Chapter 1

Trust, Mistrust and Distrust in Diverse Societies

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INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I explore some of the roles of trust, mistrust, and distrust in deeply plural or diverse societies. Section One sets out the features of deeply diverse societies that provide the contexts of trust and distrust. Section Two proposes that social relationships in diverse societies need to have two qualities to be full of intersubjective trust (trustful) and, thus, worthy of trust (trustworthy) of the members of the relationships: cooperative and contestatory quality, and self-sustaining and co-sustaining quality. Section Three suggests that such trustful relationships are grounded in and draw on a second type of trust: pre-existing co-operational trust. Section Four argues that trustful relationships and co-operational trust are co-sustained by a third type of trust: an interactive ethics or ethos of trust of the members within which they exercise judgements of trust and mistrust. These three types of trust form a triad that sustains virtuous (autopoietic) systems of trust and peacefulness (nonviolence). Throughout the sections the features of virtuous systems of trust are contrasted with vicious systems of distrust.\(^1\)
1 SIX FEATURES OF DIVERSE SOCIETIES

This section sets out the features of deeply diverse societies that provide the conditions of the modalities of trust, mistrust and distrust explored in the following sections. In this and the following sections I draw heavily on the ongoing research of the Group for Research on Plurinational Societies (GRSP) and associates. 

First, GRSP studies societies composed of criss-crossing and overlapping social relationships that constitute multiple forms of association and identification: ways of life or cultures broadly speaking. There is not only a plurality of forms of association and identification of various kinds. They also overlap and interact in complex ways (complex or diverse pluralism). These associations include not only formal legal, political and economic associations such as states, indigenous and settler nations and nationalist movements, provinces, territories, municipalities, regions, corporations, cooperatives, unions, official minorities of various kinds, political parties, NGOs and voluntary associations. They also include informal associations and identifications, such as economic classes, persons with disabilities, persons of colour, racialized minorities, gender, sexual orientation, pan-indigenous decolonization networks, social and ecological movements of various kinds, the myriad local-global networked associations, and so on. Studying this multiplicity of forms of association and identification has brought into being and sustained a learning curve from the initial focus on big and powerful forms of association and identification to the growing awareness of the depth and diversity of other forms of association and identification within, across and alongside large majoritarian and minoritarian associations.
Second, to study the lived experience of this complex lifeworld is to study the interdependent and interactive relationships of power, knowledge, authority and identity formation of members, both within the overlapping associations and among associations. Through participation in these multiple relationships that govern our conduct we come to have the corresponding forms of self-formation and self-awareness (identity) of our subject positions in the various associations. These relational identities usually come along with stereotypical contrastive identities of the members of other associations. These relationships – whether formal or informal, direct or representative – are ‘relationships of governance’ in the general sense Foucault gave to this phrase. They govern the ways we (individually and collectively) recognize and interact with each other and, reciprocally, we govern each other through interacting in and over them. They are normalizing and normative. They are also accommodating or ‘federal’ relationships in an equally general sense and to varying degrees. That is, the diverse members of relationships of governance within and among associations inhabit the relationships they bear in diverse ways, just as in the specific case of legal federal relationships (Karmis and Norman 2005; Burgess and Gagnon 2010; Gagnon and Tully 2001).

Third, a central concern of GRSP is to study the dynamics of interaction within and over these relationships of cooperation. The dynamics of interaction include the many types and cycles of cooperation, contestation, reconciliation, cooperation and recontestation: for example, working together, grievance, dissent, protest, struggle, negotiation, conflict resolution or irresolution, implementation or non-implementation, review and beginning again. These are the agonistic and democratic activities of individual and collective subjects of these always imperfect relationships of governance.
through which these subjects become free, active and responsible co-agents of them, seeking to test them and, if necessary, negotiate their modification or transformation over generations as circumstances change and new injustices and social suffering come to light. They are carried out through the courts, parliaments, constitutional change, referenda, truth and reconciliation commissions, reasonable accommodation commissions, civil disobedience, boycotts, non-cooperation, revolution, enacting alternative ways of living socially and ecologically, and, at the ground of it all, the everyday negotiation of the relationships in which we live and interact, and on which we all interdepend. Following Merleau-Ponty and Taylor, GRSP calls all these discursive and non-discursive (embodied) dynamics of interaction among humans and also non-human forms of life ‘dialogical’ in a general and ontological sense, and then studies specific types of dialogical interactions (see Section 4.6).

Fourth, although research began with the powerful actors and high profile contests over perceived injustices, it soon expanded to the expression or repression of voices of the powerless who were either outside and unrecognized by these contests or silenced within by the actors who claimed to represent them. It became obvious that appropriate forms of dialogical mutual recognition and participation of ‘all affected’ by the perceived injustice at issue are essential for reasons of justice, stability and trust. Running roughshod over the less powerful, presuming agreement or feigning consultation in each stage of the contest creates further injustices: non-recognition and mis-recognition. These generate distrust, resentment, enmity and further conflict. In a word, deep diversity joins hands with ‘intersectionality’ (Dhamoon 2009; Maclure 2000; Murphy 2012).
Fifth, among the ‘all affected’ by these human systems of social relationships are the ecosystems in which they are deeply embedded as subsystems and in which they are interdependent, yet which they are systematically destroying at an unprecedented rate (Brown 2011). Therefore, it is no longer possible to study systems of social relationships without studying their positive and negative interrelations and interactions on the ecological relationships on which they depend. The study of social relationships should thus include the study of socio-ecosystems. This insight joins together social and ecological justice (Rees 2010). Moreover, the deep diversity of ecosystems that has sustained life on earth for the last three billion years is similar in some respects to the diversity of human social systems. Thus, it may be possible to learn some lessons on how to design sustainable social systems and sustainable relationships of them to ecosystems from listening to and learning from how ecosystems have sustained life on earth (Capra 2004; Rees 2010; Heinberg & Lerch 2010; Tully 2018a).

Sixth, the conclusion GRSP, the Supreme Court of Canada and many others draw is that contests over social relationships of cooperation are a permanent feature of diverse social and socio-ecosystems in an imperfect world. Accordingly, nonviolent dialogical practices of civic engagement of all affected need to be built into the social relationships of free and democratic associations: that is, into the cycles of dissent, negotiation, implementation and openness to renewed dissent and negotiation. Since these practices are themselves systems of social relationships, they too must be open to contestation. Such practices of listening (audi alteram partem), ‘negotiation’ or ‘engagement’ (broadly defined) have come into increasing use in the last decades and they are another focus of research. For example, practices of citizen participation and consultation, mediation
practices, participatory budgeting, deliberative democracy, treaty negotiations between indigenous peoples and settlers, the representation of damaged and threatened ecosystems in negotiations over resource development, the duty to consult across the private and public spheres of contemporary societies, practices of transitional and transformative justice in pre- and post-conflict situations, and new practices of engagement beyond consultation.\textsuperscript{3}

In summary and transition, these are the demanding conditions under which any form of association and identification can present itself as a ‘we’ and exercise their constituent powers acceptably and fairly in circumstances of interdependent diversity. To exercise power together acceptably and fairly in these conditions, I will argue in the following sections, is to exercise it in trustful ways. Trust is the aspect of these social relationships that renders them ‘sociable’ (socialitas) rather than unsociable or anti-social. Trust ‘animates’ sociable relationships and the ethos of sociability of the participants.

We can already see from the GRSP research summarised above that one primary quality of such sociable and trustable relationships is that power is exercised cooperatively and agonistically (non-agonistically) \textit{within} associations and in cooperation and contestation \textit{with} other interdependent associations. This quality is examined in the next section. However, to see its importance it is necessary to be mindful of the premise on which it is based. This premise is the primacy of forms of interdependency that run through all six conditions of the complex lifeworld in which we live. Interdependence renders unacceptable and unfair the dominant modern understandings, theories, exercises and institutionalisation of agency, constituent power, representation, self-determination and sovereignty based on presumptively independent
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actors (such as states, governments, private corporations, peoples, movements, atomistic individuals). The living reality of these complex interdependent conditions is a pragmatic refutation of these dominant understandings. Indeed, as we see in the following sections, the exercise of power by self-presumptively independent agents in the face of diverse protests is the cause or exacerbation of the injustice and distrust that give rise to struggles over non-recognition and mis-recognition (Cf: Way et al. 2018; Marin 2017).

If this is correct, then it is necessary to look beyond the dominant modern theories and institutions and the discordant dynamics of vicious interaction they generate or exacerbate, and look towards the deep diversity they misrecognize and the practices of civic engagement that are emerging in response. Researchers should begin from within the actually existing contextual world of diverse interdependency and practitioners should set aside declarations of sovereign independence and work with declarations of interdependence-and-(negotiated relational) independence if they are to co-sustain fairness and trust within the conditions in which we live (Borrows 2002, 2016; Murphy 2012; Nootens 2013; Oklopcic 2014).

