Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Many legal, social, and medical theorists and practitioners, as well as lay people, seem to be concerned with the harmfulness of discriminative practices. However, the philosophical literature on the moral wrongness of discrimination, with a few exceptions, does not focus on harm. In this paper, I examine, and improve, a recent account of wrongful discrimination, which divides into a definition of group discrimination, and a characterisation of its moral wrong-making feature in terms of harm. The resulting account analyses the wrongness (...) of discrimination in terms of intrapersonal comparisons of the discriminatee’s actual, and relevantly counterfactual, well-being levels. I show that the account faces problems from counterfactuals, which can be traced back specifically to the orthodox - comparative, counterfactual, welfarist - concept of harm. I argue that non-counterfactual and non-comparative harm concepts face problems of their own, and don’t fit easily with our best understanding of discrimination; hence they are unsuitable to replace the orthodox concept here. I then propose a non-orthodox - comparative, counterfactual, hybrid - concept of harm, which relies on counterfactual comparisons of ways of being treated. I suggest how such a concept can help us handle the problems from counterfactuals, at least for my account of discrimination. I also show that there are similar proposals in other harm-related debates. An upshot of the paper is thus to corroborate the case for a non-orthodox, hybrid concept of harm, which seems better able to fulfil its functional roles in a variety of contexts. (shrink)

When facing a choice between saving one person and saving many, some people have argued that fairness requires us to decide without aggregating numbers; rather we should decide by coin toss or some form of lottery, or alternatively we should straightforwardly save the greater number but justify this in a non-aggregating contractualist way. This paper expands the debate beyond well-known number cases to previously under-considered probability cases, in which not (only) the numbers of people, but (also) the probabilities of success (...) for saving people vary. It is shown that, in these latter cases, both the coin toss and the lottery lead to what is called an awkward conclusion, which makes probabilities count in a problematic way. Attempts to avoid this conclusion are shown to lead into difficulties as well. Finally, it is shown that while the greater number method cannot be justified on contractualist grounds for probability cases, it may be replaced by another decision method which is so justified. This decision method is extensionally equivalent to maximising expected value and seems to be the least problematic way of dealing with probability cases in a non-aggregating manner. (shrink)

Recent social‐psychological research suggests that a considerable amount of, for example, racial and gendered discrimination may be connected to implicit biases: mental processes beyond our direct control or endorsement, that influence our behaviour toward members of socially salient groups. In this article I seek to improve our understanding of the phenomenon of implicit bias, including its moral status, by examining it through the lens of a theory of discrimination. In doing so, I also suggest ways to improve this theory of (...) discrimination, by creating conceptual space for implicit bias discrimination. I explore two ways of distinguishing direct and indirect discrimination and spell out the resulting four different forms of discrimination. The resulting taxonomy provides some room for implicit bias discrimination. I also deal with four challenges to my proposal for capturing implicit bias within discrimination theory: the metaphysical challenge, the moral insignificance challenge, the causal connection challenge, and the challenge from irreducibly collective bias. (shrink)

In this paper we distinguish two versions of the non-identity problem: one involving positive well-being and one involving negative well-being. Intuitively, there seems to be a difference between the two versions of the problem. In the negative case it is clear that one ought to cause the better off person to exist. However, it has recently been suggested that this is not so in the positive case. We argue that such an asymmetrical treatment of the two versions should be rejected (...) and that this is evidence against views according to which it is permissible to cause the less well off person to exist in the positive non-identity case. (shrink)

This article sets out to describe and solve two puzzles that emerge in segregated labour markets (e.g. the USA or Sweden). First, in many hiring contexts people profess to adhere to egalitarian norms, and specifically to a qualification norm according to which job qualification should be the basis of employment. Still there is evidence of frequent norm violations (discrimination). Surprisingly, the norm persists and people do not frequently protest against such norm violations. The second puzzle is that people are suspicious (...) of the hiring of minorities, perceiving such hirings as evidence that a ‘political correctness’ norm has replaced the qualification norm. The article proposes that both puzzles can be solved within a game-theoretical model of social norm-following, where implicit bias is introduced into an ‘employment game’. Within this model, implicit bias plays a double role. First, it interferes with employers' hiring decisions regarding ethnic majority and minority members, respectively. This is the standard way of understanding the effects of implicit bias. Second, implicit bias interferes with bystander evaluations of hired candidates' qualifications. This is a hitherto overlooked effect of implicit bias. The article concludes that once we understand the double role of implicit bias, the two puzzles are resolved. (shrink)

