Few of Kant's doctrines are as difficult to understand as that of self-affection. Its brief career in the published literature consists principally in its unheralded introduction in the Transcendental Aesthetic and unexpected reappearance at a key moment in the Deduction chapter in the second (B) edition of the first Critique. After blazing its trail, self-affection retreats into the background, with a discussion befitting its importance occurring only in the unfinished Opus postumum. This step out of the limelight, however, belies the doctrine's continued importance for Kant; indeed, Kant seemed to think that in self-affection was to be found the key to the project that occupied him in his last years. Thus, 'the possibility of the transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics does not consist in the fact that the subject is empirically affected but rather that it affects itself' (Opus postumum, 22: 405). As he continued to struggle with this doctrine and with the pivot-point on which to work this vital transition, Kant himself would surely come to rue his confident statement in the B Deduction: 'I do not see how one can find so many difficulties in the fact that inner sense is affected by ourselves' (B156n).

Kant's commentators, confronted with the difficulty of this doctrine, have naturally resorted to various strategies of clarification, ranging from distinguishing between empirical and transcendental self-affection, divorcing self-affection from the claims of self-knowledge with which Kant explicitly connects it, and, perhaps least justified of all, ignoring the doctrine altogether. Yet, in particular, the connection between self-affection and central Critical doctrines marks all of these strategies as last resorts, as these commentators themselves are well aware. Self-affection's
alternative association with transcendental and empirical syntheses, its occurrence in the Deduction chapter (itself not the most lucid of Kantian texts), and its connection with the already problematic doctrine of inner sense make a serious attempt to puzzle through Kant’s discussion just as necessary as it is prohibitively ambitious.

The risk of overreaching notwithstanding, in this article I propose, at the very least, to provide a clearer outline of the constellation of those issues which inform Kant’s discussion of self-affection. More particularly, I intend to explain the crucial role played by self-affection in the account of the transcendental conditions of perception provided late in the B Deduction. To this end, this article will be divided into three sections: the first will outline Kant’s understanding of perception and, in particular, discuss his claim that perception involves some kind of self-consciousness and compare it with the analyses of some of his contemporaries; the second will examine the argument in §§24, 26 of the Deduction in detail in order to demonstrate how self-affection, by means of the function of attention, provides the crucial linkage between perception and self-consciousness; and, finally, the third section will defend my interpretation of the doctrine of self-affection from various challenges.

I. Perception and Consciousness

It is, I think, relatively uncontroversial to claim that the doctrine of self-affection arises out of the discussion of the conditions of perception considered as the result of the empirical synthesis of apprehension. More specifically, we will see that self-affection is required in generating a (pure) manifold of inner intuition and, further, for unifying this manifold into a representation of time. Since, then, self-affection satisfies a theoretical requirement in Kant’s discussion of the conditions of perception, it is useful to begin with a general presentation of Kant’s analysis of perception. In a well-known passage Kant classifies the various types of representations into an ordered progression which begins: ‘The genus is representation in general (repraesentatio). Under it stands the representation with consciousness (perceptio). A perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a sensation
(sensatio)" (A321/B376). While this passage is not without its interpretative challenges (compare, for instance, the definition of sensation at A20/B34 which focuses on affection from without3), it would seem that here perception is distinguished from sensation insofar as the former, though it is accompanied by consciousness (presumably) of an object, lacks the reference to the subject that characterizes sensation. So, while sensation refers to my own subjective state, or is 'a merely subjective representation', perception has appearances as its objects and involves a consciousness or awareness of these objects (B207).4

Yet Kant does not rest content with claiming simply that perception involves the consciousness or awareness of an object but seems to claim in addition that it involves some kind of consciousness of the self. For instance, in the A Deduction, Kant might be taken to suggest that perception too refers to a subject, and thus that this consciousness is not only a consciousness of the object of perception but additionally a mode of self-consciousness: he contends that the 'first thing that is given to us is appearance, which, if it is combined with consciousness is called perception', noting additionally that this requires 'the relation to an at least possible consciousness' (A119—20). While this might be taken as requiring relation to another perception (cf. A225/B272) it is more likely that Kant is suggesting a relation to a consciousness considered as a subject. In any case, there is no such ambiguity in the Prolegomena where Kant claims that (in a judgement of perception) perceptions are compared and connected 'in a consciousness of my state' (§20, 4: 300, my emphasis). Further, in what might be taken as the canonical definition of perception, Kant refers to an empirical consciousness and contends, contrary to the Stufenleiter passage partially quoted above, that sensation (in which there is awareness of a reference to a self) plays a role in perception: 'perception is empirical consciousness, i.e., one in which there is at the same time sensation' (B207, my emphasis).5 Similarly in the Postulates chapter, Kant argues that 'cognizing the actuality of things requires perception, thus sensation of which one is conscious' (A225/B272). Kant also occasionally argues that not just sensation but perception as well can be taken to provide only a subjective association of intuitions. Thus, while Kant claims in the Critique of Judgment that 'sensation expresses just what is merely subjective in our representations of things outside us' (5: 189),6 he also maintains in the Prolegomena that 'a judgment of
perception. . . has thus far only subjective validity; it is merely a connection of perceptions within my mental state, without reference to the object' (§20, 4: 300).

A number of commentators have attributed this apparent inconsistency to a failure on Kant's part to distinguish adequately between consciousness and self-consciousness. By contrast, Andrew Brook has recently provided extensive argumentation in favour of the claim that Kant does enforce a distinction between awareness and self-awareness. Yet what should be clear from the foregoing is that only the analysis of perception (rather than that of the exceedingly broad notion of representation) can provide the decisive test case. Moreover, a glance at the precedent and contemporary discussions suffices to show that the battle lines concerning the question of the relation, if any, between consciousness and self-consciousness were well drawn. So, Leibniz accuses his Cartesian predecessors of conflating perception and apperception, while Hume would argue for perceptual awareness with no corresponding reference to an abiding self. Indeed, we will see in the next section that Kant does claim that a consciousness of self is implied in every act of perception, but a brief survey of this active discussion will help in showing that Kant's distinctive contribution to the debate consists just in providing the needed demonstration in the face of these influential criticisms.

