Artificial intellgence and fundamental rights from a European perspective.

The present thesis is an investigation of the cross-linguistic expression of knowledge predication (‘He knows that it’s raining’, ‘she knows the boy’ etc.) Knowledge predication is investigated in parallel texts—specifically New Testament translations—in a genealogically and areally stratified variety sample of 83 languages. A selection of 100 verses, representing the variety of knowledge as well as near-lying concepts, are manually analysed and annotated for lexical and constructional information and analysed using both qualitative and quantitative methods. In the first part of (...) the thesis (chapters 2-4), the theoretical and methodological foundations of the investigation are presented. The definition of knowledge is discussed and a survey of previous research on knowledge and its aspects is presented, drawing on work in philosophy and psychology as well as linguistics. The results are the basis for the selection of verses for investigation. The novel sampling procedure employed—a development of the Diversity Values sampling method with added areal stratification—is introduced. This part of the thesis also situates the investigation within the field of semantic typology, describes the theoretical frameworks used – constructional typology and cognitive semantics—and discusses the methodological challenges of parallel corpora drawing on results from translation studies. In the second part of the thesis (chapters 5-6), the question of whether knowledge is generally distinguished cross-linguistically is addressed. A similarity measure based on lexical and constructional annotations and incorporating automatically inferred paradigmatic relationships is presented and applied. This is then the basis for agglomerative hierarchical clustering, the results of which are interpreted as evidence of an extended knowledge domain (‘know’, ‘understand’ and ‘find out’) and a narrow knowledge domain (‘know’). Also addressed is the question of the universality of knowledge predication, and the sample’s two possible exceptions to this (Kalam [Nuclear Trans New Guinea, PNG] and Fasu [Isolate, PNG]) are discussed in some depth. In the third part of the thesis (chapters 7-11), the cross-linguistic expression of the extended knowledge domain is investigated in more detail. Using Classical Multi-Dimensional Scaling (also known as Torgerson Scaling or Principal Co-Ordinate Analysis), the dimensions along which the expression of knowledge varies cross-linguistically are explored. Their semantics is investigated, and the typology of their expression is discussed. Additionally, the connections of the different parts of the knowledge domain to other domains such as perception—are explored and analysed from a cognitive semantic perspective. Finally, quantitative evidence for knowledge having a core (‘know that’) and a periphery (‘know person’, ‘understand’ etc.) is presented, including a measure of directionality of formal motivational relationships. The fourth part (chapter 12) concludes and summarises the thesis. Six generalisations regarding the linguistic expression of the knowledge domain are made, describing for example restrictions on co-expression patterns. Finally, a semantic map of the domain of knowledge predication is presented, synthesising the results of the thesis, and establishing a basis for future research. (shrink)

This thesis is about the notions of health and pathology in medical theory. I develop a theory, which defines ‘health’ and ‘pathology’ in a way that solves several problems with earlier suggestions of how to define these terms. I call the theory ‘the disposition profile efficiency theory’, abbreviated ‘the DPE-theory’. According to the DPE-theory, a trait token is healthy, roughly, if and only if all of its dispositions for performing physiological functions are efficient enough. A trait token is pathological, roughly, (...) if and only if at least one of its dispositions for performing a physiological function is not efficient enough. The notion of efficiency, I suggest, is reference class-relative: the efficiency of a trait token’s disposition for performing a physiological function expresses a relation between the trait token and a health standard for the trait token’s bearer’s reference class. The thesis also examines the most discussed theory of health and pathology, “the biostatistical theory” proposed by Boorse. Both the DPE-theory and the biostatistical theory are evaluated against a number of desiderata: the theory should be theoretically sound; only use empirical, statistical, and logical terms; not involve values; be clear; both account for health and pathology as reference class-relative properties, and account for the importance of integration of different physiological functions for health; and have reasonable implications. It is argued that the DPE-theory satisfies the desiderata, and that it does so better than the biostatistical theory. The main contributions of the thesis are the DPE-theory’s models of dispositions, its approach to defining reference classes, its efficiency measure, and its way of drawing the line between high enough efficiencies and too low efficiencies. Other important contributions concern the desideratum about reasonable implications. It is shown how the DPE-theory contributes to solving two much discussed objections directed towards the biostatistical theory, “the problem of common diseases” and “Kingma’s dilemma”. Further, the DPE-theory is used to illuminate discussions about certain types of conditions for which it is contested whether they should count as healthy or pathological. (shrink)

