (which “comprehends” the manifold) and the power of judgment (which “exhibits” imagistic state. See Van Cleve (1999, p. 279) for some discussion.

E.g., Griffith (2012, p. 220, note 24) writes: “It is true that a distinction must be made between perceiving and imaging when we discuss the possibility of nonconceptual content today. But Kant does not make this distinction . . . thus, it is safe to bracket this issue when discussing Kant’s views.” It seems that Griffith’s argument in favor of conceptualism is substantially weakened once we reject the assumption made in this passage.
the manifold).\textsuperscript{3} Moreover, mere sensing is not itself sufficient for apprehension as Kant characterizes it in the first \textit{Critique}.\textsuperscript{4} The differences between sensing that generates or gives a manifold, apprehending a manifold, exhibiting a manifold, and comprehending a manifold can seem subtle at first, though I shall assume that these are different activities pertaining to the manifold, even if they need to cooperate in certain ways for cognition to arise. Even though Kant sometimes uses “apprehension” more loosely, there is a unified conception of imaginative apprehension that we can extract from the critical philosophy.\textsuperscript{5} The characterization of the activity of apprehension in this section will not presuppose that apprehension is related to other activities like reproduction, comprehension, exhibition, synthesis, and so on. Let’s label the form of apprehension that results from such an analysis \textit{apprehension in the strict sense}. Once we have a working notion of apprehension in the strict sense, we can relate apprehension in the strict sense to image formation.

Kant glosses apprehension (\textit{Apprehension, Auffassung}) in a number of suggestive ways in the first \textit{Critique}. Apprehension is a “running through” and “taking together” of the “manifoldness” of intuition (A99). He also describes apprehension as a “placing together” or “composition [\textit{Zusammensetzung}]” of the parts of an intuition (B160). Similarly, he claims that apprehension is a “positioning together” or “juxtaposition [\textit{Zusammenstellung}]” of the parts of an intuition (A176/B219). The metaphor of “placing” or “positioning” parts connotes a specialized grouping or perceptual organization procedure.\textsuperscript{6}

For Kant, “running through” a manifold presupposes that we can reproduce the representations previously apprehended while we run through the manifold. Indeed, Kant eventually lumps both reproduction and apprehension together into one “synthesis of apprehension” that is performed

\textsuperscript{3}KU, 20:220
\textsuperscript{4}Waxman (1991, p. 186) makes this point at length.
\textsuperscript{5}In various notes, Kant uses “apprehension” loosely. Kant does attribute an “apprehension” to the senses in one note (\textit{R} 228, 15:87), and sometimes speaks (often not in his own voice—but in the voice of the \textit{Alten}) of “apprehensio simplex” as belonging to “judgment” and “reason” (AA 24:701, 24:653, 24:904, 24:565). The question is whether and how to understand “apprehension” as a technical notion that can be of philosophical interest. And here, Kant’s published works trump his \textit{Reflexionen}: among many other places, A120, A125, B162 (note), as well as \textit{KU}, 5:251ff. outline a well-circumscribed and psychologically unified conception of apprehension, one in which it is an activity of the imagination performed on representations of the senses.
\textsuperscript{6}Kant suggest that we are apprehending the \textit{appearance} in many places, e.g., A165/B206, A182/B225, A190/B235, A193/B238, A201/B246.
by the imagination (B160). Such a broad characterization of apprehension is also present in the A-deduction passage above (A99), and Kant claims that reproduction and apprehension are “inseparable combined” with one another (A102). Let’s label *apprehension in the broad sense* these instances in which Kant refers to apprehension as a summary label for both the apprehensional and reproductive activities of the imagination. *Apprehension in the broad sense* would thus include, at a minimum, both *apprehension in the strict sense* as well as reproduction.

For the moment, our interest is in *apprehension in the strict sense*. How did Kant understand apprehension in this more minimal sense of “holding” or “grasping”? In the *Anthropology*, Kant at times relates apprehension to “attention (Aufmerksamkeit, attentio)” in his discussion of perceptual consciousness. In the Anthropology lectures, Kant labels the “faculty of apprehending (Auffassungsvermögen)” with the Latinate *attenio*. Furthermore, one of his examples of apprehension in the thick of the B-Deduction is one of attention (Aufmerksamkeit) (B156-157, note). Kant explains attention in a section of the *Anthropology* entitled “On the voluntary consciousness of one’s representations [*Von dem willkürlichen Bewußtsein seiner Vorstellungen*]” (§3). He contrasts attention or attending (attendiren) with abstraction, the latter of which is the “turning away from [das Absehen]” a representation. If apprehension in this most basic sense is a form of attention or selection, then Kant’s contrast here is quite apt: apprehension is the imagination’s activity of turning towards one of many representations. Consequently, apprehension is required for making an intuitive representation “distinct,” such that we become aware of differences between various of its parts. Though apprehension was not historically always associated with the *imagination* per
se, such a conception of apprehension or attention itself was common in Wolffian philosophy in the 18th century.\textsuperscript{11}

Attention and apprehension need not be voluntary in the sense of being under one’s control or being the result of choice.\textsuperscript{12} For instance, Kant claims that certain features of what we sense tend to “arouse” or “enliven” our “attention.”\textsuperscript{13} He lists “1) contrast, 2) novelty, 3) change, 4) intensification” as different features of sense impressions that have differential affects on our attention. For instance, if the sky suddenly turns red, I apprehend its novel redness due to a combination of the factors of contrast, novelty, change, and intensification. Yet the imagination apprehends these features passively and involuntarily. In a train that one rides every day, one might no longer apprehend the monotonous stop announcements. In these cases of differential attention, “it is one and the same vital energy that stirs up the consciousness of sensations” and that steers our attention.\textsuperscript{14} In lecture, Kant concludes that “without any liveliness” of our sensations “no attention would be excited.”\textsuperscript{15}

So various sensory representations can arouse our apprehension due to their novelty, contrast, or intensity—that is, roughly, due to their salience. But Kant also thinks that spatial and temporal units are of varying salience for apprehension, and these spatial and temporal units need not be novel or intense in order to attract one’s attention. As Golob (2014) has argued, Kant main-

\textsuperscript{11}Interestingly, Christian Wolff was one of the first major philosophers to give the topic of attention extended treatment (Hatfield, 1998; Mole, 2017). Relevant to our discussion in chapter 2, Wolff never suggests that attention accounts for spatial or temporal structure per se. Instead, attention enables us to represent parts of a complex. Through “mere attention to a composite thing” we are able to “distinguish the simple in them” (Wolff, 1720, §86). The “capacity” for granting some of our representations “more clarity than the rest” is “attention,” and attention (like clarity) admits of “degrees” (Wolff, 1720, sec. 268, 270) (Wolff, 1720, §§268, 270). Moreover, if the “senses are strongly taken in by many objects, attention soon stops, or it at least becomes more difficult for us to obtain it” (Wolff, 1720 [§ 270]). On Wolff’s view, attention is indeed necessary for a kind of consciousness; we shall find resonance with Kant’s view on this point in what follows. See also Baumgarten (2013, §§529, 625).

\textsuperscript{12}Merritt and Valaris (2017, pp. 577ff.) make a similar point. For cases of involuntary attention, see AF, 25:488ff.

\textsuperscript{13}Anth, 7:162 ff.

\textsuperscript{14}Anth, 7:164

\textsuperscript{15}LV, 24:842. For instance, “in a sermon distinctness and correct explication must come first, and then liveliness” must also be given to the exposition, “in order to excite attention and to move the soul” (emphasis added). Cf. AF, 25:501.
tains that there is a “basic measure” that we tend to apprehend from our empirical intuitions. That is,
there is a particular “measure” that the imagination tends to “take up” in certain perceptual contexts.
So Kant claims that

the estimation of the magnitude of the basic measure must consist simply in the
fact that one can immediately grasp it in an intuition and use it by means of imagi-
nation for the exhibition [Darstellung] of numerical concepts—i.e., in the end all
estimation of the magnitude of objects of nature is aesthetic (i.e., subjectively and
not objectively determined). 16

When we estimate the magnitude of an object, the object itself does not dictate which magnitude
we choose as the “basic measure” (it is “subjectively and not objectively determined”). It is through
a primitive or “immediate grasp” of certain magnitudes that we have points of reference for com-
paring (say) the length of a pencil with the height of a house. Apprehending the basic measure
requires nothing beyond this primitive grasp. That is, in order to apprehend the length of a pencil
as a basic measure, I need not apprehend any partial segments of the pencil—a good thing, since
there are infinitely many different ways of segmenting out the length of a pencil! 17 Also notable
is that the senses themselves do not provide some pre-existent “carving” of parts that must then be
apprehended, since the senses alone do not determine the basic measure that the imagination takes
up.

The imagination thus has some latitude in which measure it selects as a quantum or unit,
even though some quanta are too large or too small to be grasped by the imagination. Though we
can apprehend items as long as we like,

when apprehension has gone so far that the partial representations of the intuition of
the senses [Sinnenanschauung] that were apprehended first already begin to fade in
the imagination as the latter proceeds on to the apprehension of further ones, then it

16 KU, 5:251
17 In contrast, Kant seems accept this principle for cognition of extensive magnitudes: for all extensive magnitudes
X, in order to cognize X, one must apprehend the parts of X. Cf. A163/B204. This view of apprehension avoids an
objection by Van Cleve (1999, p. 86), who suggests that Kant’s view is that in order to see or imagine a certain object,
one must apprehend all its parts. On my view, one can see an object without apprehending it at all. Moreover, one
can imagine a given basic magnitude without apprehending its parts. Moreover, one can attend to a whole in a basic
measure without apprehending its parts.
loses on one side as much as it gains on the other, and there is in the comprehension a greatest point beyond which it cannot go.\textsuperscript{18}

So due to what we could call “capacity” limitations of the imagination, we can only “hold on to” a certain amount of the given “partial representations of the intuitions of sense” we apprehend at a given time. Thus, if we try to apprehend the “magnitude of the pyramids” from very far away, we will only be able represent its parts “obscurely.”\textsuperscript{19} That is, we are not able to grasp these very minute parts of the pyramids from very far away. Such a limitation is subjectively determined—the limitation does not have anything to do with the objects (the pyramids) themselves. Moreover, this limitation is not due to the \textit{senses}, for Kant maintains that we nevertheless have an “intuition of sense” that represents the pyramids and their parts.\textsuperscript{20}

With these characteristics of apprehension in the strict sense in mind, we can now turn to Kant’s characterization of it in the first \textit{Critique}. Kant begins his discussion of apprehension in the \textit{A-deduction} with the general remark that “wherever our representations may arise . . . as modifications of the mind they nevertheless belong to inner sense” (A98-99). This remark thus sets up what the \textit{domain} of representations towards which imaginative apprehension can be directed. I take it that apprehension can (in principle) be directed at any of our representations, in virtue of the fact that they all are contained in inner sense. These representations include not only empirical intuitions and sensations, but also representations of pains, moods, desires, memories, and images formed in the past.

Kant goes on to introduce the \textit{synthesis} of apprehension, which he calls an “action” in

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} \textit{KU}, 5:252
\item \textsuperscript{19} \textit{KU}, 5:252
\item \textsuperscript{20} Since the magnitude of the basic measure is \textit{subjectively} determined by the \textit{imagination}, Kant is neither committed to their being a smallest \textit{object} in nature, nor is he committed to there being a \textit{minimum sensible unit} that cannot be detected by the senses at all. The “minimum” measure of the imagination says nothing about (a) our \textit{senses per se} or (b) the \textit{objects} of the \textit{senses per se}. Kant provides a parallel account for the maximum quantum that one can grasp. Kant writes that when one is “too close” to the pyramids, “the eye requires some time to complete its apprehension from the base level to the apex, but during this time the former always partly fades before the imagination has taken in the latter, and the comprehension is never complete” (\textit{KU}, 5:252). As a result, one is never able to adequately grasp the pyramids aesthetically in the imagination. This phenomenon arises because when one \textit{does} get close enough to grasp the salient or characteristic parts of the pyramid, then the imagination is no longer able to “comprehend” or hold onto all of these parts at once. The parts begin to “fade” in the imagination. The result is an experience of the “mathematically sublime”—the sense we have that certain objects in nature in some sense “overpower” our \textit{senses} and \textit{imagination}.  

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which the imagination “run[s] through and then take[s] together” the “manifoldness” of an intuition (A99). In this passage, it seems that Kant is referring again to apprehension in the broad sense. For presumably in order to “take together” several representations after “running” from one to the next, it is necessary not only to apprehend those representations in the strict sense (that is, to notice or attend to them), but also to hold on to the representations that were just apprehended.

The synthesis of apprehension is “aimed directly at the intuition” (A99), as we discussed in the previous chapter. I have argued that Kant’s considered view is that apprehension does not produce intuition, but acts on intuition. But is Kant committed to the claim that apprehension in the strict sense always acts on an intuition? Don’t we also apprehend pains, moods, and feelings?

I think that imagination does apprehend pains, moods, and feelings, but always by apprehending an inner intuition. All token acts of apprehension depend on a token intuition towards which they are directed. Intuitions are not constituted by the products of synthesis; in particular, intuitions are not made up of images, and intuiting does not occur by means of processes of imagining. The key support for my view is that all of the representations the imagination apprehends are in inner sense and, therefore, ordered in time. Suppose I have a pain in my knee. On Kant’s view, the fact that the pain is a “modification of the mind” ensures that it is contained in inner sense. Kant thinks that inner sense provides a “manifold of determinations” or modifications of the mind; when this manifold is subject to “apprehension,” we are able to have “inner experience.”

Inner experience depends on and “contains” a “manifold of empirical inner intuition” that is subject

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21 Paton (1936, p. 267) is a clear exemplar of a view that I oppose. More recently, Griffith (2012, p. 202) seems to simply assume that without apprehension, there is no “representational vehicle” that could be the bearer of non-conceptual intuitive content. This position is only tenable if we reject the Weak Independence Thesis of the previous chapter. In a more developed account, Haag (2007, p. 296) has argued that “the imagistic grasping together of the given manifold in one image-model and the simultaneous conceptual reference in an intuition to an object by means of this image model, an intuition that gives us in advance the procedure of the construction of the image-model.” Haag’s view here seems to be that intuitions give objects to the mind only by means of generating images (“image models” in the Sellarsian sense). Moreover, Haag seems to think that intuition completely determines the possible modes of construction of images “in advance.” I disagree on two counts. Firstly, I disagree with his claim that intuitions have conceptual demonstrative content. Secondly, I think that intuition only partially determines what images are possible, since other activities besides sensing—including apprehension and reproduction—also partially determine the structure of images, as described in what follows.

22 Anth, 7:134n
to an “I of apprehension” (which humans share with other animals).\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, I am an “object of inner empirical intuition” insofar as “I am innerly affected by sensations in time, as they are simultaneously or after one another,” or insofar as I am “affected by the mind” itself.\textsuperscript{24} That is, just as sensations (from the senses) are temporally ordered in inner intuition, so too are my current and past pains, moods, and thoughts ordered in inner intuition. Whatever mental episodes I “suffer [\textit{leiden}]” or undergo belong to inner sense.\textsuperscript{25} As a result of the inner intuition produced by inner sense, there is a certain way that I “appear” to myself. This appearance of myself is the object of an inner empirical intuition.

When I apprehend a pain, I am thus apprehending a state of my mind that is represented by an empirical intuition, albeit an \textit{inner} one. Inner intuitions are causally situated sensory profiles. In contrast to outer empirical intuitions, the “causal situation” is sensitive to time, not space; similarly, the “sensory profile” is a temporal profile of myself, not a spatial profile of the outer world. The empirical intuition (of inner sense) makes such pains \textit{available} for attention, while apprehension (by the imagination) is the the actual attention to these pains. So Kant’s claim that apprehension is aimed at intuition can be taken in a strong sense: \textit{all} apprehension is aimed at intuition, be it inner or outer. I cannot \textit{apprehend} pains or moods that don’t \textit{appear} to me.

Later in the A-edition Transcendental Deduction, Kant similarly remarks that because “every appearance contains a manifold,” the parts of that manifold are “encountered dispersed and separate in the mind” (A120). Again, this manifold might be a manifold representing different items in space (e.g., blue patches), or a manifold representing different items in time (e.g., pains). The fact that parts of this appearance are “dispersed” necessitates the “combination” of these parts of the intuition that they “cannot have in sense itself.” Kant then characterizes apprehension in

\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Anth}, 7:141

\textsuperscript{24}\textit{Anth}, 7:142, 153. With Kant, I am fudging here in saying that “I” am affected by sensations (sensations don’t affect us, but are the results of affection) and that “I” am affected by the mind (in this passage, Kant seems to claim that the “human body” is affected by the mind, which does not seem to be his considered view). Strictly speaking, Kant asserts that “the soul is the organ of inner sense” (\textit{Anth}, 7:161), and I do not want to enter into the metaphysics of this “organ.” The point is that however we conceive of inner sense, the representations that we undergo are “modifications” or “determinations” of it.

\textsuperscript{25}\textit{Anth}, 7:161
the strict sense: the “action exercised immediately upon perceptions I call apprehension” (A120). On my reading, it is perhaps surprising that Kant claims that apprehension has perceptions, not intuitions, as its target. I think that Kant is using “perception” here in a broader sense to refer to appearances, since he has just referred to perceptions as appearances “combined with consciousness.” This reading makes sense of Kant’s later contention that apprehension makes perception possible (B160). With that in mind, Kant’s claim about apprehension in the strict sense is not surprising: apprehension acts on appearances as the contents of intuition.

Kant then makes a claim about image production: “the power of imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition into an image; it must therefore antecedently take up the impressions into its activity, i.e., apprehend them” (A120). We can first note that this passage gives rise to a similar annoyance as the previous one: Kant is wavering between what exactly the immediate target of apprehension is. In this passage, it is an “impression” as opposed to a “perception” or “intuition.” I again suggest that Kant is simply referring to impressions here as components of an empirical intuition that has an appearance as its “undetermined object.” I argued that empirical intuitions are causally situated sensory profiles with appearances as contents. So Kant is claiming that apprehension acts on the contents of these profiles in order to generate an image.

With this clarification, this passage provides us additional information about apprehension in the strict sense. Kant says that apprehension “takes up” the manifold “into its activity.” When $x$ is taken into the activity of the imagination, $x$ becomes available for activities of the imagination (e.g., reproduction and association). This particular form of availability involves poising the representations to be copied in reproduction. If a sensation were contained in an empirical intuition but never apprehended, then it would never become available for these further activities of the imagination like reproduction and association.

So apprehension in the strict sense “takes up” parts of a manifold such that they become available to the perceiving subject. In that sense, apprehension in the strict sense is a form of

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26 More evidence that Kant is being loose here is that he claims that the perceptions are “encountered scattered and dispersed in the mind” without apprehension and synthesis. Yet his considered view canvassed in what follows is that apprehension actually makes perception possible in the first place (e.g., B160, cf. A120n).
perceptual attention. When the imagination takes a part of an intuition “into its activity” by apprehending it, this activity of apprehension is at least conceptually distinct from taking multiple apprehended parts of intuition “together.” Suppose I perceptually attend to A, then perceptually attend to B. It is surely not conceptually guaranteed that when I perceptually attend to B, I will retain A-as-attended-to just a moment before. Strict apprehension is distinct from apprehension in the broad sense. To close this section, it is important to keep in mind that apprehension in the strict sense is a quite minimal representational achievement. There are two points of clarification.

First, apprehending x is not sufficient for reidentifying x or re-apprehending x in the future. Apprehending a representation like that of a pain need not “pick out” or “single out” a perduring object or “perceptual particular,” nor need the selection have a repeatable content of any kind, nor need the item selected be mind-independent (as is obvious with pain). The fact that the imagination apprehends x at t_n does not entail that the imagination has the capacity to apprehend x at t_{n+1}. Similarly, the fact that the imagination apprehends x of type F at t_n does not entail that the imagination has the capacity to apprehend y of type F at t_{n+1}. The idea is that it is one thing to select an x that is F once and possibly accidentally, and another to select an x that is F as the exercise of a capacity for selecting items of type F. And on the conception of strict apprehension I am providing,  

27 Some interpreters have followed the suggestion by Allais (2015, pp. 147, 153) that empirical intuition “singles out” what she calls “distinct perceptual particulars.” Allais (2015, pp. 147) writes that “‘particular’ should be understood minimally, as a thing which a subject singles out as a perceptual unit—a distinct bounded thing to which the subject can pay perceptual attention.” I take it that Allais’s thought is that intuition represents a distinct bounded thing, and that such a representation is prior to and a requirement for attending to that thing. I have argued in this section that empirical intuition alone is not sufficient for representing a “distinct bounded thing” in this sense. On my view, there is no distinct item represented prior to selection, nor is there any particular boundary prior to selection. Empirical intuitions as causally situated sensory profiles do not spatially “bound” particular items (if “bound” here means explicitly representing a particular spatial region such as, for instance, a dog-shape or a triangle). No dog or triangle shapes “pop out” of an intuition prior to our apprehending them in a particular way. At least in this sentence, Allais suggests that intuitions have more representational structure than I would allow. As an aside, “singling out” is itself a piece of technical jargon, introduced (to my knowledge) into the metaphysics literature by David Wiggins (in his 1980 Sameness and Substance) and popularized in philosophy of perception most recently by Susanna Schellenberg. Wiggins (2001, p. 6) claims that to individuate an object x, is to single out x, and to single out x is to “isolate x in experience; to determine or fix upon x in particular by drawing its spatio-temporal boundaries and distinguishing it in its environment from other things of like and unlike kinds . . .; to articulate or segment reality in such a way as to discover x there.” Wiggins’ conception of singling out involves a number of different psychological achievements, including categorical or kind-perception, which both empirical intuition and the strict apprehension of empirical intuition lack on my view. Causally situated sensory profiles need not amount to singling out in this sense. Schellenberg (2011, 2016) similarly takes singling-out to entail that some mind-independent thing is thereby isolated in one’s environment, which again is a more robust perceptual achievement than strict apprehension of empirical intuition affords on Kant’s view.
it is simply not baked into what apprehension is that it involves the latter capacity. Apprehension itself does not entail any general capacity to apprehend items of certain kinds. Instead, apprehension is a condition on the exercise of such a general capacity.

**Second,** apprehension in the strict sense is a rudimentary form of sensory discrimination of one part of the manifold from another. Now one could imagine apprehension in a *super*-strict sense as a form of discrimination *merely* in the sense that something is selected while other things are not selected. For instance, one might engage in “blind” selection that is “discriminatory” in only an attenuated sense. But this kind of discrimination is cheap. If I am blindfolded and reach into a bag of marbles, I can *select* a blue marble. Yet I do not select the marble by *discriminating* it from red marbles, and I certainly do not discriminate it on the basis of its color. The blue marble was merely the marble I happened to grasp. If I select an applicant arbitrarily, I do not discriminate between applicants.

This section argued that imaginative apprehension in the strict sense is not *this* thin. Certain subjective features of sensibility guide apprehension. Apprehension in the strict sense does indeed gravitate to certain “basic measures,” and sensory representations that exhibit novelty, contrast, or liveliness tend to attract our selection. Apprehension discriminates; it does not merely select. Nevertheless, the amount of guidance that apprehension in the strict sense receives is rather sparse. For instance, apprehension in the strict sense is not sufficient for repeatable discrimination of blue items from other ones, or triangles from squares.

More centrally, apprehension in the strict sense does not suffice for repeatable discrimination of a mind-independent object like a dog, table, or mountain. This is a happy result, for Kant denies that apprehension is sufficient for the objective distinction of objects in time. In the Second Analogy, for instance, Kant argues that our experience of objective events in time depends on a rule, namely, the category of cause and effect. Without reference to an object subject to this rule,

we would have only a play of representations that would not be related to any object.

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28 This is one of the major points against the inflationist tendency outlined in the introduction of this dissertation, for it points to a limitation of the imagination.
Kant argues that in order to distinguish objects distinct from the subject in time, one cannot simply rely on apprehension; one also requires a particular rule that is not immanent to the activity of apprehension in the strict sense.\textsuperscript{29} To apprehend the parts of a particular object over time, there needs to be some way of guiding my apprehension that goes beyond the features of sensibility described above. Apprehension in the strict sense is a form of perceptual attention or discrimination, but not a robust means of discriminating one physical object from others over time.

### 3.3 Reproduction

The last section argued that in a strict sense, apprehension is a form of perceptual attention. However, imagination is not merely perceptual attention, but also a power for “reproducing” representations. This section explains how reproduction is involved in image-production, as well as how it relates to apprehension.

First, I discuss the reproduction of sensations and empirical intuitions. I argue that reproduction does not involve sensation production at all; reproduction instead involves entertaining a

\textsuperscript{29}Abela (2002, p. 151) claims that “imagination underdetermines the order of perceptions necessary for the original representation of objects and events.” Abela is right in claiming that the imagination does not suffice for cognition of objects. But it is too strong to say that cognition is the original or most psychologically basic form of discrimination for Kant. Kant takes \textit{kennen} (acquaintance) and “physical differentiation” to be cases of discrimination of some kind—cases of non-random selection. Nevertheless, Kant consistently \textit{denies} that these are cases of cognition. Abela’s reading of the above text tips his hand on this point. For he asserts the stronger conclusion that cognition (and intellectual rules) are \textit{required} for any perceptual discrimination partially because he elides the qualification of “no appearance would be distinguished from any other,” namely, that there would be no distinction \textit{“as far as the temporal relation is concerned”} (Abela, 2002, p. 151). Kant could thus be saying that \textit{representing} distinct items at distinct times is one thing, whereas \textit{distinguishing} those items in a particular manner (according to their “temporal relations”) is another thing. Kant is likely making such a distinction given that he ultimately wants to show that our \textit{subjective} representation of distinct items in time is not sufficient for representing at least \textit{some} temporal relations, namely, the “objective” time relations between items distinct from the “subjective” time relations between the representations of those items. But even beyond this point, I want to emphasize that \textit{representing} items in time (even in a \textit{subjective} time series) is one thing, but the mental activity of \textit{distinguishing} them is plausibly a second thing beyond merely representing them. (Consider, say, simply (a) hearing a musical piece for a period of 10 seconds and (b) distinguishing one musical phrase from another during that period according to their temporal relations. These seem to be two separate psychological achievements, even if we conceive of the representation of the musical piece in (a) merely as subjective representations in me.)
copy of a sensation. Apprehension in the strict sense accompanied by the activity of reproduction generates copies of the representations that are apprehended. I argue that this Copy Model explains why (a) an empirical intuition depends on the presence of its object and (b) images do not depend on the presence of their objects.

Second, I examine the law that Kant thinks governs the faculty of reproduction: the law of association. I argue that images are generated according to laws governing the reproduction of representations, and the law of association is the basic law governing the imagination’s activity of reproduction. This framework will give me the opportunity to more precisely indicate how images depend on both apprehension and reproduction. In the next section of the chapter, I examine various phenomena Kant mentions in order to illustrate the relationship between images, apprehension, and reproduction.

3.3.1 The Metaphysics of Reproduction

Let’s now more closely examine what is involved in reproduction, and how reproduction is involved in image generation. To begin, images that involve sensory qualities must derive those sensory qualities from the senses. For Kant, it is true that “in order for us even to imagine something as external,” we require “an outer sense” (B276-277n). The “power of imagination” can “impress images [Bilder] upon us” only “in relation to outer sense.” To imagine an outer object—to produce an image of a spatial object—I must possess outer sense. Every exercise of the reproductive power of imagination is indexed to either inner or outer sense, and every exercise of reproduction involves the renewal of representations originally obtained from the senses. Among the representations renewed are empirical intuitions.

AA 18:306

30 The imagination is reproductive when it “renews” representations that it has already had (MM, 29:884). Reproduction depends on representations derived from the senses and for this reason “refers either to inner or outer sense” (MM, 29:884).

31 The “reproductive power of imagination” can “bring back into the mind an empirical intuition had previously” (Anth, 7:167). Cf. AA 23:18: “Der empirische Gebrauch der einbildungskraft beruht auf der synthesis der Apprehension der empirischen Anschauung die denn auch reproduciert werden kann oder nach deren analogie eine andere gemacht werden kann. Im letztern Fall ist es die productive Einbildungskraft.”
So suppose I imagine a reddish hue. In this case, Kant denies that the imagination produces new sensations or new sensory qualities (i.e., qualities it is has yet to sense). Kant writes that the “power of imagination” is “not creative [schöpferisch], but must get the material for its images [Bildungen] from the senses.” Moreover, “sensations from the senses cannot, in their composition, be made by the power of imagination, but must be drawn originally from the faculty of sense.” Even though the imagination is “productive,” the “material” of its representations must first be “given to our faculty of sense.” So if I never had a sensation of this reddish hue, then my imagination could not fabricate a representation of this reddish hue, even by “composition.” That is what it means to say that the power of imagination is not “creative.”

Kant thus thinks that reproduction depends on the senses for the sensory matter of images. When it comes to the “matter” of an image, reproduction strictly speaking generates an image on the basis of materials provided by previous states of the senses (both inner and outer). With this dependence claim in place, there are two general models for understanding reproduction.

On one model of reproduction, when the imagination reproduces state $x$, the imagination brings about state $x$. For instance, suppose I have a sensation of a particular shade of blue (“sensation-B”) by sensing something blue. On this model, to reproduce sensation-B involves bringing about sensation-B. To reproduce sensation-B is for the reproductive imagination to cause

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34. [Anth, 7:168]

35. [Anth, 7:168. Kant’s claims in what follows are highly reminiscent of Hume’s claims about the relation between the imagination and the senses: “Nothing is more free than the imagination of man; and though it is confined to the original stock of ideas provided by the internal and external senses, it has unlimited power to mix, combine, separate and divide these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction and vision” (Enquiry, sec. 5, part 2).

