There are various discussions on the role of desires in the Xun-Zi and how the transformation of nature takes place. Some scholars hold that the heart-mind can override inborn human desires, a view that is analogous to externalism; others maintain the internalism view that desires are essentially motivating in the Xun-Zi. This paper aims to resolve this seeming conflict between externalism and internalism. By introducing David B. Wong's model of being an internalist about duty and an externalist about reason, I (...) will show that desires in the Xun-Zi are necessarily motivating because of their direction of fit, and that the heart-mind is impotent to move one to act because it is a cognitive organ responsible for generating knowledge. In addition, I will suggest that the transformation of nature involves a change in the objects of desire through the learning of the heart-mind and provide a possible explanation of how the sages were able to transform their nature and establish the rites. Lastly, I will reply to some of the possible objections to my interpretation of the Xun-Zi. (shrink)

Through the development of a comparative analysis that explores the conceptions of the Golden Rule that are expressed in the teachings of Confucius, Christianity and the Hatatas, the article shows that the combined insights that emerge from these three teachings have a contemporary significance in the attempt to develop a complementary learning process with the Other. Throughout its variations, the Golden Rule is grounded on the need to treat others as how we want to be treated. Such a moral vision (...) occupies a central importance in Confucius’s ren, Christianity’s Gospel of Matthew and the commandments, and the Hatatas’ principle of harmony. The comparative exercise in contending conceptions of the Golden Rule that are found in Confucius’, the Christian and the Hatatas’ approaches leads into the emergence of a learning process that goes beyond the mere tolerance of the Other. In a globalized world, where there is a search for a moral guideline that can serve as a common source of motivation, the Golden Rule can serve as a foundation of a process of learning that is mutually supportive, supplementary and is hence complementary. (shrink)

This paper aims to develop a comparative analysis of the place of emotion from Indian and Western philosophical perspectives. Both Eastern and Indian philosophy consider three mental states as being involved with the arousal of emotions, i.e., cognitive (epistemic), conative (desire), and affective. In Indian philosophy, there is no such single term or specific equivalent definition to the Western term ‘emotion.’ Further, there is no clear dichotomy (cognitive & non-cognitive) between reason and emotion in Indian culture. In Indian scriptures, there (...) are various, at times intermingled conceptions of emotion. From a religious standpoint, emotion can be an expression of religious devotion (bhakti), and often emotions are viewed as barriers to having true knowledge and are considered a cause of attachment and an obstacle to liberation. After comparing a large amount of discussion on emotion following Western and Indian conceptions, and analyzing some real-life experiences where emotion plays various roles (intellectual, personal, and spiritual) within each philosophical tradition this paper concludes that it is critical to engage in a comparative, collaborative study of emotion. (shrink)

Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience argument objects to the possibility of emergent causation (both downward and same-level) based on both (1) the causal overdetermination of both (a) higher-level emergent events and (b) lower-level basal events, and (2) the causal closure principle of the physical domain. Kim argues that emergent causation entails epiphenomenalism. Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy skeptically critiques the primary (ultimate) existence of causal phenomena and instead suggests that all such phenomena may only be secondarily (conventionally) existent. Mādhyamikas acknowledge that, conventionally, emergent phenomena (...) appear to cause both basal phenomena and other emergent phenomena. However, contra Kim, Mādhyamikas doubt that causal relations ultimately exist between, or among, emergent phenomena and basal phenomena because they doubt that anything ultimately exists. As such, the Madhyamaka critique of causality may provide a skeptical response to Kim because Kim assumes that both emergent and basal phenomena are primarily existent. Altogether, I argue that if we draw upon and accept the Madhyamaka critique of causality, then we may resolve Kim’s problem of epiphenomenalism by reconceptualizing causality as a relation obtaining conventionally between phenomena, while remaining silent on the status of causation at the ultimate level of truth. By arguing this point, I do not mean to suggest that the Madhyamaka critique of causality, while plausible, is in fact correct. Rather, I intend only to show that plausible responses to Kim’s argument may be found by considering less commonly taught philosophical traditions in relation to Kim’s metaphysical assumptions. (shrink)

Early proponents of comparative philosophy believed that the dissemination of comparative methods would lead to step forward in human consciousness and contribute to a more peaceful world. Can comparative philosophy today still aspire to such goals? On the one hand, the aims of the field have narrowed, so that comparative philosophy is seen as a method of interpreting particular thinkers and texts or as a tool for addressing specific philosophical problems. On the other hand, critics argue that comparative philosophy is (...) an outmoded enterprise that should give way to more pluralistic forms of inquiry. In this paper, I examine three contemporary views about the social relevance of comparative philosophy. The first sees comparative philosophy as a means of cultivating liberal citizenship; the second as an ally in decolonial struggle; the third as offering resources to promote human flourishing in the modern world. These approaches offer comparative philosophers a wide range of options for thinking about the social relevance of their field. (shrink)

Present study analyzes the concept of respect in both Confucius' and Western philosophical traditions. It reveals the differences in interpretation and practice of respect due to their distinctive cultural, historical, and philosophical contexts. Confucius' philosophy emphasizes respect towards authority, traditions, and the elderly through dedication and commitment, while Western philosophy, primarily Aristotle's perspective, emphasizes reciprocal respect and the inherent rights of individuals. Both systems of thought, although contrasting, seek to promote values fostering cooperation, understanding, and peaceful coexistence. Despite their varied (...) conceptualizations of respect, the ultimate goal remains the same – to provide ethical and moral guidance for a harmonious society. This study contributes to an enriched understanding of respect, facilitating a respectful intercultural dialogue. (shrink)

As early as the 18th century, the similarities between Greek and Iranian thought have raised questions about the origins of Greek philosophy and a possible Oriental influence many have ventured to highlight parallels and to explain this proximity of ideas. However, although it is very well-known that Iranian philosophy is influenced by the early Hindu thought, and there are studies on the analogies between the Greek and the Indian philosophy only few scholars have studied the closeness of the Heracletean philosophy (...) with the early Indian thinking. This article attempts to compare some fragments of the Ionian philosopher on fire as the primordial element of the world, his concept about the “One” and the unity of opposites with some verses of Rig Veda that seem to share quite comparable ideas. Where possible, attempts are made to compare them with other philosophical systems that share similar concepts, such as the Parmenidean philosophy or the Chinese. (shrink)

This paper presents how the Sōtō Zen priest, Kōshō Uchiyama, and the mercurial and polarizing German philosopher, Martin Heidegger, approach what the former calls “opening the hand of thought” (omoi no te banashi). For Uchiyama, the metaphoric opening of our mental hand requires the meditative practice of zazen or “just sitting” (shikantaza) and is said to mean that we avoid the act of thinking. Conversely, Heidegger maintains that the “releasement” (Gelassenheit) of our conceptual grasp is the basis of a more (...) essential and “meditative” mode of thinking and discourse (besinnliches Denken). While Uchiyama and Heidegger appear to be at odds, their approaches are in fact compatible. By engaging in a cross-tradition examination of these two thinkers, I provide an original contribution about how both Uchiyama and Heidegger view opening the hand of thought as the critical step toward a more attuned and compassionate mode of thinking and discourse. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to examine the relationship between the Buddhist notions of causality and agency, the questions of whether the Buddhist notion of causality affirms causal determinism and whether the Buddhist notion of agency affirms libertarian free will, the implications of the Buddhist notions of causality and agency for moral responsibility, and the implications of the Buddhist rejection of the metaphysical self for agency and moral responsibility. My claim is that although the question of whether the early Buddhist (...) notions of causality and agency affirm causal determinism and libertarian free will respectively remains open, they are compatible with each other, and with the Buddhist notion of moral responsibility, without needing to affirm or deny libertarian free will, causal determinism, their compatibility with each other, or retrospective moral responsibility. (shrink)