That perception stands in a necessary connection to self-consciousness is admittedly a controversial claim. Nonetheless, both John Locke and J. N. Tetens, the one unlikely to be on Kant's mind and the other quite likely, are at least sympathetic if not wholehearted allies. In the Essay, Locke claims that to have a perception is to be conscious of what is perceived. Thus he observes that even though there may be 'a sufficient impulse . . . on the Organ; but . . . not reaching the observation of the Mind, there follows no perception.' The missing element, as Locke continues, could only be the attention of the understanding:

Want of sensation in this case, is not through any defect in the Organ, or that the Man's Ears are less affected, than at other times, when he does hear: but that which uses to produce the Idea, though conveyed in by the usual Organ, not being taken notice of in the Understanding, and so imprinting no Idea on the mind, there follows no Sensation. So that where-ever there is Sense, or perception, there some Idea is actually present in the Understanding.
Of course Locke's claim suggests only a connection between consciousness and perception, falling short of the further connection of perception and self-consciousness, though as we will see it gains import for our analysis by spurring Leibniz's distinction between perception and just this element of attention in his *New Essays on Human Understanding*. Tetens, on the other hand, rather more directly foreshadows Kant's perspective in his discussion of perception in the *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Nature and its Development*. Early in the third essay 'On Perception and Consciousness', Tetens notes that in ordinary speech 'perception' is already bound with consciousness broadly understood:

The ways of speaking in our language, of *perceiving a thing* [gewahrnehmen], *becoming aware of it* [gewahrwerden], *noticing it*, *becoming conscious of a thing*, *being conscious*, *cognising it*, and more, do not have completely similar meanings, but still all relate to the simple and common root-concept of an expression of our power of cognition; that ... is most clearly and simply indicated by the word *perception* [Gewahrnehmen].

Like Locke, Tetens identifies an element of attention as operative in the act of perception, claiming that '[w]e perceive nothing without some degree of attention . . . that is, without some exertion of our cognitive power'. Additionally, and later in the same essay, Tetens claims that perception involves a kind of *reflective* consciousness. He identifies two components of the act of perceiving: first, all perception presupposes the isolation of an aspect of the perceived thing as the object of attention, second and more importantly, perception requires the reflection [Zurückbeugung, Reflexion] of the sensing and representing power back from the perceived thing, a reflection in which our 'eyes . . . are turned back towards ourselves'. Tetens's summation at the conclusion of the essay leaves little room to doubt that he takes self-consciousness to be an integral component of perception: 'As we perceive something, we rouse ourselves, so to speak, as though from a sleep with respect to the object. We *grasp* [it], *comprehend* it, we grasp ourselves with respect to it, [and] *reflect upon ourselves* [besinnen uns].'

Yet, as was signalled above, the claim that perceptions necessarily include a reference to a self was also the object of staunch criticism, and it would have been especially important for Kant, in
making this claim, to address two influential critics: Leibniz and Hume. In the *New Essays*, Leibniz counters Locke’s more cautious association by denying any necessary connection between perception and consciousness, and he does so by invoking his own doctrine of *petites perceptions*:\(^\text{15}\)

I would prefer to distinguish between *perception* and *being aware*. For instance, a perception of light or colour of which we are aware is made up of many minute perceptions of which we are unaware; and a noise which we perceive but do not attend to is brought within reach of our awareness by a tiny increase or addition.\(^\text{16}\)

Again, though Leibniz’s discussion here is not exactly parallel to Kant’s, since Leibniz’s claim that we are not ‘aware’, or conscious, of all components of a perception does not run directly counter to the notion that in all perception we are conscious of the relation of a representation to ourselves, we will nevertheless find it useful in clarifying Kant’s position. In particular, in his second example quoted above, Leibniz elliptically asserts against Locke that perception is distinct from attention;\(^\text{17}\) for Kant, however, a special act, even *acts*, of attention provide the condition of the possibility of any perception.

Hume’s divorce of perception and self-consciousness is more to the point, presenting a direct challenge to Kant’s definition of perception. Hume is led to this separation through his famous assertion that introspection never yields an impression of the self. As he writes, if ‘any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro’ the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos’d to exist after that manner. But there is no impression that is constant and invariable.’\(^\text{18}\) Without such an abiding impression, my individual perceptions are left without a substance or subject in which to inhere: \(^\text{19}\)

But farther, what must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis? All these are different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately consider’d, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing to support their existence. After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it?\(^\text{19}\)

We can take Hume’s conclusion to be that, lacking an impression of self, we are left without anything to which to refer individual perceptions and that, therefore, perceptions themselves are
completely separable and without any (real) relation among themselves beyond mere succession. Indeed, Kant will take Hume’s point to the extent that he will agree that an intuition of the self as it is is unavailable; nonetheless, Kant does not think that this lack of an intellectual intuition precludes a necessary conscious relation of a perception to a self of which we are differently aware, that is, a self of which we are aware only as it appears.