36. Note that it is controversial whether, for Kant, the physical body that causes red sensations has any color properties (cf. B69-70; Prol, 4:290).

37. Stephenson (2015) seems to endorse this model. He maintains that for Kant, perceptual error is explained by the imagination affecting inner sense. On Stephenson’s account, there are “hallucinatory intuition[s]” in which “it is the reproductive imagination rather than the object that fulfils the role of proximal causal instigator” (Stephenson, 2015, p. 502). As a result, “the reproductive imagination fully replaces the object and is attributed similar causal powers” (Stephenson, 2015, p. 502). But there are some worries for this version of the Affection Model beyond the textual ones I note below. If the reproductive imagination affects inner sense in producing an image, then inner sense would presumably produce inner sensations. But it is not clear what exactly inner sensations are for Kant. Presumably they are not sensations of colors and sounds—these are the typical outer sensations. If so, the production of inner sensations does not explain how images present us with outer sensory qualities. This is not to deny that image production could involve the imagination affecting inner sense. It is simply to deny that an image of sensory qualities contains sensations of those sensory qualities. For a nuanced account of inner sensation and self-affection that contrasts with Stephenson’s
a subject to undergo sensation-B again. Both sensation-B as caused by an affecting object and sensation-B as caused by the reproductive imagination are states of sensation of the same kind.\textsuperscript{38} Call this the \textit{Affection Model}. This model is so called because, in the case of reproducing a sensation, sensing via sensation \(x\) is distinguished from a reproduction of sensation \(x\) based on a difference in the \textit{causal etiology} of what brings about \(x\). On the Affection Model, the causal etiology of sensing and the causal etiology of reproduction differ in what affects the senses; yet in both cases, the senses are indeed affected.

Contrast the Affection Model with the \textit{Copy Model}. Take again my sensation of blue caused by sensing something blue. On the Copy Model, to \textit{reproduce} sensation-B is for the reproductive imagination to bring about a \textit{copy} of sensation-B. This copy of sensation-B is \textit{not} sensation-B. Instead, this copy of sensation-B is an \textit{image} of sensation-B.

Hume is perhaps the most prominent historical proponent of the Copy Model. Hume famously distinguishes between “impressions” and “ideas.” “Everyone,” says Hume, “will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking.”\textsuperscript{39} He then elaborates this distinction in terms of a distinction between “impressions” and “ideas” or “images.” He claims that “impressions” include “all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul.”\textsuperscript{40} “Ideas” are “the faint images of these” impressions. Hume thus draws a contrast between mental states as \textit{they first occur} in the soul as “felt,” and ideas as “images” that postdate those impressions. As Stroud (1977, p. 19) puts it, Hume’s thought is that we “know there is a difference between actually perceiving something and just thinking about that thing in its absence, and that, Hume says, is the difference between having an impression of something and having an idea of it.”\textsuperscript{41} Hume’s

\textsuperscript{38}In this example, all that is required is that sensation-B caused by affection and sensation-B caused by reproduction are \textit{qualitatively identical} sensations. I do not want to attribute to this model the less plausible view that these sensations are also numerically identical.

\textsuperscript{39}Essay, Part 1, Book 1, pp. 1-2.

\textsuperscript{40}Essay, Part 1, Book 1, p. 1. Emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{41}Of course, for Hume, these “thoughts” in the absence of their objects simply \textit{are cases} of mental imagery \textit{akin} to having impressions, but differing with impressions in “force and liveliness.” Kant rejects both ideas: that all thoughts involve images, \textit{and} that images qualitatively differ from sensations or representations of the senses \textit{merely} in liveliness, as we shall see.
distinction between impression and idea lends itself to the Copy Model. For he would deny that the image copied from an impression is itself that very impression. An image or idea can occur even in the absence of the impression from which is derived.

So suppose I have impression-A. The “Humean” rendition of the Copy Model says that my image of impression-A is not impression-A. It couldn’t be, since the repetition of impression-A is not the “first appearance in the soul” of the mental state that was impression-A. My image of impression-A might itself be an impression (say, impression-B—maybe it’s the first time I remembered a sensation of blue), but then impression-A and impression-B are numerically distinct impressions. For an image of a sensation (impression-A) is distinct from an image of an image (impression-B). These points explain why Hume announces that “all the perceptions of the mind are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas,” and that impressions make their appearance in the soul “without any introduction.”

I argue that Kant also adopts the Copy Model in a form quite similar to Hume’s own adoption of it. A first source of support for my contention is that the Copy Model was endorsed by

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42 Albeit, for Hume, the main difference has to do with the possible “force and liveliness” of an image: “Memory and imagination may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses, but they can’t create a perception that has as much force and liveliness as the one they are copying”; “Put in philosophical terminology: all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones” (Enquiry, section 2).

43 Let’s assume for simplicity that the mental state (the emotion, sensation, or passion) in question is simply identical to the impression. Perhaps Hume meant to distinguish these mental states and the impressions that they (say) “cause.” I remain agnostic on the matter, since it seems irrelevant to my present point.

44 In this case, for instance, Hume might consider impression-A an “original impression” and impression-B a “secondary impression” (cf. Treatise, 1.1.2.1/7).

45 T 1.1.1, 2.1.1. Cf. Locke’s treatment of impressions and images, which does not make the same distinction that Hume makes between impressions and image. See Brann (1991, p. 79).

46 Of course, Kant and Hume have different overall conceptions of the imagination, and very different theories of mental representation. Stroud (1977, pp. 21-2) claims that for Hume, simple impressions “cause their corresponding simple ideas.” Kant rejects this claim. Kant believes that powers of the mind are involved in developing representations; he does not believe that representations themselves, as effects of these powers of the mind, actually cause other representations. Kant thinks that some activity of the mind is required for copying to occur, namely, reproduction by the imagination. The impression by itself does not suffice for the production of a copy (i.e., the empirical intuition by itself does not suffice for the production of an image from it). Additionally, Kant obviously denies Hume’s empiricist assertion that all ideas derive from impressions. Kant makes a much weaker claim: only representations that are generated by the imagination’s reproduction—images—are generated by a process of copying. Yet Kant will also deny that all images are simply reproduced impressions—though seeing exactly how this is the case will require the apparatus of the productive imagination that we outline in the next chapter. As a prelude, note that Kant thinks we can readily imagine shapes that we have never seen. The image of triangle is not a copy of some antecedently given impression of a triangle; instead, it is an image produced by taking up, reproducing, and structuring, not an originally given representation of a triangle, but an originally given representation of space and its manifold. For some discussion on the
one of Kant’s favorite empirical psychologists, Johann Nikolaus Tetens. Tetens claims that “representations of sensation” or “images” are obtained from sensations, and are produced when the imagination takes up “traces” of sensations. He explicitly claims that these images can outlast sensation, such that images can occur “without the sensation being present.” Given Kant’s positive appraisal of Tetens’ account of perceptual psychology, it would not be surprising if Kant simply agreed with Tetens on this point. What’s more, another significant influence on Kant, Christian August Crusius, also seems to have maintained the Copy Model. At minimum, the Copy Model was readily available to Kant when he formulated the theory of reproduction that appears in the first Critique.

Several of Kant’s texts support the Copy Model. In his discussion of perceptual hallucination and illusion in the Anthropology, Kant claims that “illusions [Täuschungen]” involve “taking images [Einbildungen] for sensations [Empfindungen].” So illusions involve confusing images and sensations. Plausibly, taking an image to be a sensation is a confusion because images are not sensations or composed of sensations. Otherwise, the mistake that Kant describes would not be a mistake at all—the subject would not be wrong in taking images for sensations if images themselves were composed of sensations. Illusions do indeed involve images that represent outer sensory qualities in virtue of containing traces of sensation (illusions are not merely pathological belief states), but the subject need not undergo a sensation to have such images.

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47Tetens (1777, p. 23). Cf. Tetens (1777, p. 85): “For what is here image [Einbildung] or re-representation is not the whole previous sensation, also not the whole, which in turn occurs in the absence of the objects in us, or is prompted to issue forth. The image [Bild] of the moon; the re-representation of a joy is only a piece of the whole previous sensation, and also only a part of the whole modification of the soul, which exists in the reproduction [welche bey der Reproduktion vorhanden ist].”


49See Crusius (1747, §64): “Now because we cannot sufficiently compare representations with one another in dreams, those representations that are the most lively are confused with sensations, and are falsely taken to be sensations, until one senses the difference of those representations with the true sensations themselves.” These representations that are falsely held to be sensations are latered identified as images: dreaming as well as various “ailments of the understanding” involve “confusing” our “images [Einbildungen]” with “sensations” (p. 812).

50Anthropology, 7:161.

51Note that the subject is not merely confusing an absent object for an present object, but an image for a sensation.
In other places in which Kant discusses mental imagery, Kant maintains that images do not contain sensations as parts. In his precritical * Dreams of a Spirit Seer*, Kant provides an account of daydreaming on which daydreaming (of “waking dreamers”) differs from regular dreaming.\(^{52}\) He claims that though the “images in question may very well occupy” a daydreamer, they still “will not deceive him.”\(^{53}\) The daydreamer is not deceived because he can differentiate “his fantastical images [Bilder] as hatched out by himself” from “the real sensation [wirkliche Empfindung] as an impression of the senses.” Yet when the subject falls asleep, the external senses are no longer affected by objects, and “all that remains are the representations he has created himself.” As a result, when we dream, we are deceived by our images. On Kant’s view, the confusion of images and sensations arises because “there is no sensation which allows” the subject, “by comparing” the “real sensation” with the illusory image, to distinguish self-made phantoms from sensations. Indeed, Kant goes on to suggest the Copy Model when he calls such images “copied images [copirte Bilder].”\(^{54}\)

Kant is reported to have made similar claims in logic lectures:

>Sensation is the representation of our present condition insofar as it originates from the presence of a certain object. Sometimes representations arise in us of which we ourselves are the originator, but whose presence we derive from the existence of a thing. And then it happens that we often confuse fictions [Fictionen] with sensations [Empfindungen], and in this way we commit an error. We can often invent [erdichten] something for ourselves, but this is not a sensation.\(^{55}\)

This passage is difficult to square with the Affection Model. Plausibly, “fictions” and represen-

\(^{52}\) Elsewhere in the essay, Kant claims that the illusion of “visionary” metaphysicians occurs when “images of the imagination [Bilder der Phantasie]” assume the “semblance of sensation [Schein der Empfindung]” (TG, 2:340). I think that Kant is actually providing a serious error theory of such metaphysical speculation in the *Dreams*. One piece of evidence for this is that he also lists “enthusiasm” and “spiritualism” as the illusions under discussion in the *Anthropology* passage (7:161). In the *Dreams*, Kant frequently suggests that he is critiquing a kind of spiritualism. This suggests that he is trying to make psychological sense of the illusions associated with it in both passages.

\(^{53}\) TG, 2:343

\(^{54}\) This passage actually claims that *each* outer sense can yield copied images. Illusions “can affect any outer sense, for each of them yields copied images [copirte Bilder] in the imagination” (TG, 2:347.). Cf. AM, 25:1241: “The power of imagination has in its power [the ability] to represent the form of things to us, but impressions to a much lesser extent; rather, the power of imagination falsifies them.” This passage again suggests that images represent various aspects of the representations of the senses.

tations that we “invent for ourselves” involve sensory qualities derived from sensation. Moreover, such “fictions” or acts of “inventing [erdichten]” are products of the Dichtungsvermögen, which is a subfaculty of the power of imagination. However, Kant is claiming that these fictions are not themselves sensations. This conclusion contradicts the Affection Model. In contrast, the Copy Model easily explains this passage and the other ones above. We can produce fictions, but those fictions involve copies or reproductions of previous sensations.

As a further illustration, suppose I am having a sensation of red while imagining green in a daydream. I have a sensation of red and an image of green. According to Kant, when I am in this daydream, I do not have the task of telling which sensations (the green sensations) are produced by the imagination and which sensations (the red sensations) are produced by outer affection. Instead, the asymmetry between real sensations and images that lack sensations facilitates the distinction between occurrent sensing and occurrent imagining. As another example, when I entertain a mental image of a pirate, I might represent a rough masculine face, the characteristic hat, and the eye patch. But suppose I imagine his shirt in only very coarse detail. If someone asks me how many buttons are on his shirt, it is not as if I have a sensation array available to me, on the basis of which I could apprehend how many buttons there “really” are. There are as many buttons as I imagine there to be. These examples illustrate what I take to be the hallmark of Kant’s account, namely, that I am able to realize that I am engaging in mental imagery by comparing my mental images with actual sensations that I enjoy.

The Copy Model has the benefit of being more general than the Affection Model because it can easily encompass reproduced representations of both inner and outer sense. For instance, the Affection Model would maintain that every time I imagine a pain, my reproductive imagination brings about the same sensory state that I have when I undergo occurrent pain. This seems implausible. Similarly, on the Affection Model, every time I imagine an emotion, my reproductive imagination causes me to have that emotion. This view is again far from obvious. Yet on the Copy Model, Kant is not committed to either position. Kant himself makes a remark on this point that supports the Copy Model:
The fear of an impending pain is distinct from the pain that is present. The fear of pain itself, namely, is a fiction [Fiction]. On the other hand, the pain itself is a sensation.56

In this case, the pain feared is presumably represented by means of reproducing a past pain sensation. (Recall that we cannot imagine the quality of sensations unless we have previously had those sensations.) Moreover, Kant must be invoking the imagination since he is talking about “fictions.” The plausible consequence is that having an actual present pain is not the same as imagining a pain. The imagining of a pain is not a pain at all. The inner appearance of pain is brought back to mind via an image made of that inner appearance by the imagination.

The Copy Model also makes sense of Kant’s distinction between intuitions “in the presence” of the object and images “even without the presence” of the object. The Copy Model explains why empirical intuitions require the presence of the object, while images do not require the presence of the object. Recall that though images depend on the senses as described above, we can “immediately distinguish the mere receptivity of an outer intuition [Anschauung] from the spontaneity that characterizes every image [Einbildung]” (B276-277n). Kant thus marks off two representational types—“outer intuition” and “image [Einbildung]”—and he suggests that outer intuitions involve the “mere receptivity” of outer sense, whereas images involve the “spontaneity” of imagination. Kant repeats this point in notes: “we really distinguish” what he calls an “image [Einbildung]” from “intuitions of the senses [Sinnenanschauungen].”57 Kant also thinks that to have an empirical intuition of sense, “the object must be represented as present,” which sets it off from “an image [Einbildung] as intuition without the presence of the object.”58 The object of an intuition of sense is not merely “present,” but “represented as present.”

The Copy Model explains this difference between empirical intuitions and images by maintaining that empirical intuitions involve sensation or contain it as a part, whereas images merely involve copies of sensations. Kant maintains that sensations are required to represent existing and present objects in intuition. To repeat Kant’s claim noted in chapter 2, “sensation is that which

57 R 6315, 18:621
58 AA 18:619

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designates an actuality in space and time” (A374), and sensation “presupposes the actual presence of the object” (A50/B74). In several of his works, Kant consistently distinguishes the “power of imagination” that represents objects “even without the presence of the object” (A100; B151) from “sense” as the “the faculty of intuition of the present” or “sensation [sensatio].” Sensations thus play an essential role in representing present objects in space and time.

An empirical intuition is a causally situated sensory profile that represents a present object. Empirical intuitions arise when sensations are generated in a particular form (or “synopsized”). In contrast, images are not themselves generated by synopsis; they are not constituted by an ordering of occurrent sensations. Instead, images are copies or traces of these empirical intuitions in the imagination; the structure of images is due not to the synopsis of these sensations but to the reproduction of these (previously apprehended) sensations. And since copies of sensations are not themselves sensations, images do not represent objects as present.

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60 Kant’s view on sensation as fundamental to representing existing and present objects was critical to his predecessors as well, especially Christian August Crusius. For a discussion, see Watkins (2017, p. 11).

61 More exactly: the structure of images is not immediately due to synopsis, but only by means of the reproduction of synopsized representations.

62 The matter gets delicate when we attempt to locate an account of perceptual memory in Kant. We can distinguish (a) images of objects that we are intuiting or have intuited from (b) images of objects that we have never intuited. For instance, suppose I have an empirical intuition at \( t_1 \) of appearance \( A_1 \). Suppose that I form an image from that empirical intuition, and that the image represents \( A_1 \). Finally, suppose that I entertain that image of \( A_1 \) at \( t_2 \) and no longer empirically intuit \( A_1 \) at \( t_2 \). Now if the above description is correct, it cannot be the case that the image merely contains copies of sensations from \( t_1 \). For then it would not be possible to distinguish (a) an image of that past object and (b) a phenomenally identical image that is not of that past object. The reason that (a) and (b) would be indistinguishable is that Kant is committed to the idea that sensations alone do not represent appearances—only empirical intuitions that contain sensations represent appearances. So if only the sensations from \( t_1 \) are copied into the image, then the image by itself could not represent \( A_1 \). So if the image is to represent \( A_1 \), then the image needs to be a copy of the empirical intuition of \( A_1 \) had at \( t_1 \). Indeed, such a model is suggested by Kant’s claim that the reproductive imagination can recall empirical intuitions had previously. How are we to understand this claim? Here’s the idea. Firstly, the empirical intuition at \( t_1 \) must be apprehended at \( t_1 \) if it is to be reproduced in an image at \( t_2 \). Thus, the first condition on reproducing an empirical intuition in an image at \( t_2 \) is that the empirical intuition be “taken into the activity” of the imagination via apprehension at \( t_1 \). Another way to put this is that at \( t_1 \), the imagination must have generated an image from the empirical intuition. Apprehension of the empirical intuition at \( t_1 \) allows the imagination, at a later date \( t_2 \), to bring back to mind the empirical intuition of \( A_1 \) at \( t_1 \). The imagination brings back to mind the empirical intuition of \( A_1 \) at \( t_1 \) by means of the image it has stored that it has formed from that empirical intuition at \( t_1 \). In the examples provided in the next section, I provide more illustrations of this model.

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3.3.2 The Law of Reproduction: Association

In the previous section, I argued that Kant endorses the Copy Model of reproduction. I want to conclude our discussion of reproduction with a discussion of the constitutive law of reproduction, namely, association. For just as apprehension in the strict sense is not an arbitrary selection procedure, so too is reproduction not an arbitrary recollection procedure. Following many of his predecessors, Kant thought that the non-arbitrariness of reproduction is derived from association. The way that the imagination “represents appearances” is “in association (in reproduction)” (A115). This section relates the law of association to image formation.

Following many of his predecessors, Kant holds that the reproductive imagination is subject to laws of association. He refers to a “law of the association of ideas,” which states of representations that “if the one is there, then the other follows.” The law of association is “also a law of the expectation of similar cases.” In a passage reminiscent of Hume’s theory of association, Kant claims that “empirical ideas that have often followed each other produce a mental habit such that, when one is produced, this causes the other to arise as well.” Let’s label any such tendency or “mental habit” of the imagination to join two representations an associative habit.

We can differentiate two different elements of the law of association that express different associative habits. The first element Kant calls acompaniment, which arises when representations follow one another in time or exist at the same time. Let’s say that the imagination apprehends two representations, A and B, and consequently makes them available for reproduction. Accompaniment says that if (a) representations A and B are apprehended by the imagination simultaneously or successively, then (b) the imagination will tend to reproduce A if B is apprehended or reproduced, and the imagination will tend to reproduce B if A is apprehended or reproduced. The second ele-

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63 For instance, Crusius claims that the rules for “human memory” are similar to what Kant calls the “law of association” (Crusius, 1747, §90, p. 161). For instance, one such rule is “An idea occurs to us, if that idea in turn occurs, which we previously have thought next to and at the same time as it.” Importantly, as we shall see in the next chapter, Crusius joins Kant in maintaining that the imagination operates according to rules beyond those governing memory, which Crusius calls the rules of ingenii (§98). Cf. Baumgarten (2013, §§557, 572), who distinguishes rules governing wit (ingenium) and memory from those governing imagination. See also Frierson (2014, pp. 97 ff.) for a discussion.

64 MD, 28:674
65 Anth, 7:176
ment Kant calls \textit{contiguity}, which arises when representations share a similar \textit{position in space}.\footnote{AF, 25:512-3.} Again, let’s say that the imagination apprehends two representations, $C$ and $D$, and consequently makes them available for reproduction. Contiguity says that if (a) representations $C$ and $D$ represent items that are at a nearby \textit{place}, then (b) the imagination will tend to reproduce $C$ if $D$ is apprehended or reproduced, and the imagination will tend to reproduce $D$ if $C$ is apprehended or reproduced. Accompaniment and contiguity are what Kant at one point calls “associations of sensibility” as distinct from “associations of the understanding.”\footnote{AF, 25:513.} I return to this distinction in the next chapter.

The formation of associative habits presupposes that representations “accompany” or “follow” one another as they occur in the temporal order of inner sense.\footnote{Hume himself describes one of the “sources of association” as “contiguity in time or place” (\textit{Enquiry}, First Enquiry, Section 3). Even for Hume, contiguity of time or place does not suffice for association; an additional “habit” must be added to such contiguity. By the same token, Hume seems to simply \textit{presuppose} the presence of temporal ordering in his description of association.} It would clearly be circular to explain how representations come to \textit{follow} or \textit{accompany} one another in time by appealing to the law of association. For the terms “follow” and “accompany” feature in the law of association itself.\footnote{Cf. Kant’s formulation of the “law of association” elsewhere: “empirical ideas that have frequently \textit{followed} one another produce a habit in the mind such that when one idea is produced, the other also comes into being” (\textit{Anth}, 7:176, emphasis added); “I reproduce the representations of past time through association, according to which one representation draws forth another, because it had been \textit{accompanying} it” (\textit{ML}$_1$, 28:236, emphasis added). Both of these formulations simply take it as primitive that representations stand in accompanying or following relations.} So Kant never meant to countenance a theory on which association generates \textit{original} temporal representations. He instead maintains that association has its “ground” in original temporal and spatial representations.\footnote{One of Kant’s reflections states this point explicitly: “The \textit{ground} of association is: 1. the similarity [\textit{Einerleihheit}] of representations; 2. their accompaniment (as cause and effect); 3. their \textit{position in space and time}” (R 354, 15:139).} Association generates \textit{additional} representations (generated by associative habits of reproduction) \textit{from} representations that are stipulated to occur in a more basic representation of time (and space).

An associative habit is a disposition that is \textit{manifested} by the \textit{reproduction} of a representation, on the basis of another representation that is apprehended or reproduced. Kant introduces the “law of reproduction” or “merely empirical law” according to which “representations that have
often followed or accompanied one another” are “associated” and “thereby placed in a connection” (A100).72 This “constant rule” specifies a “transition of the mind” between two or more representations, even “without the presence of the object” of one or more of those representations. An associative habit thus manifests itself by representing some item “even without its presence.”73 As a result, the law of association can only be a constitutive law for a power of the mind that can represent items that are not currently present to the mind.

Kant invokes images to describe this representation “without the presence of the object” in several different ways. “Images [Bilder]” are invoked to explain the representation “of present time” (Abbildung), “of past time” (Nachbildung), “of future time” (Vorbildung), and of items at no time in particular (Dichtung).74 Images can thus be formed regardless of whether the object it represents presently exists.75 For one, we often expect objects or events to be present in the future. Kant thinks that our capacity to anticipate what happens in the future is simply an outgrowth of the fundamental capacity to associate and reproduce representations. Thus, “just as I can go from the present into the past, I can also go from the present into the future,” and this projection from the present to the future “happens according to laws of the reproductive imagination.”76 Kant calls this our capacity of “anticipation [Verbildung],” which itself suggests a kind of “pre-imaging” of what is to come. And indeed, through this faculty of anticipation “one can still make in advance an image [Bild] of future items” even though one lacks an “impression” of those items.77 These images are the product of association-governed activities of reproduction, and these images can represent past, present, and future items.

72 Tetens (1777, pp. 81–2) also refers to the law of association as the “well-known law of reproduction: if a part of a previous sensation is brought back again, then the whole state united with it is brought forth.” As I note below, this law specifies a kind of completion procedure in image production, which Tetens also recognizes: “There is yet something more present” in cases of “images” of objects, “namely, a tendency also to renew the remaining parts of the sensation, the obscure feeling with it.”

73 Cf. MM, 29:883: the imagination is reproductive because it acts “with respect to past time” or by anticipating future times or by producing representations “with respect to no time.” All of these require representations of objects that we are not currently sensing.

74 ML1, 28:235; AF, 25:511-2; MM, 29:883.

75 Or more precisely, represented in the manner in which it currently exists.

76 ML1, 28:236. Such laws also govern “memory (Gedächtnis),” which is a voluntary exercise of the reproductive imagination according to the law of association; see AM, 25:1272-3; AF, 25:480.

77 ML1, 28:236. See also AF, 25:511ff.
Kant also connects reproduction to image production in the A-edition Transcendental Deduction. Though, as we saw, apprehension of intuition is required for image production,

even this apprehension of the manifold alone would bring forth no image and no connection of the impressions were there not a subjective ground for calling back a perception, from which the mind has passed on to another, to the succeeding ones, thus for exhibiting entire series of perceptions, i.e., a reproductive faculty imagination, which is then also merely empirical. (A121)

Image formation itself depends on reproduction by the imagination. Suppose that A and B are parts of the same image. Kant’s thought is that in order for A and B to be parts of the same image, A and B must stand in the association relation to one another. In order for A and B to stand in the association relation to one another, one must have an associative habit to reproduce B whenever A is apprehended or reproduced, and vice versa. Otherwise, A and B could not be parts of one image. Two items might co-occur in intuition near one another, but without association, they would fail to form a coherent representational whole that Kant calls an image. That is why “no connection of impressions” at all could occur without reproduction and association.

Images are constituents of perception because the reproduction of representations is required for generating association relations between representations. As Kant vividly puts the point in lecture, “our present time is full of images of the past, and this is the only means for representing a connection of thoughts [Gedanken].” The constituents of these association relations are not mere sensations, or even sensations synopsized into an empirical intuition, but copies of sensations and empirical intuitions, that is, images. Images are associated copies of representations of the senses generated by the activity of reproduction. The structure of images is due to reproduction, not (as with intuitions) synopsis.

3.4 Images in Kant’s Empirical Psychology

In this section, I will illustrate Kant’s empirical psychology of images by considering three different cases. In the first case, images are generated to represent present objects (as in perception). In the second case, images are generated to represent objects that exist (or existed) but that are absent (as in memory). In the third case, images are generated to represent objects that do not exist (as in hallucination).

3.4.1 Image production during occurrent sensing

Perceptual presence and perceptual completion

The first major category of image production involves image production that is connected to occurrent sensing. The imagination “illustrates” the manifold while it senses an object: “[m]y mind is always busy with forming the image [Bild] of the manifold while it goes through” the manifold given through the senses.79 So “when I see a city”—that is, sense the city from a particular vantage point—“the mind then forms an image of the object which it has before it while it runs through the manifold” (cf. A99). It is clear, then, that the imagination forms images of objects that are present to the senses.

Applying the above theory to the city example, we apprehend the different parts of the manifold provided by the senses. But let’s consider a single empirical intuition of the city—a single causally situated sensory profile. One might wonder why merely entertaining the sensory profile does not suffice to make the manifold available for reproduction by the imagination. Why is an additional step of imaginative apprehension required?

The answer is that a single sensory profile can be apprehended in many ways. I can select different parts of the manifold and ignore others, and I might apprehend (say) the shape of my watch without apprehending (say) its color. Kant’s thought is that even though my sensory profile represents the shape and color in some way (i.e., intuitively via the senses), such shape and color

79 ML1, 28:235-236
features are not represented in the right way for reproduction and image formation without imaginative apprehension. Even though there is a sense in which the elements of an empirical intuition are available for reproduction, they are not correctly poised for reproduction. (After all, a ballerina on the wings of a stage might be available but not poised to perform a fouetté.) Imaginative apprehension poises the manifold for reproduction by selecting aspects or parts of the manifold.

Kant adds complexity to this point by suggesting that at least some images are formed by taking together different spatial perspectives of objects:

The mind must undertake many observations in order to illustrate an object so that it illustrates the object differently from each side. E.g., a city appears differently from the east than from the west. There are thus many appearances of a matter according to the various sides and points of view. The mind must make an illustration from all these appearances by taking them all together.\(^{80}\)

First, one senses a city from a given perspective. Secondly, the imagination illustrates the manifold given within one perspective. This might involve apprehending and selecting different parts of the buildings that one is viewing, or attending to particular sounds that one hears. Even within this second step, one can associate these different items together. So within a single sensible perspective—a single way of positioning one’s senses in the world—both apprehension and reproduction are at work in producing an image. Put in a different way, within a single intuition—a single causally situated sensory profile—both apprehension and reproduction are at work in producing an image from a single sensory profile delivered by that occurrent empirical intuition.

Third, the imagination can generate images of features that are absent, even though the object with those features is present. As we saw above, the “soul of every person” generates “images of things that are not present” in order to “complete [vollenden] an incomplete similarity in the representation of present things.”\(^{81}\) “Completion [Vollendung]” is an example of the exercise of the power of imagination according to the law of association.\(^{82}\) So even though I might visually sense

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\(^{80}\)ML\(_1\), 28:235-236

\(^{81}\)VKK, 2:264. See also \(AF\), 25:490, where Kant gives the example that if someone is missing a button on their jacket or missing a tooth, the imagination cannot help but complete these absences.

\(^{82}\)R 338, 15:133.
a wall within the city, I might only imaginatively represent the \textit{texture} of the bricks on the wall because I am not currently touching it. I might represent sides of a building that are not present. Thus arises a multi-perspectival image of a present object.