2 TWO QUALITIES OF TRUSTFUL RELATIONSHIPS

This section examines two qualities of social relationships that make them trustful. These qualities are: (1) democratic, in the direct sense of co-operative and contestatory, and (2) federal, in the sense of self-sustaining and co-sustaining modes of living together. These two qualities help to generate and sustain intersubjective (relational) trust and well-being among the partners. These trustful relationships are co-dependent on co-operational trust
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and the trustful and truthful ethos of the partners. These three components are examined in three separate sections so it can be seen how each contributes to co-generating and co-sustaining virtuous social systems.

The different dynamics of interdependent interaction begin in everyday encounters in relationships of deep diversity. These are more interdependent than is often realized. They are not strategic relationships between two separate, distrustful actors who see each other as instruments to be manipulated. They are also not encounters in which two separate actors recognize each other as free and equal subjects and exchange reasons in conditions of secure mutual trust. Before these reflective, secondary representations of human interaction are imposed over the relationship, the partners are already in more basic, non-reflective and often non-linguistic, perceptual and dialogical relationships of interdependency and interaction from birth onward. Following Merleau-Ponty, let us call this primary, embodied perceptual dialogue we are always in with the human and non-human world through our senses (synaesthesia) ‘perceptual interdependency’ (Abram 1997, Harding 2013). This is how Mary Parker Follett introduced it into the social sciences and the study of diversity and conflict in the 1920s (Follett 1924: 62):

I never react to you but to you-plus-me; or to be more accurate, it is I-plus-you reacting to you-plus-me. “I” can never influence “you” because you have already influenced me; that is, in the very process of meeting, by the very process of meeting, we both become something different. It begins even before we meet, in the anticipation of meeting. On physiological, psychological and social levels… response is always to a relating. Accurately speaking the matter cannot be expressed
even in the phrase used above, I-plus-you meeting you-plus-me. It is I plus the-interweaving-between-you-and-me meeting you plus the-interweaving-between-you-and-me, etc., etc. This pregnant truth – *that response is always to a relation*, the relation between the response and that to which the response is being made – is the basic truth for all social sciences (my italics).

This complex, reciprocal and cyclical perceptual interdependency of interweaving and interplay is constitutive of the intersubjective experience of being-with others. Whether the partners generate trustful and peaceful relationships through virtuous cycles of reciprocal interaction or distrustful and aggressive relationships through vicious cycles of antagonism depends in part on whether they become aware of this interweaving of their identities in the course of their interactions or whether they hold fast to atomism: the false belief that their individual and collective identities exist prior to and independent of encounter and interaction.

Given the deep forms of interdependency in deeply diverse societies and the demands for practices of civic participation in response to their unfairness and unacceptability, it seems to follow that a trustful relationship would have the following two qualities.

2.1 *Democratic, cooperation and contestation*

*First*, the relationship would invite and enable the members to participate in the cooperation of the relationship and in the contestation and negotiation of the practices and
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institutions of co-operation in their diverse ways (Tully 2018a: 291-317; Wiener 2014). As GRSP researchers have argued, this relationship of cooperation and contestation is considerably more than having an opinion about the relationship, exchanging opinions in the public sphere in hopes of influencing representatives, engaging in protests to try to catch the attention of our governors, voting from time to time, and other devices of representative citizenship. It is also more than the ‘co-ordination’ of interaction. All affected are invited to have a say and a hand in the actual co-operation of the relationships among them: discussing-with, negotiating-with and exercising power-with each other. It is thus a ‘democratic’ relationship in the participatory sense of ‘democracy’ as a form of association in which the people themselves (demos) exercise the powers of self-government together (kratos). The members are not only subjects of the relationship but also engaged citizens/authors of it.

This type of co-operative and contestatory relationship brings into being and sustains a unique type of power relationship: power-with. To say all ‘have a say and a hand’ is just to say that they participate in co-organising and co-exercising nonviolent relationships of power with each other. They co-operate and co-contest their relationships as they carry on. This directly democratic type of power relationship is as old as the first self-organising human community and as recent as the global proliferation of cooperative, ‘horizontal’ associations of associations today (Tully 2014a: 3-102; Ouziel 2015). It is the everyday type of power relationship that, in countless varieties, creates and sustains society and sociability, and underlies all other types of power relationship. Although ubiquitous, it is often overridden, degraded and overlooked by two predominant types of power relationship that are based on the often violent separation of interdependent
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humans into rulers and ruled, or governors and governed, and the establishment of power-over relationships (Arendt 2005; Tully 2018b).

The first type of power-over is modelled on victory over another in a war or violent struggle (power as violence or force) or on non-democratic law-making and law-enforcing (power as coercion). One actor exercises power over others in a relationship of command and obedience. In this juridical and military model of power-over the subjects have no say or hand in the co-exercise of power-with others. They are dis-empowered on the presumption that they have consented to delegate their powers of self-government to those with power over them. If the subjects wish to have a say, they have to do so outside the power relationship; in the public sphere, voting, going to court, protest, civil disobedience, and so on. They cannot have practices of civic participation in the relationships by which they are governed directly without beginning to transform the relationship itself into a power-with relationship.

The second type of power-over relationship is the strategic hegemon-subaltern relationship between unequal partners. Modelled on the logic of warfare, the more powerful actor or actors permit the weaker actor or actors to have a limited say and hand in the relationship and to exercise some constrained powers of self-government; but the hegemon retains, or, more accurately, interacts to retain, the final say and upper hand. The hegemon either profits from the exploitation, insecurity and arms-and-surveillance race of continuing this unequal game (informal imperialism) or, if this becomes too costly, dreams of imposing a command-obedience relationship once and for all. The subalterns, if they play the game, try to get what they want through servility, flattery and toadying; or to overthrow and replace the boss; or simply to escape. If they wish to transform the game
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into a power-with relationship, they non-cooperate and self-organize co-operative associations of collective action and regime change (Tully 2018b).

Although these two types of power-over relationship are predominant, power-with relationships exist in informal relationships of everyday life to varying degrees. Associations of co-operative and contestatory relationships permeate activities of working together, interacting and resolving disputes nonviolently both within and around the public and private spheres of institutionalised power-over relationships (Sennett 2012). This was Kropotkin’s great insight in opposition to both Marxism and liberal capitalism at the beginning of the twentieth century (Kropotkin 2006). More recently Arendt argued that, while the dominant power-over governance relationships systematically degrade the power-with relationships that sustain human communities, they parasitically dependent on them (to repair the damage they do to human communities), and thus collapse without them (Arendt 1970).

In almost any situation in contemporary societies all three types of relationship are present. However, the authority of power-over relationships, insofar as they are authoritative, is not based primarily on the will of the sovereign, the expertise of the commander, the imperative quality of commands, the force to enforce commands, the superior strategy of the hegemon, or even the force to protect. All these misrepresentations conflate power with force and violence and thereby conceal the intersubjective world of power-with. Insofar as a power-over relationship is authoritative, its authority derives from the way the governor relates to the governed and from the processes of authorization through which power is conditionally delegated and authorized, as Laden has shown (Laden 2012, 2014a; Luxon 2013). When these features
are absent, its authority ‘dissolves’, force replaces legitimate power-over, and power reverts to the people who conditionally delegated it to their representative. They then exercise it directly, in the form of power-with, as Locke classically argued and successful revolutions since Locke have substantiated (Tully 1993: 9–70). This shows the primacy of power-with relationships.5

The principle that ‘all affected’ should have a say and hand as much as humanly possible simply extends power-with relationships from within associations to relationship among them. Hence, the meaning of ‘all affected’ is that everyone affected is a ‘relation’ or ‘relative’: the bearer of a relationship of interdependency. This follows from the dense types of interdependency in conditions of deep diversity. ‘We are all connected,’ and ‘all affected’ are ‘all my relations’ or my ‘neighbours’. There are countless gradations of relatives and countless ways of grading them; but there is no affected other who is not in some sense a member of this global family or federation of interdependent beings. There is no other who is different in kind: no one who is not a kin to be approached with kindness. None of the familiar binaries of modern political thought apply: friend-enemy, civilized-savage, inside-outside, and so on. We are not first abstract and separate individuals, nations, corporations, states, peoples, species, civilizations, with or without universal rights and duties, who then decide to consent to treat each other as friends or enemies, insiders or outsiders, and act accordingly. We are always already interdependent members of the human ‘family’ in dense relationships of kinship, as the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights puts it. Overlooking this feature is one of the primary injustices of modern, independence-based political thought and practice (Tully 2018a).
Like the general principle of ‘do unto others’ from which it derives, the principle of ‘all affected’ is not prescription, but, rather, an ideal and general orientation to conflict and resolution. It cannot possibly be operationalised perfectly to every affected person and association of present or future generations in cases of any complexity. All responses in real time and circumstances will be less than perfect – works in progress. Accordingly, the orientation enjoins the actors to be as inclusive as possible in coming to a resolution and to ensure that the resolution is always open to disagreement, dissent, recontestation and re-negotiation in the future by those who were not properly included. Hence the equiprimordiality of both cooperation and contestation under this orientation: that is, agonistic democracy (Tully 2008a: 291–316; 2008b: 91–124; Simpson and Tully 2012; and see Section 4.6–8).