The present article presents Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619-1692 C.E.)’s reading of the eighteenth chapter of the Zhuang-Zi 莊子 (ZZ) by looking at his entry from Zhuang-Zi-Tong 莊子通 and other key glosses from Zhuang-Zi-Jie 莊子解. The philosophical upshot, I aim to show, is that Wang takes ZZ as presenting the consummation of “the greatest joyousness” (zhi-le 至樂) as requiring getting rid of joyousness as one’s desideratum. Using Derek Parfit’s work as a point of reference, I aim to show that this is (...) not paradoxical or even inconsistent or even (directly or indirectly) self-defeating but is instead an interesting instance of a self-effacing theory. (shrink)

The article explores the inner logic and defining features of Daoist freedom. It argues that Daoist freedom can be meaningfully understood as psychological hygiene, and it suggests that Daoist xuan-jie (懸解) can be rendered possible only if one can rid oneself of intensional suffering—an idea ultimately inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche. This comparative approach enables the article to contribute to the received way of understanding Daoist freedom by stressing its dialectics: by being at ease with one’s social and political environment, Daoist (...) freedom demands social criticism, calling for room for people to be able to act spontaneously so that all can nurture their distinctive natures and have a full and free exercise of their natural abilities. The article aims to achieve two objectives at once: it aims to argue for the understanding of Daoist freedom as psychological hygiene, and it defends this reading by bringing two dimensions of Daoist freedom into a consistent whole. In a constantly changing and increasingly pluralistic world, psychological hygiene and social criticism are both necessary for leading a robust and healthy human life. (shrink)

The field of Latin American philosophy has established itself as a relevant subfield of philosophical inquiry. However, there might be good reasons to consider that our focus on the subfield could have distracted us from considering another subfield that, although it might share some geographical proximity, does not share the same historical basic elements. In this paper, I argue for a possible and meaningful conceptual difference between Latin American Philosophy and Indigenous philosophy produced in Latin America. First, I raise what (...) I call Mariátegui’s Solidarity Challenge to show that there might be some neglectful treatment of the philosophical views of different Indigenous groups. I then depart from Mariátegui and engage in a critical exercise to show that even he would be guilty of failing in his own solidarity demands. I follow that by drawing out some implications of the argument. I first sketch how this differentiation would play out against the political project of “Mestizaje,” a project that seems to inform some of the Latin American philosophical tradition. I then speculate about the kinds of duties that the field of Latin American philosophy might have towards the field of Indigenous Philosophy produced in Latin America. (shrink)

This paper aims to think or rethink the concept of home as the contemporary avatar of the age-old question of self-identity. In dialogue with Shlomo Biderman, a comparative philosopher without borders who feels at home both in Jewish and Indian sources, the author assembles a philosophical jigsaw-puzzle made of different materials from different thinking traditions in attempt to reveal a new picture of home (and self) compatible with the changing world of immigration, relocation, dislocation and displacement, a world of emigrants, (...) refugees and exiles, in which we live. The puzzle pieces include Plato’s cave, Isaiah Berlin’s “inner citadel”, Shmuel Yosef Agnon’s “Ad Hena”, Herman Melville’s “Bartleby the Scrivener”, Salman Rushdie’s “Imaginary Homelands”, Midrash Bereshit Rabbah, the Bhagavadgītā and Śaṅkara, Paul de Man on translation and Zarina Hashmi’s artwork “Home is a Foreign Place”. The discussion culminates in reflection on translation and the foreignness embedded even in one’s own mother tongue which only the translator (or Rushdie’s “translated man”) can see and feel. If foreignness and alienation are recognized as the common human denominator, and one can sober up from the fantasy of restoring an Edenic past (and language), primordial and complete, then perhaps from within the shards of language, of humanity, a different type of home can be envisioned, based on solidarity and compassion. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the continued relevance of Descartes' philosophy for present-day concerns can be demonstrated by bringing to bear on his Meditations state-of-the-art developments in Informal logic and Argumentation theory, specifically Leo Groarke’s approach to multimodal arguments. I show that the meditative exercises that Descartes viewed as preconditions of establishing the metaphysical tenets of his system can be recast in present-day form using technological tools and media that we are familiar with. We will see that, due to (...) the different historical and cultural contexts, the 21st century Cartesian meditating process can be: 1) technology-enhanced (a customizable, multimodal process using images and nonverbal sounds alongside verbal claims) and 2) interdisciplinary (sensitive to and informed by the history of philosophy, of ideas and of art). Reformulated and practised in this way, Descartes’ meditative exercises can serve as tools for honing much-needed critical thinking skills and dispositions, as well as for promoting autonomous decision-making. After providing examples of this contemporary Cartesian meditation, I suggest that Groarke’s multimodal approach can be extended to reconstructing the arguments of other philosophers thus supplying a way of doing history of philosophy that is both novel and has personal benefits for its practitioners. (shrink)

It is generally believed that the greatest asset of human being is the moral values and according to theist such values have been infused in human by the creator. By accepting such view we simply get rid of any effort of searching the origin of morality or ethics and also transfer the responsibility of being ethical on the almighty. But when atheist denied God, the liability of being moral comes to human and also the significant question arose why we should (...) be moral. Probably more important is the hunt for the origin of our morality. In this article we have discussed about that origin of our morals in Nietzsche’s view as he was one of the strongest atheist of all time and in the light of the Darwinian evolutionary philosophy which inspired the modern age atheists. In this course, we have showed that how Nietzsche’s individual-centric value system faced the demand of societal explanation of interactive moral outcome and Darwinian school of evolutionary thinking articulates such issue in a broader perspective normally dealt with the philosophical views of human ethics. (shrink)

In the Indian philosophical debate, the relationship between the structure of knowledge and external reality has been a persistent issue. This debate has been particularly prominent in Buddhism, as evidenced by the earliest Buddhist attestations in the Pāli canon, where reality is described as a perceptual defection. The world (loka) is perceived through cognition (citta), and the theme of designation (paññatti) is central to the analysis of the Abhidhamma. Buddhism can be viewed as navigating between nominalism and cognitive normativism, as (...) it deconstructs language, which is seen as an obfuscating element that separates the subject from the world. In this article, we explore these issues through a philosophical dialogue between Early Buddhism, Abhidhamma, and Madhyamaka, utilizing methodological tools from Western philosophical traditions, both ancient and modern. We engage in a clash between nihilism and absolutism, in search of the substantiality of entities, which, behind the emptiness of conventional designations, conceals a complex fractal network of pansematism. (shrink)

Many scholars interpret Chinese Aesthetics with the Kantian theory of genius because they seem to form a parallel: similar innate and spontaneous mental talents that exceed normal cognition and imagination generates beautiful arts with similar extraordinary qualities. I argue that projecting Kant’s genius to illuminate the creative power analogically, i.e., the carefree-wandering mind, is infeasible. The theory of genius assumes a critical project that stipulates a valuable way to exercise the power of judgment. Genius is only a postulated idea for (...) successfully making aesthetic judgments on artworks. In contrast, the carefree-wandering mind assumes a Daoist metaphysical-ethical theory centering on the idea of transformative self and the way to success. The carefree-wandering mind featuring Wu-Wei (無為) is the efficient cause that produces artworks with Qi-Yun (氣韵), namely, the expressive quality. Therefore, conceiving parallels between Kant and Chinese aesthetics is difficult. I conclude by proposing a potential similarity between Kant’s theory of genius and Chinese aesthetics: both draw our attention to the respective relations of each to nature. (shrink)

Due to apparent duality in this world, one has to face a lot of difficulties while searching for the Truth. Our ego is the root cause for perception of duality and this in turn leads to suffering. This suffering can only be extinguished by attainment of the Truth, i.e, non-duality. However, in order to enable the finite intellect to comprehend the incomprehensible non-duality, this undifferentiated whole is sometimes denoted by nothingness (śūnya) or fullness (pūrṇa). Non-duality is usually understood by the (...) numeral ‘1’ which stands for unity or oneness. The main aim of this paper is to show that non-duality is best represented by the numeral ‘0’, Mādhyamika śūnya (advaya) and Upaniṣadic pūrṇa (advaita). This paper also attempts to touch upon the hitherto untouched and profound implications of zero in view of its being a simultaneous indicator of nothingness as well as wholeness. It also humbly tries to tackle the perpetual mathematical problem of ‘zero divided by zero’ and in this regard tries to establish how the solution is consistent with the concept of non-duality. In a nutshell, this paper’s endeavour is to approach the Ultimate Reality via threefold path: through the neutral means of mathematical zero “0” as a concept, negative means of Mādhyamika śūnya, and the positive means of Advaita Vedānta’s pūrṇa. (shrink)