\textbf{Animal perception}

Images are relevant to Kant’s account of non-human animal perception. These cases bring out that other faculties of the mind like those of pleasure and desire can influence one’s associative habits. Moreover, pain, pleasure, and desire can influence what a subject apprehends in the first place. Thus, desires and feelings can influence image production.

Animals both apprehend and reproduce their representations. Kant was comfortable attributing apprehension in the strict sense to animals. Animals can apprehend representations because apprehension is a more basic psychological accomplishment than what Kant calls \textit{apperception}—which serves as a basis for the intellect.\textsuperscript{83} Apprehension is directed at what one “feels” or senses, what is given by the senses.\textsuperscript{84} Animals need to be able to apprehend their representations—to engage in some sort of selection among them—in order to perform many of the activities that Kant explicitly attributes to them in letters and in print.

Kant describes cases of animal perception involving an ox and a dog:

An ox is stirred differently by grass than by a stone, because the grass stirs it with a representation that is the ground of hunger, [but] such is not so with the stone, thus this distinction is merely in the different stirring—in humans, the difference in the stirring is cognizable \textit{[zu erkennen]}, [even?, –RBT] if they are not themselves conscious.\textsuperscript{85}

\textit{Physically differentiating} means being driven to different actions by different representations. The dog differentiates the roast from the loaf, and it does so because

\textsuperscript{83}“Animals also have \textit{apprehensiones}, but not \textit{apperceptiones}; hence they cannot make their representations general” (\textit{R} 411, 15:166). Additionally: “The Apprehending I (of apprehension) \textit{[Das Auffassende Ich (der apprehension)]}, which man has in common with the animals (\textit{R} 1531, 15:957). Additionally: “First, the division of the faculty of representation into the mere apprehension \textit{[Auffassung]} of representations, \textit{apprehensio bruta} without consciousness (that is only for the brutes \textit{[Vieh]} and the sphere of apperception, i.e., of concepts; the latter constitutes the sphere of understanding in general” (Draft letter to Prince Alexander von Beloselsky, 1792, \textit{AA} 11:345).


\textsuperscript{85}\textit{MH}, 28:66-67
the way in which it is affected by the roast is different from the way in which it is
affected by the loaf (for different things cause different sensations); and the sensa-
tions caused by the roast are a ground of desire in the dog which differs from the
desire caused by the loaf, according to the natural connection which exists between
its drives and its representations.\textsuperscript{86}

We can characterize these passages as cases of associative perception. To consider the dog example:
the dog has many sensations at a given time, since its sense organs are affected by many different
objects. So the dog must select among the different sensations and feelings it is having; it does not
do so voluntarily or according to concepts, but instead is driven to apprehend sensations associated
with the satisfaction of hunger. Those sensations include the starchy flavor of bread, its aroma,
and its brownish color. When the dog apprehends one of these sensations (we might think of them
as spatially structured or not), the other representations are reproduced (or tend to be reproduced).
Even if the dog does not see the loaf yet, the dog’s occurrent sensations of the loaf’s \textit{aroma} cause
the reproductive imagination to generate an image of how the loaf will look.

As we shall see in the next chapter in greater detail, the fact that animals engage in associa-
tive perception makes sense of Kant’s claim that “reflecting”—the capacity to “compare and to hold
together given representations with others or with one’s faculty of cognition”—“goes on even in an-
imals.”\textsuperscript{87} Yet it is clear that associative habits not only associate different outer sensations, but also
associate desires and pains/pleasures \textit{with} those sensations. As a result, desires and pleasures/pains
can give rise to novel associative habits that cannot be derived merely from outer sensations.

\textbf{3.4.2 Image production without occurrent sensing}

\textbf{Mental imagery}

Kant’s examples of illusion, hallucination, and mental imagery serve to highlight the dis-

\textsuperscript{86} FS, 2:60
\textsuperscript{87} KU, 20:211. Cf. “Animals indeed compare representations with one another, but they are not conscious of where
the harmony or disharmony between them lies. Therefore they also have no concepts, and also no higher cognitive
faculty, because the higher cognitive faculty consists of these. This [faculty] is thus differentiated by apperception from
the lower cognitive faculty” (\textit{MM}, 29:888).
general model of mental imagery with contemporary accounts of how veridical perception relates to other “quasi-perceptual” phenomena like perceptual memory, mental imagery, illusion, or hallucination.

These views begin from the assumption that we can sort perceptual experiences according to their phenomena character. On one view, disjunctivism, veridical perceptual experience is of a fundamentally different kind from quasi-perceptual experiences like hallucination, illusion, and mental imagery.\(^\text{88}\) That is, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is special and cannot be shared with phenomena like hallucination, illusion, and mental imagery. The denial of disjunctivism is the common factor view on which perceptual experience shares its phenomenal character with (some of) these latter phenomena.

Let’s focus in particular on mental imagery and its relationship to veridical perceptual experience. According to what Martin (2002, p. 404) calls the “Dependency Thesis,” “the mental imagery of \(x\) consists of representing the experience of \(x\).”\(^\text{89}\) Since Kant thinks mental imagery involves mental images, we could adapt the Dependency Thesis to say that a mental image of \(x\) consists of representing the perceptual experience of \(x\). This view would lend itself to a disjunctivist view, since mental imagery would always be a second-order representing of some previous first-order perceptual experience.

Indeed, there is even more subtlety here. De Brigard (2014, pp. 403-4) differentiates three positions of how a memory trace relates to its respective perceptual experience. According to direct representationalism, veridical perception is not mediated by any representations; consequently, memory traces are representations created on the basis of immediate perception of an object (perhaps in the style of naive realism about perception). According to a semi-direct representationalism, veridical perception \(is\) mediated by representations; however, memory traces are representations that are identical to the representations generated during veridical perception. Notice that

\(^{88}\)See Soteriou (2016) for a discussion of the complexities of the disjunctive view of perception. I will assume here a view on which disjunctivism is a position about whether there is a more fundamental genus of which veridical perception and hallucination/illusion/mental imagery are all species. Disjunctivism denies that there is such a fundamental kind, hence the disjunction.

\(^{89}\)For a helpful discussion, see Nanay (2016, pp. 128ff.).
**direct representationalism** is *disjunctive*: it claims that there is no common factor between a case of veridical perception and a case of entertaining a memory trace. **Semi-direct representationalism** is non-disjunctive: the representation involved in perception and in memory traces is common to both. In contrast to these two views, **indirect representationalism** maintains that both perception and recollection are representational, but that the memory trace involved in recollection is numerically distinct from the representation involved in perception.

I think that Kant’s adoption of the Copy Model of reproduction strongly supports attributing to him the indirect representationalist model. For Kant, images are numerically distinct from the intuitions that they copy, and both intuitions and images are representations. Yet I think there is an additional reason for accepting the indirect representationalist model of mental imagery in Kant. Consider that, for Kant, images are constituents of perception itself (A120n). If Kant accepted the Dependency Thesis, then he would have to say that every image represents a previous image-involving experience. When one imagines something that happened yesterday, one would thus be forming an image of some previous image (which is itself based on an intuition). As a result, images formed during perception would differ in kind from images formed post-perception, because images post-perception would be images of images. This result would sit well with a strong disjunctivist view of perception, on which veridical perception differs fundamentally from mental imagery. For the (second-order) images that figure in mental imagery would *never* be of the same kind as the (first-order) images that figure in veridical perceptual experience.

But I do not think that Kant makes a fundamental distinction between the images formed in veridical perceptual experience and the images formed in mental imagery, hallucination, and illusion. The images that are constituents of perception are not *representations of* past images of objects, but *parts* of perceptual experience that can be entertained even in the absence of their objects.90 So imagining *x per se* cannot always be a representing of an experience of *x*.

90 Moreover, it seems possible on Kant’s view that when one imagines something that happened yesterday, one simply becomes aware of an image that was unconsciously stored in the interim.
of \( x \). I think that this claim embodies the spirit of the Copy Model. But notice that on my view, the intuition of \( x \) does not amount to a full-blown perceptual experience of \( x \); rather, the intuition of \( x \) is the sensory component of perceptual experience. The images that complement these intuitions in perceptual experience are of the same kind as the images that we possess in the absence of intuition of objects. Both images might have similar or even qualitatively identical phenomenal character. Thus, though there is indeed an important common factor between veridical perception (in the “presence” of the object) and mental imagery (in the “absence” of the object), there are also fundamental differences between veridical perception (which involves empirical intuition) and mental imagery (which does not involve empirical intuition). Kant’s view thus seems to crosscut strong disjunctivist views (because he posits a common image) as well as strong common-factor views (because he posits an empirical intuition that one cannot entertain outside of veridical perception).\(^9\) This result is an outgrowth both of Kant’s view of images and of his view of intuitions as causally situated sensory profiles.

With this model of mental imagery in mind, Kant explains several cases of mental imagery in terms of the associative habits that individuals develop. Kant writes:

> Concepts of objects often prompt a spontaneously produced image \([\textit{Bild}]\) (through the productive power of imagination), which we attach to them involuntarily. When we read or have someone tell us about the life and deeds of a great man according to talent, merit, or rank, we are usually led to give him a considerable stature in our power of imagination; on the other hand when someone is, according to description, delicate and soft in character, we usually form an image \([\textit{Bildung}]\) of him as smallish and pliable.\(^{92}\)

\(^9\)More care is needed for Kant to address several typical worries. For instance, if you are hit in the head by a ball, then you might have pathological color sensations (you might “see stars”). These sensations are plausibly not due to your imagination, but to a pathological sensory episode that seems just like a regular sensory episode (bracket the fact that this seems phenomenologically wrong to me). One might suggest that the resulting pathological representation is an empirical intuition. I can concede this point, though there are two points to make here. First, I reiterate that empirical intuitions are products of a capacity to represent objects in their presence; misfirings of that capacity could very well occur, but these misfirings do not show that empirical intuitions (products of the capacity to represent objects in their presence) are the same sort of thing as images (products of the capacity to represent objects even in their absence). Second, empirical intuitions are causally situated sensory profiles. For Kant’s view to be plausible, he would need to spell out in greater detail how we are to understand causal situations. One might develop such a view by appealing to causal covariation between empirical intuitions and appearances, in the style of several contemporary causal theories of perception.

\(^{92}\)\textit{Anth}, 7:173
Kant distinguishes between what belongs to a “concept” of a certain person and what belongs to an “image” of that person. Similarly, he distinguishes between the “description [Beschreibung]” of a person and the “image [Bild/Bildung]” that one forms of the person. Kant’s claim is that in the case described above, the image is not a merely descriptive representation of the relevant object; instead, it somehow amplifies or goes beyond the description by means of an associative habit. Cases of mental imagery can thus be initiated in many different ways for Kant, even though all of those cases of imagining involve images.

**Illusion**

Kant explains practically all cases of perceptual illusion by appeal to the imagination, and many of these illusions are due to associative habits. One particularly interesting example arises from perceptual completion cases described above. The “incomplete similarity” of a present object can often give rise to non-veridical imagistic completions:

the natural history collector sees cities in florentine, stone, the devout person the passion story in the speckled marble, some lady sees the shadow of two lovers on the moon in a telescope, but her pastor two church steeples. Fear turns the rays of the northern light into spears and swords and in the twilight a sign post into a giant ghost.\(^{93}\)

So when the lady senses the surface of the moon, she can apprehend some aspect of the surface. But her own associative habits cause a certain illusory image to be generated on the basis of what is apprehended. That is, her imagination “completes” what she sees through the telescope as two figures, and the pastor’s imagination does not do so because he has a different set of associative habits. These are cases of illusory perceptual phenomena.

Kant takes these cases of illusory—or at least fictive—imagining to be rather common: “if we lie in an idle and gentle distraction after waking up, our imagination draws [zeichnet] irregular figures such as those of the bedroom curtains or of certain spots on a near wall into human shapes.”\(^{94}\)

\(^{93}\text{VKK, 2:265-6}\)

\(^{94}\text{VKK, 2:265}\)
Kant thus thinks that the representation of present things might be apprehended in particular ways when the imagination is left to its own devices, sometimes resulting in illusory “images.” Yet we can “dispel” such “illusions” as a human figure in the drape “the moment we want to.” When we lie awake and allow our imagination to play with such “irregular figures,” Kant says that we “dream,” albeit “only in part,” since the “chimaeras” are “in our power.” Yet “if something similar happens in a higher degree without the attention of the waking person being able to detach the illusion in the misleading image [Einbildung], then this reversal lets us conjecture a fantast.” So as we noted above, if we are not awake, we are ultimately not able to give our “attention” over in the right way to distinguishing between a “misleading image” from what is really present.

Images are not innate representations shared among all humans from birth. The images that humans form are heavily influenced by their own psychological make-up. Thus, there are cases in which “human beings do not see through an ordinary delusion to what is there but rather what their inclination paints [vormalt] for them.” The above examples suggest that one’s background cognitive and psychological states can “penetrate” perception in the contemporary sense by influencing our activities of imagining—a claim I spell out in greater detail in chapter 4.

**Dreams and hallucination**

Interestingly, Kant thinks that the same laws that govern the imagination’s activity in perception and illusion also govern its activity in cases of hallucination. All of these cases of image production involve the same psychological processes and the same psychological laws. Kant denies that “in the waking state, our spirit obeys other laws than in sleep.” This remark speaks against a

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95 See also AS2, VM147u: “[T]he human constantly engages in fictive imagining quietly [der Mensch dichtet unaufhörlich in der Stille] when he is given over to solitude, and he brings forth new images [Bilder] from the old [images – RBT], makes for himself new thoughts and events, and swims in a novel that he has invented for himself, and his power of imagination forms [bilder] what has no application at all in the world. This fictive capacity [Dichtungsvermögen] is the basis of all invention.”

96 VKK, 2:265

97 VKK, 2:265

98 Of course, this is not to say that all cases of illusion involve such penetration. Perhaps some cases of illusion do not involve the influence of any cognitive state at all; in such cases, the imagination’s activities alone governed by the law of association and reproduction can generate illusory perceptual states.

99 VKK, 2:264
disjunctive account of the representations that arise in sleep versus those that arise in waking life.

Though the imagination obeys the same laws in both sleep and in waking life, there are important subjective differences between both dream experiences and waking experiences. Kant writes that in a healthy and awake person, “the lively sense impressions ... obscure [verdunkeln] the more fragile images [Bilder] of chimaeras and make them unrecognizable [unkenntlich],” while images “have their full strength in sleep, in which the access to the soul is sealed off from all outer impressions.” Kant distinguishes “outer impressions” from “images” in both awake and asleep healthy humans. The subjective difference between the representations entertained while awake and the representations entertained while asleep is not due to the intrinsic features of the image or the procedures and laws involved in producing the image. Instead, the differences are due to how the images compare to impressions or sensations that are also present in the mind. While we are awake, these sensations are vivid and serve to facilitate a contrast between sensing and merely imagining. The images become “unrecognizable” and “obscure” in such cases. Yet while we are asleep, the apparent “strength” of these images increases since our mind lacks impressions with which to compare those images.

The Copy Model fits well with this theory. Like Hume and Tetens, Kant accepts that there is a certain intensity to occurrent sensations that other representations of the mind lack. In particular, we are generally not directly aware of the “faint” images that our imagination is always generating. Keep in mind that images depend on apprehension, even though an image of \( x \) at \( t \) does not depend on apprehension of \( x \) at \( t \)—images are constituted by the reproduction of apprehended representations. This reproduction of an \( x \) can occur without our awareness, apprehension, or attention being directed toward \( x \) (or toward the reproduction or copy of \( x \)). When “faint” images are the strongest sensible representations available to a subject, those images tend to become the contents of our awareness.

Even though we frequently generate many mental images, we do not mistake those mental images for veridical perceptual experiences. Kant was interested in explaining this everyday obser-

\(^{100}\text{VKK, 2:264}\)
How does he do so? Kant’s answer turns on the idea that in principle, one could become conscious of an “image” as an “inner intuition of sense”: “The image [Einbildung], if one is conscious of it as such, can also be considered as inner intuition of sense [Sinnenanschauung].” Kant reasons as follows:

[Consciousness can accompany all of my representations, hence even the representation of an image [Einbildung], which is . . . itself an object of inner sense [Object des innern Sinnes], of which it must be possible to become conscious as such, since we really distinguish such things as inner representations, hence existing in time, from the intuition of the senses.] Kant here suggests that images can themselves be brought to consciousness, and that in so doing, the subject can distinguish outer intuitions of the senses from images.

Kant clearly distinguishes images from outer intuitions. Additionally, I do not think that Kant means to equate images with inner intuitions. He claims that one can consider an image “if one is conscious of it as such” as an inner intuition of sense. I take Kant to be saying, not that the image itself is an inner intuition of sense, but that the image is the content of an inner intuition. The block quote above is clearer on this point. It claims that the “image” can itself become “an object of inner sense.” Just as states like pains, desires, and sensations can become the objects of inner sense through inner intuition, so too can images. Moreover, even though inner intuitions of sense merely have time as their form, images frequently have space as their form. So if we treat images as the contents or objects of inner intuitions, then we need not be committed to the implausible claim that images lack spatial form. Images are not themselves inner intuitions, but instead the contents or objects of inner intuitions. Because images are one of the objects of inner sense, Kant thinks that images are not the same as inner intuitions, and that they can be brought to consciousness independently of them. This is an important distinction that helps to clarify Kant’s position on the nature of imagination.
that we can differentiate illusion from veridical perception (at least in principle).

### 3.5 Conclusion

I have argued that in the broadest sense, images are representations in which copies of a sensible manifold are reproduced or associated with one another. We saw how apprehension makes representations available for reproduction and association, and we saw why images—as representations of objects even in their absence—are necessary in order for these activities to achieve their purpose. That is, images are central to the canonical definition of the imagination as a faculty for representing an object even without its presence in intuition.

This chapter also showed that for Kant, inter- and intra-subjective variation in a subject’s cognitive make-up might change the way that the imagination ultimately “paints” or “sketches” or “completes” images of the objects before us. Moreover, the same processes and laws of image production that occur in regular human perception also occur in dogs, those who are hallucinating, and those who are in the grips of a perceptual illusion. The “dreams” that misled Swedenborg in his metaphysical exuberance, as well as the images of dog shapes that I have when I veridically view dogs, are all products of the same power of imagination shared amongst humans and some animals.\(^{105}\)

The question then arises whether the power of imagination, despite these clear cases of inter- and intra-subjective variation, can nevertheless contribute to objective cognition. This shall be a central question in the following two chapters. For we have yet to explore Kant’s curious claim, central to the first *Critique*, that “the image is a product of the empirical faculty of productive power of imagination” (A141/B181). I now turn to this.

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\(^{105}\) As Lohmar (1993, p. 111) evocatively puts it, “What ‘speaks’ in dreams through ourselves and to ourselves? It was not the spirits or ‘revelations from an invisible world’ (AA 7:176) that spoke to Swedenborg. It can only be something that speaks to everybody.” The power of imagination is this shared faculty.
Kant’s Metaphysics of the Productive Power of Imagination
The sequences of beasts are only a shadow of reasoning, that is, they are nothing but connection in the imagination, a passage from one image to another; for when a new situation appears similar to its predecessor, it is expected to have the same concomitant features as before, as though things were linked in reality just because their images are linked in the memory. It is true, moreover, that reason counsels us to expect ordinarily that what we find in the future will conform to long experience of the past; but even so this is no necessary and infallible truth, and it can fail us when we least expect it to, if there is a change in the reasons which have been maintaining it.

G.W. Leibniz, *Nouveaux Essais*, Preface

### 4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter situated images in Kant’s psychological theory by showing how images depend on activities of apprehension and reproduction. To imagine objects, we must apprehend and reproduce our representations. For Kant, apprehension and reproduction, subject to the laws of association and in interaction with the faculties of desire and pleasure and pain, explain the perceptual lives of animals that are non-rational, pre-rational, or else not behaving entirely according to the dictates of reason.

While such cases of perception are not necessarily epistemically bad, Kant denies that they are cases in which subjects can attain cognition (*Erkenntnis*) of objects. Such cognition is more demanding than mere representation—indeed, it is even more demanding than the acquaintance with (*Kenntnis*) objects that non-rational animals possess. The task of this chapter is to explain how images come to have a structure that makes them amenable to states of perceptual cognition. The next chapter provides an account of that structure.
Section 2 shows that the law of association fails to account for what Kant calls the “affinity” of the manifold. For Kant, whereas the ground of association is an individual subject’s past actual experiences, desires, pleasures/pains, and inclinations, the ground of affinity is a particular capacity of the human mind: the capacity for apperception. I discuss this idea by developing a distinction between associations of sensibility and associations of understanding.

Section 3 canvasses what I call anti-penetration views for how cognitively significant images arise. According to the anti-penetration view, the activities of the imagination that contribute images to cognition are not influenced by other faculties of the mind. As some commentators have suggested, the imagination has a “self-standing” role in cognition in the sense that it contributes representations to cognition independently of other faculties—in particular, independently of the understanding or apperception. Against these views, I argue that neither apprehension nor association that occurs merely according to the law of association—the only source of rules grounded entirely in the imagination—can generate images that are involved in cognition.

In section 4, having cast doubt on these anti-penetration views, I draw on the resources of section 2 to defend what I call the penetration view. On this view, images can contribute to cognition only if those images were formed from activities of the imagination influenced by faculties unique to rational beings. However, in contrast to other proposals, my view does not require that we reify the understanding in interpreting Kant’s claim that the understanding affects sensibility, and the view I defend is actually incompatible with views that identify the imagination with the understanding. Instead, I think that because apperception influences or is added to the imagination, the imagination can engage in cognitively significant image production. In explaining this claim, I indicate how the acquaintance (Kenntnis) that non-human animals enjoy contrasts with cognition (Erkenntnis). The imagination remains a faculty of the mind that most fundamentally generates images and, thus, has a nature that does not depend on apperception or the understanding. Nevertheless, the imagination can be influenced or penetrated by our capacity to apperceive, and it is in those cases that it contributes to cognition.

Finally, in section 5, I show that schemata—representations of procedures of the imagination
that generate images—depend on apperception for their generation. I do not intend to provide an exhaustive account of schemata or Kant’s schematism here. However, I sketch why schemata would depend on consciousness, and how this form of consciousness would differ from the consciousness of an image. This sketch indicates the role that schemata play in cognition for Kant, it vindicates the claim that images are distinct from schemata, and it rounds out my account of the imagination’s role in cognition.

4.2 Affinity and Productive Imagination

The previous chapter explained the nature of images in terms of the activities of apprehension and reproduction. Yet as is well known, Kant has an extensive taxonomy of activities and subfaculties of imagination that he deploys in the first Critique. Kant invokes a particular “productive power of imagination”—a faculty which, unlike its “reproductive” counterpart, belongs in “transcendental philosophy” and not merely in “psychology” (B152). The productive power of imagination belongs to transcendental philosophy because it is essential for the “explanation of the possibility of cognition a priori” (B152). In addition to these faculties, Kant separates out a special activity called the “transcendental synthesis of the imagination,” and the relationship between this synthesis and the other activities of the imagination is subject to constant interpretive dispute.

In the next two subsections, I shall argue that this “transcendental synthesis” is merely a particular way in which the activities of apprehension and reproduction unfold.¹ My proposal is that these same activities amount to a “transcendental synthesis” when they are subject to rules not explained by the law of association discussed in the previous chapter. Similarly, the difference between the productive and reproductive imagination amounts to a difference between the laws to which the power of imagination is subject. And since the same image-producing activities are at

¹Sellers (1978, p. 13) similarly distinguishes the the reproductive imagination from the productive imagination by the “principle” of association that governs the reproductive imagination. Yet the Sellarisan reading by Haag (2007, pp. 259ff.) distinguishes the productive imagination as the faculty of capable of generating intuitions for the first time; the reproductive imagination, in contrast, merely recalls previously generated intuitions. Below, I provide an alternative account on which the productive imagination generates images for the first time, but not intuitions.
work in both cases, the productive imagination—just as much as the reproductive imagination—generates images, even though these images differ in whether or not they can eventually figure in human cognition.\textsuperscript{2} Explaining these claims, coordinating them with Kant’s texts, and extracting their philosophical significance is the work of the rest of the chapter.

4.2.1 Association versus Affinity

One of themes of the Transcendental Analytic is that mental activities governed by the laws of association alone do not yield empirical cognition or “experience.” The introduction to the \textit{Critique} itself points to two key cases of necessary and universal connections between representations that are not explained by the laws of association: those presupposed by the “propositions of mathematics” and the relation between cause and effect (B5). Similarly, Kant criticizes the idea that the imagination alone could generate experience. Hume, whom Kant understood to be a proponent of such a view, held that the principles of experience were “merely imagined”—principles that arise from “nothing but custom” and “merely empirical laws, i.e., intrinsically contingent rules, to which we ascribe a supposed necessity and universality” (A765/B793). Yet any sense of universality or necessity from association is illusory and can only be “falsely held to be objective” (A95/B127).

These illusions of necessity and universality arise from association that ranges over an individual subject’s past experiences. According to Kant, Hume sought (and failed) to explain lawful connections “from experience” or from “actual experience.” \textit{Actual} experience is explanatorily primary in Hume’s project. Kant thought that Hume was looking in the wrong place when he looked for the ground of lawful connections (like the relation between cause and effect) in actual experience and found that experience provides us no such ground. Such a misstep was a significant error from the “otherwise extremely acute man.”

\textsuperscript{2}Brook (1997, p. 127) is also sympathetic to understanding the core sense of productive imagination as image producing: “If ‘imagination’ is understood in its root sense of image making and we see imagination not as opposed to but as part of perception, Kant’s choice of” the term ‘productive imagination’ is less peculiar. However, Brook seems to think that this image-production activity sets the productive imagination apart from the reproductive imagination. The previous chapter argued that the reproductive imagination—understood as a faculty of imagination only subject to laws of association—is equally capable of forming images. This chapter suggests instead that the productive imagination generates images with a \textit{special format} from those that the reproductive imagination generates.
Kant simply agrees with Hume that no actual experience could serve as the basis for a necessary connection: “no experience at all could yield” the “trait of necessity” (A112). But Kant thinks that we have other explanatory resources for explaining the necessary connections that obtain in mathematics and between causes and effects in the natural sciences. Hume mistakenly made a “principle of affinity” that depends on the understanding and that “asserts necessary connection” into a “rule of association” that depends merely on the “imitative power of imagination [nachbilden-den Einbildungskraft]” (A765-6/B794-5). In contrast to the laws of association, Kant appeals to a separate “principle of affinity.”

“Affinity of the manifold” or the “affinity of the appearances” is the “ground of the possibility of the association of the manifold” (A113). How does such affinity arise? Kant answers that the “numerical identity” of “self-consciousness”—that is, “original apperception”—explains this affinity, because “all appearances belong, as representations, to the whole possible self-consciousness” (A113). It is because of this condition that the manifold of appearances itself stands in “thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws,” which Kant calls “transcendental affinity” (A113). In short, Kant shifts the explanatory burden for necessary connections in the manifold—its “affinity”—away from actual (past) experiences, and places the explanatory burden instead on possible experience, by way of appeal to possible self-consciousness.

Let’s consider the nature of this affinity in greater detail. The Anthropology discusses affinity as a characteristic of the “fictive faculty [Dichtungsvermögen]” of the power of imagination. Kant frequently equates the “fictive faculty” of imagination with the “productive power” of imagination. Thus, similar to the first Critique, Kant aligns the productive power of imagination with the affinity of a manifold. In general, affinity (Verwandtschaft, affinitas) is the “the unification of the manifold in virtue of its origin [Abstammung] from one ground.” Kant distinguishes association (Association, Beigesellung) from affinity with an example of two people having a conversation:

3 Anth, 7:176
4 Cf. chapter 1 for such texts.
5 Anth, 7:176
What interrupts and destroys social conversation is the jumping off from one subject to another entirely different one, for which the ground of the empirical association of representations is merely subjective (that is, with one person the representations are associated differently than they are with another)—this association, I say, is misleading, a kind of nonsense in terms of form.6

Mere associative connections are always derived from actual, individual experiences of particular subjects and are thus “merely subjective”: the “ground” of the connection of representations is “empirical association.” So if I mention something about pizza in a conversation about the architectural history of the Piazza San Marco in Venice due to an association between the sound of ‘pizza’ and ‘piazza’, then my nonsense contribution is derived from a merely subjective ground. The fact that I have heard a word similar to ‘piazza’ in the past is a fact about my contingent experiences. This subjective ground is numerically distinct from the ground of sensical contributions, a ground that presumably has something to do with the object under discussion—the Piazza San Marco. When things go well, my interlocutor and I take part in the same consciousness that represents the Piazza San Marco. When things go wrong, we have numerically distinct grounds for uniting the manifold of different parts of the conversation. Since the parts of manifolds that exhibit affinity have one ground, the conversation would lack affinity. At least one of the participants possesses an “irregular, roaming power of imagination” such that the “succession of ideas” of the conversation “are not tied to anything objective.”7 As a result, at least one of the interlocutors fails to ground their conversational contribution in original apperception. As Kant then concludes in the B-Deduction, through the mere “association of representations,” “[o]ne person combines the representation of a certain word with one thing, another with something else,” and whatever “unity of consciousness”

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6Anth, 7:177. The example Kant provides is of the same kind that Hobbes provides. Hobbes distinguishes two different “trains of imaginings”: (a) ones that are “unguided” or “without design” and (b) ones that are “regulated” by some desire and design (Leviathan, Part I, Chapter III). However, even in allegedly “unguided” trains of imaginings, there can nevertheless be “the dependence of one thought upon another”: “For in a discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more impertinent than to ask, as one did, what was the value of a Roman penny. Yet the coherence to me was manifest enough. For the thought of the war introduced the thought of the delivering up the king to his enemies; the thought of that brought in the thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the thought of the thirty pence, which was the price of that treason; and thence easily followed that malicious question; and all this in a moment of time—for thought is quick” (Leviathan, Part I, Chapter III).

