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Annette Barnes
Seeing Through Self-Deception.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. 182.
US$54.95. ISBN 0-521-62014-7.

The traditional picture depicts self-deception (SD) as deeply irrational, as Reason's *tout autre*, where passion or desire undercuts the sovereignty of reason, and a person knowingly believes contradictory propositions. This picture's moral implications are: SD is the worst thing, since the deceiver's always being with us results in a constant fear of error and a paralyzing self-doubt; it is essentially vicious and immoral, because it corrupts conscience which is the guide of life. Furthermore, it erodes the basis of both Kantian and consequentialist ethics, insofar as the application of the categorical imperative depends on consistency, and consequentialism relies on reasonable, informed calculations.

While Kant acknowledges the reality and moral dangers of SD, he conceptually complicates things by saying: 'It is easy to show that man is in fact guilty of many inner lies, but to explain the possibility of an inner lie seems more difficult. For a lie requires a second person whom one intends to deceive, and intentionally to deceive oneself seems to contain a contradiction, namely, knowingly believing a proposition and its negation at the same time.' The first fifty years of analytical writing on SD is usefully seen as a series of illuminating footnotes to the Kantian challenge to provide a coherent account. Much has been done to dispel grammatical confusions, to demythologize or naturalize SD, and to a lesser extent, to trace its quantum of reason in the desires and passions that motivate it.

Annette Barnes' positions and arguments unfold with this analytical literature as backdrop. She aims to see through conceptual anomalies, to develop her own distinctive theory, as well as explore SD's irrationality and moral status. Here is the theory in a nutshell: A person B self-deceives himself into believing that p, if and only if: 1) B has an anxious desire that q, which causes B to be biased in favour of beliefs that reduce his anxiety that *not-q*. This bias, operative in B's behaviour, thinking, judging or perceiving, causes B to believe that p. 2) The purpose of B's believing that p is to reduce his anxiety that *not-q*. 3) B is not intentionally biased. 4) B fails to make a high enough estimate of the causal role that his anxious desire that q plays in his acquiring the belief that p. B wrongly believes that his belief that p is justified.

How does Barnes' theory differ from and go beyond its predecessors? The literature on SD is divided between those who, like Kant and Davidson, see it as intentional, and those who, like Mele, see it as non-intentional. Barnes distinguishes between typical cases where 'one self-deceives oneself into believing', and atypical cases where 'one intentionally deceives oneself into believing'. The latter have a Kantian resonance, but pose no paradox for Barnes who sees these cases as believing that p and that *not-p* at different

sive privacy): all diminish my personhood. Such violations often occur when I am weak and vulnerable; and they often leave me weaker and more vulnerable. This is not a good thing. DeCew appeals here both to sociological studies and to our common intuitions concerning the value of privacy. Thus she shows the coherence of such a conception of privacy and the interest we share in sustaining it.

DeCew does not defend a particular position on strict or wide judicial interpretation (although she does present the options clearly). Nor does she mount a full utilitarian or rights-based defense of privacy. Rather, she asserts a general presumption in favor of privacy. Some readers will doubtless insist that part of what DeCew wants to preserve as 'privacy' is better understood as autonomy or self-expression. At some point, however, this criticism loses force, because any detailed defense of either privacy, autonomy, or self-expression, will refer to the one's role in preserving the other two, and assert the value of all three.

The second half of the book looks at current privacy issues, devoting a chapter each to the feminist critique of privacy, abortion, sexual self-expression, drug testing, and challenges to privacy presented by new information technologies. These chapters vary in quality.

The chapter on the feminist critique of privacy is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, DeCew uncritically repeats assertions that women as a class are 'oppressed' (83) and 'dominated' by men (92), and herself alleges the 'continued subordination of women' in the United States (94). These false assertions trivialize the suffering of actual victims of oppression. Second, while the feminist critique turns out to mean quite different things to different critics, it often involves arguments to limit privacy, based on the realization that privacy protections can cloak unjust or immoral behavior towards women. This is true and can support privacy restrictions, but not without some discussion of the extent to which we want to legislate morality, which is not forthcoming here. Third, DeCew argues that feminist critiques support 'rejection of the [public/private] dichotomy as it has been understood' (93), without backing up this assertion or suggesting how we might draw the distinction differently. In fact, her discussion suggests that hoary aspects of the traditional public/private distinction provide crucial support for feminist political positions. The simplest argument that spousal abuse is not private behavior protected from outside interference, involves appeal to Mill's harm principle.

In contrast, DeCew's chapter justifying privacy protections for consensual sex is strong. Here she focuses largely on *Bowers v. Hardwick*, the 1986 case in which the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's anti-sodomy laws. DeCew dissects the tortured logic by which the Court retreated from earlier decisions upholding expressive privacy in the realm of sexual relations. In the end, she agrees with Justice Stevens, who writes in dissent that the Court seems to exclude homosexuals from constitutional privacy protections because the justices dislike homosexuals. Beyond staking out a strong position in favor of sexual privacy, this chapter advances DeCew's general positions that

privacy includes an expressive dimension and that it has a strong presumption in its favor, which should not be overridden absent compelling reasons. Subsequent chapters carry these themes forward, shepherding privacy interests past further moralistic and technological threats.

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Gilles Deleuze
Negotiations. Trans. Martin Joughin.
New York: Columbia University Press 1997.
Pp. 221.
US$16.50. ISBN 0-231-07581-2.