Kelsen defends monism, that is, the view that international law and the various state legal systems taken together constitute a unified normative system, and the primacy of international law over state law within the monistic framework. He argues in support of the -claim that only monism is compatible with the epistemological postulate, according to which cognition requires the unity of the object of cognition, that the norm conflicts that are said by the critics of monism to undermine monism are harmless (...) because they are not norm contradictions, but only norm contrarieties, and that the doctrine of dualism collapses into solipsism due to its dependence on the doctrine of recognition. And he argues in support of the -claim that the idea of the primacy of international law within the monistic framework is necessary to account for the existence of states that are legally coordinated and separated from one another in their spheres of validity. In this article, I discuss critically claims and and the arguments - that Kelsen adduces in support of these claims. I argue, more specifically, that while Kelsen is right that only monism is compatible with the epistemological postulate, the claim is unpersuasive that norm contrarieties, as distinguished from norm contradictions, are harmless from the point of view of this postulate, and that in any case not all the norm conflicts identified by the critics of monism are norm contrarieties. I also argue that if the above-mentioned claim had been persuasive, the dualists, too, might have invoked it and avoided Kelsen’s criticism of dualism via the criticism of the doctrine of recognition, and that Kelsen’s claim is well founded that dualism collapses into solipsism because of the collapse of the doctrine of recognition. Finally, I suggest that contrary to what Kelsen appears to think, the epistemological postulate rules out locating law in a higher realm of norms and values that is sharply separated from the world of time and space. (shrink)

In this article, I shall consider a method for conceptual analysis which has been called the Canberra Plan and which might perhaps be conceived as an alternative approach to conceptual analysis in the classical sense. The Canberra Plan is not, however, aimed primarily at the elucidation of the relevant concept, but at the metaphysical question of identifying the descriptive (or natural or physical) property that corresponds to the concept.[1] The idea of the Canberra Plan is, more specifically, (a) to clarify (...) the import of the concept by reference to the role the concept plays in a network of concepts, principles, and claims, and (b) to investigate and see what, if any, descriptive property corresponds to the concept thus analyzed. What I want to do in this article, then, is first to introduce the Canberra Plan and give some consideration to its advantages and disadvantages and, secondly, to apply it to the concept of law, in order not only to clarify the import of this concept, but also to find out what, if any, descriptive property corresponds to the concept. The question of what descriptive property, if any, corresponds to the concept of law should be of considerable interest to jurisprudents, not only because the meta-ethical question of whether legal properties are descriptive, or even natural or physical, is generally interesting, but also because the existence of such descriptive (or natural or physical) legal properties is precisely what is asserted by legal positivists through the so-called social thesis, which has it that we determine what the law is using factual criteria. That is to say, if the analyst succeeds in establishing that the property of being law is a descriptive property, he would seem to have offered at least some support for the social thesis of legal positivism and, therefore, for legal positivism. In order to investigate this interesting question, I shall carry out a Canberra-style analysis of the concept of law, and I shall argue, tentatively, (1) that X is law if, and only if, (i) X is a relation between (a) a system of norms all of which can be traced back to one of several recognized sources of law that can be handled on the basis of exclusively factual considerations, and (b) an organization that is constituted and regulated by the norms of the system and whose task it is to interpret and apply these norms, (ii) X aspires to regulate social life in general, (iii) X is non-optional, and (iv) X claims to trump competing normative systems. In addition, I shall argue, equally tentatively, (2a) that the property of being law is precisely the descriptive property that satisfies the conditions (i)-(iv), (2b) that this property is a role property, not a realizer property, and (2c) that there is very little to be said about the legal realizer property on a general level and that the legal realizer property differs in this regard from moral and mental realizer properties. I shall, however, also argue (3a) that the analyst who applies the Canberra Plan to the concept of law will almost certainly find it very difficult to come up with a collection of sufficiently rich analytic platitudes, especially what Frank Jackson calls input and output clauses, (3b) that he is not likely to get much help from the idea of mature legal thinking (introduced here as an analog to Jackson’s idea of mature folk morality), and (3c) that the so-called permutation problem, which is very problematic, will arise as a result of the above-mentioned lack of input and output clauses. And I shall therefore argue (4) that, as things stand, the Canberra Plan will not help us clarify the nature of law or lend support to the strong social thesis of legal positivism. (shrink)

Plato’s Socrates is famous for claiming that “I know one thing: That I know nothing”. There is one subject that Socrates repeatedly claims to have expertise in, however: ta erôtika. Socrates also refers to this expertise as his erôtikê technê, which may be translated as “erotic expertise”. In this dissertation, I investigate Socrates’ erotic expertise: what kind of expertise is it, what is it constituted by, where is it put into practice, and how is it practiced? I argue that the (...) purposes this expertise serve are, to a significant extent, educational in nature. After first having clarified the dissertation’s topic and aim, as well as my methodological approach, I present an initial account of erôs and Socrates’ erotic expertise. While discussing what constitutes Socrates’ erotic expertise, I account for two erotic educational methods: midwifery and matchmaking. I further argue that these methods tend to be accompanied by two psychological techniques, namely charming and shaming. I argue that these methods and techniques are systematically applied by Socrates when he puts his erotic expertise into practice. In the dissertation, three dialogues where Socrates practices his erotic expertise are scrutinized: Lysis, Charmides, and Alcibiades I. I focus on Socrates’ encounters with the eponymous youths of the dialogues, and each dialogue is devoted a chapter of its own. I show how these dialogues are erotically charged, and also how Socrates in these dialogues demonstrates his erotic expertise. I argue that Socrates’ expertise on erôs plays an essential role in his attempts to engage the three youths in the processes of self-cultivation, learning, and the very practice of philosophy. In the final chapter of the dissertation I turn to some questions that arise in light of my readings, and summarize the results of my investigation. (shrink)