7Anth, 7:177
that arises from such associations cannot be “universally valid” between subjects (B140).  

Recall too the distinction mentioned in the last chapter between associations of sensibility and associations of the understanding. I argued in the previous chapter that the law of association as such merely involves associations of sensibility. Accompaniment (sameness in time) and contiguity (sameness in place) are the two elements of associations of sensibility. Affinity is an association of the understanding, for Kant goes on to note that a central case form of such an association occurs when parts of a representation are joined “from one ground.” So the idea that the linkage of representations is derived from a single ground is central to Kant’s notion of affinity.

The imagination can represent such relations of affinity unconsciously and involuntarily. Kant briefly touches on how the imagination relates to the understanding and consciousness in the case of affinity. For affinity to arise, “there must be a theme on which the manifold is strung” in order for the understanding to relate to any imaginative connections. Though the manifold must exhibit affinity or a “theme” in order for the understanding to relate to imaginative connections, Kant denies that affinity requires awareness of the rule that organizes the theme. Kant makes this claim in an interesting passage discussing how the imagination functions both in private “silent thinking” and in public “sharing of thoughts.” He writes that though the understanding is “efficacious [wirksam]” in such cases, 

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8 It is important to keep in mind a disanalogy between Kant’s conversation case and the case of an intuitive manifold. In the conversation case, we are to imagine a manifold of “contributions” that are successively and spontaneously provided according to whatever the conversational rules are. In contrast, in the case of an intuitive manifold as described in chapter 2, the intuitive manifold is given all at once by the senses. Correspondingly, there are two different “roles” the imagination has in either case. In the conversation case, the imagination is trying to determine which conversational contribution to make, given that there are many possible contributions. The manifold of contributions is not yet “given.” In the intuitive manifold case, the imagination determines, given the manifold that it has already and actually been given by the senses, how to apprehend and reproduce the manifold. The imagination’s task is to apprehend the manifold in a certain way, given that there are innumerably many different ways of apprehending and reproducing what has been given. Yet only some of those ways exhibit an affinity between the parts of the manifold.

9 AF, 25:513-4: “the third basis of association is relation, insofar as the representations are related according to their constitution,” and this association of relation is an “association of the understanding.” The lecture then continues by noting representations can be related in virtue of two aspects of their “constitution”: their “similarity” or their “derivation.” The relation of derivation “exists insofar as the representations come from one ground.” One example of such a relation is the relation of cause and effect. As an illustration, “if it rains and the sun shines, one immediately looks around” to see “if there is not a rainbow.” The relation of similarity exists if we “assign everything to certain classes, so that if we think of one thing, the other comes to mind.”

10 Anth, 7:177.
the play of the power of imagination here still follows the rules of sensibility, which provide the material whose association is achieved without consciousness of the rule, and this association is in conformity with the understanding [dem Verstande gemäß] although not derived from it [aus dem Verstande abgeleitet].

First, Kant denies that affinity requires that the subject is conscious of the rule that specifies the affinity or “theme” in question. So the subject can make a felicitous contribution to a conversation without being able to cite the rules according to which the conversation proceeds. Still, there must be some possible consciousness of the theme in question—say, an awareness of Piazza San Marco as a topic of conversation—that grounds felicitous connections. Similarly, the imagination can be subject to the “rules of sensibility,” even if the subject is not conscious of those rules. Second, Kant strikingly distinguishes association “in conformity with” the understanding and association “derived from” the understanding. He thinks that a manifold can exhibit affinity conforming to the understanding without that affinity being “derived from” the understanding. The understanding thus underdetermines the rules of affinity; the fact that cases of affinity conform with the understanding does not entail that such cases of affinity are derived from the understanding. Sensibility must provide its own “material” for such affinity.

What would an image that conforms to the understanding, but is not derived from it, be like? Kant does not allow that such conformity could be due to chance or accident, nor could it be due to a happy pre-established harmony. Concepts do not impose conformity on the representations of sensibility by being rules “arbitrarily implanted in us” that force us to associate representations or “combin[e] certain empirical representations” in particular ways (B168). If conformity were brought about in this way, then it is very hard to see how affinity is not simply derived from the understanding. Indeed, it would be highly mysterious if we could figure out what to say in a

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11 Anth, 7:177. It is clear that when Kant mentions an “association” that is in “conformity” with the understanding, he does not mean association in the minimal sense of a process governed only by the laws of association. For it is Kant’s constant contention that such processes are never sufficient for “conformity” to the understanding.

12 For more discussion, see chapter 5.

13 Kant makes a similar point about affinity in the Critique of Judgment regarding the power of judgment: the understanding “abstracts in its transcendental legislation for nature from all multiplicity of possible empirical laws; in that legislation, it takes into consideration only the conditions of the possibility of an experience in general as far as its form is concerned. In it, therefore, that principle of the affinity of particular laws of nature is not to be found” (KU, 20:209-210). Thus, the understanding’s legislation at least underdetermines what the rules of affinity are.
conversation about the Piazza San Marco merely by thinking. Presumably our sensory encounters with the Piazza San Marco have something to say about what makes for good conversation about the Piazza San Marco!\(^{14}\) So whatever it is about the understanding that gives rise to “associations of the understanding” in the imagination, it cannot be that the understanding is a free-standing faculty that issues commands to the imagination, thereby forcing it to combine a particular manifold into (say) the shape of a triangle instead of the shape of a square. Because the understanding doesn’t know anything about the Piazza San Marco before we sense the thumping thing and apprehend its parts.

This dissertation has already outlined several features of intuitions and images that are not derived from the understanding at all. In chapter 2, I argued that the essential features of intuitions are due to the senses independently of the imagination and intellect. The senses provide spatial and temporal structure, as well as an array of sensations ordered in space or time. And in chapter 3, I argued that certain features of the imagination’s apprehension and reproduction are independent of the senses and the intellect. The imagination apprehends basic measures, and it apprehends “salient” or lively sensations instead of irrelevant or dull ones. The imagination reproduces representations according to the rules of accompaniment and contiguity. So when our understanding encounters the world, it is only through a sensibility that deliver intuitions and images formed with the understanding-independent features above. I think that all of our images will have certain features that cannot be derived from the understanding.

But affinity is not mere association. On my view, affinity does depend on a faculty distinct from sensibility: the faculty of apperception. This faculty is a ground of the understanding, and apperceiving is one of the acts of the mind that grounds the understanding’s representations. Yet

\(^{14}\)My point here echoes a similar point by Ginsborg (2015, p. 54-5). Her puzzle is this: Kant thinks that empirical concepts are rules for imaginative synthesis. But empirical concepts are derived from experience, and experience depends on synthesis. So how could empirical concepts serve as rules for synthesis, if synthesis is itself a necessary condition for experience? It seems that empirical concepts depend on experience, which depends on imaginative synthesis, which depends on empirical concepts. The explanatory circle here would not be virtuous. My view explained in the text is that we should not think of concepts as a requisite for the imaginative connections that figure in cognition; we should thinking of original apperception as the requisite for imaginative connections that contribute to cognition. I think Ginsborg is also right to invoke Kant’s notion of “schematizing without a concept” at this juncture (\textit{KU}, 5:287), and section 5 of this chapter gives an idea of why. See Ginsborg (2015, p. 60ff.).
images exhibiting affinity are not “derived” from the understanding in two ways. First, images have the features sketched above that cannot be explained by anything but sensibility itself. Second, the rules of reproduction that exhibit affinity are indeed not derivable from the imagination or senses alone. But that does not mean that they are derived from or explained by the understanding. Instead, these features of affinity are explained by apperception. They are explained by our power to become conscious of our representations, not by the concepts or judgments that are the downstream effects of that power for consciousness.

Kant thinks that consciousness by itself is a game changer for the human mind. Consciousness “effects total difference” for the human soul, such that human minds differ from other animals not merely in “degree” but in “species.” Consciousness is “the principle of the possibility of the understanding, but not of sensibility.” The form of consciousness Kant calls “apperception” is what separates us from non-rational animals. Humans and (perhaps) animals are still capable of intuition and sensation without consciousness. I claim that the rules of reproduction that constitute affinity depend on our capacity to have “consciousness of what different beings agree in.” It is this form of consciousness that Kant thinks separates imaginative connections that are mere associations from those that exhibit affinity.

The fact that affinity depends on this consciousness of agreement explains why original apperception serves as the “one ground” of the affinity of the manifold. Original apperception, along with the imagination, is a faculty of the mind that “make[s] possible even the understanding” (A97); moreover, the unity of apperception or consciousness is a “ground . . . of the possibility of the understanding” (B131; cf. B137). Original apperception thus has certain effects on the imagination’s activities and on the understanding’s activities. The subtlety relevant to affinity is that a mani-

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15 MD, 28:689
16 MM, 29:878
17 MM, 29:878-9
18 See MVo, 28:449: “Now how can we conceive animals as beings below human beings? . . . We perceive in ourselves a specific feature of the understanding and of reason, namely consciousness, if I take this away there still remains something left yet, namely, sensation <sensus>, imagination <imaginatio>, the former is intuition with presence, the latter without presence of the object.”
19 MVo, 28:449.
fold could conform to the understanding in virtue of the fact that both affinity of the manifold (the “unity” of intuition) and the understanding’s thoughts (the “unity” in a judgment) share a common ground, namely, original apperception.

To be clear, I am not saying that all images are “conscious” representations in Kant’s sense. Kant thinks that the reproductive and predictive associations of the imagination can occur totally in the dark, without consciousness, as can the activity of imaginative synthesis (A78/B103). Instead, as I shall outline below, the capacity for consciousness or apperception causally influences the imagination. But this influence does not require that we are conscious of all of the effects of that influence, such as the images that the imagination forms (partially) due to that influence.

In conclusion, Kant thinks that the productive or “fictive” imagination is capable not only of associating a manifold, but also of introducing affinity into a manifold. While association is grounded in the various actual previous experiences of individual subjects, affinity has one ground universally shared among humans—the capacity of apperception. Kant explains the shared affinity by appealing to a common capacity of the mind that all rational beings share: original apperception.

4.2.2 Productive and reproductive imagination

We can now see that the division between two faculties of imagination—reproductive and productive—is plausibly a division between the laws to which the imagination is subject. On this reading, Kant maintains that the “reproductive power of imagination” is the faculty of imagination insofar as it is merely subject to its constitutive law of association, resulting in associations of sensibility. In turn, the “productive power of imagination” is the faculty of imagination insofar as it is also subject to laws pertaining to the “affinity” of the manifold. Let’s consider the support for this reading.

To begin, the question for Kant is not whether the imagination is subject to laws per se. The question of interest to Kant instead is to which laws the imagination is subject. So in the Anthropol-

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20 M沃, 28:449: “We can also think a reproduction, anticipation, without the least self-consciousness.”
21 Kitcher (1990, pp. 81ff.) is another proponent of differentiating reproductive and productive imagination in terms of the laws that govern them.
ogy, Kant contrasts “psychology” as a “set of all inner perceptions under natural laws” with “logic” as a “system of rules of the understanding.” So both “psychology” and “logic” deal with laws governing activities of the subject. When we view the imagination merely psychologically through inner sense, its activities occur according to specifiable natural laws, even if (unlike logic) psychology will never make claim to being a systematic science (in Kant’s technical sense of a totality that falls under a single principle).

When we turn to the Critique, we see that Kant marks the division between reproductive and productive power of imagination in terms of laws. In the A edition of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant writes that both apprehension and reproduction constitute the “transcendental faculty of the power of imagination” (A102). When Kant wishes to isolate this aspect of the power of imagination in the B-edition deduction, he does not do so by revising his view on what activities constitute the “transcendental” or “productive” faculty of imagination. Instead, he appeals to differences in the laws in question:

I ... thereby distinguish it [the productive power of imagination] from the reproductive power of imagination, whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws, namely those of association, and that therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of cognition a priori, and on that account belongs not in transcendental philosophy but in psychology. (B152, emphasis added)

The reproductive power of imagination involves “empirical laws” and thus, in that sense, is not part of the explanation of the “possibility of cognition a priori” or “transcendental philosophy.” Notice that Kant claims that the reproductive power of imagination engages in “synthesis” in some broad sense—Kant does not, in the first place, attempt to distinguish the reproductive and productive power of imagination based on a difference in activity between the two kinds of imagination.

My reading accounts for a very general asymmetry between “productive” and “reproductive” aspects of the imagination: in contrast to the reproductive imagination, the productive imagi-

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22 Anth, 7:141, emphasis added. See also the introduction of the Transcendental Analytic, in which Kant claims that transcendental logic will not form a mere “aggregate put together by mere estimates,” but instead a “science” of the exhaustive and complete inventory of pure concepts of the understanding “through their connection in a system” (A64/B89).
nation has no obvious act that it alone performs. It’s not clear what a primitive act of “production” would be. All of the faculties of the mind seem to have products as powers of the mind. For instance, the senses produce sensations, and the understanding produces concepts. We avoid positing “primitive production” on the part of the productive imagination, if we concede that Kant does not distinguish the productive imagination from the reproductive imagination by introducing special act types that the productive imagination performs. Kant does not introduce the act of “production” alongside the already introduced acts of apprehension and reproduction.

So whatever special activities the productive imagination does perform are to be understood in terms of the two more basic activities of apprehension and reproduction, albeit subject to different laws. Even the productive or “fictive” aspect of the imagination depends on reproduction: “the reproductive power of imagination is so combined with the facultas fingendi that it is a means to its promotion [Beförderung].” Since Kant generally equates the productive aspect of the imagination with the facultas fingendi, I take Kant to be saying that the reproductive activities of the imagination are a “means” for the exercise of the productive aspect of the imagination. We would not expect Kant to make this assertion if he meant to distinguish productive and reproductive imagination based on special acts that either faculty performs.

Moreover, Kant maintains that both productive and reproductive imagination generate images. As we have seen in chapter 3, Kant frequently invokes images when he mentions reproduction, and in the Critique, Kant describes “reproduction in the image [Einbildung]” at length (A100). In other contexts, Kant emphasizes that the productive power of imagination also generates images:

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23 MD, 28:674

24 What’s more, Kant claims that our capacity to “anticipate” representations that are not yet present itself “rests on the reproductive” capacity of imagination (ML1, 29:884). He even claims that the laws that govern anticipation are the same as those that govern reproduction (ML1, 29:884): “It is thus merely an application to future time of the law of the reproductive power of imagination.” Of course, the productive aspect of the imagination is not merely anticipatory, but this point does suggest that reproduction is a general condition on various activities of the imagination.

25 As Haag (2007, p. 260) writes: “Productive synthesis of the power of imagination would accordingly be better interpreted as apprehending and reproducing synthesis of the productive power of imagination.” I think that it is quite right to construe “productivity” of the imagination in terms of (inter alia) apprehension and reproduction. What makes it productive, I believe, pertains to the relation that the imagination has to apperception. However, I disagree with the claim that “[i]n contrast to the reproductive power of imagination, [the productive power of imagination] delivers us intuitions and does not merely connect present intuitions” (Haag, 2007, p. 260). As I argue here, the imagination does not produce intuitions, but acts on intuitions to produce images.
The image is a product of the empirical faculty of productive power of imagination. (A141/B181)

These [images, Einbildungen, -RBT] are reproduced intuitions of sense of outer objects only according to form, images which can indeed be fictions, but not in the sense that they do not have outer objects at all [nur der Form nach reproduzierte Sinnenanschauungen äußerer Gegenstände, die {Einbildungen} zwar Dichtungen seyn können, aber nicht in Ansehung dessen, daß sie gar nicht äußere Gegenstände haben].

Experience is cognition of the objects that are present to the senses. Image [Einbildung] is intuition even without the presence of the object, and the object then is called a phantasma, which can be a production [Production] (fiction [Dichtung]) or a reproduction [Reproduction] (recollection [Erinnerung]) of a previously had intuition.

In the latter two passages passages, Kant contrasts an “image [Einbildung]” with an “intuition of sense.” Some images are “reproduced intuitions of sense” or a “reproduction of a previously had intuition,” while other images are “productions” or “fictions.”

This latter class of representations still has an “outer object”; Kant labels the object of an image a “phantasm.” Kant thus claims that both productive and reproductive aspects of the imagination have a common representational output: an image. A fortiori, Kant did not mean to distinguish the reproductive and productive aspects of the power of imagination primarily in terms of their representational outputs.

In addition, the distinction between productive and reproductive imagination is not equivalent to the distinction between pure (or a priori) and empirical use of the imagination. These two distinctions cross-cut one another. The productive activities of the imagination play an important role in experience and empirical representation. Moreover, as we will see below, even pure activities of the imagination require activities of reproduction.

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26 AA 18:619
27 AA 18:618
28 Kant writes: “Das Gesetz des Dichtungsvermögens ist, daß wir nicht die Materie, sondern die Form erdichten” (MD, 28:674). This “law” indicates a dependence claim that also implicates the reproductive imagination: any image of a Dichtung will at minimum depend on the reproductive imagination for the matter of the image, even if the form changes.
29 Admittedly, some of Kant’s texts invite the equation of “a priori” imagination with “productive” imagination. Kant writes that “only the productive synthesis of the power of imagination can take place a priori; for the reproductive synthesis of the power of imagination rests on the conditions of experience” (A118); “the power of imagination is therefore also a faculty of a synthesis a priori, on account of which we give it the name of productive power of imagination” (A123). The mere fact that the productive synthesis “can” take place a priori is not a problem for my
As we saw in the introduction, some maintain that the power of imagination is primarily an *intuition* producer. I argued against this view in chapter 2. But we can turn now to a more specific variant of this view, given our new account of the difference between productive and reproductive imagination. According to this variant of the imagination-dependent view, the *productive* power of imagination is the original generator of both empirical and pure intuition. Yet if I am right, the productive power of imagination is *not* differentiated from the reproductive power of imagination in this way. The productive power of imagination is “spontaneous,” *not* in that it generates empirical or pure intuitions for the first time. Instead, the productive imagination is spontaneous because it represents the objects given in intuition according to rules that (in some sense) depend on original apperception.

Images are representations of (the contents of) other representations. Kant claims that “the empirical use of the power of imagination rests on the synthesis of apprehension of the empirical intuition, which can also be reproduced, or by whose analogy another can be made. In the latter case it is the productive power of imagination.” Passages like these do indeed suggest that productive imagination generates “new” intuitive representations. But Kant does not commit to the claim that the productive imagination generates intuitions from some non-intuition; that is, he does not assert that the productive imagination generates intuitions from, say, mere sensations or impressions. Instead, he claims that it generates representations by “analogy” to those intuitions that the mind has already received. These new intuitive representations—images—depend on copying and associating intuitions of the senses in particular ways.

To conclude this section, we saw that Kant motivates his distinction between productive and

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**E.g.,** Haag (2007, p. 259ff.). More recently, Horstmann (2018, pp. 26-8) claims that imagination “in its productive function” does not “consist solely in synthesizing items into wholes,” but also in “providing the representational material that, by creating individual and discernible units (perceptions), makes synthesis possible in the first place.”

**AA 23:18**
reproductive imagination as a distinction between two different types of laws to which the imagination is subject. In contrast, differentiating the imagination in terms of different representational products or different representational acts—or else between pure or empirical applications of the imagination—fails to capture Kant’s central reasons for invoking the productive of imagination.

4.3 The Anti-Penetration View of the Imagination

We turn in this section to the precise role of the productive power of imagination and its relation to apperception. I argued in the previous chapter that the imagination generates at least some images independently of apperception. Sections 3 and 4 center on the question of whether the imagination generates all images prior to and independently of apperception.

In this section, I consider two proposals according to which the productive imagination’s cognitively significant activity is radically independent of apperception and the understanding. To borrow from the contemporary philosophy of mind literature, these views claim that neither apperception nor the understanding penetrate the imagination’s activities—apperception and the understanding do not penetrate imagining. I will thus call these views collectively anti-penetration views. The first anti-penetration proposal suggests that imaginative apprehension independent of apperception and the understanding is the imagination’s contribution to cognition (section 3.1). The second anti-penetration proposal suggests that imaginative association independent of apperception and the understanding is the imagination’s contribution to cognition (section 3.2). I point to shortcomings in both views in this section before turning in the next section to my positive proposal. My proposal will be that apperception does penetrate imagining in cases of cognition.

Before diving into both proposals, let us get a little clearer on what anti-penetration views are claiming. Both penetration and anti-penetration views agree that activities of the imagination alone do not suffice for cognition. But this starting point leaves open two different options. The first option is that something beyond the imagination is simply added as an independent part or ingredient in cognition. The second option is that the imagination’s activities themselves must change, if
they are to contribute to cognition. This change in the activities of the imagination is due to penetration of the imagination by some other faculty of the mind like apperception or the understanding. The first model is the anti-penetration view: imagination’s apperception-independent activities are cognitively fine as they are, even though they are insufficient and in need of supplement for cognition. The second model is a penetration view: the imagination’s apperception-independent activities are cognitively defective, and no mere supplement will render them poised to contribute to cognition. So on the second model, if the images are to contribute to cognition, then something about the imagination’s activities needs to change. That is, as we shall see, something external to the imagination itself must influence the image-producing activities of the imagination. We are thus to imagine the “change” or “penetration” in question as some differential effect that some faculty distinct from the imagination has on the imagination’s activities.32

My view is that for Kant, the imaginative activities that go into image formation actually need to change if images are to contribute to cognition. Yet the following two versions of the anti-penetration view exemplify how one might challenge this penetration view.

4.3.1 Anti-Penetration View 1: Apprehension

Let us consider first the version of the anti-penetration view that focuses on apprehension. Horstmann (2018) is a recent representative of this view. He argues that apprehension of representations by the imagination occurs “independent of any direct interference from the rules of the understanding,” and thus independently of influence by the understanding.33 On his view, there are two stages of the imagination’s activity that contribute to cognition. In the first “self-standing” stage, the imagination both turns impressions into sensations and turns sensations in intuitions. In the second stage, the imagination has an additional “synthetic” function “under the influence of the understanding.”34 Importantly, it is the first stage that involves apprehension by the imagination: “it is specifically with respect to its apprehending function that the power of imagination can be

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32See section 4 for a discussion.
expected to lead a life of its own.”

An initial point is that Horstmann has a rather idiosyncratic view of apprehension in the first stage above. He assumes that in order for an impression to be a modification of my mind as opposed to a merely bodily modification, I must become conscious of that impression. That is, “in order to make them [impressions] modifications of the mind, I have to transform at least some of them into individual episodes of which I am conscious, i.e. into perceptions.” Apprehension is the only activity that can accomplish this “transformation” (as Horstmann calls it). But as Horstmann himself admits, this model is speculative. Even in the passage in the A-deduction where Kant most explicitly claims that apprehension acts on impressions (A120), Kant is equally comfortable implying that apprehension acts on appearances as the contents of intuitions—a point we saw in chapter 2. If “impression” is simply a synonym for “sensation”—as I believe it is in most contexts—then it is clear why Kant would say that apprehension acts on sensations when it apprehends appearances: for appearances are the objects of empirical (that is, sensation-involving) intuition. This point sits well with the claim that apprehension is directed at intuitions (A99; B161). Yet Horstmann is essentially positing a second form of apprehension that is directed specifically at impressions and not sensations, and this form of apprehension is a fortiori not directed at empirical intuition or appearances. But this model is not clearly supported by Kant’s texts.

This initial point aside, Horstmann’s view faces immediate problems in the very passages that he invokes to support it. Kant writes that “all appearances whatever must come into the mind or be apprehended in such a way that they are in agreement with the unity of apperception” (A122, my emphasis). On Horstmann’s view, the agreement between apprehension and the unity of apperception seems to arise no matter how the imagination apprehends appearances. For the imagination’s apprehension is supposed to be radically independent of the understanding and apperception. But such a view renders anomalous Kant’s claim in this passage that there is a particular way in which

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37 This fact has not deterred Haag (2007) and Waxman (2013) from placing considerable weight on the idea that the imagination generates sensations from unconscious impressions, as noted in chapter 2; one can locate a similar view in Sellars (1968).
apprehension must unfold if appearances are to agree with the unity of apperception. If the unity of apperception is a necessary condition on cognition, then there are particular forms of apprehension that must take place for cognition to arise. Yet Horstmann’s view has trouble explaining why the imagination alone can gravitate towards one form of apprehension (the ones friendly to cognition) as opposed to another form of apprehension (those that cannot contribute to cognition).

More generally, Horstmann is committed to distinguishing apprehension from the synthesis of apprehension. Now chapter 3 argued that apprehension in the strict sense is at least notionally distinct from apprehension in the broad sense (which also involves reproduction), and one might compare my distinction with Horstmann’s distinction between apprehension and the synthesis of apprehension. To this extent I follow Horstmann in making such a distinction. However, we understand this distinction quite differently. On my view, apprehension in the strict sense is a part of the synthesis of apprehension; the synthesis of apprehension is a synthesis—a putting together of representations—that occurs by means of apprehension. This is not Horstmann’s view. Horstmann instead thinks that synthesis happens in the second stage, and this stage presupposes that apperception-independent apprehension has already taken place. In a way, Horstmann thinks that synthesis is “super-added” to apprehension that precedes it. Thus, there can be changes in the synthesis of apprehension even when we hold fixed apprehension.

I do not think that we should divorce apprehension from synthesis in such a sharp way. If apprehension is a form of sensory attention, then it is easy to see how the imagination’s apprehension would need to unfold differently if it is to agree with the unity of apperception: it would simply

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38 Horstmann seems to be following Waxman on this point. Waxman (2013, p. 361) links association and apprehension like this: “There is, accordingly, nothing in inner intuition remotely adequate to the ordered linear succession presupposed for the kind of experience that permits patterns of temporal occurrence (constant conjunctions) to be observed. And it is precisely this non-associability of appearances as apprehended in intuition, I believe, that Kant had in mind when he asserted that cognitive experience, pace Hume, can never result from association alone but always requires, in addition, the affinity of appearances.” Waxman claims that appearances “as apprehended in intuition” are not “associable.” Let’s put aside my contention that apprehension presupposes intuition and does not generate intuition. The key point that Waxman goes on to claim is that this activity of apprehension therefore requires a “higher level of synthesis” in order to bring about experience; this higher level of synthesis brings about the affinity of the manifold. I think such a claim is ambiguous. On the one hand, Waxman might be claiming that apprehension occurs in a first-order activity, and that the “higher level of synthesis” is simply added to this first-order activity. This is a non-penetration reading. On the other hand, Waxman might be claiming that apprehension is itself organized by a “higher level of synthesis.” This is the penetration reading.
need to be the case that which representations the imagination selects are sensitive to apperception. But Horstmann cannot claim that apprehension can change in this way in virtue of apperception. The problem for Horstmann is that he cannot make sense of the idea that apprehension must unfold in a certain way—that my pattern of sensory attention must unfold in a certain way. Thus, he has trouble explaining Kant’s claim that it is because apprehension unfolds in a certain way that the synthesis of apprehension agrees with the unity of apperception.

4.3.2 Anti-Penetration View 2: Association

When we turn to the second rendition of the anti-penetration view, we see further reasons for contesting Horstmann’s model. On this rendition that focuses on association, the imagination associates representations, and this association is required for cognition. However, this association is not penetrated by apperception or the understanding. Consider a version of this view that is countenanced by Allais (2009), on which Kant

thinks that for cognition of an objective world—grasping the world as objective and (empirically) mind-independent—to be possible, intuition must be synthesized in ways that are governed by concepts. However, this does not rule out the possibility of association that is not based on concepts (understood as constituents of judgments), or that this association could enable us (and other creatures) to perceive spatial particulars or outer appearances. In fact, I have suggested that such a view is needed to make sense of the role of intuition in Kant’s account.39

On the view Allais articulates here, association is a condition on cognition because association is required for the perception of outer appearances, and perception of outer appearances is required for cognition of outer appearances. And Allais seems to imply that association of the kind that plays a role in human cognition is precisely the same association that plays a role in non-human animal perception that falls short of cognition. If taken in this way, such a view is an anti-penetration view: the association activities of the imagination are not influenced by the presence of apperception, understanding, or (in Allais’ scenario in particular) concepts.

39Allais (2009, p. 407)
Now I do not doubt that animals can associate their representations, and I also allow that they could have representations that relate to objects (i.e., intuitions). But the distinction between image and intuition reveals that there are really three different questions to be asked at this juncture. One question is whether intuitions depend on association. A second question is whether images depend on association. A third question is whether the association that occurs in non-human animal perception is the same association that contributes to human cognition (assuming correctly that empirical cognition depends on association of some kind). I argued that intuitions don’t depend on association in chapter 2. They are the products of synopsis as causally situated sensory profiles. Though synopsis orders sensations, synopsis is not a form of association, and association depends on synopsis. So the answer to first question is no. To the second question, I have argued that images do depend on reproduction, and thus are the products of our capacity to associate representations. However, to the third question, I shall now argue that in order for those images to contribute to cognition, this association must be penetrated by apperception.

Let’s begin by considering Kant’s remarks on association in the Critique. Association is the reproduction of representations according to some rule. Without “association,” our sensible representations would not be subject to a rule at all. Kant explains how this transition from unruly to ruly representation is possible:

[I]f representations reproduced one another without distinction, just as they fell together, there would in turn be no determinate connection but merely unruly heaps of them, and no cognition at all would arise, their reproduction must thus have a rule in accordance with which a representation enters into combination in the imagination with one representation rather than with any others. This subjective and empirical ground of reproduction in accordance with rules is called the association of representations. (A121)

This point is thus far familiar: the “reproduction” of the imagination must be subject to a “rule” in order for any “determinate connection” to arise between representations. This rule is the “subjective and empirical ground of reproduction” that Kant labels “association.” Such a rule ensures that representations are combined “with one representation rather than with any others.” As we have
seen, such rules might have the form “piazza <> pizza” and thus constitute mere associations of sensibility. And such connections, though ruly, are grounded merely in an individual subject’s own past actual experiences. To sum up: associations of sensibility of this sort are indeed grounded on rules and a law, albeit one that is grounded entirely in the imagination.

