How have the theories of aesthetics which were worked out in europe evolved in america? are there widely differing standpoints between european and american aestheticians? what herrmann tried to do, to shed light on these questions, was to look over the issues of "the journal of aesthetics and art criticism" since 1941. thomas munro, a pupil of john dewey and founder of the journal tried to provide in the united states a broader and more open-ended and undogmatic platform for (...) aesthetics including such separate disciplines as philosophy, psychology, and cultural history. this interdisciplinary approach was an important part of his campaign against an a priori aesthetics. once this encyclopedic view concerning art and its theoretical understanding is adopted, one is in a position to go beyond the one-sided, partial, and dogmatic attitude in aesthetics that often dominates in european journals. the author concludes by considering an example that is closely related to contemporary aesthetics as well as to the present american scene. what is the reason that there have been so few articles on these contemporary art movements? (shrink)
The problem of synthetic judgements touches on the question of whether philosophy can draw independent statements about reality in the first place. For Kant, the synthetic judgements a priori formulate the conditions of the possibility for objectively valid knowledge. Despite the principle fallibility of its statements, modern science aims for objective knowledge. This gives the topic of synthetic a priori unbroken currency. This paper aims to show that a modernized version of transcendental philosophy, if it is to be feasible at (...) all, must “bid farewell” to the concept of being “free of empiricism” or the “purity” of the a priori. Approaches to this end can already been found in Kant’s reflections on non-pure synthetic knowledge. Moreover, the a priori validity of knowledge does not exclude the possibility that it can be discovered empirically. In keeping with Kant, Fries and Nelson anticipated this separation (usually first attributed to Reichenbach) between the validity and discovery context of knowledge and pointed out that the a priori could be discovered empirically, but never proven. There are currently still good reasons why transcendental philosophical concepts are of fundamental importance for modern science, although it must not be overlooked that even within the framework of a modernized transcendental philosophy, several unsolved problems remain or are raised. For example, the irredeemability of the universal validity and necessary claims of the a priori, the problem of a clear demarcation between the phenomenal and noumenal world. Moreover, the “beautiful structure” or the Kantian system, which constituted its persuasive power, is lost. (shrink)
This article deals with the philosophical problem of how to conceive reality. The difficulty consists in finding a middle way between the claim that reality is unconceptualised reality and the claim that there is no difference between what is real and what we experience as real. In this regard, the pragmatic tradition in philosophy promises to provide us with some fruitful ideas for steering a path between the two. The author applies some of these ideas in developing a pragmatic realist (...) philosophy of religion which is not reductionist and therefore acceptable for religious as well as non-religious philosophers of religion. First, he gives a very short summary of pragmatism as background to his proposal. Second, in contrast to the notion of realism in the pragmatic tradition he sketches the presuppositions of what is labelled religious or theological realism in present analytic philosophy of religion. Third, he distinguishes between ontological commitments that are metaphysical in character and ontological commitments that are not, drawing on Rudolf Carnap’s idea of the difference between internal and external questions of existence. Fourth, he presents Hilary Putnam’s criticism of a metaphysically realist conception of existence and fifth, Putnam’s defence of what he calls internal realism. Sixth, he puts forward a pragmatic idea of the difference between observational experiences and existential ones in our lives. Finally, he applies this pragmatic philosophy of religion to the question of whether it is reasonable to claim that belief in God presupposes God’s existence. (shrink)
Causal and counterfactual thoughts are bound together in Byrne's theory of human imagination. We think there are two issues in her theory that deserve clarification. First, Byrne describes which counterfactual possibilities we think of, but she leaves unexplained the mechanisms by which we generate these possibilities. Second, her exploration of and enablers gives two different predictions of which counterfactuals we think of in causal scenarios. On one account, we think of the counterfactuals which we have control over. On the other, (...) which counterfactuals we think of depends on whether something is a strong cause or an enabler. Although these two accounts sometimes give the same predictions, we present cases in which they differ, and we would like to see Byrne's theory provide a way of reconciling these differences. (shrink)
_Animal Experimentation: Working Towards a Paradigm Change_ critically appraises current animal use in science and discusses ways in which we can contribute to a paradigm change towards human-biology based approaches.
The uniqueness of human cognition and language has long been linked to systematic changes in developmental timing. Selection for postnatal skeletal ossification resulted in progressive prolongation of universal patterns of primate growth, lengthening infancy, childhood, and adolescence. Language emerged as communication increased in complexity within and between communities rather than from selection for some unique features of childhood or adolescence, or both.