In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters’ well-being. The main result of my (...) study is that this argument for the weighted majority rule — that it maximises the common good — can be improved along the following three main lines. (1) The argument can be adapted to other criteria of the common good, such as sufficientarian, maximin, leximin or non-welfarist criteria. I propose a generic argument for the collective optimality of the weighted majority rule that works for all of these criteria. (2) The assumption of self-interested voters can be relaxed. First, common-interest voters can be accommodated. Second, even if voters are less than fully competent in judging their self-interest or the common interest, the weighted majority rule is weakly collectively optimal, that is, it almost certainly maximises the common good given large numbers of voters. Third, even for smaller groups of voters, the weighted majority rule still has some attractive features. (3) The scope of the argument can be extended to decisions with more than two options. I state the conditions under which the weighted majority rule maximises the common good even in multi-option contexts. I also analyse the possibility and the detrimental effects of strategic voting. Furthermore, I argue that self-interested voters have reason to accept the weighted majority rule. (shrink)

This book addresses these three issues: What is discrimination?; What makes it wrong?; What should be done about wrongful discrimination? It argues: that there are different concepts of discrimination; that discrimination is not always morally wrong and that when it is, it is so primarily because of its harmful effects.

In this book Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen address the complexities of his question "Is affirmative action morally justifiable?" by analyzing the prevailing contemporary arguments both for and against affirmative action. The book applies current political philosophy to demonstrate that arguments on both sides justify different conclusions given different specific cases, though it ultimately does argue in favor of affirmative action based on the relative strength and significance of the anti-discrimination- and equality of opportunity-based positions.

There are many objections to statistical discrimination in general and racial profiling in particular. One objection appeals to the idea that people have a right to be treated as individuals. Statistical discrimination violates this right because, presumably, it involves treating people simply on the basis of statistical facts about groups to which they belong while ignoring non-statistical evidence about them. While there is something to this objection—there are objectionable ways of treating others that seem aptly described as failing to treat (...) them as individuals—it needs to be articulated carefully. First, most people accept that many forms of statistical discrimination are morally unproblematic, let alone morally justified all things considered. Second, even treating people on the basis of putative non-statistical evidence relies on generalizations. Once we construe treating someone as an individual in a way that respects this fact, it becomes apparent: (1) that statistical discrimination is compatible with treating people as individuals, and (2) that one may fail to treat people as individuals even without engaging in statistical discrimination. Finally, there are situations involving the expression of messages of inclusion where we think it is good, morally speaking, that we are not treated as individuals. (shrink)

The correspondence theory of truth is a precise and innovative account of how the truth of a proposition depends upon that proposition's connection to a piece of reality. Joshua Rasmussen refines and defends the correspondence theory of truth, proposing new accounts of facts, propositions, and the correspondence between them. With these theories in hand, he then offers original solutions to the toughest objections facing correspondence theorists. Addressing the Problem of Funny Facts, Liar Paradoxes, and traditional epistemological questions concerning how (...) our minds can access reality, he challenges recent objections, and defends what has traditionally been the most popular theory of truth. Written with clarity, precision, and sensitivity to a range of philosophical backgrounds, his book will appeal to advanced students and scholars seeking a deeper understanding of the relationship between truth and reality. (shrink)

When reason leads to doubt -- The bridge of reason -- The foundation theory -- Testing ground -- Eternal power -- Purely actual -- Foundation of mind -- Foundation of matter -- Foundation of morals -- Foundation of reason -- Perfect foundation -- Challenging the bridge -- Removing barriers -- On the other side of the bridge.

Anläßlich ihres 75-jährigen Jubiläums hat die Philosophisch-Theologische Hochschule Sankt Georgen in Frankfurt am Main am 19. und 20. Oktober 2001 eine Tagung zu "Vernünftig. Ansätze gegenwärtiger Religionsphilosophie" veranstaltet, deren wissenschaftlicher Ertrag mit diesem Band öffentlich zur Diskussion gestellt wird. In zwei thematischen Einheiten haben zuerst Philosophen und dann Theologen neue Überlegungen aus ihren Forschungsgebieten vorgetragen und aktuelle Fragestellungen referiert, auf die jeweils ein Vertreter der anderen Fakultät mit kritischen Anfragen erwidert hat. Alle Gesprächseinheiten dieser Art bilden den ersten Teil des (...) vorliegenden Bandes (C.S. Evans/A. Kreiner, P. Valadier/M. Sievernich, F. Ricken/M. Kehl; D. Böhler/H. de Ternay, H.-J. Höhn/M. Dreyer, J.A. Martínez Camino/H.-D. Mutschler, H. Verweyen/J. Splett). Darüber hinaus enthält der Band Beiträge aus dem Kreis der Teilnehmer, die auf die Diskussionen während der Tagung zurückgehen. Zwei geistesgeschichtlich orientierte Aufsätze eröffnen diesen zweiten Teil (R.M.W. Stammberger, R. Berndt). Zwei weitere Texte unterziehen zeitgenössische religionsphilosophische Entwürfe einer kritischen Analyse (G. Kruck, H.-L. Ollig), bevor systematische Skizzen das Buch abschließen (H. Watzka, R. Audi, R. Wimmer). (shrink)