Moral nihilism is the view that there are no moral facts or moral truths. It is the ontological component of moral error theory, which is the best-known and most comprehensive metaethical theory that involves moral nihilism. My main aim is to discuss some consequences of endorsing moral error theory or believing to some degree that moral error theory is true. In §2, I consider the implications for ordinary moral thought and discourse and the epistemological consequences for moral theorizing. In §3, (...) I consider a recent challenge, according to which moral judgments do not have the epistemic profile that moral error theory alleges. I shall argue in §3–5 that the challenge can be met and that there is evidence that moral error theory is in fact correct about the epistemic profile of moral judgments. (shrink)

The project of this chapter is to explore some relations between the rule-following considerations and radical interpretation. I spell out the sense in which the rule-following considerations are about meaning determination, and investigate whether the principle of meaning determination used in the early Davidson's account of meaning determination - the principle of charity - provides an answer to what I shall call "Wittgenstein's paradox". More precisely, I am interested in one aspect of the paradox: the "problem of objectivity". My question (...) then is whether meaning, as determined by charity, is such that the correctness of the applications of meaningful expressions is an objective matter. After running us through the basics of the radical interpretation account of meaning determination I argue that the principle of charity does seem to fall prey to the problem of objectivity. After unsuccessfully trying to rescue objectivity by means of Lewisian natural properties, this is the verdict I in the end endorse. (shrink)

I consider a problem from pragmatics for the radical interpretation project, relying on the principle of charity. If a speaker X in a context c manifests the attitude of holding a sentence s true, this might be because of believing, not the content of s in c, but what results from a pragmatic enrichment of that content. In this case, the connection between the holding-true attitude and the meaning of s might be too loose for charity to confirm the correct (...) interpretation hypothesis. To solve this problem, I apply the coherence raising account of pragmatic enrichment developed in Pagin 2014. The result is that in upward entailing linguistic contexts, the enriched content entails the prior content, and so charity prevails: the speaker also believes the prior content. In downward entailing contexts this would not hold, but I argue that enrichments tend not to occur in downward entailing contexts. (shrink)

Against the backdrop of changing technological conditions of the contemporary media landscape, new questions arise regarding how audience can be can problematized and theorized. This dissertation seeks to shift the focus from conventional assumptions of what audience is to an empirical exploration of the specificities of the process through which audience is achieved in practice. This involves revisiting and questioning ontological assumptions about the nature of audience. The aim of the study is to develop an alternative approach for theorizing audience. (...) A three year and seven months’ exploration of one example of an audience practice, the empirical focus is on the Gallifrey Base, an internet discussion forum for viewers of the TV series Doctor Who. To explore the specifics of audience as reality-in-practice, a methodological approach is developed that adjusts ethnographic research methods to align with a concern with ontology in audience practice – an audienceography. This dissertation thereby makes questions of ontology an empirical concern, drawing attention to how practices make up realities – that is, to how ontology is achieved. By turning to theoretical and methodological insights from Science and Technology Studies, this study sets out to particularize how audience is achieved on the Gallifrey Base. Three chapters detail and analyze how practices on the Gallifrey Base achieve audience. Each build on the findings from the previous chapter, attending to ontological ordering in different ways, delving deeper into the details of the unfolding audience practice. The findings show how multiple ontologies can co-exist. In contrast to classic communication models, it is argued that the significance of communication by other means is about more than sending and receiving messages. An implication for the theorization of audience is that communication can have other purposes, as messages may be sent and received in order to maintain a particular communication practice. In relation to audience studies, the dissertation makes a theoretical contribution by connecting insights from recent debates on ontology and multiplicity in STS to empirical explorations of audience, thus widening the scope of the theoretical explanatory basis. The empirical contribution is to demonstrate that rather than a natural and stable structure, much work is invested in trying to maintain multiplicity even in the single audience practice of the Gallifrey Base forum. This suggests that ontologically fixed and given theoretical notions of audience are not compatible with contemporary audience practice. Audience practice, it is found, may include a range of multiple modes, which calls for attentiveness to the situated work carried out by various actors in the achievement of audience. In light of these findings, it is argued that approaching audience as ontology-in-practice provides a foundation for further theorizations of contemporary audience. Connecting the findings from Ontological Ordering to wider concerns in the humanities and social sciences – a concern with audience becomes a concern with the processes and implications of how we interact with media material and media devices, which in contemporary media environment is intensely technological. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that natural selection explains the rise of adaptive complexity. Razeto-Barry and Frick have recently argued in favour of this view, dubbing it the Creative View. I argue that the Creative View is mistaken if it claims that natural selection serves to answer Paley’s question. This is shown by a case that brings out the contrastive structure inherent in this demand for explanation. There is, however, a rather trivial sense in which specific environmental conditions are crucial for (...) the rise of specific adaptations, but this is hardly what opponents of the Creative View are denying. (shrink)

Raffman, Diana. Unruly Words. A Study of Vague Language.