I hope this brief analysis shows that this type of power relationship is an essential feature of living together peacefully and trustfully in the conditions of interdependence and deep diversity. It invites and enables members of all kinds of associations to co-operate and contest in their relationships in ways that appear to be fair and acceptable to them. It is well known that this type of relationship generates and sustains mutual respect and trust among the members, as long as they adopt the corresponding ethos. But this is not all (Murphy 2012).

It is manifestly also a trustful relationship – full of intersubjective trust. It is the type of relationship that trusts its members to cooperate and contest together in conciliatory and trusting ways; ways that reciprocally sustain the democratic relationship between them. By inviting and enabling this kind of participation the relationship literally gives its members ‘the gift of intersubjective trust’. The dimension of intersubjective trust
animates the relationship and helps to generate solidarity among members. We can say that the participants are ‘in intersubjective relationships of trust’ in co-operating and contesting. This shared ground of intersubjective trust makes possible the various types of subjective trust, mistrust and distrust of the participants as they co-operate and contest (Section 4).

2.2 Federal self-sustaining and co-sustaining freedom

The second quality of a trustful relationship of cooperation and contestation in conditions of diversity is its federal quality. This quality derives from the old adage that if diverse people wish to live in peace and security they need to learn to get along with their neighbours. Federal relationships, in the way that they have been developed by GRSP, are the response to this need. The democratic quality of the relationship invites and enables all affected, and thus all neighbours, to participate, and to do so in their own diverse ways (Tierney forthcoming). This is standardly conceived as a federal relationship of ‘self-rule and shared ruled’. While this is important, there is another aspect of federal relationships of equal importance and often overlooked: the dual quality of the members’ ways of life being self-sustaining and co-sustaining.

This dual sustainability quality enables and frees the members to co-operate in the association in accord with their own diverse ways of life and to contest the federal relationships if they impose a dominating, colonizing, subordinating or assimilative relationship over them. Simultaneously, the reciprocal responsibility of all members is to organise and sustain their own diverse (political, economic, cultural) ways of life in such
a way that, through their cooperative and contestatory interdependency, interaction and mutual accommodation, their ways of life also co-sustain the diverse ways of the lives of their neighbours.

This unique dual quality of self-sustaining and co-sustaining is definitive of federalism in conditions of interdependency. It is the meaning of the concepts ‘symbiosis’ (living together) and ‘symbiogenesis’ (creating new federal systems through living together). The term ‘symbiosis’ originally developed to describe the ways different human communities learned to cooperate and co-sustain each other prior to the modern state system. It was transferred to the life sciences where it is now used to describe how the diverse and interdependent forms of life on earth have co-evolved and become more complex over the last three billion years by sustaining themselves in ways that co-sustain other interdependent forms of life. The general idea is the same for human systems (Capra 2004: 230–1). Sustaining the associations to which one belongs in ways that co-sustain the associations they affect and on which their well-being is interdependent go hand in hand.

This kind of federal relationship was famously described by Marx as “an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all” (Marx and Engels 1998: 26). Marx used it in contrast to his depiction of the antagonistic relationships of mutual distrust and exploitation of states, corporations, classes and individuals in the global capitalist system. He was mistaken in believing that a war between capital and labour and the seizing of power-over would bring such an interdependent association of associations into being. Class warfare continues antagonistic command-obedience and strategic relationships into the new regime. It was
Kropotkin who renamed these federal relationships of free association and development “co-operative” relationships of “mutual aid” or “mutual care.” He showed that they already exist all around us in thousands of voluntary associations of diverse kinds despite the dominance of competitive states and corporations: “another world is not only possible but actual” (Kropotkin 2006). This influential thesis has been the basis of co-operative associations and global federalism-from-below ever since (Restakis 2010). Gagnon gives a picture of this complex associational freedom and co-development in Canada today (Gagnon 2012).

This unique type of federal relationship of mutual aid is interpreted by indigenous peoples as the gift-recognition-gratitude-reciprocity relationship or, simply, gift-reciprocity. Each member’s way of life is organized in such a way that it does no harm to its neighbours and provides some goods or services that help to sustain them. The neighbours recognize this gift as a gift and experience the emotion of gratitude. Gratitude moves and freely obliges the recipients to reciprocate by giving their gifts of mutual aid to the same or other neighbours; thus setting in motion a virtuous gift-reciprocity cycle that co-sustains all relatives.

This view of sustainable social systems is manifested in the Potlatch system of the Northwest Coast and in the international system of treaty negotiations and treaty federalism between indigenous and settler nations throughout North America (Asch 2014). The negotiations always begin with the exchange of gifts so the parties are mindful of the type of relationship they are negotiating. Moreover, Indigenous peoples insist that they did not invent this system. Rather, like life and earth scientists today, they observe the gift-reciprocity relationship in the symbiotic and symbiogenetic ecological
relationships of interdependency that co-sustain and co-evolve non-human forms of life, and they learn from this how human associations should relate to each other (Mills 2018; Tully 2018a).

This kind of federal relationship among diverse ways of human life is mutually beneficial in yet another way. Through their interactions the members learn of the diverse practices of their neighbours, borrow and trade practices and inventions with each other, and interpret and use them in new ways in their own cultures. These federal interactions initiate and sustain processes of cross-cultural ‘diffusion’ and more complex networks of interdependency and co-evolution, and these processes work against the counter-tendency to separation, distrust and antagonism.⁶

Finally, ecological and social systems of self-sustaining and co-sustaining federal relationships are ‘far from equilibrium’ and prone to tipping points. Countless species become aggressive rather than conciliatory, destroy the species and ecosystems on which they depend and thereby destroy themselves. Many human civilizations and sub-systems have done the same. We have known since the 1970s that the aggressive political and economic social systems that have become dominant over the last four hundred years (the Anthropocene) are doing the same today: bringing about the sixth mass extinction of hundreds of thousands of species and ecosystems and destroying the conditions that sustain human life. However, it is important to realize that the more predominant form of living system in the course of the co-evolution of life over three billions years, and over the last 200,000 years of Homo-sapiens, has been the self-sustaining and co-sustaining form, or life would not have survived (Dilworth 2012; Wilson 2013; Gandhi 2009: 89).
This self-sustaining and co-sustaining federal quality of interdependent social relationships complements and strengthens the intersubjective trust generated by the democratic quality. It gives the trust relationship substantial content. It is the trustful and trustworthy quality that enables the partners to co-survive and co-evolve together. These two qualities are not only possible, but actual in various degrees in the lived experience of complex human associations in so far as intersubjective trust exists within and among them. For example, at its best, Webber argues, the Canadian constitutional federation, in all its historical deep diversity and complexity, manifests these qualities in varying degrees (Webber 2015).

3 THE CO-OPERATIONAL GROUNDS OF TRUSTFUL INTERACTIONS

Just as doubt presupposes some intersubjective propositions that are not in doubt; disagreement presupposes intersubjective agreement on some background propositions in which we tacitly trust; and contestation presupposes some intersubjective cooperation; so too subjective and reflective judgments and acts of trust, mistrust and distrust presuppose some degree of background, intersubjective trustfulness that is taken for granted and goes without saying in the reflective activities (Lagerspetz and Hertzberg 2013). In addition to the two intersubjective qualities of trust in Section Two, there is a complementary type of tacit intersubjective trust: co-operational trust.

Biologically, trust, as Maturana explains, “is the spontaneous manner of being of any living system when in comfortable congruence with the medium. When this comfortable congruence disappears, another manner of relating comes to the fore, and we
distinguish fear, doubt, or aggression, rather than trust.” In the case of humans, he continues (Maturana 2008: 214–5):

[A] baby is born in the operational trust that there is a world ready to satisfy in love and care all that he or she may require for his or her living, and is therefore not helpless. And, indeed, if the baby is received in the manner that fulfils that trust, both the baby and the mother (and other members of the family) are in natural well-being.

This co-operative trust is not only trust in the dialogical relationships of mutual love and kindness between baby and caregiver, but also in the “medium” of ecological gift-reciprocity relationships we saw in the previous section – the “biosphere and cosmos to which we belong as natural members of the animal world” (Ibid).