What does it mean to be human? Philosopher Joshua Rasmussen offers a step-by-step examination into the fundamental nature and ultimate origin of persons. Using accessible language and clear logic, he argues that understanding what it means to be a person sheds light not only on our own nature but also on the existence of the one who gave us life.

A recent wave of academic and popular publications say that utopia is within reach: Automation will progress to such an extent and include so many high-skill tasks that much human work will soon become superfluous. The gains from this highly automated economy, authors suggest, could be used to fund a universal basic income (UBI). Today's employees would live off the robots' products and spend their days on intrinsically valuable pursuits. I argue that this prediction is unlikely to come true. Historical (...) precedent speaks against it, but the main problem is that the prediction fundamentally misunderstands how capitalism works—its incentives to increase or decrease production, its principles of income allocation, and the underlying conception of merit. (shrink)

If biotechnology can be used to "upgrade" humans physically and mentally, should it be done? And if so, to what extent? How will biotechnology affect societal cohesion, and can the development be controlled? Or is this a Pandora's box that should remain closed? These are just a few of the many questions that arise as a result of the increasing ability of technology to change biology and, eventually, transform human living conditions. This development has created a new horizon of a (...) posthuman future that will influence contemporary life and politics in a number of ways. The book gathers researchers within the fields of biotechnology, medicine, ethics, politics, and aesthetics. Among the contributors are Francis Fukuyama, Julian Savulescu, Maxwell Mehlman, Lone Frank and Chris Hables Gray. (shrink)

Meta-emotions are emotions about emotions, such as, for example, shame about anger. An important subset of meta-emotions constitutes a special case of co-experienced emotions, in which one emotion is directed at another emotion experienced by a subject at the same time. By making us reflectively aware of our own first-order emotions and suggesting an evaluation of them, meta-emotions enable reflection on our own emotional sensibility. In this paper, I explore the roles of meta-emotions in the context of affective empathy. I (...) show that, whereas meta-emotions on the side of the target person increase the complexity of empathy’s success conditions, meta-emotions on the side of the empathiser expand the role of meta-emotions for self-reflection and give rise to parallel phenomena of other-directed reflection. Exploring the roles of meta-emotions in the context of affective empathy allows us to better understand the significance of meta-emotions, as well as the functions of affective empathy. (shrink)

English summary: Gilduin (1155) was, from 1113, the first abbot of the community of the Canons Regular of St Augustine, soon to become an abbey, under the auspices of St Victor of Marseille, on the left bank of the river Seine. After the death of his confrere Hugh, who was of German descent and the leading figure of the Victorines, on 11 February 1141, abbot Gilduin took care that the writings of Hugh were collected and compiled in a representative complete (...) edition. This 'Gilduin-edition' - as it is called in Medieval scholarship - comprises four volumes, the first of which is reconstructed herewith and presented in print. This volume follows the 2008 edition of Hugh's theological summa, De sacramentis christiane fidei. Then as now we are dealing with a critical albeit historical text. This new volume contains nine works, among which the first ever complete edition of Hugh's Cronica surely stands out. German description: Gilduin (+ 1155) war ab 1113 der erste Abt der einige Jahre zuvor gegrundeten und bald zur Abtei erhobenen Gemeinschaft von Augustinerchorherren unter dem Patronat des hl. Victor von Marseille, auf dem linken Ufer der Seine. Nach dem Tode seines Mitbruders Hugo, des aus Deutschland stammenden fuhrenden Kopfes der Viktoriner, am 11. Februar 1141 hat Abt Gilduin dafur gesorgt, daa die Schriften Hugos gesammelt und in einer reprasentativen Gesamtausgabe zusammengestellt werden. Diese in der internationalen mediavistischen Forschung so genannte,Gilduin-Ausgabe' der Werke Hugos von Saint-Victor umfaat vier Bande, deren erster hiermit rekonstruiert und im Druck vorgelegt wird. Dieser Band folgt somit auf unsere im Jahre 2008 besorgte Ausgabe der theologischen Summe Hugos, De sacramentis christiane fidei. Damals wie heute handelt es sich um einen kritischen, wenngleich historischen Text. Dieser neue Band umfaat neun Werke, unter denen insbesondere die uberhaupt erste vollstandige Ausgabe von Hugos Cronica hervorzuheben ist. (shrink)