Now Kant commits to the stronger claim that the very reproduction of representations by the imagination in association needs to have a further ground, if it is ever to contribute to cognition. If reproduction has a ground external to the imagination, then the images that are products of reproduction have features that have some ground external to the imagination. This view is suggested by Kant’s continuation of the above passage:

But now if this unity of association did not also have an objective ground, so that it would be impossible for appearances to be apprehended by the imagination otherwise than under the condition of a possible synthetic unity of this apprehension, then it would also be entirely contingent whether appearances fit into a connection of human cognitions. (A121-122, emphasis added)

The conditioning and dependence language here is critical: the very apprehension of the imagination has as a “condition” a “possible synthetic unity.” This synthetic unity arises from some “objective ground,” not the subjective ground of association. Unsurprisingly, Kant labels this ground the “affinity” of the manifold (A122-3).

In turn, this affinity is grounded in apperception:

I call this objective ground of all association of appearances their affinity. But we can never encounter this anywhere except in the principle of the unity of apperception with regard to all cognitions that are to belong to me. In accordance with this principle all appearances whatever must come into the mind or be apprehended in such a way that they are in agreement with the unity of apperception[.] (A122, my emphasis)

Affinity among appearances thus has a ground that can only be found in the “principle of the unity of apperception,” and this principle is not what Kant refers to as the law of association according to contiguity and accompaniment. Since the “affinity of all appearances (near or remote) is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in the power of imagination that is grounded a priori on
rules” (A123), the synthesis of the imagination in question must depend on the “principle of the unity of apperception.” That is, the very way that “a representation enters into combination in the imagination with one representation rather than with any others”—the very way that representations are associated—depends on our capacity of apperception. The rules associated with the unity of apperception influence the “way” that apprehension occurs.

In short, anti-penetration views have prima facie challenges. Kant’s view instead seems to be that the imagination’s apprehension and reproduction are influenced by other “higher” faculties of cognition. The next section sketches a positive proposal in this direction.

4.4 The Penetration of the Imagination in Cognition

The previous subsections argued that imagination is penetrated in cases of cognition by arguing against two anti-penetration proposals. In this section, I provide a model for how such penetration occurs. I argue that it is only due to the understanding’s effect on the imagination that images that are an ingredient in cognition can ever arise. Images formed via associations of sensibility cannot figure into cognition; images formed via associations of the understanding can figure into cognition.

Up to now, I have done little to differentiate the role of the understanding from the role of apperception in this discussion. I do not intend to provide an account of this distinction, though as I noted in chapter 2, I think it is important to flag that these roles are not equivalent. For we saw Kant claim that the senses, the imagination, and apperception jointly ground the understanding, and that the pure understanding is the “unity of apperception . . . in relation to the transcendental synthesis of the power of imagination” (A119). I want to allow that in some sense, discursive understandings depend on a feature of the imagination in the way that Kant suggests in these passages. So to

\footnote{For instance, a full account would have to explain what this grounding claim involves. Is Kant’s view that the understanding in all receptive beings requires the consciousness implicated in apperception? Do all understandings in receptive beings depend on senses and on imagination? These are interesting questions that we need to bracket. The following argument relies only on the weaker claim that all human understandings necessarily involve sense, imagination, and apperception.}
allow for this, I will focus on what already lies at the surface of these texts, namely, that it is
the imagination’s relation to apperception that, in the first case, is responsible for modifying the
imagination’s activity.

Further texts suggest that this model of penetration is promising. For one, Kant claims
that the “transcendental” or cognitively significant activities of the imagination are a “figurative”
synthesis that “pertains merely to the original synthetic unity of apperception”; he calls the resulting
capacity the “productive imagination” since it is a manifestation of “spontaneity” (B151-2). This
passage suggests that the productive imagination, as a capacity of imagination governed by laws
beyond that of the law of association, has an essential relation to apperception. Yet again, Kant
claims that “apperception must be added to the pure power of imagination in order to make its
function intellectual,” though even after such addition the “synthesis of the power of imagination”
is “nevertheless always sensible” (A124). The understanding relates to imagination precisely in the
sense that apperception is “added” to another capacity—the power of imagination. Moreover, there
is a function of the imagination that depends on this addition of apperception. Kant’s texts clearly
establish that there is some essential relation that obtains between apperception and the imagination
in cognition.

Now this result is not yet strong enough to establish the penetration view. For penetration
requires more than a mere relation or addition: it requires a real relation between apperception
and imagination that makes a difference in the imagination’s activities. I mean to contrast a “real”
relation with a merely “logical” relation. Kant frequently claims that activities of the imagination
are “in accordance with” the unity of apperception and with the categories. For instance, as we saw
above, affinity relations are “in accordance” with the understanding, albeit not “derived from” it.
Such claims express logical relations. The “accordance” or “agreement” relation does not connote
a causal relation between one representation and another, nor does it immediately suggest a genetic
priority relation. If \( x \) agrees with \( y \), it does not follow that \( y \) is prior in its genesis to \( x \) (consider the
case of the beliefs of two people who come to agree with one another by, say, perceiving the same
object).
But I think Kant endorses the penetration view, because Kant also claims that the understanding stands in a real relation of some kind to the synthesis of the imagination. In the dense §24 of the B-edition Transcendental Deduction, Kant argues that a certain “unity of the action” of the understanding is “capable of itself determining sensibility internally with regard to the manifold that may be given to it in accordance with the form of its intuition” (B153). He then claims that the “transcendental synthesis of the imagination” is the means through which such determination occurs “on the passive subject” that possesses such a faculty of imagination. The “transcendental action of the power of imagination” is itself the “synthetic influence [Einfluß] of the understanding on inner sense” that is called “figurative synthesis” (B154). Kant’s claim here echoes his earlier claim that the “transcendental synthesis of the power of imagination” is “an effect [Wirkung] of the understanding on sensibility” (B152). Moreover, as Kant states later in the Critique, the understanding “imparts [erteilt] to the synthesis of the imagination in relation to apperception” a synthetic unity (A237/B296). So some activity of the imagination, its “transcendental synthesis,” is “imparted” by the understanding as an “effect” or “influence.”

In chapter 2, I argued that we should understand the senses as passive powers of the mind. The above passages show that the imagination is also passive in certain respects. The power of imagination is influenced or affected by the understanding; consequently, certain modifications (i.e., representations) of the imagination obtain in virtue of the understanding. These modifications include images and (as we shall see in a moment) schemata. Prima facie, in these passages, Kant is claiming that there is some real relation between the understanding and the imagination; in particular, the very activity of the imagination changes in virtue of the understanding. The understanding “affects” inner sense only mediately via the imagination, which is the faculty that immediately determines the senses.\(^{41}\) As a result, the power of imagination is a “faculty for determining sensibility a priori” (B152). We should understand “determine” here in a causal sense: the imagination is

\(^{41}\)I am drawing in large part on the distinction between mediate/immediate determination or affection put forth by Indregard (2017a, pp. 634-636). On his view, there is an “inability of the understanding with respect to intuition,” namely, “the inability to generate intuitions immediately” (p. 636). As chapter 2 shows, I disagree with Indregard’s claim about intuition here; I instead think that images are generated via this affection.
immediately causally responsible for modifications (i.e., representations) that arise in inner sense a priori.\footnote{Note that this formulation does not require that all modifications of inner sense are caused by the imagination, but only those that are “a priori.”}

Against the anti-penetration views, this causal determination is partially caused by the affection of the understanding on the imagination. The imagination takes up and reproduces representations in a certain way to form a cognitively significant image partially in virtue of this influence of the understanding on the imagination. Unlike anti-penetration views, the penetration view has an explanation for why there is logical agreement between the unity of apperception and the imagination. The logical agreement is due to a real relation of affection between the understanding and the imagination.

I want to stress that apperception plays the central role in my rendition of the penetration view. When Kant analyzes how the understanding has this “influence” on the power of imagination, he always invokes apperception. Though Kant claims that the power of imagination is a faculty for “determining” sensibility, he adds the qualification that the imagination is such a faculty “\textit{to the extent that \[so fern\]}” its synthesis occurs “in accordance with the unity of apperception” (B152). With this passage in mind, we could read the idea that the understanding affects the imagination in two ways. On the first way, the fully developed understanding—an imagination-independent capacity of the mind complete with its repertoire of categories—affects imagination. For instance, one might claim that \textit{concepts} penetrate activities of the imagination, or that one’s propositional \textit{thoughts} penetrate activities of the imagination. On the second way, the understanding affects the imagination because the imagination’s combination with the faculty of apperception influences its activity. On the second view, the result of this confluence of a system of \textit{capacities} that ground the understanding influences the imagination’s activities. The second view allows that the cognitive activities of the imagination depend on capacities that \textit{ground} the intellect instead of the \textit{representations} that are the output of exercises of those foundational capacities.

This second way of understanding affection has several points to recommend it, and I’ll
mention two. The first point repeats a point I already made: because sense, power of imagination, and apperception taken together are the “three subjective sources of cognition” that “make possible even the understanding” (A97), Kant is plausibly claiming that when these three original sources—as capacities of the mind—are coinstantiated in a single subject, that subject will possess an understanding that is not reducible to any one of those faculties. So to say that the understanding “imparts” a special activity to the power of imagination is simply to say: in subjects that also possess a capacity to apperceive, the imagination engages in special activities in virtue of that capacity to apperceive. This special activity is the transcendental synthesis, and the special (sub-)faculty for this synthesis is the productive power of imagination.43

The second point is that at least some cases of imaginative synthesis actually ground their corresponding concepts, not the other way around. Such cases speak against the idea that those concepts cause their corresponding synthesis. For instance, Kant makes the striking claim that “concepts that belong to the understanding”—which I take to be the categories—“can come about only by means of the power of imagination in relation to the sensible intuition” (A124). This passage speaks against the idea that an understanding complete with a full array of concepts penetrates the imagination’s cognitive activities. Concepts seem to be posterior to at least some cognitively significant activities of the imagination.

We can summarize our discussion on association and the penetration view. Association is indeed a condition on cognition, but the association that contributes to cognition is an association of the understanding called “affinity.” The association of the understanding is indeed due to activities of the imagination, but these activities are penetrated by apperception: the fact that subjects have a capacity for apperception makes a difference in their imaginative activities.

I now want to address two points of clarification. Firstly, the penetration view is opposed

43 Notice that I am not claiming that the unity of apperception is prior to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. I allow that there is no relation of priority between the unity of apperception and the transcendental synthesis of the imagination: perhaps they depend on one another for their generation, and perhaps features of the unity of apperception depend on features of the transcendental synthesis. Answering these questions would require a complete account of apperception that I cannot begin to address here. My point is that an imagination can generate a transcendental synthesis only if that imagination is co-instantiated with another faculty, apperception, in the same subject.
to the reductionist view that I canvassed in the introduction. Recall that the reductionist claims that the imagination is ultimately identical with or reducible to the understanding. The penetration view entails that the reductionist view is false, for the simple reason that if $x$ causally influences $y$, then $y$ is not reducible to or identical to $x$. Additionally, if $x$ penetrates $y$, then $y$ is not reducible to or identical to $x$. The reason for this is that any respectable account of cognitive penetration needs to maintain that there is some fundamental difference between the penetrated item ($y$) and the penetrating item ($x$).

In philosophy of mind and psychology, the distinction between perception and cognition is the subject of continued interest, as is the subsequent dispute about whether cognition penetrates perception. Consider two different ways of characterizing cognitive penetration of this sort:

(A) [I]n any case of perception, hold fixed what it is that is perceived (the objects properties and relations seen, heard, touched, and so on), the perceiving conditions (the level of light, shadow, mistiness, for example), the state of the sensory organ (perfect human vision, shortsighted human vision, for example) and the location of one’s focus of attention. With those conditions fixed, if it is possible for two subjects (or one subject at different times) to have different perceptual experiences due to the differing content of the states of their cognitive systems, and moreover, there is a semantic or intelligible link between the content of the cognitive states and the content of the perceptual experience, then perceptual experiences are cognitively penetrable. States of the cognitive system include beliefs, judgments and desires, and should likely also be taken to include the concepts that we possess.44

(B) [I]f a system is cognitively penetrable then the function it computes is sensitive, in a semantically coherent way, to the organism’s goals and beliefs, that is, it can be altered in a way that bears some logical relation to what the person knows.45

While (A) understands cognitive penetration as a pertaining to perceptual experience, (B) understands cognitive penetration as pertaining to the functions that early vision computes. The important point for us is that cognitive penetration is only interesting if cognition—construed broadly to include goals, beliefs, desires, and concepts—is not the same as perception. Otherwise, there would be no sense in which one capacity or system of the mind influenced another: we would merely be left with a set of interacting parts of one system.

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44Macpherson (2012, p. 7)
45Pylyshyn (1999, p. 343)
On the penetration view I am urging, the imagination’s image-production system is penetrated by apperception. In humans, the way that the imagination reproduces its representations changes in virtue of the fact that humans also possess a causally efficacious faculty of apperception. We might think of the productive imagination—the imagination insofar as it is subject to laws pertaining to affinity and not mere association of sensibility—as a derived faculty of the mind that results when apperception penetrates the faculty of imagination. The idea that faculties could be “derived” in such a manner was actually commonplace amongst Kant’s predecessors. The imagination’s contents consequently have a “semantic or intelligible link” with cognitive states and contents, as (A) puts it. For instance, the structure of images agrees with the unity of apperception, which in turn is the basis for concepts and thoughts. But images simply are not and never can be modifications of the intellect—for this reason, they are neither concepts nor thoughts.

The second point of clarification pertains to the objectivity of images that are the result of penetration by apperception. I have argued that while images are penetrated by apperception, intuitions are not penetrated by apperception. But consider that animals do form images, even though these images are not subject to penetration by apperception. I allow that humans and animals do share the same intuitions, and perhaps human imaginations that are driven by mere association or desire might generate the same images that animals possess. Nevertheless, I foreclose the possibility that these images could figure in human cognition. How are we to understand the resulting difference? What does cognitive penetration of the imagination by apperception afford human cognition?

To begin, Kant explicitly acknowledges in lecture that human imagination differs from animal imagination in virtue of apperception. Kant says that “all three” faculties of imagination (reproductive, anticipatory, and fictive) “can be accompanied by apperception or not.” When these faculties of imagination are accompanied by apperception, “they belong only to human be-

46 See especially Crusius (1747, §§101-102, 104), who takes the imagination to itself be a faculty of the mind “composed from” a capacity for “memory” and “ingenium,” such that we have both an imagination of memory and an imagination of ingenium. While the imagination of memory involves the association of past ideas quite like memory, the imagination of ingenium involves the generation of representations based on possible agreement between them.

47 MM, 29:883
ings”; when these faculties are not accompanied by apperception, “then animals also have them.” What is interesting is that Kant laments that there is no special name for this special capacity of a power of imagination that is related to apperception. For he says that “we ought, therefore, to have two different names for these” faculties as found in humans as opposed to non-human animals, but that unfortunately “there is only one, namely, the reproductive power of imagination.”

This lecture—recorded in 1782-1783—suggests that Kant is pointing to a gap in categorization of the imagination in the extant metaphysics textbooks of the time (particularly that of Baumgarten, which Kant used in lecture)—a gap that Kant explicitly fills in the first Critique with a new label of “productive power of imagination” (and its special activity of “transcendental synthesis”). Kant perceived such a terminological gap precisely because, first, only certain beings coinstantiate (a) a power of imagination and (b) a faculty of apperception, and second, because Kant believed that (b) had an influence on the activities of (a) that gave rise to a special productive power of imagination.

Strikingly, animals are able to “reflect” in the sense that they are able “to compare and to hold together given representations . . . with others.” Animals hold together their representations “only instinctively, namely not in relation to a concept which is thereby to be attained but rather in relation to some inclination which is thereby to be determined.” I assume that the “given representations” in question are intuitions, that is, causally situated sensory profiles. Kant is thus claiming that the way that representations are apprehended and reproduced and compared with one another does occur in respect to the animal’s goals and inclinations. We could even speculate that the desires of the animal penetrate its imagination: perhaps its desire to eat suddenly causes its imagination to visualize foods associated with its current spatial proximity, or to have sensory memories of smells associated with that food. There is a kind of semantic link that is to a certain extent intelligible to us and that explains the behavior of the animal. Yet the animal’s imagination is not penetrated by a capacity for concepts—the images that it produces do not bear the requisite

48 KU, 20:211: unlike humans, animals are presumably incapable of comparing a representation “with one’s faculty of cognition, in relation to a concept thereby made possible”—an activity similar to one that Kant labels “transcendental reflection” in the first Critique.

49 KU, 20:211
semantic relationship (as Kant puts it) to a “concept which is thereby to be obtained.”

Even though their imaginations are driven by association, desire, and instinct, the intuitions of animals do not for that reason lack a relation to an object. Kant distinguishes two forms of representation in his logic lectures that follow what he calls “representation” and “perception”:

The third: to be acquainted with \textit{kennen} something (nosce), or to represent something in comparison with other things, both as to \textit{sameness} and as to \textit{difference};

The fourth: to be acquainted with something with consciousness, i.e., to \textit{cognize} \textit{erkennen} it (cognoscere). Animals are acquainted with \textit{kennen} objects too, but they do not cognize \textit{erkennen} them.

Animals can compare items in a certain respect by means of their capacity for associations of sensibility, along with their capacity for desire and pleasure/pain as well as their inclinations. But animals are incapable of the associations of understanding that are based in a “single ground” that goes beyond whatever contingent associations and inclinations the animals has. Importantly, animals lack a representation of an object as such—for an object is “that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united” (B137). So however animals unite their representations in association, their associations cannot be joined together in an image of an \textit{object} in this sense. For objects do not unite the representations of animals; the law of association plus desires, inclinations, and pleasures/pains unite the representations of animals.

In a word, animal representation is \textit{narcissistic}. Animals are acquainted with things, but they do not treat them like objects in their own right. Instead, they sort their representations of those objects according to what those representations can \textit{do for them}. Kathleen Akins contrast a traditional view of perception on which its aim is \textit{veridicality} with a “narcissistic” view of perception on which its aim is to determine \textit{what this sensory episode means for me}. She compares the latter system to a real-life narcissist:

\footnote{There is at least one case in which Kant explicitly attributes intuitions to animals: “Bei der Anschauung ist die Vorstellung eines Dinges immer einzeln; die Anschauung kann also auch ein Thier haben, aber der allgemeinen Begriffe ist das Thier nicht fähig, welche das Vermögen zu denken ausmachen” (\textit{Menschenkunde}, AA 25:1033, VMe206).}

\footnote{\textit{IL}, 9:65. With McLear (2011), I suspect that Kant allows that animals really do represent objects (“things”) outside them, although in a different way from how humans do.}
The narcissist cannot see himself and his relation to the world in an objective light, as one life among others. Hence his understanding of the emotions and actions of other people, and of events in the world in general, will necessarily incorporate his own particular interests. For the most part, it is not possible for the narcissist to stand back and remove himself from the picture—and that, of course, is exactly the property which gives the narcissist away.\textsuperscript{52}

Akins applies this idea to the senses, whereas I am interested in the idea that the imagination of animals is narcissistic. Yet Akins’ example of thermoreception is illustrative of narcissistic representation in general. If one had a traditional view of thermoreception, one might predict that the body would be equally sensitive to heat no matter where on the body a thermal stimulus is registered.\textsuperscript{53} This prediction is what we would expect if thermoreception’s main job was to report the objective temperature of the external world. Yet Akins provides evidence suggesting that this prediction is false: thermoreceptors both on different parts of the body, as well as on the same part of the body at different times, are differentially sensitive to heat. The same objective temperature might feel comfortable at one place and time, but painful at another. Akins concludes that “what the organism is worried about, in the best of narcissistic traditions, is its own comfort. The system is not asking, ‘What is it like out there’?—a question about the objective temperature states of the body’s skin. Rather, it is doing something—informing the brain about the presence of any relevant thermal events. Relevant, of course, to itself.”\textsuperscript{54}

My suggestion is that the imaginations of animals (as well as in human beings who are not enjoying cognition) are likewise narcissistic, and that consequently their sensibilities are narcissistic. Animals have representations that relate to objects, but original apperception—which is ultimately responsible for producing concepts of objects—does not unite those representations in association. In some cases, for instance, the desire for the satiation of hunger might be the only thing uniting the various stimuli into an animal’s image of what-is-to-be-eaten.\textsuperscript{55} Since animals lack cognition, they are unconcerned with the truth of their representations—better, they lack rep-

\textsuperscript{52}Akins (1996, p. 345)
\textsuperscript{53}Akins (1996, p. 346)
\textsuperscript{54}Akins (1996, p. 349)
\textsuperscript{55}See the account developed in Newton (2016).
resentations that are truth-apt. For Kant maintains that truth is a property of a cognition, not of representations as such. The imagination of non-human animals generates images that do not contribute to judgments about truth, but instead images that contribute to satisfaction of desire and the alleviation of pain. Animal acquaintance is concerned with the promotion of life; human cognition is concerned with the truth. This is not to say that humans always enjoy cognition. We need only consider the case of the woman who perceives two human figures where her pastor perceives two steeples to see a case in which humans enjoy mere acquaintance with, but not cognition of, an object. In such a case, the images that either subject forms are narcissistic, guided by their own prejudices, associations, and interests.

The penetration view I have just defended clearly allows that animals and humans share a layer of representationality that the senses contribute. Some have challenged this “layer cake” interpretation of Kant, the claim that “the internal character of the manifold constituting the bottom layer” of representation in humans “remains unaffected by the introduction of the upper layer.” If I understand this claim, and if my argument thus far is correct, then this charge overlooks a wealth of complexity to Kant’s perceptual psychology. On the one hand, the above account is clearly “layer-cake” in that humans and animals can share causally situated sensory profiles—they can share empirical intuitions. Moreover, when humans are given over to narcissism during bouts of hunger, prejudicial associations, or entrenched inclinations, the images humans entertain might not be all that different from the images that animals have. On the other hand, animal sensibilities differ from human sensibilities, in that animal sensibilities are narcissistic through and through, whereas human sensibilities have the capacity to transcend such narcissism. For human imaginations are penetrated by apperception.

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57 See chapter 3, section 4.2.2 on this illusion.
58 Conant (2017, p. 120)
4.5 Schemata as apperception-dependent rules for imagining

The previous section argued that the special lawfulness of the productive imagination is due to the real relation that the imagination has to apperception. I argued that the activities of apprehension and reproduction that generate images are themselves influenced or “penetrated” by apperception, as well as animal inclinations and desires. In this section, I consolidate this point by suggesting that Kant similarly thinks that schemata depend on apperception. We will see that Kant’s account of the understanding’s “effect” on the imagination is also visible in his account of the schematism. In particular, schemata specify image-producing procedures that are not grounded in the imagination alone—they also require the faculty of apperception. I conclude the section with a gloss of what it would mean for schemata—representations of image-producing procedures—to involve a kind of apperception or consciousness that is not itself the awareness of an image.

In the Schematism chapter of the first *Critique*, Kant claims that there is at least a necessary *logical* relation between the “unity of apperception” and transcendental schemata. Transcendental schemata are “in accord with a rule of unity according to concepts in general” and concern the “connection” of “all representations” together “in accord with the unity of apperception” (A142/B181). The “schematism of the understanding” occurs “through the transcendental synthesis of power of imagination,” and this synthesis is “nothing other than the unity of all the manifold of intuition in inner sense” and thus “indirectly” comes down “to the unity of apperception, as the function that corresponds to inner sense (to a receptivity)” (A145/B185). The schemata are necessarily in accord with the unity of apperception, though these passages do not clearly establish any non-logical real relations between schemata and apperception, and they do not establish whether and how schemata depend on apperception. So as we did with the “transcendental synthesis” of the imagination, we may now ask whether schemata stand in any *real* or causal relation to apperception.

I argue that Kant is indeed committed to the claim that apperception has a real relation to the imagination that is responsible for the generation of schemata. Though the “the schema is in itself always a product of the power of imagination” (A140/B179), the imagination of a subject can
produce schemata only if that subject also has a faculty of apperception. There are four mutually supporting reasons for this model.

First, this model follows from the penetration view I have sketched thus far if we assume that the productive imagination generates schemata. And Kant does seem to maintain that the productive imagination produces schemata as well as images (A141-2/B181). So if the productive power of imagination depends on apperception, then schemata depend on apperception. So from the outset, Kant at least implies that schemata depend on apperception.

Second, this model neatly ties together the “transcendental synthesis” I described above with schemata. Recall that the transcendental synthesis of the imagination is simply a particular way in which activities of apprehension and reproduction unfold—it is a form of apprehension and reproduction that generates an image that expresses affinity. Moreover, schemata reflect some sort of activities of the imagination: they are “representations of a general procedure of the power of imagination for providing a concept with its image” (A140/B179). Now I argue that these “general procedures” simply are apprehensional and reproductive procedures that figure in image production—these are the activities of the imagination that schemata reflect. Kant claims that the activity of reproduction is directly related to schemata. Our concepts of space and time involve a “representation” that is “a mere schema,” and he claims that such schemata are “always related to the reproductive power of imagination imagination that calls forth the objects of experience,” and that without such schemata, the concepts of space and time “would have no significance; and thus it is with all concepts without distinction” (A156/B195). I am going to set aside the delicate question of how concepts relate to schemata here. The clear point is that all concepts gain their “sense and significance” due to their relation to schemata. Most important for us, these schemata are related to the reproductive power of imagination, which suggests that schemata serve as rules for how representations are reproduced by the imagination. So if the reproduction of the power of imagination is indeed penetrated by apperception, and if schemata reflect the reproductive procedures of the imagination, then schemata depend on apperception.

Third, Kant seems to simply assert that our most foundational schemata depend on apper-
ception in notes. He claims that “the transcendental time-determination itself [i.e., the transcendental schema, -RBT] is already a product of apperception [Product der Apperception] in relation to the form of intuition.” So Kant suggests again that some sort of awareness (or at least capacity for awareness) is required for our most foundational schemata (“transcendental time determinations”) to arise.

Finally, fourth, a more general reason to think that schemata depend on apperception is that a schema is a “representation of a general procedure” (A140/B180). Schemata contrast with images in that while schemata are general, images are always related to individual intuitions. Now Kant seems to think that all general representations depend on apperception. This expands to a broader point about the relationship between consciousness and general representations for Kant. Consciousness in Kant’s sense is intimately connected to the faculty of the understanding and often set apart from the faculty of sensibility. As Kant says in lecture, “consciousness is the principle of the possibility of the understanding, but not of sensibility.” And again, “consciousness underlies the entire higher faculty of cognition. Consciousness is distinguished from the senses.” As we saw above, apperception is characteristic of humans and distinct from mere apprehension, and beings without an understanding can apprehend even though they cannot apperceive. Kant seems to be drawing a similar line in these passages regarding consciousness. So Kant would need to think that schemata, as general representations, depend on apperception.

With my model of the imagination in place, we can reconcile an apparent tension in Kant’s account of how schemata arise. We just saw text suggesting that schemata are “products” of apperception:

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59 R 6359, 18:686 (Nov./Dec. 1797). Consider also Kant’s remarks about “time relations” and their relation to apperception: “For original apperception relates to inner sense (the set of all representations) and indeed a priori to the form of the same, i.e., the relation of the manifold empirical consciousness in time. Now in original apperception, this manifold should be united according to its time relations; for this states the transcendental unity of the same a priori…” (A177/B220). Kant suggests that the unifying of the representations in inner sense according to “time relations” itself occurs “in original apperception.”

60 E.g., “Animals also have apprehensiones, but not apperceptiones; hence they cannot make their representations general” (R 411, 15:166).

61 MM, 29:877. Additionally, “consciousness with the power of choice is attentiveness—the repetition of that is abstraction.”

62 ML2, 28:585-6

63 R 411, 15:166; “An animal has no apperception” (MM, 29:879); MM, 29:888.
ception in some way. But Kant also claims that the *power of imagination* produces schemata. Kant claims that the “schema of sensible concepts” is a “product” or “monogram” of the “pure a priori power of imagination” (A141-2/B181). And transcendental schemata are “a transcendental product of the power of imagination, which concerns the determination of the inner sense in general” (A142/B181). If we do not adopt the penetration view, then it would be easy to see the claim that *both* apperception and the imagination produce transcendental schemata as a confusion on Kant’s part. But Kant is not confused; rather, he is proposing an intricate metaphysics of the productive power of imagination. His view is that apperception *indirectly* produces transcendental schemata by “affecting” the power of imagination or “imparting” a unity to the power of imagination. In turn, the power of imagination (now in its “productive” guise) *directly* produces transcendental schemata by “determining” inner sense. My model thus preserves the fact that schemata are products of the imagination, while also explaining how schemata are related to the intellect.

I will close this section by noting what it would mean for a schema to relate to consciousness or apperception. The idea that some images depend on apperception or consciousness can seem rather intuitive. One of the everyday conceptions of a mental image is simply of a conscious mental episode that has a perceptual phenomenal character. But schemata aren’t images (A140/B179). Instead, they are representations of general procedures of the imagination. But what does that mean? How could such representations relate to consciousness?