Following Aristotle, al-Farabi divides philosophy into theoretical and practical each of which requires some specific methodology both in interpretation and cognition. Based on this division, there may arguably be four methodologies for four parts: 1) cognition of theoretical philosophy 2) interpretation of practical philosophy 3) cognition of practical philosophy 4) interpretation of practical philosophy. This paper focuses on the last one: the methodology of interpreting practical philosophy. Al-Farabi has an undeniably significant contribution to practical philosophy as a commentator on Greek (...) philosophy and as a founder. In this paper, I investigate how al-Farabi (870-950 AD) read classical practical philosophy to see how to read al-Farabi himself. Although a practical philosopher (e.g., Aristotle), in direct cognition, has his own sources, instruments, and methods of cognition (i.e., deduction, experience, and induction), however, the reader of him (e.g., al-Farabi) requires some adequate interpretative methods and elements, distinct from direct cognitive methodology, to read and interpret the acquired and expressed practical philosophy. Al-Farabi can provide us with a set of relevant methodological elements of an interpretative methodology for reading classical practical philosophy. This paper discusses and classifies the correlated methods and elements of this interpretative methodology into three interacting sections: 1) out-text elements 2) in-text elements 3) intertextual elements. (shrink)

Several contemporary Confucian philosophers have posited differing hybrid views fusing meritocracy to democracy. There is a good deal of interest in a meritocracy in contemporary Confucian thought, and such a view perhaps should receive more serious consideration in liberal democratic thought since it may make for a stronger form of government when appended to democracy. In this paper, four contemporary hybrid theorists who combine elements of a meritocracy with a democracy are critically analyzed concerning an ability for their views to (...) be instantiated in liberal democracies for the legislative branch only. Finally, I provide a modified hybrid view for the legislature that I believe is the best fit for current liberal democracies. (shrink)

This paper x-rays Ramose’s ubuntu ontological account in African philosophy and its cross-tradition engagement on the issue of being versus becoming (such as the Yin-Yang, Heraclitean, Nietzschean, Whiteheadean and the Buddhists’ accounts) with a view to showing how convergence and divergence of thoughts in the African, European, and Asian philosophy contexts can advance cross-cultural philosophizing or cross-tradition approach to doing philosophy. Ramose’s ubuntu ontology designates a reconstruction of reality within the framework of motion, as captured in his concept of be-ing-becoming, (...) while the Heraclitean, Nietzschean, Whiteheadean and the Buddhists’ ontological accounts also conceive reality within the confines of endless motion, except the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision that interprets reality within the perspective of complementarity. Attempts are made, in the paper, to highlight the Ramosean ubuntu ontology and how it can constructively engage with other traditions’ ontological accounts, as mentioned above, in a fruitful encounter of the African thought tradition, which Ramose belongs to, and the European and Asian traditions of thought, which the other mentioned ontological accounts belong to. (shrink)

In this paper I am addressing the question whether Nāgārjuna’s doctrine should be understood as a theory that describes reality itself (ontology) or as a theory of our relation to reality (epistemological, logical, psychological, etc.). To answer this question, I propose to compare Nāgārjuna’s concept of emptiness to that of ‘caducity’, a key element in the ontology of Renaissance Neoplatonist philosopher Francisco Patrizi. By showing that these concepts are similar, I argue that Nāgārjuna’s standpoint can be considered as that of (...) ontology. (shrink)

In this essay, I explore the nature of the logical analysis of Buddhist thought that Graham Priest has offered in his book The Fifth Corner of Four (5of4). The paper traces the development of a logical value in- troduced in 5of4, which Priest has called e. The paper points out that certain criticisms I have made earlier still stand, but focuses on a recon- ceptualization of 5of4 in which these arguments carry less weight. This new perspective on the book, inspired (...) by a response to my arguments by Priest himself, sees the logical analysis of Buddhism as aiming more for an allegorical, suggestive and aesthethic endeavour, rather a purely analytical one. I illustrate this view by focusing on the Ox herding pictures, as interpreted by Priest and Ueda Shizuteru, and I compare it to ideas in the discussion around Critical Buddhism. (shrink)

Is this just a dream? Daoist philosopher Zhuang Zi and metaphysician Descartes both considered this question but came to very different conclusions. In his Dream Hypothesis, Descartes imagined that all of his beliefs about the external world could be mistaken, which led him to the realization that the only thing that he could be certain of was his own existence: “I think therefore I am.” But what am “I”? “I am a thinking thing”, he said and concluded that the existence (...) of one’s mental self is clear, certain and indubitable, while the existence of a physical world was open to doubt. Zhuang Zi, in a similar vein, dreamt that he was a butterfly, and, on awakening, could not be sure that he was not a butterfly dreaming that he was a man. Rather than drawing a distinction between dreams and reality, or between certainty and dubitability, however, he concluded that our identities, like everything else in the world, are fluid and subject transformation and transmutation. The very different treatments of the dream scenario by these two thinkers stem from fundamentally different assumptions embedded in the two philosophical traditions. Analyzing them side by side, we realize how the resources of each intellectual tradition cast light on the unquestioned assumptions underlying the philosophy of the other. This cross cultural engagement highlights the ways in which these two varieties of skepticism fall short of complete, universal skepticism and potentially points the way towards a synthesis of the resources of Western rationalism and philosophical Daoism that may lead to novel formulations of radically skeptical world views. (shrink)

Justice has always been central to political philosophy over a period of time. No doubt, throughout the ages, countless philosophers have understood justice in different ways. Nevertheless, they have consented that a good society is a just society. Moreover, justice is a distributive concept and is concerned with the distribution of wealth, leisure, liberty, friendship, love, etc. Twentieth century justice came to be discussed usually in relation to social life in general, and the distribution of material rewards in particular and (...) usually came to be known as ‘Social Justice’. Social justice as such came to be accepted as the fair and just relation between the individual and society that could possibly be measured by unambiguous and unspoken conditions for the distribution of opportunities for social privileges and personal activities. Indeed, social justice is most significant in the context of a polarized Indian society which is divided into castes, religions, races, languages, and communities, posing threat to the democratic spirit. Consequently in India, social justice pertains to doing away with such inequalities, and finding ways for a better and just socio-economic order. In this backdrop, my paper endeavors to locate the significance of the resources conceived by both the figures in the development of political philosophy in India. (shrink)

Critical scholarship regarding the philosophy of Gloria Anzaldúa has proliferated in recent decades, especially in the fields of feminist theory, phenomenology, and epistemology. However, there is little analysis of the metaphysics which undergird their work and make possible their views on identity, experience, and community politics. First, this article will explore the significance of Anzaldúa’s ‘nos/otras’ and its relation to Mexica (Aztec) monistic metaphysics. Such a concept resists an us/them construction of the world because it situates the other as us: (...) the Spanish word for ‘we’ is ‘nosotros’ and holds the ‘other/otros’ as its root, which Anzaldúa feminizes to ‘otras’. Second, we will compare Daoist and Mexica metaphysics, two monist systems, and unpack the moral implications for spirituality. Doing so, we will see that according to Anzaldúa’s monistic view, we are affected by each other’s spirit and have an obligation to be spiritually active in the world. This claim is found throughout Anzaldúa’s philosophy and is the key to understanding the spiritual implications of her work. Lastly, we will apply such a view to sexual trauma and see that Anzalduan metaphysics lays out a path of recovery. If sexual violence is the severing of trust with others, then Anzaldúa’s understanding of how the world is constructed gives us a way to re-establish trust with ourselves, each other, and our communities. (shrink)