Co-operative or caring trust is the culturally diverse form of non-reflective, embodied know-how or savoir-faire (or savoir-vivre) that a baby tacitly acquires through the loving care of his or her caregivers. This practical know-how grows with the child and enables him or her to learn how to participate interactively in social relationships throughout life (Maturana 2010: 215):

When a child is loved, and he or she must be loved at least by one adult person, he or she exhibits the embodied knowledge of our biological constitution as Homo sapiens-amans [loving or caring humanness], and becomes an active basic participant in the recursive systemic conservation of the biology of love.
In these loving relationships a child acquires the abilities to play the many childhood games of cooperation and contestation, agreement and disagreement, trust and mistrust that enable him or her to play the adult games in the same conciliatory and, if necessary, reconciliatory spirit.

In contrast, much of human suffering arises through the loss of tacit co-operational trust through the disruption and distortion of the systemic coherences of human and ecological relationships and the irruption of distrust, fear, and aggression (Maturana 2008: 215):

Our patriarchal culture, in its continuous and insisting penetration into child upbringing through its demands on both mothers and children for competition and success, and through its glorification of violence and aggression, interferes with the biology of love in the mother/child relation and in the child’s growth into adulthood. As a result, mistrust, aggression, and arrogance become the main generators of anti-social behavior in modern life as they totally contradict love, which is the emotion that constitutes social living (my italics).

When this occurs systematically, during childhood and later, as in patriarchal modern society, the erosion of co-operational trust and its virtuous social systems is overridden or replaced by anti-social and aggressive behaviour and the vicious social systems it generates and sustains: *Homo-sapiens-aggressans* (anti-social aggressiveness)
(Maturana 2008: 84–140; Cf: Gilligan 2018). On this view, therefore, co-operational trust in relationships is the ground of humanness and sociability.

In so far as humans acquire co-operational trust *savoir-faire* in childhood, they bring it with them into many everyday social relationships beyond the family and often persist in projecting it over disruptions that arise, drawing on its nonviolent means of dispute resolution to resolve them (Gandhi 2009: 88–99). These are the informal cooperative social systems of mutual aid and nonviolent contestation that sustain communities and relations among communities (Shiva 2005). They persist even when they are dominated and nearly destroyed by the larger social systems of ruthless competition, exploitation, ecological destruction, aggressive behavior, imprisonment, violent video games and endless wars that feed parasitically on their social capital (Solnit 2012). Furthermore, in their daily activities humans also non-reflectively ‘project’ this primary mode of being-with-others onto direct and mediated social relationships with complete strangers; treating them trustingly, unless and until this tacit trust is disrupted. If this were not the case, if distrust were primary, we would be unable to engage in these daily activities (Hawley 2012: 1). Finally, as above, every breath and step we take, and every drink of water and taste of food rests on the tacit co-operational trust provided as gifts by the ecosystems of the living earth that are good for us and take care of us, unless and until we learn otherwise (Commoner 1974).

This embodied co-operational trust is known by many names in different traditions: mutual love, interbeing, care, biophilia, *ahimsa*, *caritas*, *philia*, compassion, friendship, neighbourliness, kindness, and so on. My point is that it is a basic kind of intersubjective and interactive trust we have as earthlings and human beings. If I am not
mistaken, it is drawn on, developed and transformed in the two qualities of intersubjective relationships of trust. It also plays a similar basic role in the complementary subjective ethos of the members of these relationships: the ethos of trust.

4 THE ETHOS OF NONVIOLENT TRUSTFULNESS

The third and final source of virtuous social systems of trust is the members’ ethos of trust that corresponds to and complements the two qualities of relationships of intersubjective trustfulness and draws on and develops the savoir-faire of tacit co-operational trust. This ethos of trust completes, co-enacts and co-sustains virtuous social systems. It is the ground of individual epistemic and ethical judgments and action of trust and mistrust within them.

An ethics or ethos in this sense is an embodied mode-of-being-in-the-world-with-diverse-others. It is grounded in the non-reflective co-operational trust savoir-faire of the previous section, but goes beyond it in many respects. Ethics or ethos in this sense is a particular kind of embodied non-reflective and reflective, non-linguistic and linguistic, perceptual and conceptual, participatory dialogue in and with the lifeworld – of becoming aware of the affects of one’s actions and interactions on all of one’s relations. “In other words”, Maturana suggests, “ethics is a network of doings and emotioning in which the care and concern for the consequences of one’s actions on others is present in what one does, and one acts in a way that entails accepting the consequences of that care and concern” (Maturana 2008: 181). Ethos or ethics in this sense comprises the modes of
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_inhabiting_ social and ecological relationships in virtuous ways (Tully 2018b). It not only sustains existing trustful relationships. It also enables the members to prevent these relationships from tipping over into systematically distrustful relationships. Furthermore, it is the means by which vicious systems of distrust can be transformed into virtuous systems of trust.

It is a _trusting_ ethos in the present continuous sense that it takes trustful relationships and co-operational trust as the ongoing ground of humanness and sociability. It is a settled mode of being – of trusting in one’s relationship with oneself and others. The whole ethos is an _initiatory gift_ to others that awakens gratitude and invites reciprocity (Macy and Johnstone 2012; Mansbridge 1999; Laden 2013). Prior to and more important than recognition, it says to another that they are ‘welcome.’ It is universally manifest in an outstretched open hand in contrast to the taunt closed fist. But it is not trusting in an idealistic, abstract or foolhardy way. It accepts the inevitability of vulnerability, uncertainty, conflict, suffering, injustice, unfairness, distrust, manipulation, force and fraud. Indeed, it invites and enables others to bring these ills to the awareness of all affected and to address to them. Yet it does so in a distinctive way. Like all ethics, this one requires the cultivation of certain qualities of character and conduct. These are the qualities that show to others that the person is trustworthy; not manipulative, threatening, or counterfeiting trustworthiness. The central qualities are, as Gandhi exemplified, trustfulness, peacefulness, truthfulness (_parrhesia_), compassion, empathy, conciliatoriness, courage, receptivity, and perseverance in the face of distrust and violence (Gregg 2018: 49-72; Tully 2018c: xxxiii-li).
Beyond the qualities of character, the first and perhaps most important feature of the trusting ethos is the relation between means and ends. It is based on the realization that the ways employed to respond to conflict, suffering and injustice must themselves manifest the ends they are employed to bring about. The reason for this is that many means and ends are internally related: means are pre-figurative and constitutive of ends to a large degree. Thus, just as a plant grows from an appropriate seed, peace is brought about by the seeds of peaceful means, democratic relationships by democratic means, and trustful relationships are brought about in conditions of distrust by trusting means – by means that manifest a trustful ethos. There is no way ‘to’ peace and trust; peace and trust are the way: means are autotelic (they manifest and bring about the ends) (Gandhi 2009: 80–1; Huxley 1946; Arendt 1970; Gregg in Tully 2018c: xxxv).

This autotelic view of means and ends has been developed over the last two hundred years in response to the failures of the dominant view that means are instrumentally and contingently related to ends, and, thus, evil means can and often must be used to bring about good ends. This view, promoted by Hobbes, Kant, Darwin, Freud and their many followers, is based on the rejection of the premise that humans are naturally sociable and trustable. Rather, on this influential version, humans are asserted to be naturally anti-social: separate, antagonistic, untrustworthy and insecure, and thus in a natural state of war with each other. Given these conditions, radical distrust is prior to trust. Accordingly, in Kant’s words, “man is an animal who needs a master” who coercively imposes a structure of command-obedience legal and economic relationships
over others by means of war (and other vicious forms of antagonism such as “enviably competitive vanity and insatiable desires for possession or even power”). Wars of conquest and expansion gradually spread the modern state-form of structures of laws around the world over societies that do not have the state form and thus are in a state of war. This civilizing process progressively provides the necessary “guarantee” of peace, security and trust in some distant future (Kant 2009). The two instrumental means-ends dogmas of modernization follow from this general structure of argument: war and war-preparation are the means to bring about and protect peace and security; and the authoritarian imposition of command-obedience relationships is the necessary means to bring about representative government and mutual trust within states and eventually between them. States retain the right to prepare and go to war but only for self-defence.

Rather than bringing about a world of peace, security and trust, we now know from four centuries of experience that this system of distrustful and violent means generates a security dilemma (or distrust dilemma) that produces and reproduces the vicious, interlocking military-industrial systems and cycles of war-preparation, war, violence and counter-violence, and more war preparation. This is the constitutive ‘security dilemma’ at the centre of the modern world system of international relations between sovereign states. Nietzsche was among the first to show why the system does not bring about peace. It is worth quoting in full because it captures the initiation and logic of interaction of vicious systems of distrust and aggressiveness, not only among states, but among distrustful actors of many kinds (Nietzsche 1986: 380–1).
No government nowadays admits that it maintains an army so as to satisfy occasional thirst for conquest: the army is supposed to be for defence. But that means to reserve morality to oneself and to accuse one’s neighbour of immorality, since he has to be thought of as ready for aggression and conquest if our own state is obliged to take thought of means of self-defence; moreover, when our neighbour denies any thirst for aggression just as heatedly as our state does, and protests that he too maintains an army only for reasons of legitimate self-defence, our declaration of why we require an army declares our neighbour a hypocrite and cunning criminal who would be only too happy to pounce upon a harmless and unprepared victim and subdue him without a struggle.