The following is a brief proposal. Kant frequently claims that we can become conscious of representations. However, he also claims that we can “consciously represent two acts”: (1) *reflection* characterized specifically as an “inner activity (spontaneity), by means of which a concept (a thought) becomes possible,” and (2) *apprehension* characterized as “receptiveness (receptivity), by means of which a perception, i.e., empirical intuition, becomes possible.” So Kant seems to be saying that the faculty of apperception enables two forms of awareness of activities: an awareness

\[^{64}\text{Lohmar (1993, p. 102), Matherne (2015), and Sellars (1978) are by far the most explicit in accentuating such a distinction.}\]

\[^{65}\text{Anth, 7:134. Kant concludes: “The first is a consciousness of understanding, pure apperception; the second a consciousness of inner sense, empirical apperception.”}\]
of (1) thinking by the understanding and (2) awareness of imagining or apprehension by the imagination. My suggestion going forward is that this latter form of awareness generates schemata.

Now what is it to be aware of imagining itself as opposed to its effects, namely, images? How could there be a form of consciousness that is neither merely intellectual (like the consciousness one has in thinking the proposition “for all propositions \( p, p \lor \neg p \)”), nor merely imagistic (like the consciousness of a particular equilateral triangle)? My suggestion in what follows is that schemata are associated with a kind of cognitive phenomenology. While images have an imagistic phenomenology, schemata have a phenomenology that is not merely imagistic or merely intellectual, but which ranges over images.

Suppose I form an image of the shape of a house from a distance, and then move closer to it and form another image of its shape.\(^{66}\) Contrast the image I form far away (“image-far”) from the image I form close up (“image-close”). (For simplicity, these images represent shape but no particular color or texture of the house.) Image-close represents the same shape—the shape of the house—from a new viewing angle: I apprehend the front of the house from a different perspective. The front of the house “looms over” me in a way that it did not from far away. Nevertheless, the front of the house still has a square shape and still seems to have a square shape. It is just that that shape now appears to me from a different perspective.

In this case, I have represented the square front of the house via two different images, image-far and image-close. The conscious character of image-close and the conscious character of image-far are distinct. However, they both involve consciousness of a common shape. This common shape is just the shape of the front of the house. My suggestion is that there is a second mode of imaginary consciousness that is not specified by the conscious character of image-close or the conscious character of image-far. This second mode of consciousness is still a kind of consciousness of imagining. It is the consciousness one has of how image-close and image-far vary in certain ways as a function of distance and viewing angle. That is, this second mode of imagination-involving

\(^{66}\)I have adapted the following example from Masrour (2013, p. 122). My account is indebted to his suggestion regarding various forms of phenomenal character in question.
consciousness is the consciousness one entertains when one imagines oneself “zooming” in and going around the house from different perspectives. These zoomings and movements result in rule-governed transformations between the images. The special imaginative power that I am describing is part of the content of the schema for squares. Even if one is not aware of the rule that the schema specifies, nevertheless, the schema makes a difference to my consciousness and structures how I anticipate images will change over time.

The temporally extended consciousness a subject has of zooming in on and moving around objects—the mental rehearsal of how the images one forms vary as a function of that zooming and moving—is not consciousness of a merely intellectual act of thought. One could imagine an analytic geometer who is quite bad at tracking certain shapes as he approaches them. The awareness of how image-close and image-far are related to one another makes essential reference to space and time, not as mere concepts with marks, or as dispositions to classify particular shapes. Instead, the awareness I am characterizing is an ego-centric awareness of one’s perspective in space and time, as well as how one must move in order to get certain properties of objects into view.

This account makes sense of schemata of shapes and (as chapter 5 explores) of number. But what about schemata for empirical objects like dogs or houses? Kant thinks that we require such schemata if we are to apply our concepts DOG and HOUSE to dogs and houses. How could we make sense of such forms of imagistic awareness?

Here is a sketch of an answer. Consider the phenomenon of afterimages. Plausibly, when we have afterimages, those afterimages do not seem to us to be phenomenally objective. Conscious pains, for instance, lack phenomenal objectivity because they do not present themselves to us as conscious awareness of something distinct from ourselves. The same is true of afterimages. However, afterimages are, well, images in which we are conscious of certain spatial and sensory qualities. Mere perceptions—even though they might present shape properties and colors and textures—are not themselves phenomenally objective, in the sense that they do not represent physical bodies.

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67 I am again indebted to Masrour for this example.
But why aren’t afterimages phenomenally objective? On the view of schemata I am recommending, the reason that afterimages lack phenomenal objectivity is that we lack an awareness of how afterimages would appear differently from different points of view in space and in time. There is (more suggestively) something it is like to experience apparent size, apparent shape, or apparent color as varying (and co-varying) in a rule-governed manner. Afterimages do not change when I move my body through space; afterimages have no “backside,” and we are not able to “zoom in” on them. Unlike our mental imagery of a square, there is no rule for how such zooming in would go. In this sense, we are not conscious of how our apprehension of a physical object changes over time, because there are no other points of view from which to apprehend the afterimage. As a result, we lack consciousness of the activities of the imagination involved in coordinating the afterimage to other possible images.

When we are conscious of an afterimage, the consciousness associated with the schema for substance is not attached to it. When I perceive a dog prancing in the field, I have some imaginary anticipation of how the dog will go. This imaginary anticipation is due to the schema for dogs, and it makes a difference to my conscious perception of dogs. At the end of chapter 5, I will return to this point. My point for now is not to give an exhaustive characterization of these so-called “dynamical” schemata associated with the relational and modal categories. My intent is merely to indicate one necessary ingredient in such a characterization.

In short, in the case of schemata associated with objects like trees and dogs, schemata involve the phenomenology of what is like to imagine (and consequently, for Kant, perceive) a dog’s body moving when it pursues a frisbee, or what is like to approach a tree from a distance. In both cases, we entertain multiple images of the tree and the dog. The schema in both cases conveys what it is like to perceive changing substances or to move our bodies in space with respect to those substances. In contrast, the schema for shapes involve the phenomenology of what it is like to zoom in on those shapes or view them from different angles. The key point to note is that on this proposal, the phenomenology associated with schemata is reducible neither to the cognitive phenomenology

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\[68\] See Masrour (2013, p. 122).
involved in thought nor to the imagistic phenomenology involved in an individual image.

4.6 Conclusion

To sum up, the productive power of imagination is a power of mind derived from both the power of apperception and the power of imagination. This power of the mind has special rules that govern its function that go beyond the mere rules of association that are constitutive principles of the power of imagination taken in isolation from apperception. These rules depend on the consciousness provided by the faculty of apperception. In the next chapter, we will consider the effect that these laws have on the structure of images. Thus, we will have a better grasp on the semantic relationship between images and other representations like concepts and intuitions.
5

Images as an Ingredient in Cognition
5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter provided a general framework for how the imagination relates to apperception, while maintaining that the imagination is not itself the faculty of apperception or some part of it. In this section, I outline how the imagination engages in a synthesis that generates images that are “in accordance with” the laws that the understanding legislates. I shall argue that the relationship between the parts of an image have a unity that the imagination imparts to them in virtue of the way that the imagination reproduces the representations that it apprehends—a unity not provided by the intuition itself. In virtue of its relation to apperception, the imagination relates parts of images differently than it would merely according to the law of association.

I begin by indicating how the structure of images is impacted by the influence of apperception on the imagination. I show that synthesis of the imagination in its most basic sense is an activity that generates images (section 2). The rest of the chapter is dedicated to the different structures that images might take. I shall argue that images formed in arithmetic and geometry stand in a many-to-one relation to the pure intuitions from which they are formed (sections 3 and 4). I indicate similarities between geometric and arithmetic images. In particular, I suggest that all of these images have a privileged structure that all intuitions lack.

I go on to illustrate that empirical images fit naturally into the theory developed for both arithmetic and geometry (section 5). I argue that the overall theory of the imagination and mental images provided in chapters 3 and 4 suggests that empirical images do not represent actual objects—something that empirical intuitions do represent. Nor do empirical images represent actual objects as actual bodies—something that conceptually structured empirical cognition does represent. Instead, empirical images have particular qualitative contents that represent the spatial/temporal form and sensory qualities of empirical objects, but in a way that is entirely representationally uncommittal as to their actuality (in contrast to empirical intuitions). Empirical images cannot represent actual objects or bodies as bodies; images are not capable of representing objects as perduring loci of causal efficacy (in contrast to conceptually structured empirical cognition). Kant thus places
restrictions on what is imaginable. The resulting account, I suggest, vindicates a broadly Sellarsian account of mental imagery in Kant.

I close the chapter by showing that this account fits broadly with Kant’s general account of mental representation in the Dialectic of the first Critique, Kant’s remarks about the imagination in the second Critique, and the elaborate final theory of the imagination’s role in judgment that Kant arrives at in the third Critique.

5.2 Synthesis as Image Producer

Let’s first consider the basic features of synthesis, and why we should think that it produces representations at all. Kant provides his general gloss of this activity of the imagination:

By synthesis in the most general sense, however, I understand the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition. (A77/B103)

This passage suggests that synthesis sets different representations—antecedently unrelated in some respect—into new relations such that their “manifoldness” can be “comprehended” in “one cognition.” There is a story to be told about how synthesis relates to cognition.¹ The point I wish to make now is more limited: cognition depends on synthesis because synthesis gives cognition content.

¹One might think that, according to this passage, synthesis is simply what generates cognition. However, we should tread more carefully: this passage merely claims that synthesis comprehends the manifold “in one cognition [in einer Erkenntnis]”; Kant does not make the seemingly stronger claim that the manifold is comprehended “into one cognition [in eine Erkenntnis].” Whereas the latter phrasing suggests the production of a cognition, the former phrasing is consistent with the idea that synthesis necessary for, but not sufficient for, cognition. Other passages challenge the claim that synthesis is sufficient for cognition directly. In introducing synthesis, Kant writes that three items are required for “cognition of an object that comes before us”: “The first thing that must be given to us a priori for the cognition of all objects is the manifold of pure intuition; the synthesis of this manifold by means of the imagination is the second thing, but it still does not yield cognition” (A78-9/B104, emphasis added). The third item is the “synthetic unity” specified by a concept. Similarly regarding combination, Kant writes in §15 of the B-deduction that “in addition to the concept of the manifold and of its synthesis, the concept of combination also carries with it the concept of the unity of the manifold” (B130). So the concept of “combination [Verbindung]” contains more than the concept “manifold” and the concept “synthesis.” For it also contains “the concept of the unity of the manifold.” Kant seems to be making a similar claim for combination that he made for cognition above. Just as we require three different ingredients to cognize an object, in order to “combine” a manifold we require (a) a manifold given by an intuition, (b) the synthesis of the manifold, and (c) the “unity” of the manifold in that synthesis.
5.2.1 Synthesis and “Content” in the Metaphysical Deduction

What does this claim mean, and why accept it? Kant indicates what synthesis contributes to cognition:

[T]he synthesis alone is that which properly collects the elements for cognitions \( \text{[die Elemente zu Erkenntnissen sammler]} \) and unifies them into a certain content \( \text{[zu einem gewissen Inhalte vereinigt]} \). (A77-78/B103)

Kant identifies a “certain content” as the proximate product of synthesis, and this content is a requirement for “cognition.” This passage raises the question of what this content is and how it is related to synthesis. Yet again, Kant writes that

[T]he spontaneity of our thought requires that this manifold first be gone through \( \text{[durchgegangen]} \), taken up \( \text{[aufgenommen]} \), and combined \( \text{[verbunden]} \) in a certain way \( \text{[auf gewisse Weise]} \) in order for cognition to be made out of it. I call this action synthesis. (A77/B102)

This passage emphasizes that the content generated in synthesis will involve how the elements synthesized are “combined in a certain way.” Moreover, this activity of “going through,” “taking up,” and “combining” is required in order for cognition to arise. These passages assert that synthesis occurs \text{in a certain way} and that this activity generates a \text{content}. We should expect the adverbial structure of synthesis—\text{how} it unfolds—to be reflected in the contents that it generates.

Cognition needs a content, and synthesis generates this content. Thus, Kant envisions the following order of genesis in his theory of cognition:

\[ \text{manifold given by an intuition} \rightarrow \text{content} \rightarrow \text{cognition} \]

But what does Kant mean by “content” here? Kant’s theory of images can help us answer this question.

According to Kant, “synthesis” is the “mere effect of the imagination” (A78/B103). It is perhaps surprising that synthesis as Kant first describes it could be a \text{mere} effect of the imagination. If synthesis is any procedure that unifies elements for a cognition, then surely the procedures that
combine concepts into propositions in judgments or that combine propositions into syllogisms in inferences are also syntheses. If I know that it is raining, and I know that if it is raining then the ground is wet, then I also know that the ground is wet. Kant does not mean to deny the possibility of cognition of such a kind, and he indeed allows for higher forms of cognition that would result from the gathering together of such elements.² The possibility of such “intellectual” synthesis is something he explicitly acknowledges (B151).

When Kant says that synthesis is the mere effect of the imagination, he is making the more limited claim that all cognition-yielding synthesis depends on the imagination. The imagination is a “blind though indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no cognition at all” (A78/B103, emphasis added). So Kant allows that I can cognize that the ground is wet inferentially, and that the inference itself can lead to a new cognition.³ But Kant thinks that the imagination’s synthesis is the fundamental synthesis upon which all other cognition-yielding synthesis depends.

5.2.2 Images as Content: The A-Edition Transcendental Deduction

Synthesis by the imagination contributes a “certain content” or a manifold combined “in a certain way” to cognition. I shall now argue that this proximate “content” of synthesis that unfolds in a certain “way” is an image. To use a metaphor that we need to unpack, just as judgments can be brought together into inferences that give rise to new cognitions, so too can parts of an intuition be brought together into images that give rise to new cognitions.

As I have already noted, Kant claims in the A deduction that the synthesis of apprehension brings the manifold of intuition “into an image [in ein Bild]” (A120). This phrasing already marks a parallel between bringing a diverse elements “into a content” and bringing a manifold “into an image.” Later, Kant makes clear that this image requires synthesis in the sense of apprehension in the broad sense: an activity of the imagination requiring both apprehension and reproduction (cf. A121). Similarly, synthesis involves a “collection” and a “going through” of diverse elements

²See Kant’s enumeration of different “degrees of cognition” in JL, 9:64-5.
³Kant explicitly claims that some inferences lead to new “cognition” (see JL, 9:114, 120).
in order to generate a “unity” of diverse elements. These points suggest that the “content” generated by synthesis is an image.

Kant’s elaboration of “reproduction in the image” bears this point out when he indicates how reproduction contributes to the “pure transcendental synthesis” of the imagination that is “prior to all experience” (A101). Kant cites illustrations of why reproduction contributes to the transcendental synthesis, and these illustrations are all cases of images. If “I draw a line in thought, or think of the time from one noon to the next, or even want to represent a certain number to myself,” it is “obvious” that I need to “grasp one of these manifold representations after the other in thought” (A102). The examples of a representation of a “line” and a “number” invoke examples which, as we saw in chapter 1, Kant elsewhere describes as images.4

I read Kant as claiming that images are required for various kinds of conceptual representations or “thoughts.” Kant argues that if I am to think any of these representations to myself, then “I must necessarily first grasp one of these manifold representations after another in my thoughts” (A102). The “manifold representations” in this case are the “preceding representations,” that is, “the first parts of the line,” “the preceding parts of time,” and the “successively represented units.” If I were simply to “lose” these representations “from my thoughts” and “not reproduce them when I proceed to the following ones,” then no “whole representation” and “none of the previously mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most fundamental representations of space and time, could even arise.”5

Kant is thus arguing that neither a “whole representation” nor any of the “previously mentioned thoughts” would arise without the reproductive imagination. I take this to mean that neither an image of those objects nor thoughts about those objects could occur without the reproductive imagination.6 What the section on “reproduction in the image” is supposed to illustrate in particular

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4Cf. Kant’s discussion of “images” of “a line” (B156) and “the number five” (A140/B179).

5Cf. the description of this passage by Tolley (2016, p. 281), who argues that Kant is talking about the “a priori concept of space,” not the original pure intuition of space. I agree that Kant is not talking about the genesis of the pure intuition of space in this passage; my additional point is that the “representation” in question is specifically the image of a line.

6As Kant will later conclude, “concepts that belong to the understanding can come about” only “through the relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception,” but even this relation can occur “only by means of the power of
is why the *imagination* is required here, and not simply (say) apperception plus the senses. Since
the reproductive imagination “refers either to inner or outer sense,” the “parts” of the “whole rep-
resentation” are presumably reproduced from previously apprehended intuitions. That is, intuitions
produced by either inner or outer sense are apprehended. Then, after they are apprehended and
taken up into the activity of the imagination (cf. A120), they are “renewed” or “reproduced” by the
reproductive imagination. And only if these parts are apprehended and reproduced can a “whole
representation” arise from them.\(^7\) This whole representation is an image.

### 5.2.3 Images as Content: The B-Edition Transcendental Deduction

In the B-deduction, Kant presents his account somewhat differently in his discussion of
“self-affection” and the influence of the understanding on sensibility. I argued in chapter 4 that
apperception and imagination are two basic faculties standing in a real relation to one another as
two mental faculties in one subject. This real relation constitutes the understanding’s affection of
sensibility. To say that the imagination’s activity is influenced by the understanding is to say that the
imagination and apperception stand in these real causal relations. Moreover, imaginative synthesis
generates a content from intuitions provided the senses. That content is an image, not an intuition.
But central parts of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction in the B edition might seem to cut against the
idea that this content is an image as opposed to an intuition. They can be read as claiming that any
intuition that features in cognition is actually a product of imaginative synthesis. Yet as I shall now
argue, Kant instead views synthesis as something done *to* intuitions to “determine” them. In this
process of determining an intuition, an image is generated.

In §24 of the B-deduction, Kant claims that though inner sense contains the *form* of
intuition—the pure intuition of time—it does not contain a “determinate intuition [bestimmte
imagination in relation to the sensible intuition” (A124). So at least *some* concepts—notably, our most basic temporal
and spatial concepts—arise from such a complex involving the senses, the imagination, and apperception. Moreover, it
seems that the *content* of at least *some* concepts—particularly pertaining to spatial and temporal objects—depends on
this complex.

\(^7\)Kant’s notion of a *distinct* representation seems to be very closely aligned to his notion of a “whole” representation:
**Anschauung**. Kant maintains that this determinate intuition is possible only through the consciousness of the determination of the manifold through the transcendental action of the imagination (synthetic influence of the understanding on the inner sense), which I have named the figurative synthesis. (B154)

So the “transcendental action of the imagination” involves an “influence” of the imagination (and ultimately the understanding) on “inner sense.”

But what is this “determinate intuition”? Kant goes on to provide examples that we “perceive in ourselves” of this influence of the imagination on inner sense. I think his examples show that a “determinate intuition” is itself a complex of an *intuition* and an *image* generated from it.

Kant elaborates on this notion of a “determinate intuition”:

We cannot think of a line without **drawing** [ziehen] it in thought, we cannot think of a circle without **describing** [beschreiben] it, we cannot represent the three dimensions of space at all without **placing** [setzen] three lines perpendicular to each other at the same point[.]. (B154)

Kant himself emphasizes the activities at work that make possible certain kinds of thinking. We “draw” a line, “describe” a circle, and “place” three lines mutually perpendicular to one another, as in three-dimensional Cartesian space. These are plausibly cases of image formation.

Direct evidence for this reading is on the facing page of the B-deduction. There, Kant writes that

> time, although it is not itself an object of outer intuition at all, cannot be made representable to us except under the image [Bilde] of a line, insofar as we draw [ziehen] it, without which sort of exhibition [Darstellungsart] we could not cognize the unity of its measure at all[.]. (B156)

When Kant says that “we draw it,” the “it” refers to the *line*. Thus, Kant seems to be suggesting the drawing activity generates an “image.” The activity of drawing is itself a means of “exhibiting” the concept of succession and time.

To fill out the drawing metaphor, the *intuition* is the mental sketchpad or frame in which such drawing occurs. Drawing in a spatial sketchpad “exhibits” what is possible in a spatial medium. If
we switch to a temporal medium, then our imaginations would be capable of exhibiting different items. Kant’s idea in the above passage is that in order to exhibit features of the temporal medium (the pure intuition of time), we need to exhibit features of the spatial medium (the pure intuition of space). For the very activity of outer imagining—which involves successive acts of apprehension and reproduction—that is responsible for exhibiting outer objects makes apparent that time has a “unity” to its “measure.”

Kant continues to use this drawing metaphor in the B deduction to denote the activity of image formation and, with it, the production of perceptions via apprehension. Consider the example of the house again:

Thus if, e.g., I make the empirical intuition of a house into perception through apprehension of its manifold, my ground is the necessary unity of space and of outer sensible intuition in general, and I as it were draw its shape [zeichne gleichsam seine Gestalt] in agreement with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space. (B162)

Kant seems to be describing the same processes as above. We start with an “empirical intuition” and produce a “perception” from it. The “shape” that serves as the content of the resulting perception “agrees” with and has its “ground” in the “synthetic unity” of the manifold of intuition. On our model, the empirical intuition is the sketch pad (this time populated with, say, colors), and the representation of this shapes by outlining or “drawing” parts of the empirical intuition is an image.

Beyond the “drawing” metaphor, the passage above mentioned that “placing” three lines together allows us to represent three-dimensional space. Kant directly relates this “placing” metaphor

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8Kant does not restrict this account to outer intuitions. In the example he gives later, Kant also claims: “If (in another example) I perceive the freezing of water, I apprehend two states (of fluidity and solidity) as ones standing in a relation of time to each other. But in time, on which I ground the appearance as inner intuition, I represent necessary synthetic unity of the manifold, without which that relation could not be determinately given in an intuition (with regard to the temporal sequence)” (B163). This passage again talks about a relation being “determinately given in an intuition”—in particular, in an inner intuition. Plausibly, a “determinate intuition” of an object is the same as “determinately giving” that object in intuition. The apprehension of two different states that occur in time generates an image of a temporal sequence. Though Kant does not call this an “image” in this passage, and also does not use the metaphor of “drawing” to describe determinate inner intuition, it is important to note the overall parallel structure of inner and outer intuition in these cases. In particular, the inner intuition itself has an appearance of two different states; the imagination then determines the “relation” between those states to generate an inner image that represents the temporal difference between the two states (much like outer images represent the spatial difference between two items).
to image production. In the Schematism, Kant writes

[I]f I place [setze] five points in a row, this is an image [Bild] of the number five.
(A140/B179)

The image that Kant describes here is not an image of a line, but an image of a number. Yet the point is similar: just as one apprehends three different mutually perpendicular lines and generates an affinity between them by reproducing them in an image, so too does one apprehend different dots and generate an affinity between them by reproducing them as one progresses in apprehending further dots. Indeed, Kant’s general characterization of a schema as a “rule for the determination of our intuition in accordance with a certain general concept” (A 141/B 180), combined with his claim that a schema is a “representation of a general procedure” for “providing a concept its image” (A140/B179-180), suggest that the activity of determination of an intuition is one in which the imagination generates an image that corresponds to a certain concept. In turn, schemata represent whatever rules are at work in the “placing” or “drawing” that results in an image.

So Kant frequently employs “drawing” and “placing” as metaphors for both the “giving” of determinate intuitions and the “production” of images. An implication of what I have argued so far is that such cases of transcendental synthesis generate images but not empirical intuitions. Some of Kant’s remarks suggest precisely that the unity characteristic of a “one representation” or a “determined” intuition is not actually provided by the intuition itself, but by the transcendental synthesis of the imagination that acts on intuition. We already saw that “the representation of the composite [Zusammengesetzt], as such, is not mere intuition”;9 “we do not intuit an object as composed.”10 Kant reminds us of this point at the beginning of the B-deduction: “combination” cannot already be “contained in [in . . . enthalten]” the pure form of sensible intuition because combination—synthesis—is an “act [Actus]” (B129-130).

Kant brings these points together in the middle of the B-deduction, where he explains regarding the “representations” that are brought together in synthesis:

I indeed do not want to say, that these representations necessarily belong to one another in the empirical intuition, but rather they belong to one another in the synthesis of intuitions by means of the necessary unity of apperception. (B142, my emphasis)

In this passage, Kant contrasts the “empirical intuition” with the “synthesis of intuitions.” The empirical intuition itself does not represent any necessary connection—that is, no intuitive contents necessarily belong to one another merely as intuited.

By contrast, certain representations do necessarily belong to one another in the synthesis of those intuitions. Image production is required to represent such necessary relations because affinity is required to represent such necessary relations. In the image, certain parts of the intuition are represented as standing in “determinate” relations to one another. After all, images arise from association of the manifold, and association is simply the reproduction of representations according to a rule. The association in question is not mere association, but affinity, because the rules in question depend on apperception. The image manifesting this affinity arises from “a rule in accordance with which a representation enters into combination in the imagination with one representation rather than with any others” (A121, my emphasis). To represent two items as necessarily belonging together, we must first represent them as belonging together. Unlike the empirical intuition itself, images represent items within an empirical intuition as belonging together. For instance, the windows of a house might belong with my representation of the door, but not with my representation of clouds that lie above the house. I form this image of the house from a causally situated sensory profile (an empirical intuition) that puts me in sensory contact with many items that are not the house, like (say) the sky, the surrounding field, and the grazing farm animals. Images are thus a necessary condition on cognition for Kant.

To sum up, my suggestion is that the imagination “determines” an appearance, which is the “undetermined object [unbestimmte Gegenstand] of an empirical intuition” (A20/B34), when it produces an image from that empirical intuition. This suggestion explains, at least in part, why Kant describes the imagination as a “faculty for determining sensibility a priori” (B152). Images are the basic content that synthesis generates from an intuitive manifold when it determines or “sketches”
it, and images prove to be a necessary condition on cognition of items through such an intuitive manifold.

5.3 Images of number in arithmetic

I will further explain the above cognitive theory of images by considering key examples. On the systematic view I shall now defend, images have a particular format that grants them with certain contents that differ from the format and contents of intuitions. We will again see that thoughts about particular objects in cognition depend on images.11

In an effort to differentiate schemata from images, Kant discusses an “image of the number five” (A140/B179). Such an image arises when I “place five points next to one another [hinter einander setze].” Images of numbers arise from this activity of placing or apprehending, which is of a piece with the fact that images arise from certain kinds of syntheses. So the “+” sign indicates “a kind [Art] of synthesis for finding a third number from two given numbers.”12 Presumably, this type or “kind” of synthesis is precisely the synthesis tokened when I “place five points next to one another” to generate an image. For adding one item to the next is the most primitive form of addition. Finally, at the type or “kind” level, Kant actually names the “representation of the general procedure” that specifies such an activity: it is the “pure schema of magnitude” which, when thought “as a concept of the understanding, is number” (A142/B182). The example of number thus affords us a rare opportunity to assemble Kant’s thoughts on a variety of different representations into a single narrative of the acts of the imagination and how they relate to both intuition and concepts.

I argued in chapter 2 that the essential features of pure intuitions depend merely on features of the senses. Thus, the structure and format of pure intuitions relies solely on (a) the primary activation of the senses by a distinct power in affection and (b) the pure and empirical synopsis.

11Ameriks (2000, p. 243) approaches my view when he claims that “when we think of abstract entities (e.g., numbers), it is via consideration of non-abstract items such as images (B16, A240/B298).” My specific claim is that if we are to cognize abstract entities like numbers, then it must be via images. Cognition involves thinking, after all. However, I want to allow that some forms of abstract thinking do not depend on images; plausibly, my thoughts about modus ponens don’t always require me to entertain instances of modus ponens.

12Letter to Schultz, AA 10:555-556

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Neither (a) nor (b) involve the combination or synthesis of different representations together. Thus, we should expect that the syntax or format of pure intuitions does not privilege the connection of one item in the manifold with another item in the manifold. That is (as we have seen), no item is associated with another item in the manifold. (Ditto for empirical intuitions.) One of the consequences of this uncombined format of the pure intuition of space is that it is strictly homogeneous. Adapting Sutherland (2004), we can say that a representation exhibits strict logical homogeneity if it satisfies the following principle:

\[ SLH \text{ For a whole } w: \text{ for every } x \text{ and every } y, \text{ if } x \text{ and } y \text{ are parts of } w \text{ and } x \neq y, \text{ then there is no monadic concept } F \text{ such that } F \text{ is instantiated by } x \text{ but not by } y. \]

Informally, a whole exhibits strict logical homogeneity when no matter which part of the whole we select, it will not qualitatively differ from any other part that we select.

Intuitions satisfy SLH because our intuitions are, in the first instance, uncomposed representations. Now synthesis directed at a representation that exhibits SLH generates an image. The images that are generated—of both arithmetic and geometric objects—themselves violate SLH. They have what we can label privileged structure. Images contain parts that are associated with certain parts as opposed to others, and in virtue of this affinity between parts, have particular qualitative contents that ultimately correspond to concepts. A way to put my background theory, then, is that the synthetic activities of the imagination structure the syntax of images, and in virtue of this syntax, new content arises—the Inhalt Kant mentions in his basic characterizations of synthesis.

To return to our example, an exemplar of a representation with this privileged structure that violates SLH is the image of five. For the activities of reproduction and apprehension generate syntactic forms beyond the mere having of the sensations ordered in space. As an image with numerical content, the image of five mentioned above is associated with the schema of quantity. This schema specifies a particular procedure of the imagination, namely, “the successive addition of One to One (of the same kind) [Einem zu Einem (Gleichartigen)]” (A142/B182).\(^\text{13}\) The image of five

\(^{13}\)Recall that schemata represent procedures of the imagination, cf. A140/B180. Such a schema follows the conception of arithmetic common in Kant’s time and formulated in the textbook by Johann Andreas Segner that Kant
that Kant mentions is a composite in this sense—it contains parts that are “taken to be” of the same kind (i.e., homogeneous). This procedure thus involves, at minimum, two components. **First,** some unit item must be specified as the “One” in question. This One will be the item that is apprehended by the imagination. **Second,** that very “One” must be set next to another “One”—the procedure must exhibit “homogeneity” and treat distinct items in the same way, thereby representing sameness through difference.