In this theme essay for the addressed special-theme section in this special issue of the journal Comparative Philosophy commemorating the first anniversary of the International Society for Comparative Philosophy toward World Philosophy, I intend to give an elaboration of the theme “comparative philosophy as a general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement toward world philosophy”, which has been explicitly presented and formally stated through its recent academic-organizational channel CPWP and focuses on via the Journal’s and CPWP’s jointly organized international (...) conference. The theme “comparative philosophy toward world philosophy” as a whole marks a momentous accumulating point of the significant development of comparative philosophy as a general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement regarding its “direction” dimension, through the constructive-engagement strategy in theoretic exploration and reflective practice especially since the beginning of this century. (shrink)

Attention to the details of putatively obvious examples of philosophy-as-worldview within Latin America give us reasons to be skeptical about the taxonomy that gives us the category of philosophy-as-worldview. Among the examples that suggest difficulties for this way of thinking about the philosophical enterprise are 19th century Mexican ethnolinguistics, contemporary efforts to reconstruct historical and contemporary Indigenous thought, and 20th century efforts to articulate regional ontologies within Latin America. However, reflection on these cases also point to a different project worth (...) considering, namely, a taxonomy of wisdom- and knowledge-focused practices that might allow a different way of drawing distinctions between kinds of “philosophies”. (shrink)

Studies the threefold hierarchy of certainty, from its origins in Mahāyāna Buddhism, through Islam, to 17th century China. This tripartite scheme may be traced back to the ancient Buddhist scheme of the threefold wisdom as systematized by Vasubandhu of Gandhāra in the 4th-5th centuries CE. Following the advent of Islam in the 8th century, it was combined with Qur'anic notions of certainty. Initially taken up by early Islamic mystics such as Sahl al-Tustarī and al-Ḥākim al-Tirmiḏī, the notion of yaqīn was (...) gradually systematized into the three-level hierarchy of “knowledge or science of certainly”, “essence” of certainty, and “truth or reality of certainty”, a hierarchy that bears a distinct resemblance to the Buddhist threefold path of wisdom as discussed by Marc-Henri Deroche. Half a millennium later, this threefold hierarchy of levels of certainty, remotely inspired by Buddhism and integrated into the philosophical Sufism of Ibn ʿArabī and his Persian disciple Jāmī, this complex of ideas may have resurfaced in 17th century China. (shrink)

Marxist philosophy, Western philosophy, and Chinese traditional philosophy constitute three main forces of contemporary Chinese philosophy. In the past two decades, a great deal of in-depth and extensive constructive engagement has been carried out among the three. Previous studies on such constructive engagement have focused on the perspectives of Western or Chinese traditional philosophy, while the perspective of Marxist philosophy has been neglected to a large extent. Given the key position of Marxist philosophy in contemporary Chinese philosophy, it is undoubtedly (...) regrettable that such a perspective is missing. This paper aims to fill this gap in the perspective of examination from the perspective of Marxist philosophy by examining the constructive engagement between various research paths within contemporary Chinese Marxist philosophy on the one hand, and the constructive engagement between Marxist philosophy, Western and Chinese traditional philosophy on the other hand. (shrink)

When Western philosophy was introduced to Indian academia in the late nineteenth century, there arose for Indian philosophers a two-fold need: the need to preserve the self-identity of Indian philosophy and the need to dialogue with Western philosophy. In their attempt to defend the distinctiveness of Indian philosophy, the philosophers of the first half of the twentieth century affirmed that classical Indian philosophy was essentially spiritual. The philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century, however, did not have a (...) compulsion to defend Indian philosophy in the face of Western philosophy. Many of them critiqued the traditional view about classical Indian philosophy. For them classical Indian philosophy, too, was a rational discourse and it is equally capable to contribute to the enrichment of philosophy. Today the two traditions—Indian and Western—are known to each other fairly well and hence there is little need to pursue comparative philosophy as a distinct discipline in philosophy. Instead, what should be promoted is an open philosophizing—philosophizing that is characterized by our openness to diverse ways of thought. (shrink)

Aiming to become a part of transcultural discourses and debates, the author argues in this paper for the use of transcultural approaches overcoming the traditional ones in doing philosophy comparatively in the Southern Europe. Within this framework, new forms of cross-cultural philosophizing in the Mediterranean philosophy will arise in the triangle among the Western Balkans, Italy and Greece as a transcultural exchange of knowledge and ideas including more than twenty surrounding countries in the Mediterranean basin. In this regard, the author (...) is trying to find a way for deepening and broadening transcultural approaches concerning the Southern Europe in general and the Balkans and Mediterranean Philosophy in particular, because of transcultural potential that philosophy in the Southern Europe has to gradually develop its possible transcultural connotations in the very near future. (shrink)

This article is designed to offer a phenomenological reading of Wang Yang-ming’s doctrine of ge-wu, which, as a part of Wang radical reading of The Great Learning, distinguishes his doctrine from that of Zhu Xi. Wang argues that ge-wu, as rectifying things, is the same process with the act of cheng-yi, in which yi and wu form a relation of intentionality in Edmund Husserl’s sense. Since for Wang, what can be made sincere are emotional yi such as liking and disliking, (...) Husserl's phenomenology on emotional intentionality will be used in this article. The emotional intentionality is the unity of emotional noeses and valued noemata. For Wang, ge-wu is to change a wu improperly valued into a proper one, which is the same process of rectifying an immoral yi into a moral one. (shrink)

In the first part of my work I consider the false opposition between abstract universalism and cultural particularisms. I propose to dissolve it by means of a nomadic thought and take as an example of such thinking the work of Luis Villoro. The second part discusses the disagreement between Manuel Vargas and Robert Sánchez on philosophy as a cultural resource. The third part explores the genuine opposition between arrogant reason and porous reason.

The recent literature on Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi centres around Jay Garfield’s and Graham Priest’s interpretation. It is an open discussion to what extent their interpretation is an adequate model of the logic for the catuskoti, and the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā. Priest and Garfield try to make sense of the contradictions within the catuskoti by appeal to a series of lattices – orderings of truth-values, supposed to model the path to enlightenment. They use Anderson & Belnaps's framework of First Degree Entailment. Cotnoir has argued (...) that the lattices of Priest and Garfield cannot ground the logic of the catuskoti. The concern is simple: on the one hand, FDE brings with it the failure of classical principles such as modus ponens. On the other hand, we frequently encounter Nāgārjuna using classical principles in other arguments in the MMK. There is a problem of validity. If FDE is Nāgārjuna’s logic of choice, he is facing what is commonly called the classical recapture problem: how to make sense of cases where classical principles like modus pones are valid? One cannot just add principles like modus pones as assumptions, because in the background paraconsistent logic this does not rule out their negations. In this essay, I shall explore and critically evaluate Cotnoir’s proposal. In detail, I shall reveal that his framework suffers collapse of the kotis. Taking Cotnoir’s concerns seriously, I shall suggest a formulation of the catuskoti in classical Boolean Algebra, extended by the notion of an external negation as an illocutionary act. I will focus on purely formal considerations, leaving doctrinal matters to the scholarly discourse – as far as this is possible. (shrink)

For Martin Heidegger the story of Western philosophy ended basically in egocentrism or the metaphysics of “subjectivity”; however, he acknowledged the possibility of another path in Greece: that of pre-Socratic thinking. Yet, there is a further path he did not acknowledge: the tradition of Orthodox philosophy and theology. The paper focuses on some key works of the prominent contemporary Greek philosopher Christos Yannaras, for a long time professor in Athens. Taking over the notions of “Being” and ontology, Yannaras construes them (...) not as ontic “substances” amenable to epistemic knowledge, but as guideposts to “relational” or participatory experience. His early text On the Absence and Unknowability of God: Heidegger and the Aeropagite explores the affinity between the German thinker and the Orthodox stress on “apophaticism.” For Yannaras, apophaticism profoundly reorients philosophical inquiry; it also has important implications for human “personhood” and “freedom.” Far from denoting individuation, personhood for him means a face standing out toward others, just as freedom transcends self-will in the direction of a relational event. By way of conclusion, I probe the status of relational “community.” For Yannaras, I ask, is community a concretely achieved way of life ; or does it point more apophatically to a future advent? (shrink)