2. Perception and Self-Affection in the B Deduction

Between Leibniz and Hume, then, we see that the contention that all perceptions reflexively refer to a self is under threat. Fortunately, just this conscious relation of perceptions to the self is the topic of key additions to the *Critique* in the B edition, including §§24 and 26 of the Transcendental Deduction. After making a ‘beginning of a deduction’ in §§15–20 of the Deduction chapter in B, Kant turns in the second half of his argument to the demonstration that ‘from the way in which the empirical intuition is given in sensibility . . . its unity can be none other than the one the category prescribes to the manifold of a given intuition in general’ (B144–5). (Here it should be noted that it is not my intention to enter into the ongoing dispute concerning the relation between the two parts of the deduction itself.20 Rather, in what follows I only presume to take for granted the claim that §§24 and 26 of the deduction jointly concern themselves, at least in part, with the conditions under which the empirical synthesis of apprehension is possible, which assumption I take to be uncontroversial,21)

Beginning with the second paragraph of §26, Kant first relates perception to the synthesis of apprehension: ‘(1) First of all I remark that by the *synthesis of apprehension* I understand the composition of the manifold in an empirical intuition, through which perception, i.e., empirical consciousness of it (as appearance) becomes possible’ (B160). Just as it had in the Deduction in A, the synthesis of apprehension here involves the representation of an empirical manifold as a unity: ‘in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold . . . it is necessary first to run through and then take together this manifoldness, which action I call the *synthesis of apprehension*’ (A99). Kant’s language, though, in claiming that perception is only ‘possible’ given the synthesis of
apprehension, may seem misleading inasmuch as it wrongly implies that perceiving is something over and above the performance of that synthesis. Yet, he cannot strictly identify the synthesis of apprehension with perception since this synthesis is itself conditioned by, among other things, a higher synthesis and the forms of intuition. These further conditions provide the topic of the next paragraph in the section (mid-B160–1), which divides itself into three points of interest for our analysis. Following upon the description of the synthesis of apprehension, Kant provides a simple restatement of one of the results of the Aesthetic, namely, that ‘(2) We have forms of outer as well as inner sensible intuition a priori in the representations of space and time’. In particular, it is the latter form of intuition, inner intuition, that will primarily interest Kant in accounting for the conditions of perception. Kant proceeds to put a finer point on this and indicates that the above-mentioned synthesis of apprehension is itself conditioned by time, apparently simply as the form of inner intuition: ‘(3) the synthesis of the apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always be in agreement with the latter [i.e., the form of inner sensible intuition], since it can only occur in accordance with this form.’ Again, Kant is introducing the familiar result of the Aesthetic that while the form of space is the ground of ‘outer intuitions’ (A24/B38), time ‘is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions’ (A31/B46). This particular result of the Aesthetic will take on new importance here but also and especially in §24 as Kant explores the problematic asymmetries between the two forms.

Somewhat surprisingly, however, after broadly claiming that the synthesis of apprehension is beholden to the form of inner intuition, Kant now provides the first requirement entailed by this dependence, namely, that the synthesis of apprehension is also bound by the conditions of the representation of time itself as a unity inasmuch as time is not simply a form of intuition but is also a formal intuition: ‘(4) But space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but also as intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold), and thus with the determination of the unity of this manifold in them.’ Although Kant, for the reason given above, certainly has time foremost in mind, the important footnote appended to this proposition clarifies this statement only with regard to space.22 Kant has claimed earlier that
space and time are not only pure forms of intuition but also ‘pure intuitions’ (A20/B34) inasmuch as they both contain pure manifolds which require, like any run-of-the-mill empirical intuition, synthetic combination in order to be represented as a unity: ‘The first thing that must be given to us a priori for the cognition of all objects is the manifold of pure intuition; the synthesis of this manifold . . . is the second thing’ (A78–9/B104). When these given pure manifolds are so combined they yield ‘formal intuitions’, that is, in the case of space, ‘more than the mere form of intuition, namely the comprehension of the manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation’ (B160n). Of course, representing space and time as objects ‘presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses’ (B161n), and, further, this required synthesis cannot be identified with the synthesis of apprehension since it would amount to the false claim that we perceive, or apprehend, time and space.23 Thus, a further synthesis that also conditions the empirical synthesis of apprehension must be sought, through which, as Kant claims in the footnote, ‘the understanding determines the sensibility’, that is, a synthesis is required through which the understanding acts upon and determines the form of intuition within sensibility insofar as this form itself is taken to provide a manifold: ‘Thus even unity of the synthesis of the manifold, outside or within us, hence also a combination with which everything that is to be represented as determined in space or time must agree, is already given a priori, along with (not in) these intuitions, as conditions of the synthesis of all apprehension’ (B161). Yet, even though in claim (3) Kant has stated that the synthesis of apprehension must ‘always be in agreement’ with the form of time, we might naturally question whether this also entails that the synthesis must also be in accord with the conditions of representing this form as a unity, that is, as a formal intuition. However, as Kant illustrates immediately after the original passage with the example of the perception of a house, all perception requires the situation of the perceived object, the house, at some point within a general representation of space (and time): ‘if, e.g., I make the empirical intuition of a house into perception through apprehension of its manifold, my ground is the necessary unity of space and of outer intuition in general, and I as it were draw its shape in agreement with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space’ (B162).24
To sum up the foregoing, the empirical synthesis of apprehension, which yields individual perceptions, is itself governed by the conditions of the representation of space and time as objects, among which conditions is a higher synthesis through which the understanding determines the pure manifold supplied by the form of intuition itself. At the conclusion of the note at B160-1 where Kant makes the last point, he refers the reader to §24 for clarification, to which we now also turn. In that section, Kant identifies the higher synthesis in question as the *transcendental synthesis of the imagination* (figurative synthesis, or *synthesis speciosa*) (B151). This synthesis is in fact the sought-for synthesis inasmuch as ‘the transcendental synthesis of the imagination . . . is an effect of the understanding on sensibility, and [is] its first application (and at the same time the ground of all others)’ (B152). What is left to ascertain is how the forms of intuition, in particular time, are represented as objects, that is, how time is already taken as a unity by means of this synthesis. Kant takes up this question after the break in §24 (at B152). Thus (continuing our numbering) at B154, Kant claims that, while time must be represented as a unity: ‘(5) inner sense [itself] . . . contains the mere form of intuition, but without the combination of the manifold in it, and thus it does not yet contain any determinate intuition at all’. Assuming as he does that inner sense here contains a manifold albeit uncombined, Kant is apparently recalling the point already made clear in §15, namely, that combination can never be given in the senses, but must be supplied by the understanding’s action upon sensibility. As a result, he elliptically concludes that the requisite combination of the manifold given along with inner sense, ‘(6) is possible only through the consciousness of the determination of the manifold through the transcendental action of the imagination (synthetic influence of the understanding on the inner sense), which I have named the figurative synthesis’ (my emphasis). Here, then, we have all of the major points of the argument. The synthesis of apprehension must accord with the conditions of inner intuition and one of these conditions is that the manifold of time itself be represented as a unity. This unity, however, must be the product of some synthesis though it cannot be the result of the direction of the empirical synthesis of apprehension upon the contents of a given empirical manifold. This synthesis could only be the result of the action of the understanding upon inner sense itself, which action is identified as the transcendental
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synthesis of the imagination, or the figurative synthesis. Yet this synthesis that yields a representation of time is a determination of the pure manifold of inner sense, which determination, Kant claims, is only possible through consciousness of the determination of this manifold. In this way, Kant concludes that consciousness (of the determination of the manifold) must be an essential part of all perception.