It is important to contrast this procedure of apprehending an item in accordance with the *schema,* and apprehending an item merely in accordance with the law of association. It is certainly possible to apprehend items of the same kind through association. A dog might apprehend similar odors every time that such an odor occurs, and the dog might apprehend similar food-shaped items every time they occur. Yet the dog’s associative apprehension differs from schematic apprehension in respect to both aspects of the schema of quantity.

**First,** the dog might apprehend several items at once. But the dog does not grasp some subset of those items as a *unit.* Suppose the dog simultaneously apprehends a bell sound and a loaf shape. The dog thus simultaneously selects both items. But without a capacity to schematically apprehend items, it remains indeterminate what counts as a unit in the first place: is it the loaf, the bell, or the loaf plus the bell? For us rational beings, any of these three options could serve as a unit; our imaginations have a certain degree of freedom in selecting any of these three as a unit. But canine imaginations lacks such a freedom: the dog’s capacity to select a certain kind of item is entirely contingent on the dog’s own psychological history. And in accordance with that psychological history, it is very unlikely that at a given time, the dog’s imagination would be free to select among these three options; instead, whatever unity arises (whatever counts as One) will be *psychologically determined* by features we discussed in the previous chapter (among which are the dog’s desires, the intensity of the relevant sensations, and associative habits).

**Second,** there is simply no guarantee that the dog can or will *iterate* whatever it does apprehended in lecture, *Anfangsgründe der Arithmetik.* Segner writes that “arithmetic is concerned with composite magnitudes [zusammengesetzten Grössen], whose parts are either the same as one another, or are taken to be the same [vor gleich gehalten]” (Segner, 1773, p. 1).
heh. Iteration entails that what was apprehended previously can be apprehended again—a capacity to take one unit, whatever it was, and to apprehend it again. But does the dog have this capacity? No: the dog’s future capacity to apprehend a unit is sensitive to whatever its associative habits and desires are. So it does not have a general capacity to repeat what was apprehended that is insensitive to what was apprehended. In the future, if its desires change, or if its associative habits alter, it will simply lose the capacity to apprehend that item again. Thus, if the dog were to actually apprehend five dots, it would be a complete accident: such apprehension would not be an exercise of a general capacity for iterating a unit no matter what unit is selected.

In short, the dog lacks a capacity to count. The procedure that the schema specifies has two basic components. First, the imagination has to select some unit to iterate. Suppose it selects a dot as its unit. Second, the imagination has to apprehend this unit several times—the imagination treats all dots as of the same kind but as spatially differentiated. This means that the given representation in Figure 1 is to be treated as a group of objects that are of the same kind (in Kant’s terminology, they are “homogeneous”), each of which is a unit (no dot can be “double-counted”). Figure 2 diagrams the apprehension of the dots.

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**Figure 5.1:** Intuition

The intuition in Figure 1 represents items in space, while the image of six in Figure 2 represents those items in a determinate manner. The red arrows denote the activity of successive apprehension. When apprehension moves to a dot (say, the fourth dot from the left, in the act sym-

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14This process is discussed by Golob (2014). Plausibly, there is some primitive grasp of a “basic measure” that is required to start this iterated process.

15Of course, for Kant, every “item” in the manifold is itself composed of a manifold.
bolized by the third arrow from the left), the imagination simultaneously reproduces the previously apprehended dots (i.e., those contained in the three left-most boxes). Apprehension successively grasps each unit, and reproduction reproduces the apprehended units while further units are being grasped. The representation symbolized by the red boxes is the image.

In contrast, uncomposed intuitions can be composed in countlessly many ways, corresponding to the many images we can form from them. And this one-to-many relationship between the mere uncomposed intuition and the image is grounded in the sytheses of apprehension and reproduction: apprehension selects which units to apprehend (e.g., it doesn’t apprehend non-dots), while reproduction reproduces the units relevant to the image in question (e.g., it doesn’t reproduce items the imagination apprehended yesterday that are unrelated to the present image). Without both processes, an image of six could never arise.

To see the one-to-many relationship between intuitions and images, note that the imagination could have used two dots as the “unit” measure, and then produced an image of 3 by apprehending three pairs of dots, as in Figure 3.

Figure 5.2: Image of six

Figure 5.3: Image of three
This discussion illustrates that a single uncomposed intuition corresponds to multiple possible images. For the intuition (Figure 1) is compatible with at least two different ways of associating, “carving,” or “grouping” the manifold (Figures 2 and 3). In one case, an image of three is produced; in another case, an image of six is produced. The image that the imagination generates depends on which unit it selects, and how many times it iterates that unit.

Therefore, the representational format of images does not supervene on the representational format of intuitions in two respects. On the one hand, which image the imagination forms is not determined by the intuition, since there is a one-to-many relationship between an intuition and the images it is possible to form from that intuition. On the other hand, the structure of even a single image is not determined by the intuition. For apprehension and reproduction play an essential role in structuring an the syntax of an image: apprehension is directed at the intuition in selecting certain units, while reproduction is required to selectively reproduce certain previously apprehended units. In short, the structure of images is not determined by the structure of intuitions alone.

If the above account is correct, then images violate SLH. The syntax of the image of three, say, would involve special relations that obtain between certain parts of the manifold, but not others. To echo Fodor (2007), the image has a privileged structure or “canonical” composition.\textsuperscript{16} That is, just like the sentence ‘Karpov is in the yard’ has a special “canonical” way of being composed and decomposed—namely, into ‘Karpov’ and ‘is in the yard’ (and not into ‘Karpov is in’ and ‘the yard’) —so too does the intuitive manifold need to be composed and decomposed in a certain way rather than another in order for images that are ingredients in cognition to arise. Thus, like intuitions, images involve a coordination of various parts of a manifold. Yet unlike intuitions, images contain a coordination of discretely apprehended parts that are reproduced in accordance with a rule.

\textsuperscript{16}Fodor himself calls it “canonical decomposition,” which I believe comes to the same thought.
5.4 Images of geometrical objects

Mental imagery regarding shape is another paradigm case of image production for Kant. He contrasts the “image of a triangle” with both its schema and its concept, as we saw in chapter 1. In this section, I show that such images of shapes have the same general structure as images of number.

The first clue that arithmetic and geometry would both involve images with a similar structure is that Kant associates mathematical objects with a particular subset of synthesis. Kant distinguishes between two types of “combination [Verbindung]” in the Analytic of Principles, “composition [Zusammensetzung]” and “connection [Verknüpfung].” Composition is aligned with the mathematical categories, and connection is aligned with the dynamical categories.

In this technical sense as a subset of combination, composition is the synthesis of the manifold of what does not necessarily belong to each other, as e.g., the two triangles into which a square is divided by the diagonal do not themselves necessarily belong to each other, and of such a sort is the synthesis of the homogeneous in everything that can be considered mathematically[]. (B201-202, note)

In contrast, “connection” is the synthesis of “unhomogeneous” parts “insofar as they necessarily belong to one another.” Examples of features represented by connection are when “an accident belongs to some substance” or “the effect” belongs “to the cause.”

So while connection represents relations between heterogeneous items, composition represents relations between items that are homogeneous. A cause is not homogeneous with its effect, just as accidents are not homogeneous with the substance in which they inhere. Of course, a cause and an effect could fall under a common kind (consider one billiard ball causing another billiard ball to move); however, it is surely not the case that the cause and effect relationship requires or is constituted by such homogeneity between two items falling under a common kind (a billiard ball could have an effect on the cue, or it could cause representations in the mind when someone views it).
However, the *composition* relation *demands* that the relata are homogeneous. We have two representations in which every part is *guaranteed* to be homogeneous with other parts: the pure intuition of space and the pure intuition of time. They satisfy SLH. When composition represents relations between parts of space, both relata are different spaces. Thus, when the imagination “composes” space, it does not join items of a different kind (like substance and accidents) but items of the same kind (space and space). An implication of joining two parts of a homogeneous manifold is that such “combination” between parts is “accidental”; composition is the combination of what “*does not necessarily* belong to each other” (B201). As Kant puts it in a note, “[c]omposition is the accidental unity of the plurality [*die zufällige Einheit des Vielen*].”\(^{17}\) The joining of parts of space is accidental because the imagination is free to have selected different spaces when it synthesizes spaces. The pure intuition of space alone does not “tell” the imagination which parts of it to join together, which, barring other constraints, leaves the imagination free to apprehend and reproduce the manifold of the pure intuition of space, “as it pleases” so to speak.

Now these claims can seem confusing because they suggest that the synthesis involved in representing mathematical objects is *accidental* and *not necessary* in some respect. But Kant is obviously committed to the claim that mathematical propositions express universal and necessary truths. Such truths cannot be grounded on the accidental connections established according to the law of association. I think that the “accidental” nature of composition should be understood as a *priority* claim about the mereology of the representations in question. The pure intuition of space is a whole that is prior to its parts; this “whole before part” priority is part of the essence of space and belongs to the very metaphysical “exposition” of the “concept” of space as an “a priori given representation” (B38). In that sense, space is not an *accidental whole*, but a *necessary whole*. As space is *given* by outer sense, it is necessarily a whole.

In contrast, finite spatial wholes are not necessary in this way. Let’s consider the full text of the note I mentioned above:

\(^{17}\)R 5299, 18:147.
Composition is the accidental unity of the plurality. For this reason, not every whole is composite, e.g., space, because the unity here precedes the plurality, or the plurality presupposes the unity in order to be thought in it. This [former, -RBT] unity consists in the connection either with a third or among one another [untereinander]. This composition is either ideal or real; the first through taking-together [Zusammennehmung], the second through connection [Verknüpfung].

So whatever “unity” is involved in space itself is distinct from the “unity” that arises from “composition.” Moreover, Kant infers from (a) the fact that composition is an “accidental” unity of a plurality that (b) space is not “composed.” Composition thus cannot be generative of space per se. This result clarifies the significance of the claim that insofar as intuitions are given to the mind, they are uncomposed (as I argued in chapter 2). Moreover, it suggests that the intuition of space has a prior unity to the unity that arises from the synthesis of apprehension that composes a manifold (cf. B160).

Turning now to images, Kant maintains that there is a certain arbitrariness in our representation of the contents of intuition. My guiding suggestion is that images reflect this arbitrariness. Let’s unpack this idea.

Images of shapes in space are composed, and the unity of these objects is distinct from the unity of space itself. Kant thinks that composition occurs in pure and empirical intuitions, and that it occurs in the same manner: “I put together in a pure intuition, just as in an empirical one, the manifold that belongs to the schema of a triangle in general and thus to its concept” (A718/B746). Similarly, Kant claims that one can “construct a triangle” either “through mere intuition, in pure intuition, or on paper, in empirical intuition, but in both cases completely a priori” (A713/B741).

The only difference in either case is towards which intuition apprehension is directed. Between both the pure and empirical case, the activities of apprehension and reproduction are held fixed.
Now there are two different aspects to the generation of an image of a triangle. On the one hand, one might merely apprehend the triangle as a kind of “qualitative shape” like any other shape, such as the shape of a banana, a dot, or a smiley face. On the other hand, one might apprehend a triangle according to its magnitude. Kant distinguishes between these two cases:

Now of all intuition none is given a priori except the mere form of appearances, space and time, and a concept of these, as quanta can be exhibited a priori in pure intuition, i.e., constructed, together with either its quality (its shape) or else merely its quantity (the mere synthesis of the homogeneous manifold) through number. (A720/B748)

This passage signals that there are different ways that a synthesis might proceed in intuition. On the one hand, one might generate an “image” of a certain magnitude as described in the previous section—an image comprised of homogeneous parts of the manifold apprehended and reproduced according to a schema. The schema in question was the “schema of quantity”—one of the schemata that Kant calls a “transcendental schema.” We can say that such images have quantitative contents. But Kant suggests that the schema corresponding to “triangularity” will involve something beyond this mere schema pertaining to quantity. For triangularity specifies a kind of quality, just as rectangularity and banana-shaped do. Other “qualities” involved in geometric construction involve “lines” and “planes” which are “spaces with different quality,” along with “continuity” as a quality of space itself (A715/B743). These “qualitative” notions are set apart from notions that involve quantity or “magnitude,” such as “totality” and “infinity.” We can say that such images have qualitative contents.

This distinction is of particular interest when we consider what Kant calls pure images of space and time. In the Schematism, Kant claims that space is the “pure image of all magnitudes (quantorum) for outer sense,” while time is the pure image of “all objects of the senses in general” (A142/B182). Kant does not provide a schema for both space and time, but rather provides a single “schema of magnitude (quantitatis)”—that is, of magnitude in general. Moreover, while the schema

qualities in empirical intuition, whereas it will not do so in pure intuition.

21For further discussion on these points, see Shabel (2017).
of magnitude specifies how one represents quantity as such (i.e., quantitas), space is a condition for all determinate representation of quantity (i.e., of an object that exhibits quantitas, namely, a quantum).

In the Stufenleiter taxonomy, Kant invokes pure images to differentiate two kinds of pure concepts. He claims that a pure concept can have its origin “solely in the understanding” or “in a pure image of sensibility” (A320/B377). I take Kant’s claim here to be that the content of these concepts finds its origin in two different sources. Pure concepts like “substance” and “cause/effect” do not derive their content from the pure image at all, but instead (as Kant explains at the beginning of the Analytic of Concepts) from functions of judgment. In contrast, concepts like “triangularity” or “plane” also depend on the pure image of space for their content.

Pure images of space exhibit an affinity of the manifold of spaces. The parts of the triangle that I connect with one another via reproduction of the manifold are not merely associated with one another. The connection or coherence between the manifold that constitutes a triangle is not something that depends merely on my psychological history; instead, original apperception is a necessary condition for this “affinity” of the various parts of the triangle with one another. The affinity in the pure image of a triangle or a line is a necessary condition for thinking about a triangle or a line, and thus for cognizing those objects. If my image of a triangle were merely generated via association independently of apperception, then pure images would not exhibit the kind of unity required to ground pure, non-categorial concepts—against Kant’s explicit claim above that pure

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22 The concept of number can seem more difficult. The schemata of all categories, as “pure concepts of the understanding,” cannot be “brought to an image at all” (A142/B181). One might think that since the fundamental concepts of quantity—unity, plurality, and totality—are image-independent categories, so too is the concept of number. Yet Kant does claim a form of image-dependence for number concepts that he does not claim for the categories. Beyond invoking images of numbers, Kant also claims that “number concepts equally require pure sensible images [reinsinnlicher Bilder]” (AA 14:55). Since this note is dated 1790, Kant seems to have made this comment as an explicit correction to a 1790 letter from Rehberg, who alleges that “unlike geometry,” arithmetic as the science of number does “not require pure images [reinsinnlicher Bilder] to guide the proofs at all” pertaining to arithmetic propositions (AA 11:205). The question then is whether the pure concept of number derives its content from the pure image. We might, after all, read this passage differently as claiming that the pure concept of number depends on an image to subsume an object under some image-independent content. I will bracket this question here; I simply note that Kant is at least committed to the idea that to cognize the quantity of any object (to subsume an object under a number concept), we require a pure image. See also Shabel (2017).

23 Though I shall not discuss it here, there is also an interesting question of both whether and how the schema for geometric shapes like triangles depends on the schema for quantity.
images do so ground such concepts.

Finally, we can see that an image of a triangle, like an image of six, violates SLH. An image of a triangle has qualitative contents that violate SLH: certain regions of space exhibit qualities like “line” or “triangle” that other regions of space do not. For the space represented by the pure image, it is not the case that for every monadic predicate $F$, if one arbitrary part of space instantiates $F$, then another arbitrary part of space instantiates $F$. Pure images represent qualitative difference. Pure images violate SLH because the acts of apprehension and reproduction that structure pure images do not apprehend all parts of the pure intuition in the same way. In contrast, the synopsis of outer sense (say) does structure all parts of the pure intuition in the same uniform manner.

The image of a triangle and an image of six are thus distinguished from the pure intuition of space as well as an empirical intuition. Both involve a particular way of composing the manifold into a whole that is arbitrary, in that the imagination in its “free play” can establish units as it wishes in order to represent determinate magnitudes (in the image of numbers) and can arbitrarily determine how to arrange certain qualitative features of space (in the image of shapes). Such whole representations or images are “arbitrary” in that they depend on such free activities of the imagination. In contrast, we saw that, on the one hand, intuitions are representational wholes that are not subject to such free activities of the imagination; the “unity” of an intuition does not arise from “composition.”

5.5 Images of empirical objects

Finally, Kant mentions images of various empirical objects like a dog and a city. In this section, I suggest that these images are best thought of as images of the shape and sensory qualities of those objects. However, these images do not represent all of the features of these objects, and in particular, images are incapable of representing perduring substances or the causal features of objects. Kant’s account of imagining thus makes specific commitments regarding what is and is not imaginable.
Kant indirectly refers to an image of a dog in the schematism. He writes that “the concept of a dog signifies a rule in accordance with which my power of imagination can indicate \[verzeichnen\] the shape of a four-footed animal in general, without being restricted to any single particular that experience offers me or any possible image that I can exhibit in concreto” (A141/B181). The concept “dog” relates to or “signifies” a schema—a “rule” by which the “imagination can indicate” a kind of shape. The particular shape that a dog takes is manifested in an “image,” but the “schema” of the general shape of a dog is not “restricted” to a particular image. In turn, a concept “is always related immediately to \[bezieht sich jederzeit unmittelbar\]” or “refers to \[bedeutet\]” a “rule of synthesis of the power of imagination” or a “rule of the determination of our intuition according to \[gemäß\] a certain general concept” (A141/B180). Schemata are these rules. So though schemata are not “restricted to any particular shape that experience offers me or any possible image that I can exhibit in concreto,” they nevertheless essentially involve image-production.

In our previous example of an “image of the number five,” the image itself had the quantitative content “five.” Similarly, in the “image of a triangle,” the image itself had the qualitative content “triangle.” Now we are considering something that might be considered an “image of a dog.” The question we need to address is whether such an image could have the content “dog.” Moreover, we need to consider whether such an image represents an actual particular, namely, a dog that (we might assume) one is currently perceiving. I shall now argue that the image itself does not suffice to represent an actuality. Instead, the contents of the “image of a dog” are merely various qualitative contents (pertaining to shape and temporal features) and quantitative contents (pertaining to magnitude) described above, albeit with the addition of further empirical qualitative contents contributed by copies of sensations. In a slogan: the image does not suffice for representing an actual dog, because it is not an empirical intuition of it; and the image does not suffice to represent a dog as a dog, because it alone does not involve the representational resources required for representing empirical bodies as perduring and causally efficacious. Empirical intuitions and empirical concepts thus have specific roles that empirical images cannot fulfill.

As Kant emphasizes, representing dogs has special challenges that don’t arise in represent-
ing shapes or quantities. Whereas triangles reliably have three sides, dogs unfortunately do not reliably have four legs, nor do all dogs have faces with the same configuration of features. But like triangles, we might largely characterize the shape of a dog in terms of certain qualitative features of shape, like the curvature of its back and the general orientation of its neck. Beyond these static shape features, the dog changes shape over time as it moves.

The imagination associates representations to represent the shape of a dog. The unity here is again “accidental” in Kant’s sense, since the imagination is free to set the parts into different relations. This unity contrasts with the unity involved in representing substance-inherence relations, or cause-effect relations. For these latter relations do not involve relations among spatial parts; instead, they involve real relations between items falling under different metaphysical categories. The image of the dog does not “attribute” one spatial part to another spatial part as the “property” of some substance, nor does it represent one spatial part as “causing” another spatial part. Spaces do not inhere in spaces, and spaces do not cause spaces (nor do shapes causally influence shapes). So if my characterization of the image of a dog is correct thus far, it is clear that the image does not represent any item as a substance or as an item with causal powers.

Nevertheless, images can represent some aspect of actual dogs, for such images represent the qualitative and quantitative features that an empirical object might have. We need to focus on the differences between intuitions and images to understand this point. Neither images nor intuitions represent actualities as actualities—neither representation has substance-contents, causal-contents, or modal contents (pertaining to actuality, necessity, or possibility). But images are not intuitions. Images do not contain sensations as parts, while empirical intuitions do contain sensations as parts. Images do not have the component of an empirical intuition—sensation—in virtue of which empirical intuitions relate to actualities in space and time. Empirical intuitions, but not images, are representations that essentially relate to actualities. Images might be necessary for the cognition of

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24 This is not to deny that the cognition of causal relations ultimately depends on an “intuition” involving the “the motion of a point in space” (B292). My claim here is that though such representation is required for applying the concept of cause/effect to appearances, the content of this intuitive representation of motion is not itself a causal content, but instead an condition for applying a concept with causal content to appearances.
actualities, but they are not sufficient: concepts and empirical intuition are also needed. If I merely have an image of a dog or an image of a unicorn, I am not able to cognize any actuality—or even a possible actuality—merely on the basis of that image. All that I can cognize merely on the basis of the image are possible features of actualities.

It is helpful here to distinguish between two different aspects of such imaginational episodes. What Kung (2016) calls the qualitative content of the imaginational episode is specified by the content of the image. In our case, the qualitative content of the image is a grouping of the manifold given in the intuition into the representation of a shape. However, we can distinguish the qualitative content from the attributed content of the imagining. Attributed content is any content that goes beyond the qualitative content. For instance, suppose I imagine a certain person, Karpov, and that I form a mental image while imagining him. If I imagine that Karpov has an identical twin, I might produce two qualitatively identical images. These images would have contents pertaining to Karpov’s appearance. However, I can go on to stipulate that one image is of Karpov and one image is of Karpov’s twin. The attributed content distinguishes the two qualitatively identical images. I could stipulate other features of the imaginational episode that outstrip the qualitative contents of the image. I might stipulate that Karpov just beat Kasparov and is having a discussion about the French Defense with his twin.

For Kant, the image exhibits non-attributed, qualitative content pertaining to objects given in intuition. My image itself does not represent Karpov—the actual person in causal connection with other bodies—in its qualitative content. As far as the qualitative content of the image is concerned, the image is silent between Karpov and Karpov’s twin. Thus—and this is crucial—Karpov himself does not enter into the content of the image. An image has a qualitative content involving particular instances of relations between spatial, temporal, and qualitative features apprehended from the intuition.

This is an important result for Kant. For such an account sets significant limits on what the imagination’s images alone can obtain for cognition. If I have an image of a unicorn, I have

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25I am indebted to Rosefeldt (2019) for this distinction.
surely represented a set of possible features. For instance, the yellowness of the horn is a possible coloration of an empirical object—the fact that such yellowness is possible is secured, in the first case, by the fact that I cannot imagine yellowness without having an outer empirical intuition (a representation that essentially relates to actualities). Moreover, I can represent the shape of the unicorn’s legs, and such a shape is surely a possible property of an actuality (one might make a wax figure with precisely that shape). But what I have surely not represented with the image is the thing that unites all of these features together into one locus of causal efficacy that stands in mutual interaction with other things. Any such “imagining” of substance or causal contents is not the qualitative content of the image at all, but at best an attribution or stipulation that is superadded to an image that itself lacks such content.

Kant explicitly allows that we have such images that bear some objective qualitative content, but that nevertheless fail to relate to actual objects. In his argument for the Second Analogy, Kant argues that to have cognition of causally efficacious bodies, we need to be able to represent the temporal order of objects. However, the power of imagination by itself, which indeed involves a subjective order of successive representations, does not itself determine such an order: “the order of the sequence” of objects is “not determined in the power of imagination at all” (A201/B246). This would seem to entail that the representations that the imagination generates—images—should not necessarily (merely as products of the imagination) involve any relation to actual bodies. Indeed, Kant draws such a conclusion:

Contrariwise, if I were to posit that which precedes and the occurrence did not follow it necessarily, then I would have to hold it to be only a subjective play of my images [Einbildungen], and if I still represented something objective by it I would have to call it a mere dream. (A201-202/B247)

Kant here allows that there is some sort of content of “images”—something “objective” albeit a “mere dream”—that represents, say, shape and color. However, Kant points out that the objective content (the relevant shape and color content) is not exemplified by any actual body—that is, an actual object that perdures and bears causal relations to other objects. Yet though these contents
are not exemplified by actual bodies, these contents are nevertheless “objective” in that the images could exhibit an affinity characteristic of shapes and sensory properties of certain kinds. Images of triangles seem to be coherent wholes, even in hallucination; moreover, the content in question might very well have the intersubjective character that images exhibit that are produced in accordance with the laws of affinity (over and above the laws of association). So Kant himself introduces the perfectly intelligible category of representations that do not represent actualities, but which nevertheless exemplify certain objective and shareable contents—images.

Importantly, when Kant describes the argument he later gives that we do indeed represent actualities in the Refutation of Idealism, he takes care to note that these images are not to be confused with intuitions that do in fact relate to such actualities. In this section, Kant claims that we must distinguish the “mere receptivity of an outer intuition [Anschauung]” from the “spontaneity that characterizes every image [Einbildung]” (B277, note). And it is only outer sense, not the imagination, that is a “relation of intuition to something actual outside me” (Bxl, note). So Kant’s point in this further elaboration is that we might indeed be subject to dream-like images on occasion. Sometimes, we hallucinate objects when our imagination tricks us. However, the images are not to be confused with the empirical intuitions that do relate to actual objects.

We thus arrive at our result regarding the image of a dog: the image alone does not represent an actual dog, because it is not an empirical intuition of it; and the image alone does not represent a dog as a dog, because it alone does not involve the representational resources required for representing empirical bodies. Instead, the “image” of a dog represents possible features of actual bodies (in this case, possible features that really are instantiated in dogs).

The present account ultimately vindicates a Sellarsian picture of the relationship between sensing and imagining in perception. In his account of “image models,”26 Sellars respects the distinction I drew above between the senses (for him, “sensing”) and the power of imagination (for him, “imaging”). He takes both of these to be necessary for “perception,” which is a conscious representation of objects “as actualities.” Even when we do not sense “of” an apple its opposite

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side, say, its opposite side is present “by virtue of being imagined.”\textsuperscript{27} Image-models thus contain representations of “features” of objects that I am not currently sensing.\textsuperscript{28}

Sellars’ claims are supported by what we saw in chapter 3, namely, that images can “complete” or “fill in” features of objects, even if we are not currently sensing those features. Moreover, it is quite plausible that representing actual objects depends on the capacity to fill in and complete features that are not currently being sensed, as when one anticipates how objects will appear from different sides. Indeed, Kant himself writes that the “image of a city” involves taking together how it appears from many “points of view” or perspectives and “from many different sides,”\textsuperscript{29} so he believed that images are involved in representing absent features of objects. My account also agrees with Sellars’ emphasis that we do not “perceive of the object its causal properties.”\textsuperscript{30} For as I argued, images have qualitative and quantitative and sensory contents, but these contents—the contents that figure in perception (Wahrnehmung) in Kant’s own technical sense—are representationally silent regarding the causal and substantial features of the objects perceived.

In short, images are ingredients in cognition of actualities, but are not themselves sufficient for cognition of actualities. Moreover, though images depend on intuitions, intuitions have a different role from images in cognition of objects. Intuitions anchor images to actualities, while images manifest the affinity of the manifold—images represent parts of the manifold as “belonging together.”

\textsuperscript{27}Sellars (1978, §21). Cf. Young (1988, p. 142), who thinks of imagination as an “interpretation” of a mental image; in particular, he thinks it involves “interpreting something perceived (e. g., the line on the chalkboard) as something other or more than what it is perceived as being (e. g., as a lever).” As is clear below, I think Young’s view is far too restrictive, since perception itself contains images (cf. A120n).

\textsuperscript{28}As a point of clarification, we can also take perspectives on these very features. A perspectival representation is thus logically distinct from a representation that “binds” its sensory properties together. “Glint” (or, we might imagine, color) and “curviness” are properties of a champagne flute, whereas “how it looks” from different places is usually not considered a property of the champagne flute. Moreover, how the curviness or glint is perceived changes based on one’s perspective on those very features. “Perspectives” on x are not its properties, but ways those properties are presented. To borrow C.D. Broad’s famous example, there is an ordinary sense in which a penny looks round both when viewed straight on and when viewed at a tilt. Of course, there is also an ordinary sense in which the penny (or its roundness) looks different when viewed straight on instead of at a tilt.

\textsuperscript{29}As argued by Matherne (2015).

\textsuperscript{30}Sellars (1978, p. 15)
5.6 The Limitations and Applications of Images

The points from the previous section can be expanded. For just as images are necessary but not sufficient for cognition of actual objects, Kant accepts the more general claim that images are necessary but not sufficient for theoretical cognition per se. In the texts with which we began the chapter, Kant asserted that synthesis was necessary for assembling elements for cognition. But, he insists, such synthesis is not sufficient for cognition. For “to bring this synthesis to concepts is a function that pertains to the understanding,” not the imagination, “and by means of which” the understanding “first provides cognition in the proper sense” (A78/B103, my emphasis). Since such synthesis generates images, Kant’s view is thus that images still need to be brought to concepts in order for cognition to arise. The synthesis of the imagination “still does not yield cognition” (A79/B104). Beyond intuitions of sense and images of the imagination, concepts are “the third thing necessary for cognition of an object that comes before us, and they depend on the understanding” (A79/B104). Images are thus essential to our cognitive lives, but they are not the single most fundamental ingredient of cognition.

Images have a function in cognition that contrasts with that of both intuitions and concepts. In this section, I want to conclude by noting how images contrast with other phenomena in the Kantian corpus, as well as how they shed light on those phenomena. I shall begin by considering how images and the imagination interact with reason’s demand for knowledge of unconditioned objects in the Transcendental Dialectic. I then turn to Kant’s views of representations of the imagination in moral philosophy in the Critique of Practical Reason and in his theory of judgment in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. We shall see that an appreciation of images coheres with and better defines some of the central doctrines of these works.