. In this paper, the significance of using general logic-systems and finite consequence operators defined on non-organized languages is discussed. Results are established that show how properties of finite consequence operators are independent from language organization and that, in some cases, they depend only upon one simple language characteristic. For example, it is shown that there are infinitely many finite consequence operators defined on any non-organized infinite language L that cannot be generated from any finite logic-system. On the other hand, (...) it is shown that for any nonempty language L, a set map is a finite consequence operator if and only if it is defined by a general logic-system. Simple logic-system examples that determine specific consequence operator properties are given. (shrink)
Jakob Friedrich Fries is one of the most important representatives of the Critical Philosophy, someone who built immediately on the original Kantian philosophy. -/- Fries was born in 1773 in Barby (on the Elbe). In 1805 he was extraordinary professor for philosophy in Jena and in the same year was ordinary professor for philosophy in Heidelberg. Returning to Jena in 1816, one year later he was compulsorily retired because of his participation at the nationalistic and republican Wartburg Festival. In 1924 (...) he obtained a professorship for physics and mathematics, and in 1838 he was given back a professorship for philosophy. He died in 1843 in Jena. -/- The book summarizes the research results of the DFG-Project "Jakob Friedrich Fries' Influence on the Sciences of the 19th Century". The research project was carried out by Dr. Kay Herrmann (Institute of Philosophy, Jena University) and Prof. Dr. Wolfram Hogrebe (Institute of Philosophy, Bonn University). Such a study has special importance. There is available a large amount of literature about the "speculative contemporaries" of Fries, like Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. In contrast to the "speculative philosophy", there has been published only a few studies about the Friesian natural philosophy. Fries was, in his natural-philosophical studies, looking for a link between philosophy and modern sciences, wheras his "speculative philosophical" contemporaries felt obligated to stick primarily to a descriptive, phenomenal view of nature. So far the question "How was mathematical natural philosophy regarded by scientists and mathematicians of the 19th century?" has hardly been investigated. Archival studies showed that this gap in Fries-research can be filled. The Friesian correspondence turned out to be a rich gold mine. -/- The present publication is more than a research report. The monographic first part is intended to introduce the foundations of the Friesian theory of cognition, the Friesian methodology, and the Friesian natural philosophy. This should facilitate entry into Friesian philosophy. -/- The Friesian theory is analyzed from two points of view: •How did Fries suceed in continuing and improving the Kantian approach? Is Fries able to remove the weak points of Kantian philosophy? -/- •What is the current significance of the Friesian approach? There are some interesting similarities between the Friesian approach and modern philosophical theories (such like Chomsky's theory of "universal grammer"). The lasting core of the Friesian theory of cognition is: To use empirical studies for working on philosophical problems. -/- Chapters 3 and 4 are scientific-historically oriented. These chapters analyze the Friesian position in scientific and mathematical debates (debates about the a priori foundations of physics, the problem of the identification of physics as an independent discipline, the problem of the boundary between chemistry and physics, the problem of mathematization of the sciences, the theory of the imponderabilia, the systematics and structure of sciences and mathematics, problems of infinity, the differential calculus, the theory of parallel lines) and the relation between Fries and the scientists of the 19th century. The book contains the latest findings gained by evaluation of the Friesian unpublished work (for example the correspondence with W. Weber, C. F. Gauß, E. F. Apelt, O. Schlömilch, Ch. Reichel, B. A. v. Lindenau, L. Gmelin, E. G. Fischer, A. N. Scherer, J. S. C. Schweigger) -/- One result of the research project is that some important scientists took a favourable view of the Friesian theory, but the influence of the Friesian philosophy on the sciences of the 19th century was very limited. The causes are very complex: An anti-natural-philosophical spirit of age, the limits of the Kantian inspired philosophy and some unfavourable aspects in the biography of Fries. -/- For the first time the voluminous Fries-Reichel-correspondence was evaluated. The Fries-Reichel-correspondence contains the Friesian approach to prove the 11th Euclidean axiom, and the whole transcript of the Friesian attempt at proof is given. // Der erste Teil des Buches will in die Grundprobleme Fries’scher Erkenntnistheorie, Methodenlehre und Naturphilosophie einführen, wobei das Hauptaugenmerk auf die Fortführung der kantischen Ansätze durch Fries sowie auf die aktuelle Interpretation der Fries’schen Lehre gerichtet ist. Der wissenschaftshistorisch ausgerichtete zweite Teil analysiert Fries’ Stellung zu naturwissenschaftlichen und mathematischen Diskussionsrichtungen (Probleme der Identifizierung der Physik als eigenständige Disziplin, der Grenzziehung zwischen Physik und Chemie, der Mathematisierung der Naturwissenschaften, der Imponderabilientheorie, der Systematik von Naturwissenschaft und Mathematik, des Unendlichen, der Parallelentheorie usw.) sowie sein Verhältnis zu Naturwissenschaftlern und Mathematikern seiner Zeit. Das Buch enthält neue Erkenntnisse, die aus der Auswertung zahlreicher Nachlassmaterialien gewonnen wurden. Erstmalig wird unter dem Blickwinkel „Fries als Naturwissenschaftler und Mathematiker“ auch der sehr umfangreiche Reichel-Briefwechsel ausgewertet. Dem Reichel-Briefwechsel entstammt auch Fries’ Versuch eines Beweises des Parallelenaxioms, der in diesem Buch erstmalig in transkribierter Form vollständig vorliegt. -/- . (shrink)