This article generalizes the explanationist account of inference to the best explanation. It draws a clear distinction between IBE and abduction and presents abduction as the first step of IBE. The second step amounts to the evaluation of explanatory power, which consist in the degree of explanatory virtues that a hypothesis exhibits. Moreover, even though coherence is the most often cited explanatory virtue, on pain of circularity, it should not be treated as one of the explanatory virtues. Rather, coherence should (...) be equated with explanatory power and considered to be derivable from the other explanatory virtues: unification, explanatory depth and simplicity. (shrink)

Inference to the best explanation (IBE) is considered to be the main means of discovery and justification of scientific hypotheses and theories. The article investigates this inference and its relationship to the main kinds of inference: deduction, induction and abduction. IBE has an abductive inference mechanism, but, contrary to abduction, infers not a possible, but a true conclusion. IBE is an inductive inference, because it is underdetermined by the rules of deduction and by evidence. The article claims that despite its (...) abductive and inductive features which demonstrate that it is not and cannot be deductive inference, IBE nevertheless makes pretense to an absolute truth of its inference, i.e. claims for an almost deductive validity. (shrink)

The article explicates psychological and ontological aspects of Inference to the Best Explanation . IBE is a psychological theory, because cognitive science studies support IBE as descriptively true and psychologically adequate theory, i.e., people perceive best explanations as true and follow the rule of IBE in their reasoning. Moreover, different features of IBE imply that conclusions of IBE can be true only in a world with a very particular ontological constitution. Realism about the external world, the uniformity of nature, the (...) truth of background knowledge and the truth-conduciveness of explanatory virtues are necessary and sufficient for IBE to be truth-conducive. Therefore, IBE is an epistemic theory only because at the same time it is committed to a particular ontology. Keywords: inference to the best explanation, abduction, psychology, ontology, explanatory virtues. (shrink)

The study focuses on the interpretation of the motif of unaddressed phenomena in the dialogue between Adolf Portmann’s thought and phenomenology. It establishes the closeness between Portmann and phenomenology, not in the foundation of phenomenality, but rather in employing nonaddressedness for interpreting phenomenality’s meaning. The concept of invisibility, especially in M. Merleau-Ponty and M. Henry, is considered as a phenomenological parallel to nonaddressedness. Both nonaddressedness and invisibility determine a layered perceptual environment that is based neither on representation of the perceived (...) in a perceiving subject nor on an objective, causally interrelated system of functional relations. (shrink)

In 1905 was publshed a biographical nowel written by Adolf Nowaczyński entitled Portrait of Mikołaj Rej from Nagłowice. While the novel was being written, there were not enough comprehensive and reliable materials about Rej’s life. The purpose of this work is to show pieces of work which were used by Nowaczyński in his novel. Only thanks to searching analysis of those hypothetical available materials the author could manage to establish sources of the hero’s creation. We are sure to say that (...) while writing a novel about Rej, Nowaczyński took some pieces information from Andrzej Trzecieski’s biograhy from the XVI century and Zbigniew n‘aziohtcki’s biography from the XIX century. We can suppose that the author of the Crcation knew the results of Beicikowski’s research. (shrink)

Masarykovy a Brentanovy snahy o překonání Humova skepticismu prostřednictvím počtu pravděpodobnosti lze chápat jako svého druhu "třetí cestu" mezi kantovským apriorismem a kapitulací před subtilními Humovými argumenty. U Masaryka je ono snažení součástí jeho projektu nové induktivní logiky, která (v návaznosti na Leibnize) by měla být logickým základem pro "umění vynalézat" (ars inveniendi). Masaryk akceptuje Humovu koncepci analytických soudů, ale zároveň inklinuje i ke koncepci Adolfa Ficka, v souladu s níž mají věty počtu pravděpodobnosti charakter syntetických soudů a priori; kromě (...) toho odkazuje pozoruhodným způsobem k Bernoulliho zákonu velkých čísel. Masarykovy úvahy vedou k závěru, že zákon velkých čísel zaručuje shodu mezi apriorními tvrzeními počtu pravděpodobnosti a empirickou skutečností, což podle Masaryka vyvrací "tresť" Humova skepticismu, spočívající v tvrzení, že rozum a zkušenost se vylučují. Vzhledem k tomu, že hlavním objektem Humovy kritiky byl pojem kauzality, je však nutno konstatovat, že Masarykovo snažení bylo neúspěšné, neboť žádná aplikace počtu pravděpodobnosti, jenž se zabývá náhodnými jevy, nemůže vést k založení kauzálního zákona (pokud tento zákon zahrnuje také tezi uniformity kauzální determinace). (shrink)

Artykuł poddaje omówieniu wyjątkową polską instytucję państwową działającą w okresie międzywojennym, Polski Komitet Imprez Sportowych w Berlinie. Jej przedstawiciele poprzez sport realizowali ambicję kształtowania korzystnego wizerunku Polski we wrogiej II RP Rzeszy Niemieckiej. W dłuższej perspektywie Komitet okazał się narzędziem poprawy ogólnych stosunków polsko-niemieckich. Artykuł koncentruje się na początkowej fazie działalności PKISB, kiedy po dojściu do władzy Adolfa Hitlera stawką była przyszłość stosunków politycznych między dotychczas skłóconymi sąsiadami. Działalność tej instytucji została przeanalizowana głównie w odniesieniu do piłki nożnej jako najpopularniejszego (...) sportu w Polsce i Niemczech. (shrink)