This article is an attempt to explore some thoughts regarding how different kinds and levels of expectation might construct being in music education. The philosophical lenses through which this is analysed consist of a combination of a Deweyan pragmatism, the possibilistic parts of the philosophy of the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss who draws on Spinoza and finally parts of the philosophy of Deleuze & Guettari. A claim made in the article is that it is important in arts educationto challenge the (...) expected and for the world to be created in an eternally wide, and at the same time claustrophobically narrow set of pathways to experience. To learn a communicative art could in other words imply to learn how to consciously adapt to conventions and expectations of musical parameters and at the same time break with them in ways which are functional in aesthetic communication. An important task in arts education must therefore be to train and develop the skill to imagine as rich a web of possible outcomes to any musical situation at the same time as being aware of the conventions that are at stake and their expected uses in order to understand as well as to play with them. That way music education can help pupils become interesting musicians, composers and listeners who are also critical, creative and happy. As an added benefit, these kinds of possibilistic skills, attitudes and modes might actually be beneficial for both learner and society in most parts of life. (shrink)

According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the “defeasibility problem”. This problem arises from the combination of standard intentionalism with further (...) plausible principles governing the epistemology of perception: that experience provides defeasible justification for empirical belief, and that such justification is best construed as probabilification. After exploring some ways in which the standard intentionalist could deal with the defeasibility problem, I argue that the best option is to replace standard intentionalism by what I call “phenomenal intentionalism”. Where standard intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having the content p, phenomenal intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having “phenomenal” or “looks contents”: contents of the form Lp. (shrink)

This article is a response to critical articles by Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen on my book Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim that moral facts are queer, and its role in the argument for moral error theory. In section 2, I discuss the relative merits of moral error theory and moral contextualism. In section 3, I explain why I still find the (...) queerness argument concerning supervenience an unpromising argument against non-naturalistic moral realism. In section 4, finally, I reconsider the question whether I, or anyone, can believe the error theory. (shrink)

This study analyses the wolf and human relations in Swedish landscapes. By addressing the change of ideas influencing land use and nature management during the time when the wolf was considered functionally extinct, two parallel realities appear that is shown to be something that the participants in this study relates and recognizes as their reality. These realities in turn can be understood against the background of environmental philosophy and the anthropocentric and eco-centric view of nature and the instrumental and intrinsic (...) value that the nature may carry. Life story interview is used as a method to grasp these details in an individual’s perception of the wolf and nature. Since the wolf is considered to be as a division between rural and urban people, the study also analyses how people sharing the space with the wolf is referring to these dichotomies and how they identify with their surroundings. With contradictory, data a new way of conceptualize this is suggested: that urbanity and rurality is something that could be seen as performativity, something that you do rather than something that you are. One might express identification with rural space but have an urban performativity i.e. working, living part-time, influenced by ideas represented in urban lifestyles. While the rural performativity is mirrored by living, working and sharing the ideas of how that landscape is used. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the application of formal methods from social choice theory to the metasemantic question of whether radical interpretation is possible. Radical interpretation involves deducing semantic truths from non-semantic truths by appeal to certain a priori principles or criteria, such as the principle of charity. A familiar view is that the intended interpretation is the one that best meets a combination of constraints. It is suggested that this situation can be modelled as follows: each constraint determines a binary relation (...) on the set X of interpretations that is transitive and complete. The radical interpreter’s task is to determine an overall ordering as a function from the profile of individual orderings. The application of Arrow’s theorem in this context is discussed. (shrink)

In the contemporary world, the celebration of difference and avowal of identity politics have come to be regarded as the hallmarks of a progressive, modern society. Yet, the once-clear definitions of “us” and “them” are being blurred in the confusing interface of national, cultural, linguistic, and religious traditions. Citizens in politically vulnerable societies are more and more aware of the increasing anxiety about the presence of the “Other”. And this is all the more true regarding societies that suffer from communal (...) rivalries, and on top of it, have to grapple with problems of social and political organisation due to the presence of an increasing number of refugees on its soil. The alarming number of devastating conflicts and civil wars spins off problems that necessitate new learning and new solutions to new problems, compelling us to stretch the limits of our customary imagination and self-understanding. The aim of the study is to examine the philosophical basis of our cultural ideals and beliefs. The central research question is wether people from diffrent cultures live in diffrenet worlds or not. The study ends up suggesting that regardless how different human cultures can be, this should however culminate in an unbridgeable separatism. A major synthesis is required here: the choice is not difference or similarity; rather, it is difference and similarity. (shrink)