Of course, both of these last steps are highly problematic. Not only does Kant appear simply to assume in (5) that a pure manifold of inner sense is given but, further, the conclusion, 6, requires explanation if it is not simply to beg the question as to why self-consciousness must accompany the activity of the figurative synthesis. Fortunately, Kant addresses these problems in the paragraph which follows at B154. There, Kant’s intention is to illustrate exactly how it is that time acquires a manifold and how, through its combination, it is represented as an object. As hinted above, the asymmetry between space and time becomes crucial at this juncture. Kant begins the paragraph by detailing how space is represented as an object. Indeed, since space has a pure manifold of its own comprising ‘extension and form ... [which] belong to the pure intuition’ (A21/B35), this is hardly problematic, as evidenced by the fact that geometrical objects admit of immediate construction in pure intuition: ‘We cannot think of a line without drawing it in thought, we cannot think of a circle without describing it, we cannot represent the three dimensions of space at all without placing three lines perpendicular to each other at the same point.’

As a result, the representation of the ‘objective’ geometrical space required by these representations is possible, as indicated in the footnote at B160–1, simply through the action of the understanding upon sensibility (here, the pure manifold of outer sense), which action is just the figurative synthesis.25

The same, however, is not the case with the representation of time, with regard to which Kant claims that ‘the understanding therefore does not find some sort of combination of the manifold already in inner sense, but produces it, by affecting inner sense’ (B155).26 Properly speaking, this claim should be amended to say that no pure manifold, combined or otherwise, is initially discovered in inner sense; as Kant explains in the Aesthetic, ‘inner intuition yields no shape’ (A33/B50) and, later in the Amphiboly, he claims that ‘I therefore have nothing absolutely but only
comparatively internal [Innerliches]' (A277/B333). This is just to say that inner sense has no manifold of its own and, as a result, we are required to resort to indirect means in order to represent time as a unity (later the Analogies of Experience are intended to address this requirement further). Kant grapples with this limitation of time in the remainder of the sentence in question at B154, which I take to provide crucial support for claims (5) and (6) above (hence the numbering):

(5a) we cannot even represent time without, in drawing a straight line (which is to be the external figurative representation of time), (5b) attending merely to the action of the synthesis of the manifold through which we successively determine the inner sense, and (5c) thereby attending to the succession of this determination in inner sense.

This dense claim requires unpacking. First, (5a), given that inner intuition does not yield a sensible shape, or more generally that it has no manifold of its own but must (at least at first) rely on borrowings from outer sense, we must indirectly represent time by means of a spatial representation. Here and elsewhere (A33/B50, A102, A163/B203, B156, B292) Kant uses the image of a straight line. Yet, in order not merely to draw a line but, in addition, figuratively to represent time as an object, more is required, namely, 5b, attention to the individual acts of synthesis involved in the action of drawing such a line in thought. Though Kant neglects to define attention in the passage under consideration, in the Metaphysik Mrongovius attention is defined as that act 'through which only a single representation is made clear and all the remaining are obscured' (29: 878). In §24, it is the function of attention that is essential in explaining precisely how time acquires a manifold since attention to the successive syntheses involved in drawing the line, rather than simply taking the line as what it is (a determination of outer sense), yields a new set of determinations consisting of discrete acts of attention to these syntheses. This effectively supplies inner sense with a pure manifold of its own comprising just this set of discrete acts of attention because, even though the syntheses involved in the drawing of the line were occasioned by outer sense, the acts of attention to these syntheses are not reciprocally exhibitable in outer sense.

Attention then plays a central role in explaining time's acquisition of a pure manifold of its own; yet, in introducing the faculty of
attention at this point in the argument, a faculty that was a fixture in the textbooks of empirical psychology,\(^\text{30}\) Kant might be accused of confusing the already tenuous distinction between the analysis of the transcendental conditions of perception and a merely psychological account of that process. Furthermore, Kant’s mention of an ‘act [Aktus] of attention’ (B156n) appears to add an unwelcome voluntarist element to the discussion, insofar as it suggests that attention is a function determined, for instance, by the will rather than constituting a properly transcendental condition for the possibility of perception.\(^\text{31}\) Nonetheless, we might note that, rather than compromising the analysis of the necessary transcendental conditions of perception with an additional, illicitly psychological, posit of a faculty, Kant indicates elsewhere that attention is just another function of the understanding. In the Anthropology, for instance, he claims that the understanding (in the most general sense) must include the function of attention, in addition to the capacities for abstraction and reflection (cf. 7: 138). Second, Kant’s discussion of an ‘act [Aktus]’ of attention serves to associate it with his general discussion of the synthesis or combination of a manifold at the outset of the Deduction which he refers to as an ‘act [Aktus] of spontaneity’ and as an ‘act [Aktus] of its [the subject’s] self-activity’ (B130).