5.6.1 Images and Pure Theoretical Reason

In his Stufenleiter taxonomy, Kant divides pure concepts into those that depend for their content on images and those that do not. He remarks that some pure concepts have their “origin
solely in the understanding,” while others have their origin “in a pure image of sensibility” (A320/B377). I take this to be a differentiation in what grounds the content of different concepts.\textsuperscript{31} Kant claims that certain concepts—the categories of the Analytic and the ideas of the Dialectic (and, presumably, moral concepts and ideas)—derive their content solely from understanding or reason considered in abstraction from sensibility.\textsuperscript{32} In contrast, other concepts depend for their content on a “pure image” of sensibility.

Kant’s famous contention is that the contents of pure concepts of the understanding (categories) are grounded in functions of judgment, while the contents of pure concepts of reason (ideas) are grounded in inferential forms of syllogisms (A321/B378). It is thus unsurprising that the content of such concepts is not derived from any image. But we can also note an asymmetry between the categories and ideas regarding images. Images can be brought to categories by means of schemata, in the sense that transcendental schemata corresponding to certain categories serve as laws for image formation. However, images cannot be brought to ideas in this way. Let’s look at this point more closely.

Kant introduces transcendental ideas by distinguishing the role of the understanding and the role of reason:

Now a transcendental concept of reason always goes to the absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions, and never ends except with the absolutely unconditioned, i.e., what is unconditioned in every relation. For pure reason leaves to the understanding everything that relates directly to objects of intuition or rather to their synthesis in the power of imagination. It reserves for itself only the absolute totality in the use of concepts, and seeks to carry the synthetic unity, which is thought in the categories, all the way to the absolutely unconditioned. (A326/B382-3)

This passage marks a distinction between understanding and reason by noting that the understanding, but not reason, relates to objects by means of a synthesis of the imagination. This point has several implications for understanding Kant’s theory of reason. Kant’s separation between under-

\textsuperscript{31}As opposed to grounding their mere generation; the categories might depend on the imagination for their generation (cf. A124).

\textsuperscript{32}See also Kant’s claim that schemata for the pure concepts of the understanding—the categories—“can never be brought to an image at all” (A142/B181).
standing and reason is largely due to the fact that reason seeks the “absolutely unconditioned.” The understanding applies its categories to objects of intuition, but these objects (appearances) are always dependent on (“conditioned” by) other things in one way or another. Reason’s task is to seek a cause for every event, an appearance that is yet further away than any that we have encountered, and ever smaller parts of physical objects.

Of course, Kant’s eventual claim is that we can never encounter the unconditioned in experience—we can never be “given” it in any cognitively satisfying why. But we can of course represent the absolutely unconditioned. We do so when we engage in transcendental philosophy, but we also do (at least implicitly, thinks Kant) when we engage in scientific inquiry. Yet if we can represent the unconditioned conceptually, then why can’t we be given such an unconditioned corresponding to it? After all, we are given infinite sensible objects in intuition, namely, space and time. And we can certainly think about absolutely unconditioned objects with discursive concepts, as we can with our concept of God. So the mere appeal to our sensible natures or our discursive intellects is not sufficient to exclude the possibility that we could be presented with an absolute totality of appearances.

I think Kant more exactly appeals to our imagination to account for our cognitive limitation regarding ideas of pure reason. Kant claims above that the understanding, but not reason, relates directly to the synthesis of intuitions by the power of imagination. I argued above that the synthesis of the power of imagination is, in the first place, an activity that generates mental images. So we should expect Kant to conclude that no image could be generated that corresponds to the totality of causes, or the totality of remote appearances, or the totality of parts of an appearance. And he does:

Thus we might say that the absolute whole of appearances is only an idea, since, because we can never project it in an image [im Bilde entwerfen], it remains a problem without any solution. (A328/B384; cf. A416/B444)

The reason that ideas (unlike categories) remain “problems” is that their alleged object—some “absolute whole of appearances”—is never “projected” or “drafted” as an imagistic representation. With the categories, pure sensible concepts, and empirical concepts, even if the imagination is
unable to generate an image that neatly corresponds to one of these concepts (as is the case of a 1000-gon), it can nevertheless project such an image. Such “projection” is made available to the imagination because it generates schemata—representations that serve as laws for image production. Because we have such schemata, we know what it would be to generate an image of a 1000-gon. However, we don’t have a solid imaginative grasp of what it would be to reach an appearance that limits the universe, nor do we have a solid imaginative grasp of what it would be to create an image that represents a universe that is infinite in extension.

So Kant’s thought is that ideas are radically incapable of imagistic representation because we lack a schema for representing even one instance of an object that falls under one of those ideas. In the world-whole—an idea that specifies a complete series of conditioning relations between different appearances—we do not know what the termination conditions are on such an imaginative process. The problem for the human imagination is that it lacks any representation of a procedure for image formation (a schema) that would yield such a complete series of conditions for a given conditioned object. As a result, concepts, but not images, are capable of representing unconditioned objects. If this is correct, then it immediately follows that we can think unconditioned objects, but cannot cognize them. For the image-producing sensible synthesis that generates the relevant content for cognition in these cases is lacking. The elements for such a cognition cannot be assembled.

5.6.2 Images and Pure Practical Reason

Turning to the Critique of Practical Reason, we find that Kant accords the imagination and images a different status. In the section of the second Critique entitled “On the Typic of the Pure Practical Power of Judgment,” Kant provides a number of contrasts setting apart theoretical judgement from practical judgement. Broadly speaking, this section discusses judgment in the sense of the activity by which objects are matched to (“subsumed under”) certain concepts. In the justified objective use of theoretical pure theoretical reason, we use categories provided by the understanding to think objects presented in sensible intuition. Schemata join sensible intuitions with the categories and other pure concepts. However, since the morally good is “something supersensible” and thus
cannot be presented in sensible intuition, schemata of the kind described in the first Critique cannot explain how the “law of freedom” relates to its object.\textsuperscript{33} Because the productive imagination generates schemata, it thus seems (as interpreters have often noted) that Kant bars the imagination from his account of morality.\textsuperscript{34}

I instead think that Kant means to make both a positive and negative claim regarding the imagination in this respect.\textsuperscript{35} On the one hand, negatively, Kant denies that the legislation of pure reason occurs by means of the imagination. This contrasts with the legislation of the understanding, which legislates via the imagination. Kant thus writes regarding the legislation of the moral law:

\begin{quote}
[a] Thus the moral law has no cognitive faculty other than the understanding (not the power of imagination) by means of which it can be applied to objects of nature, and what the understanding can put under an idea of reason is not a schema of sensibility but a law, [b] such a law, however, as can be presented in concreto in objects of the senses and hence a law of nature, though only as to its form; this law is what the understanding can put under an idea of reason on behalf of judgment, and we can, accordingly, call it the typus [Typus] of the moral law.
\end{quote}

Part [a] asserts that the even though the concepts of the understanding are relevant for applying the moral law to the sensible world, the imagination is not involved in such an application. The “form” of laws of nature render the moral law apt for application to the sensible world, not the “matter” of such laws; the imagination belongs on the “matter” side of this particular form/matter distinction. What reason receives from the understanding is not an image-involving schema but what Kant calls a type or typus. A “typus” or “cast” is itself traditionally understood as an “image.”\textsuperscript{36} Kant is thus invoking a metaphor: just as images of the imagination present sensible objects to the categories (in the understanding), so too does a typus or type present sensible objects to moral concepts (in reason). The former, but not the latter, relies specifically on the imagination.

But positively, the imagination is broadly important for the symbolic exhibition of morality in judgments of the beautiful in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Kant’s tune is less anti-

\textsuperscript{33} KpV, 5:68
\textsuperscript{34} This has been argued by Johnson (2016), who takes Kant’s eviction of the imagination from moral theorizing to mark a key break between Kant and the sentimentalists, especially Adam Smith.
\textsuperscript{35} What follows is sympathetic to the broad view put forth in Deleuze (1984, chapter 2).
\textsuperscript{36} Cf. Kant’s own use of the term in this way (MSI, 2:405).
imagination in this work. He claims that the “play of the faculties of cognition” actually “promotes the receptivity of the mind to moral feeling,” and such a play is itself partially constituted by activities of the imagination.\(^\text{37}\) The play of these faculties is expressed in both judgments of beauty and judgments of the sublime, and Kant thinks that both of these judgments have a moral function:

Both, united in the same subject, are purposive in relation to the moral feeling. The beautiful prepares us to love something, even nature, without interest; the sublime, to esteem it, even contrary to our (sensible) interest.\(^\text{38}\)

So Kant thinks that the imagination is essential for moral feelings of one kind or another and thus for the human appreciation of morality. This positive point is compatible with Kant’s claim that the legislation of the moral law is not mediated by the imagination in the way that the legislation of the laws of nature are mediated by the imagination. Though images are not involved in the legislation of the moral law, they are relevant to how aesthetic judgments make us receptive to moral feeling. I will close the section by noting briefly how Kant extends his discussion of images in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* on this point.

### 5.6.3 Images, the Power of Judgment, and the Human Understanding

Kant’s discussion of the “ideal” of beauty relies heavily on his conception of the imagination as a power for exhibition (*Darstellung*) of objects. Kant again contrasts such ideals of beauty—or an “ideal of the power of imagination”—from ideas or concepts of the reason.\(^\text{39}\) Kant claims that these ideals can be represented in a “model image” that corresponds to no particular image generated on the basis of actual particulars, but that instead “averages” them into an *ideal* object. So, for instance, the “stature for a beautiful man” can be represented because the imagination “knows how to reproduce the image and shape of an object out of an immense number of objects of different kinds, or even of one and the same kind.”\(^\text{40}\) The imagination can generate entirely new model

\(^{37}\) *KU*, 5:197  
\(^{38}\) *KU*, 5:267  
\(^{39}\) *KU*, 5:232  
\(^{40}\) *KU*, 5:234. Cf. *R* 323, 15:127: “We ultimately draw an originary image out of all objects of the same kind [Wir ziehen aus allen Gegenstanden von einerley Art endlich ein Urbild].”
images from previously generated images, which are themselves generated from intuitions of the senses. These model or “normal ideas” can differ between individuals as well as—and here Kant’s racialized conception of the imagination becomes apparent—between “a Negro” and “a white” or between a “Chinese person” and a “European.” Since such ideals of the imagination are not determined by shareable concepts, Kant concludes that we should expect intersubjective differences in our imagined ideal of certain objects like the ideal human form.

The third Critique makes use of the general framework I have introduced in this dissertation. For Kant consistently distinguishes in that work between sensation and form of our empirical intuition—a contribution of the senses—and the apprehension of these aspects of empirical intuition—a contribution of the power of imagination. As Kant writes in the introduction to the third Critique, the imagination contrasts with both judgment and understanding in that it is the faculty for “apprehension” of the object.\(^{41}\) Kant doubtlessly refers to “intuitions of the imagination” at points in this work, but we are now in a position to see that these representations, as images, differ from the “intuitions of the senses” also mentioned throughout that work.\(^{42}\) Such intuitions of the imagination are central to Kant’s account of “exhibition” as well as his account of the “expounding” of appearances and his marking off of a domain of “inexponible representations of the imagination” that arise during the “free play” of the imagination.\(^{43}\) So beyond providing ideals of beautiful objects, images of the imagination are also components of states that do not contribute to cognition but do contribute to aesthetic judgment when the imagination is in free play.

Kant’s final reflections of the nature of the human understanding in the third Critique are centered around images in a way that is rarely appreciated among interpreters. In section 77, entitled “On the special character of the human understanding, by means of which the concept of a natural end is possible for us,” Kant differentiates an “ectypal” from an “archetypal” understanding, as we saw in chapter 1. He there claims that the human or ectypal understanding is discursive, that is, an

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\(^{41}\) *KU*, First Introduction, 20:220

\(^{42}\) E.g., *KU*, 5:252, 254

\(^{43}\) *KU*, 5:343
“image-dependent understanding.” The account of images provided above provides a broad sketch of how to understand this claim. We saw above that for Kant, the imagination serves as one of the grounds of the human understanding, along with apperception and sense. On such a story, Kant does not agree with Hume that the imagination is the primary or sole ground of human understanding; for Kant, thought also requires apperception. The faculty derived from both power of imagination and apperception—the productive power of imagination—produces images and schemata that connect intuited appearances with concepts of various kinds.

Kant’s point is that our intellect essentially depends on images and the imagination for the presentation of objects to concepts. We can at least conceive of an intellect that is not like this. For such an intellect, particulars would actually be “derived from” universals. Such a being would have no use for an imagination, because such an intellect would already contain within itself principles by which it could read off or “derive” the method by which particulars are to be found (or better: generated) that correspond to such principles. Such an intellect is thus an arche—an origin of particulars; in contrast, the human intellect is an ectype—a cast or copy or typus of particulars. This language brings out that an ectypal understanding thinks objects given from an external source, namely, sensibility. Through the process of image formation and schematizing, such objects can be thought by an ectypal intellect. So if the human understanding is ever to think objects, it must be joined with a faculty that “runs about” or “roams” (dis-currere) a manifold. This faculty, the imagination, generates intelligible copies of those objects (pure and empirical) that are given by the senses.

Images thus play a role in transcendental philosophy for Kant because they are built into his very conception of the human understanding and the human mode of cognizing objects. As I have argued, Kant thinks that what sets the human understanding apart from the divine understanding is not intuition per se, but rather the human reliance on images. The account of images provided in this chapter provides particular significance to Kant’s claim that

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44 KU, 5:408
45 KU, 5:406
however exalted the application of our concepts, and however far up from sensibility we may abstract them, still they will always be appended to imagistic representations [bildliche Vorstellungen], whose proper vocation [Bestimmung] is to make these concepts, which are not otherwise derived from experience, serviceable for experiential use. . . . If from this concrete act of the understanding we leave out the addition [Beimischung] of the image [des Bildes] . . . then what is left over is the pure concept of understanding, whose range is now enlarged and contains a rule for thinking in general. It is in just such a way that general logic comes about[.]

My suggestion has been that without images, we may very well possess concepts, but we would not enjoy theoretical cognition.

\[SDO, 8:133\]
Conclusion
I have argued that Kant has a theory of images as products of the imagination (the Image Thesis). In contrast, intuitions are products of the senses alone (the Strong Independence Thesis). He thinks that images and intuitions are fundamentally different representations (the Distinctness Thesis); additionally, images are not to be conflated with concepts or schemata. Animals and humans both enjoy images, though some of the images that humans have can factor into cognition, while none of the images that animals have can. Our capacity for apperception or consciousness makes a difference in the structure of the images that factor in cognition (the penetration view). Finally, images are a necessary condition for thinking the objects presented in intuition. Consequently, images are a condition on human cognition in both experience and in theoretical domains like mathematics and natural science (the Image-Centric Cognition Thesis). We are left with a novel account of sensibility—the counterpart of the understanding—that recognizes Kant’s systematic discussion of mental imagery.

I want to conclude with a brief discussion of two things. First, I will consider how plausible Kant’s resulting view of images is as a component of a theory of cognition. Second, I will indicate why Kant’s faculty psychology is of importance to philosophy and psychology more generally.

6.1 Kant’s View of Image-Centric Cognition: Evaluation

As I have argued, Kant is not a reductionist about the imagination. He thinks that the intellect and the imagination are different faculties of the mind, whatever other relations they might have. So unlike an empiricist like Hume, Kant simply denies that concepts are “faint” images. Moreover, Kant thinks that a whole class of concepts—the “pure” ones that do not depend on a “pure image”—do not depend on images at all. This is compatible with the idea that all (empirical and theoretical) cognition depends on images, because Kant believes that we can have thoughts with image-independent concepts without thinking about any particular intuited object.

Sensibility and understanding cooperate to give us cognitions of objects. Kant does allow that we have philosophical cognition from principles. But those cognitions, though they are not
of particular objects, are nevertheless justified by reflection on our empirical cognition of objects. Many of the components of empirical cognition, it turns out, are a priori in their origin; it is here that the imagination is able to expand our cognition beyond the objects that we actually experience to possible features of objects of experience. Images of the imagination, along with intuitions and concepts, are indispensable for theoretical cognition for Kant.

Kant’s theory of cognition is anchored to both what we sense and what we can imagine. Starting in the 1970s, the “mental imagery debate” has drawn into question whether mental imagery really does play an essential role in cognition. This debate has extended to include both everyday phenomena like numerical cognition, spatial cognition, and perceptual cognition as well as more rarefied phenomena like cognition of possibilities and necessities. I think Kant has a unique position in this debate. For on the one hand, Kant does think that the imagination is central to knowledge. But on the other hand, Kant thinks that pure images and pure intuitions are a source of cognition, so mental imagery for Kant is not slave to sensation as it is for certain empiricists.¹

For instance, consider a Kantian view of spatial cognition—an area in which mental imagery is frequently invoked. As I have argued, Kant does not think that pure intuitions are imagistic representations. The pure intuition of space is supramodal in that it does not depend on a particular sensory modality (either touch or vision suffice for a pure intuition of space for Kant). The pure intuition of a blind person is qualitatively identical to the pure intuition of a paralyzed person. What, then, are pure images? Pure images are sensation-independent images. They could be visual, as when I visually imagine a triangle of no particular color. Though it is more difficult to imagine pure images in the tactile case, such pure images also seem possible there too, as when I imagine moving my arm without any particular ambient temperature, texture sensations, or perception of moisture. These pure images give us information about the visual and tactile presentations of shapes, but they do so without relying on any particular set of visual or tactile sensations. Even though they have modality-specific information, they evidence features of the supramodal pure intuition of space. We cognize a supramodal space by means of sensation-independent pure images.

¹E.g., Prinz (2012) puts forth a sensation-centric empiricist view of mental imagery and perceptual consciousness.
This view is not completely alien to contemporary psychology. For instance, Knauff (2013) argues that spatial reasoning depends on spatial layout models. These layout models are neither descriptive nor conceptual in structure. They are also not mental images. Instead, a spatial layout model is “a metamodal integrated mental representation that can capture the spatial information from different input modalities such as vision, touch, hearing, and language.”

Like Kant, Knauff posits a non-conceptual supramodal spatial representation, and like Kant, he takes spatial mental imagery to depend on this distinct metamodal representation of space.

However, Knauff and Kant disagree on two instructive points. First, Knauff thinks that images are not essential to spatial reasoning; he thinks that they even tend to impede spatial reasoning. Kant disagrees on this point and sides with pro-image advocates like Stephen Kosslyn. Kosslyn (1994, p. 404) thinks that it is “clear that imagery plays a critical role in many types of reasoning,” especially spatial reasoning. For Kant, images are required for spatial reasoning. Even for shapes that apparently exceed the capacity of our imaginations, Kant still thinks that our concepts of those shapes ultimately refer to some process of image formation. As Kant describes it, when Archimedes described a 96-sided shape, he was not engaging in image-independent thought. Instead, Archimedes grounded his concept of a 96-sided shape in the pure intuition of space, not in that “he actually drew it (which would be an unnecessary and absurd demand), but rather, in that he knew [kannte] the rule for the construction of his concept.”

This rule, plausibly specified by a schema, “proves” that the concept of such a shape describes a really possible property of an object (some empirical object could have 96 sides). Moreover, it proves that even though capacity limitations on (among other things) our working memory prevent us from forming an image of a 96-sided shape, nevertheless we are aware that forming an image of such a shape would simply involve an iteration of the everyday process of forming an image of a triangle, quadrilateral, or pentagon. That’s what Kant means when he says that concepts of such objects have “reality” because

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2 Knauff (2013, p. 35)  
3 Knauff (2013, p. x)  
4 UE, 8:212
they are shown to be suitably related to the “use of the imagination.” Images do not impede spatial reasoning; instead, even in those cases that seem to exceed our capacity to form images, image formation is essential to thinking about spatial objects and features.

Second, Knauff thinks that the metamodal representation of space is constructed. As I have argued, Kant would disagree that our most fundamental spatial representations are constructed, for the pure intuition of space is an unconstructed representation grounded entirely in the “mere receptivity” of the subject. Moreover, the pure intuition of space does not depend on the kinds of sensations that we have or the contingent features of the empirical world. For Kant, the pure intuition of space is both a priori and unconstructed—it is the experience-independent construction base for the construction of all of our other spatial representations.

Many readers of Kant think he gets into trouble if he thinks that the pure intuition of space is both unconstructed and a priori. One notable critique comes from Hermann von Helmholtz, who took the particular features of perceptual space to be contingent. He argued brilliantly that (for instance) non-Euclidean spaces were certainly imagineable and possible, in contrast to the standard reading of Kant on which space is necessarily Euclidean. Helmholtz instead claimed that our basic representation of space—though not abstracted from our visual or tactile sensations—nevertheless depends on the particular “will impulses” the cause the body to move and consequently generate new sensations. Spatial representations are generated from qualitatively primitive elements: the feeling that accompanies will impulses along with the visual and tactile sensations that arise from bodily movements caused by the will impulses. For Helmholtz, spatial representations are constructed from elements that are not themselves spatial. On my reading of Kant, pure intuitions are not constructed from anything, and they do not depend on any sensations or qualitative elements like feelings. This might seem like a bug of Kant’s view if perceptual space has contingent features that depend on learning and the contingent features of our world. Helmholtz himself gave a perceptual interpretation of what it would be like to have visual perceptions in a world with non-zero

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5UE, 8:212
6See Helmholtz (1867, 3:204-7, 209). Hatfield (1990) provides an excellent discussion of Helmholtz’s relation to Kant on the topic of spatial representation.
curvature—a world in which you would sometimes get glimpses of the back your head without the aid of a mirror. But Kant seems to eliminate such a perceptual world a priori.

Perhaps the complete package of Kant’s views regarding the necessity, a prioricity, and non-constructed character of space is indefensible. But the fact that Kant distinguishes between images and intuitions gives his theory more durability than one might realize. For the essential features of space as intuited are quite minimal: it is an infinite given magnitude, it is “a priori” or sensation-independent, it is an intuition, and it represents items “outside and next to one another” (B38). As far as the pure intuition is concerned here, it is indeterminate what the geometry of the space is. Kant does think that the pure intuition of space is a necessary condition on geometric cognition, and he thinks that geometric axioms and propositions are necessary and a priori (B40-1). But that might simply be because our pure images of geometrical figures—figures that we construct via the imagination—represent a three dimensional space.

This suggestion is admittedly speculative, and I am unsure whether it is really Kant’s view. But a Kantian could maintain that we have some experience-independent and unconstructed representation (the pure intuition of space) that underdetermines what the geometry of the space is that we describe. In turn, we could form different pure images of space, such as an image that represents a space of non-zero curvature (as Helmholtz did), or an image the represents a space with zero curvature that obeys the Euclidean distance measure (as Kant did), or even an image that represents other non-Euclidean spaces. Maybe Kant’s mistake was in underestimating what we are capable of imagining spatially. At minimum, once we appreciate the role of images in Kant’s philosophy, we are better able to consider which part of sensibility Kant took to be the guarantor of the necessity of the propositions of Euclidean geometry.

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7 Kant puts forth a related distinction between metaphysical and geometric space (UK, 20:410ff.). For discussion, see Tolley (2016) and Tracz (2020).
6.2 Imagination and Kant’s Psychology

Interpretation of Kant’s philosophy of mind is balkanized. For a while, the balkinazation took the form of the conceptualism/non-conceptualism debate. Though this debate has died down, it has not and probably never will go away. But in one respect, I think that it is a symptom of a bigger-picture interpretive problem.

Several interpreters affiliated with certain colleges in the Midwest think of Kant’s account of the mental faculties in a way we might call instrumentalist. That is, they tend to view Kant’s distinctions between faculties of the mind like understanding and sensibility—and a fortiori between understanding and imagination—as convenient fictions that help us tell a story about how we come to know things. The real center of the Kantian mental economy is experience, and Kant posits faculties as methodologically useful fictions to help us theorize about experience. Intuitions and concepts are really “abstractions” from what is an absolute unity in experience. Others, the realists, take Kant at his word that faculties of the mind are causal powers that (in many cases) interact with other powers in the mind and in the world. Instrumentalists call these realists “layer cake” theorists because realists think that understanding and sensibility make different, irreducible, and (at least in some ways) independent contributions to human experience and cognition. According to the realist, Kant thinks “experience” or “empirical cognition” is a literal combination of elements, at least some of which are not altered by being constituents of experience.

I have argued that the realist Kant is the real Kant. Kant thinks that the powers of the mind are real and distinct causal powers that the representations that we enjoy. Yet I also take the instrumentalist point that human perception is different in virtue of our having an understanding and a capacity for apperception or consciousness. But I resist the instrumentalist conclusion that we do not literally share imaginations and senses—in a word, a common sensibility—with animals. There is a real layer of perception that rational humans share with animals, as well as with humans and even ourselves when we are in pathological or irrational states of mind.

If we take realism about Kant’s talk of faculties seriously, then there are a rich set of ques-
tions regarding how the senses and the imagination interact. One lingering question is how precisely *inner sense* and *imagination* relate to one another. I have argued that imagination and inner sense are different faculties of the mind. However, there is a significant tendency to conflate the functions of imagination and inner sense with one another. Some recent accounts of inner sense take the apprehensional activity of the power of imagination to be a “shuttle service” between outer sense and inner sense, transferring representations from outer sense to inner sense. But this characterization is at best incomplete. For one, it says nothing about the imagination’s role as image maker. For another, it remains unclear why apprehension’s main job is to chauffeur representations from outer sense into inner sense. Kant instead says that apprehension by the imagination takes impressions, not into *inner sense*, but “into its [own] activity”—that is, into the power of imagination (A120).

Then there’s a big picture question: why should Kant care about his faculty psychology—indeed, why should anyone care? On this front, as I suggested in chapter 4, Kant thinks there is a real distinction between perception and cognition, as do many contemporary psychologists and philosophers of mind. On the realist view, sensibility and understanding are distinct and irreducible faculties of the mind of the mind. But sensibility is a divided house. As I have suggested, while the *senses* are not penetrated by apperception, the *imagination* is penetrated by apperception. Since apperception is a ground of the understanding and thus cognition, the imagination is influenced by our capacity for cognition. However, the fact that the imagination is influenced by our capacity for cognition does not mean that the imagination is nothing other than our capacity for cognition. In fact, that’s the whole point of saying that it is *penetrated by* apperception: the imagination has its own representations, but those representations can be modified by other “higher” faculties. To take

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8Liang (2020, p. 325) writes: “Since inner sense . . . is essentially related to apprehension and phenomenal consciousness, a further conclusion can be drawn that the scopes of attention, apprehension, inner sense and phenomenal consciousness coincide.” Liang claims that imaginative apprehension “takes the obscure products of outer sense into inner sense” (Liang, 2020, p. 322). This recent “shuttle” or “chauffeur” view of inner sense is due to the tendency, exemplified especially in Valaris (2008) and Merritt and Valaris (2017), of taking an example Kant provides of affection of inner sense (namely, attention, at B156-7n) and making it into the very purpose of affection of inner sense. Even then, it is unclear why apprehension as a component of attention is what makes something a “modification of the mind” in the first place; as I described it in chapter 2, our intuitions (even our inner intuitions) have obscure parts to which we are not attending. It’s not that they aren’t parts of our mind, but that they are parts of our mind to which we are not attending (or of which we are not conscious).

9Burge (2010) and Block (2018) both provide synoptic and influential accounts of this distinction.
Kant’s example, a priest perceives a pair of steeples where a woman perceives two figures, even though they both only see the moon through a telescope. To take a contemporary example, a police officer might form an image of a gun when all he empirically intuits is a banana. Forming an image of a gun on the basis of intuiting a banana is epistemically different from forming an image of a gun on the basis of intuiting a gun. But these epistemic differences are erased on the instrumentalist view. For on the instrumentalist view, the components of the tripartite model—sense, imagination, and apperception—are just convenient and useful fictions that philosophers use to describe what is really an irreducible whole, namely mind or Geist. Similarly, there is no way to isolate a layer of experience in which all the police officer literally sees is a banana.

Kant thus takes our sensory systems and our capacity for mental imagery to be two different subsystems of sensibility. Put in this way, Kant’s views can be seen as continuous not only with views in contemporary philosophy of mind, but also with some of the earliest views in German academic psychology in the 19th century. In fact, as Hatfield (1990) and Beiser (2015) have documented, there is a whole tradition after Kant that resists the “darker” or more “metaphysically speculative” or “rationalist” tendencies of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. This less-explored strand of Kantianism includes early philosophical psychologists like Jakob Friedrich Fries, Johannes Müller (of Müller-Lyer fame), Johann Steinbuch, Hermann Lotze, Friedrich Eduard Beneke, and Hermann von Helmholtz. Among other things, these philosophical psychologists tried to tease apart the contribution of sensation from the contribution of mental imagery to cognition. Focusing on the role specifically of images in their epistemology is a topic for future research. But it stands to bear fruit, particularly because writers like Lotze and Helmholtz often refer to images produced by a metamodal perceptual faculty, even though they frequently dispense with term “imagination” to name the faculty that produces images. Nevertheless, the distinction between sensations, images, and concepts was maintained consistently among these authors. This dissertation suggests that Kant is the rightful patriarch of this movement in philosophical psychology.

Finally, further work is required to determine how our imaginations actually influence the nature of our intellects. Again, the imagination and the intellect are different powers of the mind for
Kant. But is the nature of our intellect influenced by the nature of our sensibility, or the nature of our imaginings? It seems that Kant is committed to saying yes. As I noted in chapter 5, Kant thinks that discursive understandings (like those of humans) are different from intuitive understandings (as a divine mind would have). But I have not given more than a preview of how concepts themselves would reflect this difference, or how the nature of our concepts systematically links up to the nature of our sensibility for Kant. Nevertheless, I have indicated that an answer to this question will require one to consider two fundamentally different aspects of sensibility: the intuitions that our senses generate and the images that our imaginations generate.
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