A glass couldn't contain water unless it contained H2O-molecules. Likewise, a man couldn't be a bachelor unless he was unmarried. Now, the latter is what we would call a conceptual or analytical truth. It's also what we would call a priori. But it's hardly a conceptual or analytical truth that if a glass contains water, then it contains H2O-molecules. Neither is it a priori. The fact that water is composed of H2O-molecules was an empirical discovery made in the eighteenth century. (...) The fact that all bachelors are unmarried was not. But neither is a logical truth, so how do we explain the difference? Two-dimensional semantics is a framework that promises to shed light on these issues. The main purpose of this thesis is to understand and evaluate this framework in relation to various alternatives, to see whether some version of it can be defended. I argue that it fares better than the alternatives. However, much criticism of two-dimensionalism has focused on its alleged inability to provide a proper semantics for certain epistemic operators, in particular the belief operator and the a priori operator. In response to this criticism, a two-dimensional semantics for belief ascriptions is developed using structured propositions. In connection with this, a number of other issues in the semantics of belief ascriptions are addressed, concerning indexicals, beliefs de se, beliefs de re, and the problem of logical omniscience. (shrink)

This essay advances a libertarian theory of moral rights, which responds effectively to some serious objections that have been raised against libertarianism. I show how libertarianism can explain children’s rights to certain physical integrity and aid. I defend strong moral rights of human, pre-natal organisms, infants and children against all agents to certain non-interference with their physical integrity. I also argue that parents’ moral obligation to aid their offspring follows from a moral principle that prohibits agents to actively harm rights-bearers. (...) Since this is the core principle of all versions of libertarianism, we gain simplicity and coherence. In chapter two, I explain my theory’s similarities and differences to a libertarian theory of moral rights advanced by Robert Nozick in his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia. I explain the structure and coherence of negative moral rights as advanced by Nozick. Then, I discuss what these negative rights are rights to, and the criteria for being a rights-bearer. In chapter three, I formulate a clear distinction between active and passive behaviour, and discuss the moral importance of foreseeing consequences of one’s active interventions. In chapter four, I claim that some pre-natal human organisms, human infants, and children, are rights-bearers. I formulate a morally relevant characterization of potentiality, and argue that possession of such potentiality is sufficient to have negative rights against all agents. In chapter five, I discuss whether potential moral subjects, in addition, have positive moral rights against all agents to means sufficient to develop into actual moral subjects. I argue that this suggestion brings some difficulties when applied to rights-conflicts. In chapter six, I argue that potential moral subjects’ rights to means necessary to develop into actual moral subjects can be defended in terms of merely negative rights. By adopting the view advanced in this chapter, we get a simple, coherent theory. It avoids the difficulties in the view advanced in chapter five, while keeping its intuitively plausible features. In chapter seven, I discuss whether the entitlement theory is contradictory and morally repugnant. I argue that my version of the entitlement theory is not. (shrink)

The theoretical movement known under the heading of posthumanism has entered the academic field. Posthumanisms most prominent feature is to retrieve the concept of matter into the analytical framework. Matter is understood to be under-theorized within the social sciences as a result of the permeative focus upon language and discourse. A prevailing understanding of posthumanism that has been used within educational science and philosophy thus consists of moving the searchlight from language/discourse onto matter. Notably, these scholars are turning to the (...) philosopher Karen Barad in order to spell out their posthumanistic implications. The aim of the thesis is to give an account of the philosophy of Karen Barad in contrast to other prevailing renderings of her. The analysis is carried out using a contrastive methodological approach. In this study I demonstrate how my reading of Barad differs from the scholarly readings that I choose to engage with. The results show that with an alternative conceptual understanding of Barad’s posthumanistic theory the analysis is being steered towards the entanglement of matter and discourse rather than towards the materialistic components of a posed problem. In addition, the results also show how a focus on the ontological underpinnings of Barad’s theoretical framework can give crucial contributions when it comes to understanding the generative conditions of science and knowledge-making. (shrink)

Set within discussions of gender, migration and social practices, this thesis explores the ways in which Thai women migrants to Sweden build connections between rural areas through their daily activities. Arriving in Sweden primarily through marriage ties, Thai women migrants are more likely to live in Swedish rural areas than in urban areas. Rural areas are typically not seen as a site of globalization or as receivers of international migrants. In contrast to these perceptions, the case of Thai women migrants (...) in the Swedish countryside reveals a complex and vigorous set of social practices that connect rural Sweden across spatial and temporal scales. The aim of this study is to explore the ways in which Thai migrant women construct and implement social practices spatially and temporally. Drawing on the life stories of 16 Thai women living in Sweden, along with other sources of empirical data analysed within feminist epistemologies, this thesis discusses: In what ways does gender shape migrant social practices? How are social practices constructed within individual migrant micro-geographies? By what means are migrant social practices contextualized by spaces and places? Thai women migrants are gendered agents of these social practices and are utilizing specific resources, objects and networks to bridge the distances found in their daily lives. The empirical material examined in this thesis points to the importance of women’s everyday social practices in connecting and linking rural areas globally at different spatial and temporal scales. The results highlight the importance of a translocalism perspective to understanding gendered social practices. This study adds to the translocal discussion by demonstrating that social practices are embedded in multiple geographic sites and scales. Thai women migrants, in this study, emerge as significant actors in global countrysides and do the functional work of bringing spaces and places together daily and through their life course. This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and five papers. The introductory chapter outlines the context and theoretical approaches to understanding Thai migration flows to Sweden. The papers share an emphasis on local sites: homes, workplaces and community. They examine different ways that women construct and build social practices – for example, through food, community projects and in developing their businesses. (shrink)