This is how all states confront one another: they presuppose an evil disposition in their neighbour and a benevolent disposition in themselves. This presupposition, however, is a piece of inhumanity as bad as, if not worse than, a war would be; indeed, fundamentally it already constitutes an invitation to and cause of wars, because, as aforesaid, it imputes immorality to one’s neighbour and thereby seems to provoke hostility and hostile acts on his part.

That is, the presupposition of distrust generates a vicious dynamic of interaction of deepening distrust, insecurity, aggressiveness, violence and counter-violence, and more war and war-preparation in times of ‘peace’ that is then said to be the solution to the distrust and insecurity the first step generates. Moreover, the power-over relationships, aggressive ethos and strategic thinking constitutive of the military-industrial complex deeply influence the ethos of the members of the societies involved. The members of the
most violent societies tend to become the most insecure, distrustful, fearful and aggressive in their own relationships. Radical distrust appears to them as the human condition, thereby re-affirming the necessity of the vicious system and causing them to overlook and erode the background, intersubjective, co-operational trust that makes social life possible (the boomerang or blowback-effect of militarisation). When peace activists, such as Tolstoy, Einstein, Russell, Gandhi and Huxley point this out, defenders of the system, such as Freud, reply that their ‘discontents’ with the present seeming lack of progress are a sign of weakness and that we all must stay the course of ‘savage wars of peace’ for the peace and trust that we must believe is to come in some distant future (Freud 2002). For, as Kant argues, these vicious means are what ‘nature herself’ employs to move humanity from a savage world of distrust to a moral world of trust (Kant 2009: 108). More war, distrust and war preparation follow.

The lesson to be learned is an old one: distrust begets distrust and violence begets violence. According to Nietzsche, as also Jesus and Gandhi, the only way to break out of a vicious system of distrust is, first, to become aware that the whole system rests on a radical disposition of distrust: “the so-called armed peace such as now parades about in every country is a disposition to fractiousness which trusts neither itself nor its neighbour and fails to lay down its arms half out of hatred, half out of fear.” The next steps are to realise that “the means to real peace … must always rest on a disposition for peace” and for the strongest to enact this disposition of peace and trust by renouncing violence as the means of self-defence and unilaterally disarming: “we shall shatter the sword – and demolish it entire military machine down to its last foundations.” The “supreme maxim” that one must live in order to move from the dispositional ethos of distrust and violence to
the ethos of trust and nonviolence is: “better to perish than to fear and hate, and twofold better to perish than to make oneself hated and feared” (Nietzsche 1986: 380–1). That is, in my terms, one must always be prepared to resist the siren songs of fear and hatred of the latest enemy; to reach out to the other with an open hand rather than a closed fist; and to present them with the gift of trust if we wish to initiate a reciprocal virtuous system of reciprocal nonviolent cooperation and contestation. Trust begets trust and nonviolent contestation begets nonviolent contestation.

Although Nietzsche’s analysis of the dynamic of distrust is of enduring importance, we know much more today about wars among unequal states and state-seeking actors (civil wars, violent revolutions, terrorist movements) and about the global military-industrial-political-media complexes and arms races that support them. In the 1960s Arendt and others argued decisively that the vicious global system is irrational and tending towards mutual destruction; that it is based on distrust and the false premise that evil means lead to good ends; and that the only alternative is the politics of nonviolence (Arendt 1970). Since then, we have learned much more about the power of nonviolence to overthrow unjust regimes and to replace the politics of violence and counter-violence (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Tully 2014b: 238–48; Gregg 2018; and section 4.3).

### 4.2 Inviting and enabling dissent

As we saw with regard to the first quality of virtuous relationships in Section 2, the first correlative responsibility of the trust ethos is to invite and enable dissent; not only in the representative institutions designed for this purpose, but also in the specific relationship in
which it occurs. In deeply diverse societies, it is only through the dissent of those who are suffering from injustices that others can learn of the way that the interdependent relationships in which they participate are harming these relatives, as, for example, in their producing and consuming relationships. Moreover, when the dissent is enacted in the specific relationship in which the suffering occurs, as, for example, strikes and boycotts, it has the potential to open that relationship, which is usually a type of power-over, to dialogue and contestation, and thus to democratisation from within. These direct forms of dissent often require the support of those not directly affected to move the powers-that-be to listen and hear what is being said. For these reasons, dissent is seen as a gift, and encouraging it as a fitting reciprocity. This is not to agree or disagree with particular cases, but to make possible a fair hearing by being open to it in a trusting way.

4.3 Receptivity: the step of nonattachment

The next step is to be receptive: to present the dissent or, reciprocally, to listen so as to hear the social suffering that is being presented; to recognize it for what it is. This is arguably the most difficult step to learn. Although suffering an injustice and hearing of an injustice in which one may be complicit are very different (as we see at the end of this section), both are often perceived as disruptive of social relationships. In each case, in different ways, one’s mode of being is experienced as disrupted by another, discordant mode of being (Howes 2009: 74–97). There are two general types of response: nonviolent and violent. The nonviolent response is to mobilise the resources within one’s co-operational trust, in the virtuous social relationships, and in one’s cooperative and
contestatory ethos, to present or respond trustingly – to offer the gift of trust in one’s comportment. The violent response overrides a trusting response. Let’s examine this first as it is more familiar.

The violent response is a mostly non-reflective bodily counter-disposition to respond aggressively: with anger or fear in dissenting response to suffering and with angry or haughty denial, dismissal or discredit in response to dissent. This dynamic of knee-jerk reaction and counter-reaction is hardened if the injustice, dissent and response occur in deeply diverse societies that are caught up in the war system and its domestic effects described above, as most are. The dissent and the response tend to come to cognition and expression in terms of ‘stereotypes’. A stereotype in this sense is a way of recognizing and representing oneself and the other that is given by the associations to which one belongs, and one’s subject positions within them; as an identity and a contrastive identity of those who do not. It separates them and draws lines of enmity rather than amity for them. Moreover, as Bohm argues, it is not only or primarily discursive; it is woven into one’s emotions, dispositions, ways of behaving and relating to others. It is a view projected onto the world and a way of acting and interacting within it. This whole habitual apparatus does the responding for us. It is even possible and not uncommon, especially in cases of racism, sexism and xenophobia, to put on a quite different public face when challenged, while nevertheless being conducted in one’s conduct by the covert, embodied force of the stereotype (Bohm 2010: 52–9).

If we give in to this dynamic we are on our way to a vicious cycle that can lead from stereotyping and misrecognition, through the escalating to and fro of aggressive interaction to physical and systemic violence and war. In *Practicing Peace in Times of*
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*War*, Chodron describes this dynamic disposition in the following way (Chodron 2006: 55–6):

[The Tibetan word ‘*shenpa*’] points to a familiar experience that is at the root of all conflict, all cruelty, oppression, and greed. The usual translation is ‘attachment’, but this doesn’t adequately express the full meaning. I think of *shenpa* as ‘getting hooked’. Another definition is…the ‘charge’ – the charge behind our thoughts and words and actions, the charge behind ‘like and don’t like’… [For example] somebody says a harsh word and immediately you feel a shift. There’s a tightening that rapidly spirals into mentally blaming this person, or wanting revenge, or blaming yourself. Then you speak and act. The charge behind the tightening, behind the urge, behind the story line or action is *shenpa*.

Stereotypes of ourselves and others become closed views in order to secure ourselves from the discordant way of being of the other. Each member’s perspectival view of the intersubjective world becomes instead a presumptively comprehensive view of an omni-subjective world – the solipsistic world of distrust. A growing attitude of self-righteousness reinforces the presumptive rightness of their worldview and their ‘heart hardens’. The other responds in kind; setting in motion the sort of vicious antagonistic cycle of mutual misunderstanding diagnosed by Nietzsche. If we bear in mind the complex interweaving and interplay of human interaction given by Follett and others earlier, we can see that this kind of response can irrupt in any social relationships whatsoever, even in the most intimate relationships when one partner misunderstands or
unwittingly insults the other. If it not reconciled by the ethos of trust, it can spiral out of control.