“Constructive-Engagement” is a meta-philosophical and meta-methodological “strategy” suggested by Chinese and comparative philosophy scholar Bo Mou for analyzing and enriching philosophical exchange. In this paper, I will use this strategy towards an end, on a scale, and with a topic not attempted before. I will use it as a “template” for redesigning a poorly developing area of cross-cultural comparison I call Sino-African reflective studies. My goal in this work-in-progress is to design a plan for reconstituting SARS as Sino-African philosophy, an (...) inclusive yet coherent field of research and innovation unified through organizing principles. I will design the overhaul of SARS in three stages. First, by surveying SARS for its basic features including its structural flaws. Second, by remapping SARS in line with “renovation” principles drawn from its literature. Third, by blueprinting SARS in line with “construction” principles theorized from the constructive-engagement strategy. (shrink)

This paper will explore competing intuitions behind the problem of other minds. On the one hand, consciousness is strictly a self-manifest, first-person phenomenon: subjectivity is in each case one’s own. On the other hand, it is obvious, on the basis of their behavioral activity, that others are conscious agents despite this coming across through objective determinations. The tension between these intuitions is what grounds the problem of other minds. Attempts to navigate this problem generally neglect one of these intuitions and (...) so are inadequate accounts of intersubjectivity. As such, and given the paradox involved in accepting each intuition, I argue that we must look to traditions that are comfortable with paradox if we are to give an adequate account of intersubjectivity and the relationship between one’s own and other minds. In particular, I point to the Kaśmīr Śaiva tradition, and specifically the work of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, as an excellent resource for bringing together and holding in tension these paradoxical intuitions. For in this tradition, the very nature of reality is at once solipsistic and paradoxically revealed through a divine, intersubjective dialogue. As such, this tradition takes each intuition seriously despite the tension between them. (shrink)

In reply to Hominh and Nguyen, I argue that “creolizing” methods in the study and practice of Buddhism should not be opposed to historicist and contextualist modes of investigation and understanding. Rather, historicism and contextualism can and should inform creolizing approaches.

In his recent book, Why I Am Not a Buddhist, Evan Thompson argues that inter-tradition or cross-cultural philosophical dialogue ought to be governed by cosmopolitan conversational norms that do not subsume any one tradition’s deep commitments under those of any other tradition, but rather bring those commitments into the discussion so that they can be challenged and defended. He argues on this basis for the application of a deeply contextualist and historicist interpretive methodology to Buddhist texts, concepts, and theories in (...) dialogue with philosophy and contemporary cognitive sciences. Buddhist modernism, in eschewing that deeply contextualist and historicist methodology, falls short of those cosmopolitan commitments. We argue that Thompson’s cosmopolitan commitments do not mandate the deeply contextualist and historicist methodology he recommends. As an alternative, we propose a creolizing methodology that finds value in mixing, reinterpreting, and reinventing cultural traditions and other forms of belonging to address the complex problems the world faces. We suggest that such a creolizing methodology can be found in other forms of Buddhist modernism than those Thompson criticizes. We provide, as two examples, the thought of the Chinese monk Taixu and the Vietnamese monk Thich Nhat Hanh. (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of myth in two books written by Kōsaka Masaaki, The Historical World and Philosophy of the Nation. In both, myth appears as a central moment in the transition from primitive to modern societies. The role of myth is closely related to Kōsaka’s notion of nature, since one goal of his reflection is to show how history is supported by the “substratum” of nature. In this sense, he also distinguishes between the natural and historical aspects of (...) nations. After analyzing the subcategories of primordial nature, environmental nature, and historical nature, the paper shows how these layers are articulated by myth. Authority, in the contractual form of potlatch, signalizes the moment of transition to the true self-determination of nations. Miki Kiyoshi was one author who pointed out the problematic aspects of Kōsaka’s theory of nation. A comparison with Miki’s thought uncovers how authority is the main characteristic of Kōsaka’s view of myth. The paper finishes by investigating where this authority comes from. Since it cannot come from nature alone, it should also come from the past character of myth itself, which is an expression of what Kōsaka terms “the eternal now”. (shrink)

In the present work I study Daoist philosophy in conjunction with the radical new philosophy of antinatalism, spearheaded by South African philosopher David Benatar. Although I am not claiming equivalence between the two, a meaningful communication emerges between the classical Chinese sources used here and the modern doctrine of antinatalism. I argue that both visions partake in a radical critique of consciousness according to which this faculty of the human mind is far from what it is often held to be. (...) In fact, it is perceived as a destructive and disruptive element of, and in, existence. Moreover, both offer a praxis of return that seeks to undo this disruption. In the case of Daoism, consciousness pushes humans ever farther away from the Dao. It is imperative to return from this exile, and to return to the Dao. This can, radically, only be achieved by the return from ‘ordinary’ conscious existence. This is the prerogative of sagehood. It will be shown that the trajectory of sagehood shares important parameters with the antinatalist quest to significantly challenge human hubris in the cosmos at large, and to reinstate cosmic humility. (shrink)

In contemporary virtue epistemology, responsibilist intellectual virtues in the tradition of Aristotle's moral theory are acquired character traits involving a motivational component and a success component. The motivational component is an emotion that regulates inquiry but which would ordinarily, and problematically, carry bias. In order to monitor the patterns of fallibility in emotions, reflection can correct beyond perceptual errors or logical fallacies. Emotions which survive reflection are less partial and hold more epistemic valance than egotistical emotions. Since the framework of (...) virtue epistemology might be at a loss for monitoring emotions reflectively, given the fact emotions operate rapidly and tend to bypass cognitive functions, a theory of non-cognitive, egoless emotions, such as the Sanskrit aesthetic theory of rasa is a useful paradigm for epistemic value. Aestheticized emotions have a place in emotion-evaluation. In particular, Abhinavagupta's realistic analysis of the aestheticized emotion of pathos in the Abhinavabhāratī, shows that, “aestheticized tragedy,” unlike ordinary compassion or pity, is an immersive but moving higher-order affective response that involves evaluating the transitions from one unreflective emotion to the next. The cognitive fallout for related virtues, such as compassion, is that karuṇa affords insight into the process of transformation. Subsequently, it is possible to articulate a new kind of intellectual virtue, one that regulates observation, anticipates attunement with sentient beings, and adds insight to the evaluative structure of pathos. (shrink)

In this paper I contrast the metaphysical philosophies of Benedict de Spinoza and the ‘sudden enlightenment’ tradition of Chan Buddhism. Spinoza’s expressivist philosophy, in which everything can be conceived via a lineage of finite causes terminating in substance as a metaphysical ground of all things, emphasises the relative sameness of all entities. By contrast, Chan’s philosophy of emptiness, which rests on the dependent co-origination of all entities, renders such comparison fundamentally meaningless. Having no source beyond dependent co-origination to generate a (...) thing’s distinct nature leads to a metaphysics in which, rather than being relatively similar or different, all things are at one and the same time absolutely the same and absolutely distinct. As a result, Spinoza grounds ethics wholly is sameness or similarity, whereas Chan transcends the dichotomy of sameness and difference and offers an environmental ethics grounded simultaneously in absolute sameness and absolute difference. As a result, in Spinoza’s case, the dissimilarity between human beings and the non-human world places limits on our concern for it. In Chan Buddhism, however, insight into the emptiness of all phenomena leads to a concern for all entities in their suchness, regardless of whether they are similar or different to human beings. As such, I argue that Chan is in a better position than Spinoza to develop a robust environmental ethic. (shrink)