Indeed, the relation between the acts of attention and of synthesis, especially the transcendental synthesis, is more than a mere association. Insofar as Kant observes that ‘[i]n such acts [of attention] the understanding always determines the inner sense’ (B156–7n), he is directly identifying the act of attention with the transcendental synthesis of the imagination defined precisely as the ‘influence of the understanding on the inner sense’ or the figurative synthesis (B154). Moreover, if it is attention, now also identified as the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, that provides inner sense with an ersatz manifold of its own, a manifold comprising just the acts of attention to the syntheses involved in the drawing of a line, then this is just to say that it is through the act of attention that the subject affects itself. Thus it is that same act of attention involved in differentiating the simple drawing of a line from a putative representation of time that must be taken as the sole means of self-affection instead of, as is more commonly suspected, being taken merely as the means through which self-affection is witnessed.\(^\text{32}\) Kant makes this identification explicit in the footnote at B156–7 (already partially quoted.

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above): 'I do not see how one can find so many difficulties in the fact that inner sense is affected by ourselves. Every act of attention can give us an example of this.'

While the identification of attention with the synthetic influence of the understanding upon inner sense, and, consequently, with self-affection, is a crucial step in the analysis of the conditions of perception, this alone does not conclude the account of the conditions of the unified representation of time. This is because discrete acts of attention to the individual syntheses do not yield a unified representation but instead only a disconnected, unordered manifold. What is required in addition, then, is (5c) the synthesis of these acts of attention themselves. As Kant has pointed out, the combination of discrete acts of attention, here into a single unified succession, is never the work of sensibility (see §15 and also B233) but requires, in this case, a reapplication of the activity of the understanding, just as the pure manifold of space was synthetically combined into a unified representation. This synthesis, then, combines the discrete acts of attention (resulting from the first application of the understanding to inner sense), thereby synthetically generating the representation of a unified succession of those acts of attention comprising the pure manifold of time: 'if we abstract from this manifold in space and attend solely to the action, through which [attention] we determine inner sense in accordance with its form, [this] first produces the concept of succession at all' (B155, my emphasis).

And while Kant here, and in claim (5c) ('and thereby attending to the succession of this determination in inner sense'), straightforwardly identifies this synthesis with attention, this should only be taken to reinforce the identification of attention with the understanding's influence upon the inner sense (whether it be in affecting inner sense for the initial generation of the pure manifold, or in unifying that manifold). It is this representation, the unified succession of a manifold of otherwise disconnected acts of attention, which suffices as the desired representation of time as a unity, that is, 'not merely as [a] form ... but also as [an] intuition ... which contains a manifold ... and thus [it is represented through] ... the determination of the unity of this manifold' (B160).

This is still not quite the end of the story, though, as it leaves out the element of self-consciousness with which our discussion began. Such consciousness is to be sought in this second act of the understanding.
upon the inner sense, that is, in this second act of attention the objects of which are the individual acts of attention themselves. In extending over all of the individual acts of awareness, this additional act of attention generates precisely, as Kant put it before (claim (6)), 'the consciousness of the determination of the manifold through the transcendental action of the imagination' (B154, my emphasis), that is, a self-consciousness since it comprises a reflexive attention to those acts of attention that constitute the manifold of inner sense: I attend to (and thereby synthesize) my individual acts of attention. This self-consciousness, however, cannot be taken as a cognition of the self as it is but, since it is a function of the combination of a manifold of inner sense that was itself the product of self-affection, this consciousness can only be of the self as it appears:

the determination of my existence can only occur in correspondence with the form of inner sense, according to the particular way in which the manifold that I combine is given in inner intuition, and I therefore have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself. (B157-8)

It is in this way, then, that self-consciousness, or consciousness of myself as I appear to myself, becomes a necessary component of every perception. Indeed, the connection is closer than expected since this self-consciousness, as the result of the synthesis of the manifold of time taken as a pure intuition, is just the unity of time represented as an object, as Kant suggests in an addition to the Analytic of Principles in the second edition: 'for in order subsequently to make even inner alterations thinkable, we must be able to grasp time, as the form of inner sense, figuratively through a line ... and thus grasp the successive existence of ourself in different states through outer intuition' (B292, my emphasis).

3. Problems with Self-Affection

Of course, Kant's doctrine of self-affection has been the subject of vigorous controversy. Allison provides a concise statement of two major problems facing this doctrine as Kant presents it. First, in naming that action of the understanding upon sensibility (the transcendental synthesis of the imagination) self-affection, Kant seems
to be suggesting a parallelism between that influence and the influence of external objects upon outer sense, or simple affection (A19/B33). Yet, Allison argues,

the identification of self-affection with the transcendental synthesis serves to accentuate the disanalogy between the two modes of affection. There is, indeed, little in common between the influence of objects upon outer sense . . . and the ‘synthetic influence of the understanding’ . . . which is one of the ways in which Kant characterizes self-affection.

As should be clear from the foregoing, however, the parallelism between affection and self-affection (if not between outer and inner sense) can be unproblematically maintained. First, we should note that self-affection should not be unilaterally identified with the synthetic influence of the understanding upon sensibility insofar as this synthesis is operative in both the representation of time and space considered as formal intuitions. As was noted above, space is supplied with a pure manifold of its own and this implies that the activity of the understanding is required only for the combination of this given manifold. It is only the transcendental synthesis of the imagination considered as the effect of the understanding upon inner sense that can properly be identified with self-affection, as Kant makes clear throughout §24 (‘synthetic influence of the understanding on the inner sense’, B154; ‘In such acts [of attention] the understanding always determines the inner sense’, B157n). For this reason, self-affection only enters upon the scene as a necessary supplement to inner sense which has no pure manifold of its own. In the task of representing time as an object, a task that conditions the synthesis of apprehension, we need to have recourse to indirect means and so we make use of an external representation (the drawing of a line) where the line itself is not the object of our attention but, rather, solely the occasion for our attention to the succession of the syntheses which such drawing involves. Clearly, this manifold of time is provided neither through the form of intuition itself (which, again, has no manifold proper to itself), nor through the manifold of outer sense (which provides only the occasion of the direction of our attention), but instead and only through attention, or the determination of inner sense by the understanding. Self-affection, then, is parallel to the influence of objects upon outer sense since it is only by such means that a manifold of time can be given at all.
Allison's second criticism draws our attention to a potential inconsistency between the doctrine of self-affection as presented in the *Aesthetic* and that presented in §24. I quote this discussion at length, focusing on two particular points of interest (denoted by [a] and [b]):