One of the important discussions in the philosophy of mathematics, is that centered on Benacerraf’s Dilemma. Benacerraf’s dilemma challenges theorists to provide an epistemology and semantics for mathematics, based on their favourite ontology. This challenge is the point on which all philosophies of mathematics are judged, and clarifying how we might acquire mathematical knowledge is one of the main occupations of philosophers of mathematics. In this thesis I argue that this discussion has overlooked an important part of mathematics, namely mathematics (...) as it is exercised by ordinary people. I do so by looking at the different theories that have been put forward in the recent debate, and showing for each of these that they are unable to account for the mathematical practices of ordinary people. In order to show that these practices do need to be accounted for, I also argue that ordinary people are doing mathematics, i.e. that they engage in properly mathematical practices. Because these practices are properly mathematical, they should be accounted for by any philosophy of mathematics. The conclusion of my thesis, then, is that current theories fail to do something that they should do, while remaining neutral on how well they perform when it comes to accounting for the practices of professional mathematicians. (shrink)

This thesis examines the local waterscapes of two smallholder irrigation farming systems in the dry lands of East African in a context of socio-ecological changes. It focuses on three aspects: institutional arrangements, gender relations and landscape investments. This thesis is based on a reflexive analysis of cross-cultural, cross-language research, particularly focusing on the role of field assistants and interpreters, and on member checking as a method to ensure validity. Flexible irrigation infrastructure in Sibou, Kenya, and Engaruka, Tanzania, allow farmers to (...) shift the course of water and to extend or reduce the area cultivated depending on seasonal rainfall patterns. Water conflicts are avoided through a decentralized common property management system. Water rights are continuously renegotiated depending on water supply. Water is seen as a common good the management of which is guided by mutual understanding to prevent conflicts through participation and shared information about water rights. However, participation in water management is a privilege that is endowed mostly to men. Strict patriarchal norms regulate control over water and practically exclude women from irrigation management. The control over water usage for productive means is a manifestation of masculinity. The same gender bias has emerged in recent decades as men have increased their engagement in agriculture by cultivating crops for sale. Women, because of their subordinated position, cannot take advantage of the recent livelihood diversification. Rather, the cultivation of horticultural products for sale has increased the workload for women who already farm most food crops for family consumption. In addition, they now have to weed and harvest the commercial crops that their husbands sell for profit. This agricultural gender divide is mirrored in men´s and women´s response to increased climate variability. Women intercrop as a risk adverting strategy, while men sow more rounds of crops for sale when the rain allows for it. Additionally, while discursively underestimated by men, women´s assistance is materially fundamental to maintaining of the irrigation infrastructure and to ensuring the soil fertility that makes the cultivation of crops for sale possible. In sum, this thesis highlights the adaptation potentials of contemporary smallholder irrigation systems through local common property regimes that, while not inclusive towards women, avoid conflicts generated by shifting water supply and increased climate variability. To be able to assess the success and viability of irrigation systems, research must be carried out at a local level. By studying how local water management works, how conflicts are adverted through common property regimes and how these systems adapt to socio-ecological changes, this thesis provides insights that are important both for the planning of current irrigation schemes and the rehabilitation or the extension of older systems. By investigating the factors behind the consistent marginalization of women from water management and their subordinated role in agricultural production, this study also cautions against the reproduction of these discriminatory norms in the planning of irrigation projects. (shrink)

This dissertation explores the social and political dimensions of aesthetic autonomy as it is given formal expression in Wallace Stevens’s poetry of the 1930s and the early 1940s. Whereas modernist claims to autonomy are often said to rest upon an ideological assertion of art’s detachment from socio-historical concerns, I argue that, in Stevens’s work, autonomy is conceived in relational terms, which gives rise to new lines of interconnection between his poetry and its cultural situation. Written over a period when the (...) political efficacy of literature became a staple of discussion among a myriad of writers and critics, Stevens’s poetry offers an understanding of autonomy not as an escape from, but as a productive condition for imagining alternative forms of engagement with the historical crisis with which it has to reckon. In taking into account the cultural context from which Stevens’s poetics of autonomy emerged, my study aims to highlight the significance of the concept to the poet’s exploration of the tension between aesthetic and social domains, to his imaginative formations of collective agency, and to the vexed relationship between poetic and philosophical modes of thinking. By transposing the theoretical discussion of autonomy into the register of historical scrutiny, I hope to pave the way for a rethinking of autonomy and its relevance to the period’s radical and modernist writing, literary debates, and cultural politics. For this purpose, I draw on recent theories, such as those offered by Jacques Rancière and Alain Badiou, on poetry, politics, and aesthetics, which serve to complicate the working definitions of modernist autonomy as literature’s immunity from the world, and to indicate an alternative path for analyzing its critical and contextual implications. (shrink)