Based on the symbolism of the trigrams, the Yi-Jing cosmic model offers possibilities in a coordinate system with eight octants to discuss different philosophical developments in parallel. It forms a framework for further elaboration of theory and methodology of comparative philosophy. This paper is restricted to extracting, analyzing and comparing common features from the perspectives of the Yi-Jing model. Achieving harmony is the subject of a new paper under construction. The philosophical developments in the quadrants, Naturalism, Moralism, Rationalism and Humanism, (...) are characterized by a fundamental difference between subject and object. This difference remains intact in the octants, but specified developments underline the subject and others the object. In Naturality man or woman does not consider him- or herself more valuable than other life forms, as in Daoism and ecocentrism. In Existentiality man or woman places his or her “ego” at the center and should give meaning from itself, as in existentialism. In Connectivity emphasis is on the human being, looking for liberation, as in Buddhism and parts of Hindu philosophy. In Normativity the subject focuses on the object, through norms and values, as in ancient China and Greek culture, and in modern technology assessment. In Rationality man or woman sees him or herself as more important. In Differentiality an anti-subject attitude arises, which led to phenomenology, hermeneutics, postmodernism and difference thinking. In Sociality, emphasis is on society and reality determines the idea. In Humanity emphasis is on the person, as in Confucianism, which strives for harmonious human relationships. (shrink)

In this article I will try to demonstrate the existence of points in common between the eternalist instances of Parmenidean philosophy and the Buddhist formulations made by some parts of the Abhidhamma, Nāgārjuna, and the Sarvāstivādins. These three philosophies have numerous points in common with Emanuele Severino’s formulations from the point of view of what is defined as neo-Parmenidism. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the points in common between these systems of thought are due to a (...) basic affinity which, despite having led them to emphasize different themes, present similar reasoning and logical consequences, which allow us to detect very strong points in common especially on issues related to the conception of reality as unique and indivisible in the form of an absolute totality, the eternity of Being, the interdependent nature of entities, and even the illusory perception of worldly reality. Since this text is only an introduction to the problem, I will examine the main issues, also analyzing the main problems to conclude with what I have found to be the actual points in common on which an interdisciplinary dialogue can be built between the problems raised by Severino through Parmenides and Nāgārjuna who from this point of view is more similar to the Sarvasarvādins than has been thought up to now. (shrink)

What is the relationship between moral virtue and happiness? Does having moral virtues make their possessors happy? Can one be happy without them? Philosophers provide diverging answers to these questions due to their different understandings of the concept of happiness which has multifarious meanings and senses. In this essay, I compare the representative Western theories of happiness with what may be called “a classical Confucian view” informed by recent scholarship on classical Confucianism. I argue that for classical Confucian philosophers, especially (...) Confucius and Mencius, there are two kinds of happiness: exclusive and inclusive happiness. I conclude that moral virtue is necessary for inclusive happiness shared by the virtuous and the recipients of their virtuous actions and/or policies. (shrink)

This paper seeks to lay down the theoretical groundwork for the emergence of holistic cross-cultural philosophical investigations of personal identity ¾ investigations that approach the theoretical, phenomenological, psychological, and practical-ethical dimensions of selfhood as indissociable. My strategy is to discuss three closely connected conceptual distinctions that the Buddhist approach to personal identity urges us to draw, and a lucid understanding of which is essential for the emergence of appropriately comprehensive and thus genuinely cosmopolitan discussions at the cross-road between Western and (...) Buddhist philosophical traditions. The first, primary distinction is that between the “visceral sense of self” and the “substance view of self”. This in turn gives rise to two derivative distinctions, namely between “harbouring VSS” and “believing SVS”, and between “overcoming VSS” and “rejecting SVS”. After discussing these distinctions, I consider and respond to three philosophical objections to features of Buddhist approach to selfhood that are thrown into sharper relief when attention is paid to these three distinctions. I then discuss some of the ways the foregoing may inform research in cross-cultural philosophy of personal identity. This discussion focuses on: the primacy of the first-person stance in matters of personal identity; the relationship between numerical identity and narrative identity; interdisciplinarity in the study of selfhood; and personal identity and egoism. (shrink)

The paper begins by criticizing the usual division of Latin America philosophy into three stages: founders, forgers and thecnicians. Then the history of philosophy in 20th in Mexico is narrated with the help of four maps that indicates the main positions and names. Towards the end, two kinds of lessons are drawn. The first is to promote the destruction of the vices of such a philosophy to regain its virtues. The second lesson comes from interpreting the metaphors of the previous (...) maps: we are victims of shipwreckes living in archipielagos and thus we may explore their transitions. (shrink)

What kind of polity is justified by classic Confucian values? Adopting an interpretive approach, this paper explores the idea of leadership democracy being expressive of classic Confucian values by first introducing the models of leadership democracy associated with Weber and Schumpeter and second connecting Confucian elitist values to them. I argue that leadership democracy best realizes the Confucian emphasis on the people as the source of legitimacy and the ruler as the engine of good governance. The Confucian idea of people-rootedness (...) is borne out by citizens behaving as democratic plebeians who are empowered to choose their leader but devoid of moral and intellectual capabilities for collective decision-making. The Confucian idea of rulership is expressed by democratic leaders displaying competent statesmanship and compensating for intra-elite tensions within the Confucian tradition. (shrink)

In his seminal Orientalism and Religion, Richard King argues that Western scholars of religion have constructed a conceptual dichotomy between “mysticism” and “rationality” that has caused them to systematically distort the claims and arguments of Eastern thinkers. While King focuses primarily on Western scholarship on the Buddhist and Hindu traditions, this essay shows that his argument can also be extended to apply to Western scholarship on al-Ghazālī, whose sympathy for Sufism and apparent rejection of Greek philosophy has often earned him (...) the reputation of being a champion of Islamic mysticism. I argue that al-Ghazālī transcends the dueling categories of ‘rationality’ and ‘mysticism’ that have been imposed on him by offering a conception of experiential knowledge that retains its roots in the ‘mystical’ Sufi tradition, even while also highlighting the rational merits of experientially-grounded modes of knowing. In particular, I argue that al-Ghazālī shows us how experiential knowledge is both important to providing motivation for rational action and also critical to underwriting persons’ genuine understanding of the evaluative properties of that which is known. (shrink)

Classical presentations of the Buddhist path prescribe the cultivation of various good qualities that are necessary for spiritual progress, from mindfulness and loving-kindness to faith and wisdom. Examining the way in which such qualities are described and classified in early Buddhism—with special reference to their treatment in the Visuddhimagga by the fifth-century Buddhist thinker Buddhaghosa—the present article employs a comparative method in order to identify the Buddhist catalog of virtues. The first part sketches the characteristics of virtue as analyzed by (...) neo-Aristotelian theories. Relying on these accounts, the second part considers three lists from early Buddhism as possible catalogs of virtue: the components of ethical conduct, the 37 factors that contribute to awakening, and the wholesome or beautiful mental factors. I then raise the question of why the Buddhist tradition developed several classifications of virtue, whereas the Western tradition of virtue ethics used a single category. Appealing to the connection between the virtues and living well in the eudaimonistic version of virtue ethics, I propose that one of the reasons why Buddhism developed multiple lists of virtues is its pluralistic acceptance of different modalities of living well and associated practices, in MacIntyre’s sense of the term. These modalities and practices are not equal, but are ordered hierarchically. Accordingly, I conclude that Buddhist ethics ought to be seen as a pluralist-gradualist system rather than a universalist theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I delineate a variety of questions related to personal identity and ontology. I develop and compare the Confucian conception of the person and the view of the person developed throughout Derek Parfit’s work on personal identity and ontology. I will demonstrate that the Confucian conception of the person has numerous instructive similarities with Parfit’s work on personal identity, despite a number of differences. I argue, briefly, that this project is worthwhile as a piece of comparative philosophy. One (...) of the final two sections of the paper develop a new hybrid account of personal identity and ontology that combine the Confucian and Parfitian views of personal identity and personal ontology. The last section of the paper goes into detail developing this view in response to potential questions, and responds to some objections to this hybrid account, including objections based on a similarity between the Confucian account and the narrative account of personal identity. (shrink)

Anand Vaidya, Sean Smith, and Mark Siderits have presented thoughtful comments and provocative challenges to my article “What Kind of an Illusion is the Illusion of Self?” Their challenges raise significant questions about the nature of illusion, whether Buddhism is denying the self in all senses of the term, whether there could be a self that exists for some limited duration of time and has at least some measure of control, whether there is a phenomenal illusion of self, whether the (...) neuropsychological assumptions embedded in Thomas Metzinger’s Phenomenal Self Model is consistent with Buddhist metaphysics, the usefulness of evolutionary psychology in explaining why we have the illusion of self, whether the I-sense is a result of natural selection or cultural selection, vipassanā meditation as a form of verification and its usefulness for extinguishing the I-sense. The discussion here is my response to these criticisms through which I further clarify and develop my arguments and, in some ways, amend my position. (shrink)

A Response to Karsten Struhl’s “What Kind of an Illusion is the Illusion of Self”.