The second point is that the figurative synthesis is a transcendental condition of all experience, not merely of inner experience. As we have seen, the main thrust of the argument of the second part of the Transcendental Deduction is to show the determination of inner sense by the understanding ... is necessary in order to provide a determinate intuition for consciousness. This claim is independent of the issue of whether the intuition is of inner or outer objects because all appearances, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. [a] Consequently, the mere appeal to self-affection, construed as transcendental synthesis, hardly explains how such synthesis could serve as a specific condition of self-knowledge. In fact, this suggests that there may be a fundamental incoherence in Kant's whole account of self-affection. [b] The problem is that in the *Aesthetic* self-affection is presented as if it were equivalent to the synthesis of apprehension, while in the Deduction it is equated with the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. At the same time, however, Kant explicitly distinguishes between these two types of synthesis on the grounds that the latter is empirical and is conditioned by the former.38

Point [a] concerns self-affection's double title as both the transcendental condition of all experience (in the guise of the figurative synthesis), and the specific condition of inner experience, through which (for instance) the self as it appears is known. Presented as such, characterizing self-affection merely as the transcendental synthesis of imagination does not help us describe the particular conditions of inner experience in any but a trivial sense (that is, such a synthesis is the condition of all experience and thus, *a fortiori*, also of inner experience). However, we can now see that such a difficulty arises only as the result of an unwarranted distinction between two apparently separate activities: that action through which experience as such is generated and an act (or acts) of attention which results in self-consciousness. For Kant, these actions cannot be separated since perception always requires, or even *results in*, consciousness of the self. Yet, this result does not convince on its own inasmuch as it leaves out the possibility that we can consider the contents of our minds outside of the process of
perception of an empirically external object. Indeed, this is the crux of Allison's concern since such an act does not, in any straightforward sense, seem to require the figurative synthesis in generating a manifold of inner sense— in this case the objects are just inner appearances.

Crucially, however, Kant claims both that perception requires self-consciousness (as I appear) and that self-consciousness (as I appear) requires perception. The former was demonstrated in the Deduction and the latter was discussed previous to that in the Aesthetic, in the very passage (B68—9) to which Allison alludes in point [b] above. Since this dense and often misunderstood passage is relatively short, I will also quote it in full, as usual infixing numbers to indicate what I take to be self-standing claims (and one missing premise):

1 Consciousness of itself (apperception) is the simple representation of the I, 2 and if all of the manifold in the subject were given self-actively through that alone, then the inner intuition would be intellectual. 3 In human beings this consciousness requires inner perception of the manifold that is antecedently given in the subject, 4 and the manner in which this is given in the mind without spontaneity must be called sensibility on account of this difference. 5a If the faculty for becoming conscious of oneself is to seek out (apprehend) that which lies in the mind, 5b it must affect the latter, and it can only produce an intuition of itself in such a way, 6 [the] form [of which intuition], however, which antecedently grounds it in the mind, determines the way in which the manifold is together in the mind in the representation of time; 7 8 there it then intuits itself not as it would immediately self-actively represent itself, but in accordance with the way in which it is affected from within, 9 consequently as it appears to itself, not as it is.

The passage divides as follows: propositions 1—2 provide an explanation for the unavailability of an intuition of the self as it is. Proposition 3 qualifies human self-consciousness as requiring 'inner perception of the manifold that is antecedently given in the subject', which implies that, 4, any such self-consciousness will only be of the self as it appears. Propositions 5a—9, then, represent the argument proper. Starting with proposition 5a, we should note that Kant is intent on addressing precisely the issue discussed by Allison—an act in which we focus upon the contents of inner sense where that action requires that we 'seek out (apprehend) that which lies in the mind'. Kant's identification of this 'seeking out' on
the part of the mind with the act of apprehension is decisive, and it implies that the conditions of this ‘seeking out’ are just the conditions of the performance of the synthesis of apprehension. These conditions were of course the topic of §§24, 26, and among these conditions is 5b, that the mind must affect itself in order to generate and combine the pure manifold of time and, as shown in the conclusion of section 2, above, ‘it can only produce an intuition of itself in such a way’. The remainder of the passage, then, is just a brief but anticipatory run-through of the later argument of the Deduction. So, 6, this act of inner apprehension, as all acts of apprehension are, is conditioned by the form of inner sense which implies that this apprehension, since it ‘determines the way the manifold is together in the mind’, is also subject to the conditions of the ‘representation of time’, namely, the representation of time as a formal intuition (since the apprehension of a mental content requires the situation of that content in the representation of time). At this point, 7, there is apparently a missing step which is only introduced later with the discussion of the act of attention whereby, through the process of determining the pure manifold of time, I become aware of myself.39 Only the supplement of this premise could yield 8, the claim that this self is not itself apprehended through an intellectual intuition as pure self-activity, but instead produced through the (self-)affection of passive inner sense.40 Consequently, 9, this also implies that such a self could only be intuited as it appears and not as it is in itself.41

Thus, rather than complicating Kant’s account of self-affection in the Deduction or being symptomatic of a deep incoherence in Kant’s notion of self-affection in general, the brief discussion at B68–9 shows that consciousness of myself as I appear and perception are mutually implicative, with self-affection providing the crucial linkage. Since in seeking self-knowledge we take a given mental content as the object of apprehension, we are still bound to the conditions of the synthesis of apprehension and, indeed, it is just the fulfillment of these conditions that will generate a consciousness of the self. This also shows that Kant is not caught out in alternatively identifying self-affection with the transcendental synthesis in the Deduction and with the empirical synthesis (of apprehension) in the Aesthetic (point [b] in Allison’s criticism above), a difficulty that might tempt us into distinguishing between ‘transcendental’ and ‘empirical’ self-affection or something of the
sort. Rather, the performance of the empirical synthesis is only ever the occasion for self-affection, which is consistently identified with the transcendental synthesis, that is the action of the understanding upon inner sense, in both cases.