Accordingly, to practice peace and trust in times of war it is necessary to cultivate a counter-disposition that enables people to detach themselves from the ‘charge’ of the stereotypes given to them by their subject positions in deep diversity before they can begin to listen and hear. This involves the difficult work of reconnecting with and drawing on the resources that the ‘charge’ overrides (the resources of intersubjective and ethical trust of the first type of response); or, better yet, cultivating the ethos of trust so it withstands the charge in the first instance. Chodron gives a number of ethical practices that enable practitioners to withstand or detach and reconnect, and, thereby, open their hearts to the other: courage to wait, patience, living with insecurity, meditation, and compassionate abiding. These solitary practices can be more powerful than shenpa, but not without mutual aid of the dialogical resources discussed below. The first step is simply coming to realize that aggression begins with the individual being emotionally catapulted into the kneejerk distrustful reaction – a reaction that separates humans, overrides and effaces their background interdependency and intersubjective trust, and positions them as antagonists. That is, it places them in the classic modern political scene of mutual distrust and presents it as primordial. It effaces the lifeworld it disrupts, just as the vicious social systems it generates efface the underlying symbiotic social systems on which they depend.

Merleau-Ponty provides a crucial insight into this phenomenon (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 355):
With the *cogito* begins the struggle between consciousnesses, each one of which, as Hegel says, seeks the death of the other. For the struggle ever to begin, and for each consciousness to be capable of suspecting alien presences which it negates, all must necessarily have some common ground and be mindful of their peaceful co-existence in the world of childhood.

I take Merleau-Ponty to mean that dominant theories and practices of human struggles begin with ‘stereotypes’ of mutual distrust as if they are primordial. It is only once we cognize and re-cognize another living being as an alien and suspicious (untrustable) consciousness in threatening relation to ourselves as a separate consciousness (the ‘cogito’ effect) that the various types of antagonistic struggles for existence, recognition and so on follow. And, crucially, taking this as our fundamental way of being in the world overlooks, overrides and undermines what lies beneath it in the lived experience of human beings: the intersubjective and interdependent ‘common ground’ and the shared experience of “their peaceful co-existence in the world of childhood.” The peaceful co-existence in the world of childhood is his description of co-operational trust (Section 3). Rather than letting themselves be interpolated into violent struggles, they have the capabilities to be “mindful of” this intersubjective common ground of co-operational *savoir-faire*, to connect or re-connect with it, and to enact it in a trusting, truthful and cooperative way of interacting with each other. This human capacity to draw on the intersubjective trust of childhood in adulthood “remains an indispensable acquisition underlying that of maturity, if there is to be for the adult one single intersubjective world” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 354). The capacity to draw on this ground of trust, and on the lived
experience of co-operative ecological and social relationships of intersubjective trust in which it is enacted, varies enormously. Nevertheless, it exists and is the condition of an intersubjective and peaceful world.\(^8\)

Now, what is the ethical difference in responses between those suffering injustice and those responsible or complicit for it? As we saw in the section on means and ends, all parties have good and compelling ethical and pragmatic reasons to respond by being peaceful, trustful and just. This nonviolent mode of being is the ground of bringing about peace, trust and justice more widely. However, there are crucial differences between them. Actors responsible for injustice and interdependent bystanders who are often complicit beneficiaries of the injustice seem to me to have unconditional responsibilities (response-abilities) to offer the gift of trust openly, nonviolently and truthfully. Even when they receive an aggressive dissent from those suffering injustice they surely have a duty to turn the other cheek and try again and again. They should see this rebuke as a gift that enables them, depending on their ethical tradition, to exercise their forgiveness, mercy, magnanimity, or the courage of truthfulness: to live up to the platitudes they espouse.

While the oppressed have the same, compelling means-ends reasons to dissent nonviolently, they do not seem to me to have an unconditional responsibility to do so. How many persons have the courage and discipline of a Gandhi, King or Thich Nhat Hahn to be prepared to die but never to kill; to “perish rather than hate and fear”? If the oppressed dissent aggressively it is up to the oppressors and the complicit to understand where this is coming from and to respond with the courage of compassion until they gain their trust. In the world of violence, exploitation, lies and repression by the powers-that-
be, to demand that the oppressed take the first nonviolent step is the all too familiar unethical and cowardly pretext for the repression that follows.

Yet, despite all the power-over piled up to silence or provoke them, the oppressed are usually the ones who bring nonviolence, trust and justice into the world in their organisations. They are usually met initially with agents provocateurs, violent repression and media propaganda of the powers-that-be. Persistent well-organised, nonviolent collective action of the oppressed in response gradually dissolves the authority of command and moves complicit bystanders and even some members of the ruling class to support them; thereby tipping the dynamics in favour of nonviolent negotiations of the injustice, as we have seen in nonviolent regime change in recent years (Kurlansky 2006; Horsburgh 1968; Schell 2003; Ackermann and Duvall 2000; Martin 2001; Sharp 2010; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Tully 2012; and Section 4.5).

4.4 Two (contentious) examples

The importance of upholding the trustful virtue of truthfulness (parrhesia) can be illustrated with two (contentious) political and economic examples. The first illustrates the destructive consequences of appearing to make promises yet not following up on them. In the 1980 referendum campaign in Quebec the YES side led by Premier Lévesque put forward a proposal for a new kind of relationship with the rest of Canada in a paradigmatically trustful manner. The proposal was for ‘sovereignty-association’ in which the continuing association with Canada was as important as the sovereignty of Quebec. It called for two referenda: the first to give Premier Lévesque the authority to
proceed to negotiate sovereignty and association with all affected in the rest of Canada and the second to put the result of the negotiations to the people of Quebec.⁹ He defended the rights of minorities in Quebec, especially the Anglophone minority, and the First Nations, and the YES campaign was widely grounded in the social and economic cooperative associations in Quebec.

During the campaign, the NO side led by Prime Minister Trudeau countered by appearing to say, and leading many citizens to believe, they would negotiate a new relationship with Quebec within Canada. After the NO side won, not only did the Prime Minister and federal government not recognize Quebec in the constitutional change that followed in The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; the Charter was brought into force without the consent, and over the explicit dissent of the majority of representatives in the Quebec National Assembly. Quebec federalist and ‘sovereignist’ governments ever since have protested this injustice and demanded negotiations in good faith.¹⁰ But, the failures to follow up on commitments and to gain the consent of Quebec people, undermined the trust generated by the two-step proposal of the YES side and generated a culture of distrust. Despite two decades of negotiations to ‘bring Quebec in with dignity’, the distrust and suspicion generated in Quebec and throughout Canada has made this impossible. It set in motion a vicious dynamic of spin and counter-spin, suspicion and counter-suspicion, and pervasive distrust of governments and negotiations in general on both sides: a culture of “incertitude” (Gagnon 2014). There is an obvious general lesson in this, as well as a specific lesson for the NO side in the recent Scottish referendum on independence, since they too made similar promises in the campaign.
The second (contentious) example is the ‘dissimulation of trust’ in non-democratised market relationships. Neo-liberal capitalism promotes an anti-social ethos that is the antithesis of the cooperative and co-sustaining ethos. It promotes and rewards ruthless competition to maximize profits by any means possible, including exploiting natural resources (the living earth) and human resources (human beings) at the lowest cost in order to win the competition. The constitutive problem of such vicious systems is that they cannot generate trust among the members because they never know when the other will take advantage of them. It is seemingly individually rational and collectively irrational to distrust others. The attempts to solve this problem with laws that force compliance in the absence of trust just generate ruthless competition over legislation and within whatever laws are passed. These economic systems depend upon pre-existing and co-existing social associations of intersubjective and co-operational trust to hold them together, but, at the same time, their anti-social ethos erodes this social ‘capital’ (as they call trust), pitting individuals and communities against one another in order to survive, and thus destroying the conditions on which social life depends.

To try to solve this performative contradiction at the core of radical distrust systems, the competitors develop a clever ethos of dissimulating trustfulness and its virtues. They appear to be everything the ethos of trust embodies in order to gain the confidence, and so the cooperation, of others, all the while continuing aggressive competition behind the appearance of trustworthiness. This is the duplicitous world of marketing – of oneself, products, corporations, political parties, movements, and so on. The theory is that the powerful can get away with this confidence game by being a “great feignер and dissembler”, as Machiavelli put it, because the people are easily deceived and
they judge by “appearances” and “results”; not by the vicious means going on behind the manufactured scene (Machiavelli 1988: 62–3). But, as Rousseau and Melville replied, this is not the case. People see through the appearances and they experience the vicious results. While the “confidence men” become more powerful and wealthy, the majority become poorer and insecure. The consequences are radical distrust, class war, social disintegration, protests and revolutions (Rousseau 1994; Melville 1989).

This destructive dynamic was exposed to all in the financial crisis of 2008, the bailouts of the banks and corporations that caused it, and the austerity programs, deregulation of markets and resource extraction, and deepening indebtedness that followed. People could see the massive and growing inequality locally and globally and the destruction of social and ecological relationships. There have been three types of response to the crisis. Some become cynical or ironical and play the con game themselves (deepening the crisis); others disengage from the dominant economic system and engage with local and global cooperative socio-economic cooperatives, small businesses, and fair trade; and others organise cooperatively to transform the dominant vicious system by nonviolent and trustful means. The latter two have learned the basic lesson from the performative contradiction of the vicious system: means are constitutive of ends and hence only trustful means can regenerate trustful ends (Gregg 2018: 149; Gandhi 1968: 151; Section 4.7 below).