This study creates and develops a concept called the untimely-image including two sub-concepts called contours of the new and the untimely-site. The untimely-image concerns the clearing for and the expression of figures of “potential” in thought in the form of moving-images. The aim of these concepts is to form a critical framework for evaluating and conceptualizing political film as expressive, not of the new itself but of its “untimely” contours. The untimely-image, and its many implications, is developed over the course (...) of six chapters. Chapter 1 extensively defines “contours” and “new” as operative in this study, and also introduces a theme that runs through all the chapters: how to think the contours of the new in relation to the cult of the new in consumer culture and in relation to the larger mechanisms of advanced capitalism. Chapter 2 defines the parameters of the untimely-image as specifically regarding moving images, and continues the development of this concept. In Chapters 3 to 6, The Wire serves the double function of complicating and giving specification to the elaboration of the untimely-image as well as a case in which the untimely-image is used as a critical framework. The Wire and the untimely-image relate in processes of juxtaposition, wherein they meet, cross over, separate, and reproblematize each other. An untimely-image is fully defined in relation to concrete political issues. The untimely-image is therefore advanced by articulating the components and characteristics that, independently of the concrete issue, remain in every case, as well as by putting the concept to work regarding two specific problems in The Wire: its expression of blackness and its mapping of advanced capitalism. (shrink)

This thesis is a study of the Russian religious philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev. The aim of the thesis is to re-examine the alleged gnostic subtext in Berdiaev’s thought by exploring a number of interrelated motifs in his world outlook, teaching on man and theory of knowledge. The method employed is a close reading of Berdiaev's philosophical and autobiographical writings. In order to establish which motifs should be examined, how they are to be understood and the manner in which they are interconnected, (...) a scrutiny is made of Hans Jonas’s phenomenological elucidation of ancient Gnosticism. A synthetic conception labelled Jonasian Gnosticism is proposed as the interpretive framework, in order to provide a unitary and consistent heuristic tool with which to investigate the topic, and to distinguish the specific proposed representation of Gnosticism from other existing ones. A chapter is devoted to an analysis of the concept of gnosis as employed by Berdiaev. Another key notion taken from the Jonasian framework is that of demundanization, which denotes among other things a rejectionary attitude towards the world grounded in a negative experience of evil and suffering. Varieties of dualism as well as Berdiaev’s doctrine of the human spirit’s otherworldly origin and non-belonging in the world, constitute other issues that are examined. In addition, both Berdiaev’s assessment of historical Gnosticism and his view of a gnostic return in modern times are examined. The study demonstrates the complexity of Berdiaev’s attitude towards the classic Gnostics, and his attempt to denounce Gnosticism while at the same time making a case for a Christian gnosis. The results suggest both affinities and divergences in the relationship between Berdiaev’s thought and Jonasian Gnosticism. Even though the doctrinal standpoints diverge on crucial points, it is argued that a suggestive affinity nevertheless exists in the shared existential attitude towards self and world. (shrink)

In recent years the normativity of thought and meaning has been the subject of an extensive debate. What is at issue is whether intentionality has normative features, and if so, whether that constitutes a problem for naturalistic attempts to account for intentional phenomena. The origin of the debate is Saul Kripke’s interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, published in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke claimed, on behalf of Wittgenstein, that dispositional accounts of linguistic meaning - accounts, i.e., which (...) attempt to reduce semantic phenomena to facts about how speakers are disposed to employ words - fail to ground the factuality of semantic statements. From this, and other arguments, the far reaching conclusion was drawn by Kripke’s Wittgenstein that there are no semantic facts, that every application of a word is “a leap in the dark”. This position has become known as meaning scepticism. In the present essay, it will be argued that meaning scepticism is incoherent, but that the normativity argument is interesting in its own right. The development of the debate will be traced, primarily through detailed consideration of the writings of Paul Boghossian, who has shifted the focus from the normativity of linguistic meaning to that of belief. It will be contended that even though Boghossian’s attempt to locate a normativity of belief fails, there is a related form of normativity that has to do with the intrinsic badness of false beliefs. Also, suggestions made by Kripke regarding the normativity of intentions will be investigated, and related to contemporary arguments in the philosophy of rationality. The tentative conclusion is that there are some interesting kinds of normativity associated with the intentional, but of a somewhat different variety than those usually discussed. (shrink)

This article analyzes situated knowledge through the lens of the author and her three field assistants. This work is written self-reflexively and is based on geographical fieldwork in Eastern Africa. It seeks to capitalize on the personal and professional relationships of the researcher and her field assistants to improve both research outcomes and working arrangements. Reflecting on episodes of failure, anxiety and misunderstanding, it disentangles the power geometry of situated knowledge and sheds light on the vital role played by the (...) assistant/interpreter and by his/her positionality ‘in the making’ of cross-cultural, cross-language research. Grounded in a feminist epistemological perspective, this article shows that methodological reflexivity should engage not only the researcher or the participants but also the field assistants. This praxis is crucial to enhancing the validity of studies conducted in a cross-cultural, cross-language environment across social science. (shrink)