By way of conclusion, we might briefly outline Kant's responses to Leibniz's and Hume's criticisms that framed our discussion in the last section. Focusing for the moment only on Leibniz's separation of perception and attention in contrast to Locke, Kant might contend that such a separation would in fact render the representation of time impossible, inasmuch as time has no manifold of its own and therefore requires attention or the determination of the inner sense by the understanding, that is, self-affection. Yet, since there is no logical contradiction in the notion of multiple times—'the proposition that different times cannot be simultaneous cannot be derived from a general concept' (A31–2/B47)—without fulfilling the conditions necessary for the representation of a singular, unified time, experience itself is likewise rendered impossible. For this reason, Kant maintains that attention and perception are not separable.

The case is similar with regard to Hume. The Deduction itself has been taken as arguing principally against Hume's contention that perceptions are completely separable from one another (that is, that there are no real connections among perceptions, or even representations in general) as well as from the self. However, from the limited point of view of our analysis, we might simply point out that while Kant like Hume denies immediate access to an intuition of the self, Kant nonetheless demonstrates to his own satisfaction that all perception necessarily generates consciousness of myself as I appear. Again, the conditions of representing time, itself required by the operation of the empirical synthesis of apprehension upon the manifold given in inner (and outer) appearances, require that two acts of attention are performed, the second being that in which the consciousness of the successive determination of the manifold of time (considered as a formal intuition) is generated. Insofar as Hume pretends to avoid relating perceptions to a subject, so also does he disregard the conditions of the representation of the sensible condition of the representation of all appearances, namely, the representation of the unity of time.
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Notes

1 Translations from the Kritik der reinen Vernunft are taken from the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. P. Guyer and A. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), though in some cases I have offered amendments; translations from the Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik are taken from Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. and ed. G. Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), and translations from the Opus postumum are taken from Opus postumum, trans. E. Förster and M. Rosen, ed. E. Förster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). All other translations from the German are my own. Citations from the Critique are given in the standard A/B format while all other citations of Kant's works refer to volume and page number in the Gesammelte Schriften, Königliche Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin and Leipzig: de Gruyter, 1922).

2 Of course, self-affection is mentioned in a number of Reflexionen, and is briefly discussed in a couple of published works, including the Anthropologie (7: 140), the Kritik der Urtheilskraft (albeit only in the discarded first introduction at 20: 223), and the late essay 'Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnizens und Wolff's Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht haben?' (20: 270).

3 If the taxonomy in the so-called Stufenleiter passage differs from that in other passages it is most likely because in the former Kant closely follows Baumgarten's presentation in §522 of the Metaphysica (reprinted in vol. XVI of Kant's Gesammelte Schriften): 'Repraentanto mihi quaedam ita, ut aliqui eorum characteres clari sint, aliqui obscuri. Eiusmodi perceptio, qua notas claras, distincta est, qua obscuras, sensitiva ...'.

4 See also R 5661 (1788–90): 'An empirical representation, of which I am conscious, is perception' (18: 318).
See also *Prolegomena* §20: ‘At bottom lies the intuition of which I am conscious, i.e., perception (*perceptio*) which belongs solely to the senses’ (4: 300).

See also Kant’s note in his edition of the *Critique*: ‘Intuition is related to the object, sensation merely to the subject’ (23: 21).


In fact, Tetens endorses this Leibnizian doctrine in the third essay, although only with a revealing amendment. Since to endorse the notion of a perception of which we are not conscious would be in conflict with his claim, presented above, that all perception involves consciousness, Tetens instead refers to ‘unperceived representations’ (‘unwahrgenomme Vorstellungen’) (Tetens, *Philosophische Versuche*, p. 265).


See also the Preface of the *New Essays*, p. 54.


*Treatise*, p. 252.


I should also note that in the following I am heavily indebted to Henry Allison’s analysis of the Deduction. While I differ from him on
a number of points, which will be noted in due course, my general approach and arrangement of the argument in the second half of the deduction parallel his.

22 Indeed, there is an important justification for Kant's focus on space in the footnote at B160–1 based upon the asymmetry between space and time as pure intuitions. This will be discussed in detail below.

23 See, for instance, B207: 'Appearances ... are not pure (merely formal) intuitions, like space and time (for these cannot be perceived in themselves)'. Kant's claim in the A edition that 'this synthesis of apprehension must also be a priori, i.e., in regard to representations that are not empirical [for] without it we could have a priori neither the representations of space nor time' (A99) is not inconsistent with the emphasis in the B edition that 'time is not perceived' (B219, B225, B233) since, in the A discussion, Kant is referring to a pure synthesis of apprehension which is closely linked in the next section with the transcendental synthesis of the imagination ('The synthesis of apprehension is therefore inseparably combined with the synthesis of reproduction', A102). This is a claim Kant will also make in the B Deduction (B162n).

24 I also take this dependency of apprehended objects upon the representation of space and time to be the thrust of the following confusing remark in the Amphiboly: 'But since sensible intuition is an entirely peculiar subjective condition, which grounds all perception a priori, and the form of which is original, thus the form is given for itself alone, and so far is it from being the case that the matter (or the things ... which appear) ought to be the ground (as one would have to judge according to mere concepts), that their possibility presupposes a formal intuition (of space and time) as given' (A268/B323–4). On this point, also see Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, pp. 168–9.

25 On the determination of space as a unity, see also the discussion in Opus postumum: 'empirical intuition . . . represents space itself through the composition of the manifold in appearance a priori into an object of experience as of a synthetic cognition of the object of the senses'. That space is directly represented by the combination of the manifold of appearance (without, as will be seen with time, requiring the additional generation of that manifold) is due to the fact that the 'the pure intuition of the manifold in space contains the form of the objects in appearance a priori of the first order, that is, direct' (22: 367, my emphasis).