In a petty German principality around 1700, an influential Court Jew wants a traditional Hebrew commentary published. The printer he commissions moves shop and starts printing, not aware of severe clerical censorship. With part of the job done he has to move to another location hoping for a more liberal policy there. Within the absolutist system the episode highlights the opportunities and the limits of Court Jew's influence, as well as the prince's wavering between the prospect of profiting from a (...) new trade and the fear of risking covert un-Christian propaganda. (shrink)

What about Confucian bioethics should compel our interest? Apart from the fact that Confucianism grounds the belief system of a great number of people, a Confucian bioethics poses a profound challe...

We investigate the value of persons. Our primary goal is to chart a path from equal and extreme value to infinite value. We advance two arguments. Each argument offers a reason to think that equal and extreme value are best accounted for if we are infinitely valuable. We then raise some difficult but fruitful questions about the possible grounds or sources of our infinite value, if we indeed have such value.

In Virtue, Piety and the Law Katharina Ivanyi examines Birgivī Meḥmed Efendī's (d. 981/1573) al-Ṭarīqa al-muḥammadiyya, a major work of pietist exhortation and advice, composed by the sixteenth-century Ottoman jurist, Ḥadīth scholar and grammarian, who would articulate a style of religiosity that had considerable reformist appeal into modern times. Linking the cultivation of individual virtue to questions of wider political, social and economic concern, Birgivīplayed a significant role in the negotiation and articulation of early modern Ottoman Ḥanafīpiety. Birgivī's deep (...) mistrust of the passions of the human soul led him to prescribe a regime of self-surveillance and control that was only matched in rigor by his likewise exacting interpretation of the law in matters of everyday life, as much as in state practices, such as the cash waqf, Ottoman land tenure and taxation. (shrink)

Volume IV of the edition of Martin Bucer's letters covers the period from January to September 1530. The main emphasis is on the controversy over Communion from the Disputation in Marburg in 1529 until the end of the Augsburg Imperial Diet in 1530.

Unlike most theologians of his age, Martin Bucer proved to be farsighted with respect to European affairs: In addition to his contacts within Alsace and Germany he established relations with almost every European country. It was his ecumenical attitude that always led him to mediate between the parties in the religious battles of his time. His deep commitment to the goal of reaching agreement can be traced in all his activities, works and letters. Since the first editor, Jean Rott, died (...) in 1998, Bucer's correspondence has been edited in Erlangen. This academic edition of source material provides future research with a broad basis for significant aspects of Reformation history about which very little is known. Volume VII covers the period from October 1531 to March 1532. (shrink)

The paper argues that Paul Ricoeur's The Philosophy of the Will retained a certain fidelity to phenomenology's early emphasis on subjectivity. When Ricoeur turned to the philosophy of language, he found a way to retain a certain emphasis on subjectivity and individuality that would make his work distinctive among other approaches to the philosophy of language. Hence, the title, Preserving the Eidetic Moment, intends to characterize Ricoeur's distinctive contribution to philosophy. The paper goes on to show how Ricoeur's approach can (...) contribute to Critical Theory, particularly in relationship to its theory of interlocution. (shrink)

A realist view of numbers often rests on the following thesis: statements like ‘The number of moons of Jupiter is four’ are identity statements in which the copula is flanked by singular terms whose semantic function consists in referring to a number (henceforth: Identity). On the basis of Identity the realists argue that the assertive use of such statements commits us to numbers. Recently, some anti-realists have disputed this argument. According to them, Identity is false, and, thus, we may deny (...) that the relevant statements commit us to numbers. The present paper argues that the correct linguistic analysis of the relevant number statements supports the anti-realist view that Identity is false. However, as will further be shown, pace the anti-realist, this analysis does not establish that such statements do not commit us to numbers after all. (shrink)