Deleuze is the most recent thinker to have gained the kind of simultaneously enthusiastic and skeptical acceptance into the Anglophone academy that is characteristically reserved for contemporary French philosophers. All his major works (bar one, ironically on a British figure, the painter Francis Bacon) are now available in English, and *Negotiations* represents the continuation of this project into the translation of his minor and occasional pieces. It consists of a series of interviews with Deleuze, and sometimes also with his collaborator Félix Guattari, originally published between 1972 and 1990, when the collection was first assembled in France. The interviews concern mostly other books by Deleuze, ranging across the mammoth two-volume *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1972-1980), the two volumes on cinema (1983-5), the small eulogistic text on Foucault (1984) as well as his scholarly monographs on Leibniz (1988) and, to a lesser extent, Spinoza (1968, 1970).

The interview format is obviously not one which fosters major conceptual advances: most of the ideas Deleuze tables are recalled straight from the books he is talking about, and readers would be unwise to think that they could learn about them best from these interviews. The book is not, as billed in the blurbs, a good 'introduction' to Deleuze; indeed it might serve to put skeptical first-time readers off Deleuze, since points are mostly asserted rather than argued for. But it does serve several other functions rather well. The summaries of the cinema books are very concise, and give a wide-lens view of what can otherwise appear to be an intimidatingly dense conceptual network. The time-bound nature of interviews encourages Deleuze to give explicit analyses of contemporary events. Particularly compelling is his rather backhanded complement suggesting that Foucault's account of disci-

plinary society is already obsolete, being replaced by a society of control modeled on cybernetic rather than thermodynamic technology.

Most significantly, the necessity to respond in real, conversational time also forces Deleuze to address his large-scale motivations, which are often a little difficult to discern in his more extended projects, and which are certainly often misunderstood both in France and elsewhere. Of special interest to an Anglophone readership is his claim that — unlike many other popular French thinkers — he is an empiricist (88-9). This raises the possibility of lines of communication between Deleuze and Anglophone thought other than the traditional and familiar ones stretching between French philosophy and university humanities departments in Britain and the U.S. Such lines would not be unproblematic. Aside from stylistic concerns, Deleuze's empiricism is resolutely anti-individualist. But even here, there are some quite unexpected convergences: Deleuze's emphasis on distributed networks (what he calls rhizomes) rather than tree-like structures exactly parallels, and pre-dates, recent developments in cognitive science (connectionism, dynamic approaches to cognition). Indeed, around this issue, the often rather gallocentric concerns of Deleuze's interviewers elide quite substantially with those of a post-Sokal (hoax) Anglophone audience: what is the relation of philosophical to scientific concepts? Deleuze's responses to this frequently posed question (made of course prior to the current brouhaha) are measured, interesting and relevant.

Martin Joughin's translation is fluent, readerly and generates, by persistent colloquialism and contraction, an intimacy that, whilst not a strict rendering of Deleuze's French, nevertheless usually gives the welcome impression of being the way that Deleuze might have conducted informal conversations in English (a language whose flexibility he always loved). It is — considerations of tone apart — not particularly accurate, making elementary errors of tense, number and vocabulary. But the worst effect of this is an occasional clumsiness in the English: in only one case is any serious theoretical violence done to Deleuze (*l'agent, l'opération* and *le thèse* are all inexcusably translated as 'principle' in the space of a page, hiding the active nature of Deleuze's comments under a transcendental shell). In the context of the increasingly pedantic nature of academic translations, especially of French philosophers, a sacrifice of some term-for-term precision is certainly worth tolerating for the sake of a warm and legible English text.

Joughin also adds a large critical apparatus to the bare French edition, comprising about one fifth of the volume of the book. The index is certainly a helpful addition, but the footnotes, whilst occasionally noting technical elements in Deleuze translation, and filling in some perhaps unfamiliar French intellectual background, are mostly hectoring, pretentious and often tendentious attempts at exegesis. Such attempts are particularly out of place in a Deleuze book, since Deleuze inveighs constantly against the indignity of speaking for others and against the very notion of interpretation (there is a long and apparently entirely humorless note explaining what Deleuze means by saying that he is only interested in how things work, not in what they

mean). One suspects that the notes are a sublimated and fragmented translator's introduction, and would probably have been better left unsublimated.

Alistair Welchman
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Daniel C. Dennett
Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1998.
Pp. xi + 418.
US$42.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-04166-9);
US$20.00 (paper: ISBN 0-262-54090-8).

Dennett's most recent publication, *Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds*, is the logical successor to his earlier books, *Brainstorms* and *The Intentional Stance*, in so far as it collects together previously published essays (1984 - 1997) on such topics as philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and the philosophical foundations of cognitive science. In this case, though, the essays are collected from a variety of relatively inaccessible sources and, thus, at least some of them have escaped the notice even of Dennett's legions of fans and attentive critics. The one exception here is the essay *Real Patterns* which, although widely available, is, as Dennett puts it, 'utterly central to my thinking' (95).

The essays are collected thematically into four sections: Philosophy of Mind; Artificial Intelligence and Artificial Life; Ethology, Animal Mind; and Standing Back. Of the many fine essays in the first section, 'Speaking for Ourselves', co-authored with Nicholas Humphrey, is particularly interesting. The authors sketch a theory of the phenomenon of Multiple Personality Disorder (hereafter: MPD) that shows MPD to be theoretically possible. That is, it is shown to be neither logically nor scientifically contradictory and, thus, potentially more than merely an artifact of diagnosis. Only in this way, argue the authors, is it possible to discuss the phenomenon in a way that is not *a priori* dismissive (38). However, the real value for those concerned to understand the complexities of Dennett's thought is the insight it provides on his *Multiple Drafts Model* of consciousness. Essentially the authors argue that whereas, in the ordinary case an illusion of unity results from the fact that the various narrative drafts (i.e., fictive selves) coalesce around some dominant narrative that is elected to be the Head of Mind, in cases of MPD, 'the competing fictive selves are so equally balanced, or different constituencies