Karsten Struhl has offered an intriguing account of what kind of illusion the self is. His account is based on Buddhist philosophy, neuropsychology, and neuroscience. This critical notice examines his arguments, and aims to question whether or not the self is the kind of illusion Struhl argues it to be.

The 18th century Irish philosopher George Berkeley argued that we might know of the existence of other minds based upon our experience of having certain sense-data or “ideas” imprinted upon us. This served, for Berkeley, ultimately as a basis for us to know of a “grand” other mind orchestrating the order among said ideas imprinted upon us, that is, God. This leap to God, however, has been challenged over the past three decades. A very rudimentary form could still be retained (...) though from Berkeley’s argument for God, whereby Berkeley argued that human minds were dependent upon other “more powerful” minds. I shall open with the contention that Berkeley did not actually show that there must exist one or many other minds orchestrating the order among imprinted ideas. This contention shall serve as the ground for speculating what form Berkeleyanism would take, if we posit many other minds instead of one God. I shall argue that this Berkeleyanism “reworked” on the premise of many other minds, could understand those ideas imprinted upon us as having been decided by a commune of finite other minds. I shall also argue that the experience of having ideas imprinted upon us is identical to an experience the Japanese thinker of the same century, Motoori Norinaga, expressed with the phrase semusubenaki. This experience of there being “nothing-to-be-done” shall also be situated within the Berkeleyanism “reworked” around the premise of a commune of other minds imprinting ideas upon us to speculative ends. (shrink)

When comparing diverse philosophical traditions, it becomes necessary to establish a common point of departure. This paper offers a comparative analysis of Advaita Vedānta Hinduism and esoteric Christianity, as represented by the two highly celebrated figures of Śaṅkara and Nicholas Cusanus, respectively. The common point of departure on which I base this comparison is the concept of “non-duality”—a concept that is fitting for at least two reasons. First, it is general enough to encompass both traditions, pervading the work of each (...) figure, and thus allowing for a kind of “shared language.” Second, it is specific enough to identify a set of core and well-defined principles amenable to systematic study, chief among which are the notions of the “Absolute” as an infinite unity that transcends all determinations and exceeds all oppositions, and the world as an ontologically ambiguous “reflection” that simultaneously hides and manifests its meta-ontological Principle. In drawing these connections, I hope to show how the concept of non-duality provides the possibility for a mutual understanding among diverse traditions at the philosophical level. (shrink)

Nietzsche and Zhuang Zi both believe that the supposed value of certain emotions they deem harmful should be questioned and that reflection can be utilized to change the emotions. They intend to disabuse those of their respective times of conventional morality, with the aim of achieving a state in which negative moral emotions are eliminated and a more natural way of life is embraced. Specifically, Nietzsche examines guilt, a remnant of an ascetic morality endorsed by the religious elite; Zhuang Zi, (...) similarly, considers grief, a moral emotion tied to traditional culture and endorsed by Confucian morality. Living naturally involves the absence of psychic conflict that accompanies negative emotions; it also involves a psychological ease within ourselves and with the world. (shrink)

Even in the field of comparative or cross-cultural philosophy, distinctive contributions by African philosophers are often side-lined – that is, relegated to niche publications. Why is it so hard for African philosophers to draw their Western colleagues into a real dialogue? An attempt is made to describe the field of tension; it is shown that some of the reflexes that manifest themselves in it reveal not just the attachment to specific perspectives or frames of reference, but also implicit ideas about (...) the nature of the “philosophical game”. On the Western side, motives constitutive of practical or traditional life are either ignored or tacitly equated with attempts to realize goals that can be best understood from a reflexive point of view. In this way, the concrete conditions of any human activity, including intellectual activity, are lost from view. This critical lesson has been spelt out by a number of philosophers, but is seldom taken to heart. As a result, it becomes difficult to penetrate beyond conceptual differences. It will also be maintained that while many African philosophers question intellectualist attitudes, they do not always do so in a way that invites discussion on the central, or basic, issues. (shrink)

Graham Priest has offered a rational reconstruction of Buddhist thought that involves, first, modeling the Catuṣkoṭi by a four valued logic, and then later adding a fifth value, read as “ineffability”. This note examines that fifth value and raises some concerns about it that seem grave enough to reject it. It then sketches an alternative to Priest’s account that has no need for the fifth value.

Chief amongst the issues Toshihiko Izutsu broached is the philosophisation of Zen Buddhism in his book Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism. This article aims to critically compare Izutsu’s reconstruction of Zen metaphysics with another metaphysical tradition rooted in Descartes’ cogito ergo sum. Putting Izutsu’s terminological choices into the context of Zen Buddhism, we review his argument based on the subject-object distinction and establish a comparison with the Cartesian cogito. A critical analysis is conducted on the functional relationship between subject (...) and object in Izutsu’s metaphysics of Zen. This is examined step by step from the perspective of Descartes’ Meditations. On the one hand, we focus on prima facie similarities in meditative and reflective methodologies used by the Zen and Cartesian approaches. On the other, we highlight some unequivocal differences in the metaphysical role of the subject: an indubitable foundation for the epistemological access to objective reality, and an introspective apprehension of the egoless void or absolute reality. (shrink)

The is a brief reply to the central objection against the construction of my The Fifth Corner of Four by Andi Kapsner in his “Cutting Corners: A Critical Note on Priest’s Five-Valued Catuṣkoṭi. This concerns the desirability of adding a fifth corner to the four of the catuṣkoṭi.

Both early and later forms of Buddhism developed a set of arguments to demonstrate that the self is an illusion. This article begins with a brief review of some of the arguments but then proceeds to show that these arguments are not themselves sufficient to dispel the illusion. It analyzes three ways in which the illusion of self manifests itself – as wish fulfillment, as a cognitive illusion, and as a phenomenal illusion. With respect to this last, the article reviews (...) some recent developments in cognitive neuropsychology and neuroscience to discuss the way in which the phenomenal illusion of self is encoded within our brain processes. This article also considers the way in which the illusion of self is constructed through social interaction, by episodic memory, and by narrative construction. Finally, it focuses on how the illusion of self developed as an evolutionary necessity to make it possible for the human organism to navigate physical and social reality; and that it continues to be useful today. This poses a dilemma for the Buddhist soteriological project of extinguishing the illusion of self. Specifically, while it is possible to develop a non-self perspective though the continued practice of vipassanā, it is not possible to maintain it consistently. The article concludes that even fully enlightened individuals must sometimes oscillate between a non-self perspective and a self-perspective and suggests an analogy between this oscillation and what occurs in the Kanizsa square illusion. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Meng Zi’s idea of yi as a virtue. In it, I first briefly examine two influential interpretations of yi – the “appropriateness” approach that views yi as a disposition to do what is fitting in a given situation and the shame-centered approach that understands yi as a disposition to avoid what is shameful in the moral life. The first approach is too thin to distinguish yi from acting properly in general and the second reading confines the (...) definitive feeling involved in yi to a too moralized understanding of shame. Moreover, both fail to pay enough attention to the reliance of yi on social norms to receive its content. Through textual analysis, I show that in addition to a sense of shame, respect as an attitude of prioritizing other persons in the way specified by the relevant norms also serves as an important emotional core of yi as a virtue. In the end, I highlight the potential contribution of the Mengzian idea of yi to virtue ethics. The two-faceted structure of yi points to a way to account for rule-related virtues – virtues that have rule-conformity as a component. Equipped with thick descriptions of rule-related virtues, virtue ethics will be in a better position to guide actions. (shrink)