26 See also R 6349 (1797): 'The difficulty [with regard to inner experience] concerns only how the subject could itself institute experience. It must not merely perceive sensations in itself, but rather excite [erregen] and connect them synthetically, consequently affecting itself.' (18: 673–4)
A reviewer for *Kantian Review* has charged that I force the view upon Kant that inner sense has no manifold of its own (that this ascription is a commonplace is, of course, no counter-argument). The reviewer disputes this attribution by quoting A99 where Kant claims that ‘every intuition contains a manifold in itself’ without limiting the claim to empirical (as opposed to pure) intuitions. I would point out, however, that Kant does not make a comparably strong claim in the B-edition Deduction, asserting only at B160 (already quoted above) that space and time are also represented as ‘intuitions . . . (which contain a manifold)’, without commenting (at that point) on how this manifold is supplied. (Indeed, the differences between the A and B Deductions are especially material on this point, given that the doctrine of self-affection is formally introduced only in the latter.) The reviewer continues, arguing that even if spatial analogies are required in order to represent time as an object, this does not imply that the manifold of time is itself borrowed from outer sense since this may be a unique requirement of the representation of time. Yet, this line of argument strikes me as faulty — why would an analogy be required for representation when a manifold is readily available for synthesis? In addition to the references provided above, the clearest statement of Kant’s view that inner sense has no manifold of its own seems to be B67: ‘the representations of the outer senses constitute the proper material with which we occupy our mind’ (as concerns the secondary literature, one might consult Béatrice Longuenesse’s *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 228–9, and Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 258–63, among others).

Of course, this is not to make the additional, and false, claim that in every act of perception the perceiver is required actually to draw a line. Rather, the example is intended only to illustrate the dependence of inner sense upon outer sense for the determination of the time in which a given percept is placed, which dependence is later expanded in the first Analogy and the Refutation of Idealism. Indeed, at B155, Kant suggests that attending to motion would also yield the appropriate representation of time (a claim which plays upon the close connection between time and the concept of motion in the Transcendental Exposition of time at B48–9). Thus, the example of a line is intended only as one possible example of time’s general limitation to representation through space: ‘we can only represent time to ourselves in that we affect ourselves by describing space and grasping the manifold of its representation’ (Leningrad *Reflection, International Philosophical Quarterly* 29 (1989), 252–261, cf. 253).

Thus, again in the *Opus postumum*, Kant contrasts the ‘direct’ appearance which is given through outer sense (see note 25, above)
with the ‘indirect’ appearance generated through self-affection: ‘The composition of the perception of appearance in the subject for the purpose of experience is in turn appearance of the so-affected subject as it represents itself, therefore, indirectly and it is appearance of the second order . . . that is, appearance of the self-affecting subject’ (22: 367).

In addition to Tetens’s use, presented above, of the notion of attention, see Wolff, *Psychologia empirica* (reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1968), §237; Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, §529. Baumgarten’s student, G. F. Meier, even identifies attention as one of two ‘Hauptvermögen’ in his *Metaphysik* (2nd edn, Halle, 1765) §506.

As, for instance, in Wolff’s claim in the *Psychologia empirica* that ‘Videmus adeo attentionis directionem pendere ab arbitrio nostro ...’ (§256). Compare Kant’s similar claim in the *Anthropologie* (7: 131).

Along these lines we might note an ambiguity in Kant’s statement at B155: ‘Motion, as action of the subject (not as determination of the object), consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space, if we abstract from this manifold in space and attend solely to the action in accordance with which we determine the form of inner sense [wenn wir von diesem abstrahiren und blass auf die Handlung Acht haben, dadurch wir den inneren Sinn seiner Form gemäss bestimmen], first produces the concept of succession at all’ (my emphasis). The ambiguity concerns the nature of the second clause and whether it further determines the nature of the action, that is, we attend to the action of determining inner sense (this is suggested by the Guyer-Wood translation), or whether it introduces a consequence of the attention to the action taken to be the synthesis of the manifold in space, that is, ‘we attend to the action [of synthesis in drawing the line, etc.], through which [attention] we determine inner sense in accordance with its form’.

See also the late essay, ‘Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte’, where Kant notes that ‘we affect inner sense by means of attention [wir . . . den innern Sinn . . . vermittelst der Aufmerksamkeit afficiren]’ (20: 270).

Thus A142/B182: ‘I generate time itself in the apprehension of the intuition.’

Kant asserts this parallelism at B156: ‘hence if we admit about [objects in outer sense] that we cognize objects by their means only insofar as we are externally affected, then we must also concede that through inner sense we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected by our selves’.


Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, p. 267.
Kant probably foregoes introducing the notion of attention explicitly here since the discussion of the synthesis of the imagination, with which attention is linked, would not properly belong in the Aesthetic. On the passivity of inner sense in self-affection, see also B69, B156, B429–30 and R 6354 (1797, 18: 680).

See Kant’s similar presentation of this argument in R 6354 (1797): ‘Inner sense is not yet cognition of my self, rather we must first have appearances through it, immediately after which we make a concept of ourselves through reflection on these appearances, which thereupon has as a consequence the empirical cognition of my self, that is, inner experience’ (18: 680).

Such is Guenter Zoeller’s attempt to reconcile the contrary poles in Allison’s accusation of a deep incoherence, in ‘Making sense out of inner sense: the Kantian doctrine as illuminated by the Leningrad Reflexion’ (in International Philosophical Quarterly, 29 (1989), 263–70, cf. esp. 267–8). Manfred Baum is apparently of a similar view, claiming that another kind of self-affection is necessary for becoming conscious of the representations of my mind’ (Manfred Baum, ‘Cosmological Apperception’, International Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1989), 281–9, cf. 283, my emphasis). According to my interpretation, however, there is one type of self-affection distinguished only by what occasions it; thus, it is occasioned either by the attempt to perceive a given external object, or by the attention to a mental state with the aim of cognizing the mind and its contents. Since both cases involve apprehension, both cases must also require, as shown above, the synthetic activity of the understanding upon the inner sense in order to generate and determine the manifold and, therefore, both require self-affection understood in precisely the same way.

On this point see also Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, pp. 160–2.