4.5 Compassion and Empathy
The ethics of listening and speaking in deeply diverse societies raises a whole set of complex questions that I cannot go into here. Fortunately, there is a lot of good literature on this in GRSP and elsewhere. I wish to mention just a few ethical implications that relate directly to trust and distrust. It is undeniable that if all the affected individual and collective members of deeply diverse societies wish to share an intersubjective world of peaceful cooperation, contestation and co-sustainability, rather than a concatenation of mutually distrustful and fractious subjective associations, then they have to understand each other in their own terms to some extent. This is acknowledged in the duty to listen (\textit{audi alteram partem}) and the ‘duty to consult all affected’ or at least a subset (the official stakeholders). However, this reciprocal responsibility is more demanding than is often assumed (Maclure and Taylor 2013; Kompridis 2013; Karmis 2014).

Listening, coming to understand and responding appropriately to injustice and suffering of fellow human beings involves two dispositional abilities of the trusting ethos. The first is the compassion that underlies the whole virtuous ethos of co-operational trust and moves the person to be concerned and care for the well-being of his or her relations in diversely appropriate ways. Compassion encompasses more than justice. It is the \textit{savoir-faire} of being-with the other (Mitsein) in their suffering (Mitleiden) and in the way to well-being (Mitfreude) (Nietzsche 2001: s.338). Compassion in this sense is the threshold condition of any kind of ethical ethos of being in the world with others. Compassion, like trust, seems on the one hand to presuppose awareness of interdependency, yet, on the other hand, the concerted practice of compassion, like trust, brings interdependency to self-awareness, and this motivates further compassion. (Dalai Lama 2012: 41–72).
The exercise of compassion in particular cases requires empathy to understand the lived experience of the injustice and suffering from the perspective of the individual or group subjected to the injustice. Empathy involves the imaginary movement of transposition of myself into your place, and the perspectival understanding of you as another to me, and of me as another to you (mutual self and other understanding); and these movements bring into being the concrete ethical perception of you as an ethical being like me (ethical perception). This is the reciprocal re-perception and re-cognition that occurs in deep listening and speaking in turn. The listener is freed from their stereotypical mis-perception and mis-cognition of the suffering of others as separate and of no concern: mis-recognition. And, he or she moves around to re-perceive and re-cognize the lived experience of the suffering other human being, class, minority and so on. Insofar as this is (asymmetrically) reciprocal, the suffering partner goes through a similar transposition and they begin a dialogue towards ‘mutual’ recognition and understanding (Tully 2016).

It is literally impossible to know how to treat another with respect or dignity, or to do unto them as you would have them do unto you in similar circumstances, as all ethical systems require, unless one begins to understand their suffering in this emphatic way (Thompson 2007: 382–413; Irlbacher-Fox 2009). To proceed to respond to injustices through the misrecognizing and misunderstanding stereotypes of the subject positions of one’s associations (class, gender, religion, office) with superficial consultation and apologies is just to add further insult to injury, and thus trigger shenpa and cascading struggles and cycles of misrecognition that plague Canada and other diverse societies (Murphy 2012; Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014).
4.6 Dialogue

The mobilization of co-operational trust, compassion, empathy, understanding and reciprocity takes place in dialogical relationships in the broad sense of dialogue developed in the dialogue tradition (Buber 2002; Bohm 2014; Temelini 2014). Dialogue in this phenomenological sense includes five very general types of both non-reflective and reflective participatory and interactive relationship. These are: the kinds of perceptual and intuitive interactions humans have with the living world in every breath they take (Abram 1997: 89–92); the perceptual, embodied interactions with other human beings; the ethical relationship we have with ourselves through which we become ethical agents; the linguistic kinds of interactions they have with each other that draw on these and involve senses, emotions, intuitions and language; and dialogues of communion that draw on all these but go beyond language to the spiritual realm (and deep religious diversity).

Once all types of interactions are included in the field of study, it is possible to address not only conflicts among partners who are in agreement in their shared form of life (shallow diversity), but also conflicts that arise from conflicting underlying forms of life and relationships to the living earth and the spiritual realm (deep diversity): that is, conflicts over the second quality of virtuous social relationships (Section 2.2). Consequently, the repertoire of linguistic and behavioural modes of nonviolent, trustful and conciliatory interaction that are used to persuade and move a violent or intransigent partner into the space of specific dialogues of negotiation are themselves also dialogical relationships in this fundamental sense. These Gandhian and post-Gandhian autotelic
means of interaction are called nonviolent agonistics or “moral jiu-jitsu” (Gregg 2018: 49-58; Tully 2018c: xli-lxi).

The trusting ethos invites and enables the voicing of dissent and dialogues of contestation over the suffering and injustices of the complex social relationships humans inhabit. This is where compassionate and empathetic listening and speaking take place. These are the familiar critical dialogues of demands and counter-demands, proposals and counter-proposals, arguing and bargaining, agreeing and disagreeing, acting together, losing trust, falling apart, starting again – world without end. In the course of the reciprocal criticism of the demands and counter-demands, the background prejudices, stereotypes and comprehensive doctrines are gradually called into the space of questions and examined. This is painful and it takes a kind of trustful courage to present criticism of others and withstand criticism of your own prejudices in the right way. These critical exchanges are a form of reciprocal enlightenment that can only occur in dialogue: where the partners reciprocally enlighten each other as to the partial and non-comprehensive character of their own and others’ view of their shared world (Wiener 2014; Laden 2012; Tully 2016).

Moreover, these contestatory dialogues are, at the same time, the exchange of perspectival background stories or traditions within the horizons of which the various members make sense of their demands and the counter-demands of others and the corrections in their self-understandings that the criticisms force on them. This exchange of diverse background stories gradually brings to light and awareness the overlapping and criss-crossing intersubjective and interdependent world they always already share in common, yet inhabit diversely. This experience is not consensus on a meta-story. Rather,
it is diversity-awareness of being in a shared intersubjective world that is co-sustained by the very way they are participating in the critical and self-critical dialogue and relating to each other. Through dialogue, as Merleau-Ponty and Sousa Santos argue, light dawns slowly over the common intersubjective world we already inhabit and sharable ‘commonalities’ begin to appear (Sousa Santos 2005). This is the original meaning of ‘dialogue’: through participation (dia) in linguistic dialogue (logos) we bring before us the world we are talking about (Bohm 2010: 6–8, 87–9).

Of course, the world revealed in these open and critical dialogues of reciprocal elucidation is deeply unequal and structured by power-over relationships and vicious social systems that dominate the present. It would be impossible to address suffering and injustice if this dimension of the present were not brought to light; and critical dialogue does this in a way that monological critique cannot hope to do. Moreover, such dialogues also bring into being a virtuous system of cooperative and contestatory relationships of intersubjective trust among the partners and disclose the background intersubjective social relationships on which it is based. It brings the three types of trust to self-awareness and the participants’ role in co-sustaining them. And this provides the common ground for addressing suffering and injustice.

4.7 Mistrust and distrust

Virtuous systems of cooperative and contestatory relationships that enable these broad kinds of critical dialogue present a challenge to a specific kind of epistemic distrust. This epistemic distrust is the subjective distrust that one partner has to another based on good
reasons derived from the evidence available about the partner’s behaviour. All social systems, including virtuous ones, involve some partners who interact viciously in order to get what they want. They lie, cheat, con, trick, free ride, manipulate, bribe, make false promises, commitments and apologies, pretend to be trustworthy, fail to carry through, and so on. The evidence clearly suggests that such partners are untrustworthy and other partners have reasons to distrust them on these grounds.

The ethos of trust does not support the activities of making and expressing judgements of distrust of this kind. Rather, the character of judgment in these cases is also shaped by one’s knowledge of the background conditions of intersubjective trust, co-operational trust, and generating subjective trust. It brings into play the kind of judgment called ‘mistrust’ for the following reasons. An unqualified judgment of distrust implies certainty and definitiveness. It separates the judge from the judged, often implying that he or she can live without this partner and, should they meet again, they will be met with more than suspicion. It seems to lack compassion as well any residual trust, and thus fails to sustain trust. It indicates a hardening heart in Chodron’s sense.