This paper proposes an interdisciplinary reading of the Bhagavad Gītā, presenting it as a parrhesiastic dialogue between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, and focusing on the importance attached to memory. Foucault’s studies on the exercise of parrhesia in the Greco-Roman context, but also Heidegger's views on the original memory, and Abhinavagupta’s commentary to the Bhagavad Gītā have been used as important tools of interpretation. Devotion is described as the constant memory of Kṛṣṇa, through which the practitioner succeeds in substituting some subconscious dispositions (...) for others, building a psychic memory that allows for liberation at the time of death. On the one hand, Kṛṣṇa’s goal is to awaken transcendental memory in Arjuna, on the other, at the end of the Gītā we are invited to remember and study this sacred conversation. This leads us to establish a comparison between the use of memory promoted in the Bhagavad Gītā and in the Epicurean school, highlighting important similarities and differences between the two pedagogies. (shrink)

Names name, but there are no individuals who are named by names. This is the key to an elegant and ideologically parsimonious strategy for analyzing the Buddhist catuṣkoṭi. The strategy is ideologically parsimonious, because it appeals to no analytic resources beyond those of standard predicate logic. The strategy is elegant, because it is, in effect, an application of Bertrand Russell's theory of definite descriptions to Buddhist contexts. The strategy imposes some minor adjustments upon Russell's theory. Attention to familiar catuṣkoṭi from (...) Vacchagotta and Nagarjuna as well as more obscure catuṣkoṭi from Khema, Zhi Yi, and Fa Zang motivates the adjustments. The result is a principled structural distinction between affirmative and negative catuṣkoṭi, as well as analyses for each that compare favorably to more recent efforts from Tillemans, Westerhoff, and Priest. (shrink)

Based on Yi-Jing we present an elaborated version of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity that consists of immanent and transcendent processes via the void, the oneness, the twofold, the fourfold and the Five Phases in combination with the eight trigrams to reproduction and the innumerable beings. The duograms are further discussed in a quadrant system with axes derived from pattern li and vital energy qi. The model has similarities with Libbrecht’s model of comparative philosophy, but also differences. It is (...) further consistent with the quadrant system of Wilber’s integral theory. The trigrams are studied in an octant system, that we derive by adding diagonal axes in the quadrant system, representing competition versus cooperation and renewal versus preservation. This leads to the Ji-Jing cosmic model, which shows a fractal pattern of self-similarity of states and stages, with a process of involution, turn and evolution that is propelled by immanent and transcendent flows of energy. There are relationships with various modern approaches, such as Integral Theory, Reflexive Universe and Spiral Dynamics. The model can be used to analyse situations and problems at different levels: cosmos, human world, society, organizations and individuals. I demonstrate that this method, which is based on ancient resources as the Yi-Jing philosophy, through due reflective interpretation can contribute to our understanding and treatment of some currently significant jointly concerned issues. In the application a number of disadvantages of the current neo-liberal system are confronted with some proposed solutions in order to restore the balance between Yin and Yang. (shrink)

It has become popular to portray the Buddhist Nāgārjuna as an ontological nihilist, i.e., that he denies the reality of entities and does not postulate any further reality. A reading of his works does show that he rejects the self-existent reality of entities, but it also shows that he accepts a "that-ness" to phenomenal reality that survives the denial of any distinct, self-contained entities. Thus, he is not a nihilist concerning what is real in the final analysis of things. How (...) Nāgārjuna’s positions impact contemporary discussions of ontological nihilism and deflationism in Western philosophy is also discussed. (shrink)

This essay has three parts. The first moves from what artists confronted when China was first opened to the west in 1978 to what two classical Chinese critics and artists said art was and how it was to be made. The second looks at artists’ works made between two exhibitions in the United States, one in 1998, the other in 2017, to find an uncanny reprise of the classical principles. The third looks at the ideas of the global, contemporary, and (...) art through the works of Peter Osborne and Arthur Danto that apply to the new art from China. (shrink)

The article seeks to analyse Kierkegaard’s indirecte Meddelelse, which the author proposes to translate as ‘indirect message’. It attempts to consider and illuminate this concept and its general characteristics, types and cases in Kierkegaard's work. They are to serve as a baseline for investigations of indirect messages in Buddhism, especially the famous ‘public cases’ of the Chán Buddhists. The author tries to specify indirect messages on both sides of the cultural divide in terms of some Western philosophers. Kierkegaard’s theoretical rationale (...) for his indirect message is profound, sophisticated and appropriate to the theoretical investigation of the Chán public cases. Chán representatives do not possess such pertinent tools for the formal analysis of their own or other indirect messages. However, their indirect messages are impressive in their formal diversity; their variety is, unlike Kierkegaard’s counterparts, not limited by orthodox theological residues. (shrink)

In this paper we elaborate on the neo-Confucian interpretation of the Yi-Jing system. Based on a further exploration of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity of Zhou Dunyi, we develop a cosmological-anthropological model in constructive engagement with Western thoughts and views on systems and on the universe. The vital energy and the pattern play central roles in this model and also in the interpretation of the images and forces of the trigrams. This leads to a comparative model, based on a (...) quadrant system with four perspectives: naturality, rationality, humanity and morality. This model fits in the quadrant system of Wilber, and also corresponds to the cosmic ring of duograms. The natural YI Ba-Gua, a cycle of trigrams where Heaven and Earth are seen as elements of the production cycle, supplies an alternative interpretation of the King Wen Ba-Gua. When extending the quadrant system to octants we observe a cycle of trigrams, the cosmic YI Ba-Gua, as a spiralling sequence, following the order of the Five elements. Heaven and Earth are seen, as in the elaborated Diagram of the Supreme Polarity, as instigator and receiver respectively of the production cycle. It forms the framework for an alternative interpretation of the Fu Xi Ba-Gua. In addition to the images, we can display the forces of the trigrams in the octant system of the cosmic YI Ba-Gua as concentric circles. In the YI Ba-Gua we combine both the cosmic and the natural YI Ba-Gua, and compare this with the Ba-Gua of King Wen and of Fu Xi. Finally we present some hypotheses for further analysis of the matrix of hexagrams based on the cosmic YI Ba-Gua. The comparison of the different philosophical views in one framework may lead to further engagement of these ways of seeing. We already conclude that there is so much structure in the Yi-Jing that it is possible to use the wisdom of the Yi-Jing without applying a divination system. (shrink)

While respect for persons is fundamental to many moral and political theories, its nature and ground remain controversial. According to the standard model of respect, respect is primarily a response to certain inherent features of a person or an object. Importantly, it is in virtue of the value, status or authority of those features that respect is justified or owed. This model, however, faces many serious challenges. Drawing on the classical Confucian notion of jing, I develop an alternative model of (...) respect, which construes respect as an expression of agent’s sense of the self and its place in the world. The emphasis is thus on the agent’s own self-conception and the corresponding attitudes and dispositions, as opposed to on inherent features of the objects of respect. To further illustrate this distinction, I contrast the traditional Kantian conception of respect for persons with the Confucian, jing-based, conception along three dimensions: the normative ground, the content, and the distribution of respect. The Kantian respect certainly has its merits, and perhaps is indispensable in some contexts, but there is much more to respect than what Kantians can offer. The Confucian conception of respect, on the other hand, has important theoretical and practical values such that it is essential to an adequate understanding of the role of respect in our moral and political life. (shrink)

Latin American philosophy has long been concerned with its philosophical identity. In this paper I argue that the search for Latin American philosophical identity is motivated by a desire for recognition that largely hinges on its relationship to European thought. Given that motivations are seldom easily accessible, the essay comparatively draws on Africana and Native American metaphilosophical reflections. Such juxtapositions serve as a means of establishing how philosophical exclusions have themselves motivated and structured how Latin American philosophy has understood its (...) own quest for philosophical identity. In closing, I gesture toward the possibilities of shifting the conversation away from what makes Latin American philosophy distinct toward one of praxis—what do we want Latin American philosophy to do. (shrink)