What does emancipation mean today? In political theory, the idea of emancipation has typically been understood as a process of rationalization involving the promotion of human rights or the historical overcoming of capitalism. However, in contemporary social criticism the earlier antagonism between liberalism and Marxism has largely been replaced by the conflict between Enlightenment thinking and Enlightenment critique. The tension between Enlightenment philosophy and Enlightenment skepticism can be taken as emblematic of the two main tendencies within contemporary critical thought. However, (...) a similar ambivalence can be found in the classical critical theory of the so-called Frankfurt School. Given that we have to distinguish between two types of critical theoretical thought, is it even possible to answer the question about emancipation in an unambiguous way? The overall aim of this study is to examine the meaning of emancipation in contemporary critical thought. More specifically, the principal aim is to demonstrate that Jürgen Habermas’s critical theory can be understood as an attempt to overcome the opposition between the early and the late Frankfurt School in order subsequently to evaluate this attempt and thereby judge whether Habermas’s approach can serve as a key for combining the concepts of emancipation corresponding to these two types of critique. My main objection to Habermas’s reformulation of critical theory is that it is characterized by a lack of emancipatory potential and a lack of critical force. In trying to pave the way for an alternative approach, my strategy for accommodating the tensions between the two models of critical theory is to show that emancipation can be viewed as a process involving three disparate yet interconnected stages: an initial break in the continuity of history; a collective political struggle in order to realize the utopian vision thereby opened up; and, a possible understanding among the participants in a discourse. (shrink)

This thesis considers the role of aesthetic meaning-making in elementary school science learning. Children’s aesthetic experiences are traced through their use of aesthetic judgements, spontaneous metaphors and art activities. The thesis is based on four empirical studies: the first two examining children’s language use, i.e. the role of aesthetic judgements and the significance of spontaneous metaphors while learning science and the latter two dealing with how art activities mediate what elementary school children learn in science and what a variety of (...) art activities with different purposes afford elementary school children to learn in science. The theoretical stance emanates from pragmatist theories and includes Dewey’s definition of an aesthetic experience, Wittgenstein’s later work on language-games, and socio-cultural perspectives. The analytic approach used is a practical epistemology analysis developed by Wickman and Östman. The empirical data consists of audio- and video recordings of elementary school children’s (aged 6–10 years) discussions in pairs or small groups during science lessons and photographs of children’s pictures, sculptures and poems from a total of 14 different elementary school classes. The main findings of the empirical studies show how aesthetic meaning-making is continuous with elementary school children’s scientific learning. The thesis shows how elementary school children’s aesthetic experiences are related to whole activities and are crucial for the direction that learning takes. Aesthetic experience is important in terms of how and what elementary school children learn aesthetically and normatively in science class, which has consequences for cognitive learning, the possibility of participating in science class and learning the genre of science. Moreover, it can be seen how children’s prior experiences are recurrently reconstructed and transformed through imaginative processes. (shrink)

Dissonant Voices has a twofold aspiration. First, it is a philosophical treatment of everyday pedagogical interactions between children and their elders, between teachers and pupils. More specifically it is an exploration of the possibilities to go on with dissonant voices that interrupt established practices – our attunement – in behaviour, practice and thinking. Voices that are incomprehensible or expressions that are unacceptable, morally or otherwise. The text works on a tension between two inclinations: an inclination to wave off, discourage, or (...) change an expression that is unacceptable or unintelligible; and an inclination to be tolerant and accept the dissonant expression as doing something worthwhile, but different. The second aspiration is a philosophical engagement with children’s literature. Reading children’s literature becomes a form of philosophising, a way to explore the complexity of a range of philosophical issues. This turn to literature marks a dissatisfaction with what philosophy can accomplish through argumentation and what philosophy can do with a particular and limited set of concepts for a subject, such as ethics. It is a way to go beyond philosophising as the founding of theories that justify particular responses. The philosophy of dissonance and children’s literature becomes a way to destabilise justifications of our established practices and ways of interacting. The philosophical investigations of dissonance are meant to make manifest the possibilities and risks of engaging in interactions beyond established agreement or attunements. Thinking of the dissonant voice as an expression beyond established practices calls for improvisation. Such improvisations become a perfectionist education where both the child and the elder, the teacher and the student, search for as yet unattained forms of interaction and take responsibility for every word and action of the interaction. The investigation goes through a number of picture books and novels for children such as Harry Potter, Garmann’s Summer, and books by Shaun Tan, Astrid Lindgren and Dr. Seuss as well narratives by J.R.R. Tolkien, Henrik Ibsen, Jane Austen and Henry David Thoreau. These works of fiction are read in conversation with philosophical works of, and inspired by, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell, their moral perfectionism and ordinary language philosophy. (shrink)