The partner upholding a trusting ethos judges in a more tempered and conciliatory way, consistent with their duty to sustain the relationships that sustain intersubjective trust as much as possible. Their judgment is one of mistrust. Although this term is used interchangeably with ‘distrust’, it has a different grammar that give expression precisely to the conciliatory ethos that is necessary in these circumstances (Lenard 2012: 14–37, 58–61). ‘Mistrust’ is like ‘misjudgement’, ‘misunderstand’, ‘misplace’, ‘misinterpret’, ‘misrepresent’, and so on. It says that the partner appears to be untrustworthy, but it also implies the qualification that this judgment might be mistaken or based on a
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misunderstanding, and that the person making the judgment hopes this is the case (for example, that the partner judged was acting out of character or in circumstances the judge does not know about). Even if the judgment is correct, the voicing of the judgment of mistrust is a conciliatory invitation to change: it leaves open and encourages the possibility that the partner judged will change his or her ways. This well-known diplomatic tone and implication indicates to the partner that their correction of the judgment, if it is a misjudgment, or of their behaviour, if it is correct, will be welcomed, and that they will be welcomed back into the virtuous social relationship as a trusted partner. Mistrust judges the behaviour of the person or group in a redeemable way, not in an irredeemable and reciprocally distrustful manner. It also shows how carefully enacted and cautious virtuous means can work their conciliatory power on vicious partners and save the relationship from spiralling out of control.

The most radical sense of ‘mistrust’ occurs when a person is fully aware that the other person is distrustful yet always acts in truthful and trustful ways towards them. In the narrow sense of judging a person by their actions alone, their trust appears to be mistaken and misplaced; hence ‘mistrust’. Yet the ethical person knows that if they reciprocate with distrust the conflict will escalate into a vicious cycle, as we have seen in sections 4.1 and 4.4. They realize that the only way to generate or bring about trustfulness in the distrustful person is to act and react truthfully and trustfully, come what may, and as difficult and courageous as that may be. ‘Distrust is a weakness’ as Gandhi succinctly puts it (Gandhi 1968: 306-307). This is a fundamental principle of the philosophy and practice of nonviolent conflict resolution (Gregg 2018: 49-58, 149).
4.8 Reasoning-with and acting-with diverse partners

What, finally, is the trustful ethos of reasoning together and acting together when diverse members of diverse associations come together to address an injustice in the way set out so far? The first distinctive feature is that the constructive dialogue is like a big smorgasbord. Each member brings the gift of their perspectival view of the injustice and how it might be resolved fairly and acceptably from their perspective. Each gift enables others to disclose their shared intersubjective world from a perspective concealed from their viewpoint. The mutual exchange enlarges the view of each and they see the labyrinth of criss-crossing relationships of interdependency in which they live. A feeling of mutual gratitude arises among them and this strengthens mutual trust, care and goodwill.

This provides the basis for the emergence of an ethos of ‘distributed intelligence’. Distributed intelligence is the defining feature of ethical reasoning under the orientation of the all affected principle (Section 2.1). The members begin to consider not only what is best for themselves or their primary association of identification. They begin to see that to be ethical members of the intersubjective diverse world they inhabit, they must consider what is best for all affected members, human and non-human, from their perspectives, and for the symbiotic ethical community as a whole that this comprises (Leopold 1953: 237–64). No one person is in command and no one procedure of negotiation dominates. As in improvisation in jazz, to which distributed intelligence is often compared, each participant acts freely in being guided by concerns for themselves, others and the whole; agreeing and disagreeing as they go along. This is the unique power of mutual trust, co-
operational trust and intersubjective trust working together (Macy and Johnstone 2012: 99–100).

The power of trust is a creative power. It brings something new into the world in these difficult critical dialogues: namely, a solution they did not and could not see before. What makes this possible is that, prior to this moment, they were expending all their energy in conflict and Hegelian struggles of trying to gain power over others or to force a compromise. Now they are exercising all their energy together in trying to resolve the problem at hand in cooperative and contestatory ways. The technical term is ‘integration’ but I do not think this captures the complexity or creativity of it (Greg 2018: 65–66). It is reciprocal elucidation and symbiogenesis: bringing to light new ways of seeing the relationships in which we are entangled and of acting together in and on them.

This mode of reasoning together and acting together does not generate consensus or perfect solutions. Resolutions are imperfect and thus always open to review, dissent, re-contestation and re-negotiation in the future. “À la prochaine,” as Premier Lévesque knew and the Supreme Court reaffirmed, is a constitutive feature of all virtuous social systems, and must always be invoked and responded to honestly. This open-ended or ‘non-finality’ feature renders resolutions acceptable at the time to those members who do not get everything they want, yet are mindful that this shortcoming enables other suffering members to get the response they need.11

This way of reasoning together gives the participants the experience and pleasure of acting together; of power-with relationships. And they can convey this experience to the people they represent if they consult with them in the same reciprocal way. That is to say, as Laden argues in detail, the most important feature of this unique kind of reasoning
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together is not the specific responses to injustice it generates, as important as they surely are, since we also need to be open to seeing their imperfections in the future. Rather, the most important feature is the nonviolent and trustful, autotelic way that brings about the response and carries the partners into the future (Laden 2014b, 2012).\textsuperscript{12}

CONCLUSION

For many of us associated with GRSP, the symbol of this trustful way of collective life in conditions of deep diversity is the monumental sculpture by Haida artist Bill Reid and a group of indigenous and non-indigenous fellow-carvers, \textit{The Spirit of Haida}. The thirteen members of this famous canoe manifest diverse ways of life. They are contesting for recognition and rearrangement of positions in the canoe; and Raven, the trickster, is steering. The only means they have to conciliate or reconcile their disputes is to pass around the talking stick held by the chief in the center. That is, they are constrained to govern themselves and resolve disputes co-freely by exchanging stories and reasoning together. Yet, for all that contestation and discord, they are paddling together and carrying on co-sustaining and co-evolving their diverse ways of life (Bringhurst 1992; Tully 1995). The \textit{spirit} of Haida Gwaii is thus the complex kind of interdependent freedom we have been discussing: an “association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.” In his remarkable study of the Canadian constitution, Webber argues that the complex Canadian constitution – at its best – approximates this spirit of “agonistic constitutionalism” (Webber 2015).
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This great symbol of the deep diversity of indigenous and settler Canada adorns Canadian museums, airports, the Canadian consulate in Washington DC, and, until recently, the twenty dollar bill. In 2012 it was removed from the twenty dollar bill and replaced with the military symbol of Vimy Ridge. Abu Laban suggests that this represents the systematic turn that the federal government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper took to dismantle support for social systems of intersubjective, cooperative-contestatory trust and reassert the politics of competitive distrust (Abu Laban 2014). If so, then this chapter may be helpful in seeing our situation more clearly – as a contest over these two antithetical ways of being in the world.13

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Chapter 1

1 I use the term ‘virtuous’ in two senses. First, drawing on living systems theory, it designates interactions that tend to sustain the well-being of the system of living relationships and its members. This general sense of ‘virtuous’ provides the core of all sustainable living systems, including human systems. Second, I use ‘virtuous’ in the ethical sense to designate the ethos (actions and interactions) that, in addition to the core shared by all forms of life, sustains specifically human systems. I use the term ‘vicious’ in the two contrasting senses: for interactions that tend to render living relationships destructive and unsustainable in general and ethically vicious in the specific case of human relationships.

2 By GRSP I mean my own interpretation of the research of GRSP and associates.

3 I discuss these six features in more detail in Tully (2008a). See also Wiener 2014.

4 The analysis of trust in the following sections is deeply indebted to the work of Mohandas Gandhi and Richard Bartlett Gregg on trust. See Gregg 2018.

5 For example, this ‘power-with’ dissolution dynamic was illustrated in the Egyptian Spring (2011), the popular assemblies in Spain (2011-2014), and the pro-democracy
protests in Hong Kong (2014). I discuss these three types of power relationship in more detail in Tully (2014: 3–102; Tully 2018b).

6 The diffusion thesis is associated with Franz Boas and his work with Indigenous people in North America (Tully 2018c).

7 The first European to articulate the security dilemma was Montesquieu in 1748. Among the most influential formulations of it in non-technical terms in recent decades was Schell (1984). For an outstanding recent critical analysis of the dilemma and its historical reconstruction see Havercroft (2011: 198–206).

8 Hegel makes the same basic point in The Philosophy of Mind that Merleau-Ponty makes here in The Phenomenology of Perception: these struggles are not the basic human condition.

9 The 1980 YES side approach of negotiating with all affected was later endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC 1998).

10 The term ‘sovereignist’ for the independence party is misleading since the federalist party and all Canadians accept the sovereignty of Quebec. The two referenda of 1980 and 1995 presuppose and confirm that the people of Quebec are sovereign and hence have the right to choose independence. In both referenda the sovereign people of Quebec have decided to exercise their powers of self-determination within the Canadian federation (and contest to reform it) rather than exercise these powers in an independent state. For this important distinction see Tuck (2015), Gagnon (2014), Gagnon and Tully (2001: 1–33).
The Supreme Court of Canada endorsed this principle of ‘always a next time’ or ‘we look forward to meeting again’ in the Reference re the Secession of Quebec in 1998. Their phrase is ‘dissent is inevitable’ (SCC 1998, Tully 2000, Webber 2015).

I discuss these types of dialogue in more detail in Tully 2016.

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