The paper investigates the system of 'Imaginary Logic' created by the Russian logician N.A. Vasil'ev (1880-1940), considered by some to be a forerunner of paraconsistent or intuitionistic logics. It is shown how he constructs a logic without the law of contradiction redefining the concept of negation. Vasil'ev singles out two levels of logic, an external one which is absolute and one depending on commitments in relation to cognizable objects which is not absolute. His reconstruction of the syllogism shows the viability (...) of his system and indicates how, indeed, he may be called an initiator of nonclassical logics. (shrink)

According to Alexius Meinong, in order to give a philosophical explanation of the world we need to consider both existent and nonexistent objects, lest we fall into the "prejudice in favour of the real". The paper starts by examining some basic concepts of object theory seen as an existence-free science (modes of being, principle of independence of so-being from being, "Aussersein" and Meinong's paradox). There follows an exposition of Bertrand Russell's position, characterized by a "robust sense of reality", and afterwards (...) an analysis of differences and similarities between the two philosophers. The paper ends with a short account of Meinongian semantics and a comparison between object theory and metaphysics. (shrink)

The correspondence between Meinong and Kazimierz Twardowski highlights the relationship between two philosophers who influenced the history of philosophy and psychology in Austria and Poland. The two correspondents discuss, among other things, their epistemological approach and the university politics of their times. In addition, there is an extensive introduction that places the correspondence in its proper historical and philosophical context.

This volume addresses key aspects of the philosophical psychology elaborated by Alexius Meinong and some of his students. It covers a wide range of topics, from the place of psychological investigations in Meinong's unique philosophical program to his thought-provoking views on perception, colors, "Vorstellungsproduktion," assumptions, values, truth, and emotions.

This volume examines the entire logical and philosophical production of Nikolai A. Vasil’ev, studying his life and activities as a historian and man of letters. Readers will gain a comprehensive understanding of this influential Russian logician, philosopher, psychologist, and poet. The author frames Vasil’ev’s work within its historical and cultural context. He takes into consideration both the situation of logic in Russia and the state of logic in Western Europe, from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of (...) the 20th. Following this, the book considers the attempts to develop non-Aristotelian logics or ideas that present affinities with imaginary logic. It then looks at the contribution of traditional logic in elaborating non-classical ideas. This logic allows the author to deal with incomplete objects just as imaginary logic does with contradictory ones. Both logics are objects of interesting analysis by modern researchers. (shrink)

Starting with the philosophical reflections of the Italian writer C. E. Gadda, the paper offers a criticism of the traditional concept of an individual as something which is determinate, separate and autonomous. Gadda argues that an individual should be understood as an element which is in a multiplicity of relations with the other elements of the system inside of which it exists. The idea is developed on the basis of Spinoza's 'Ethics', but it shares many affinities with Peirce's notions of (...) an individual and of a continuum. Taking its cue from Peirce's ideas, which are here discussed in relation to Aristotle and Kant, the paper proposes to construe an individual as a continuum, that is as something which is in a continuity of reactions and relations with the objects of the phenomenological (spatial-temporal) context in which it exists and with those of the dialectical context, that is that net of objects which can be identified starting from the relational properties of the object. (shrink)

Łukasiewicz distinguishes three formulations of the principle of contradiction in Aristotle’s works: ontological, logical, and psychological. The first two formulations are equivalent though not synonymous, but neither of them is equivalent to the psychological one, which expresses not a principle but only an empirical law. Furthermore, the principle of contradiction is neither a simple and ultimate law nor is it necessary for conducting an inference, because the syllogism is independent of it. The further explanation of this concept leads Łukasiewicz to (...) formulate the idea of a non-Aristotelian logic, that is, a logic operating without the principle of contradiction. If the principle of contradiction shall be valid, it must be proved. A proof can be supplied only on the basis of a definition of object, as something that cannot have and not have the same property at the same time. However, this definition does not hold for all objects, i.e., for contradictory objects. In virtue of its ontological character the Aristotelian principle of contradiction is then different from that of symbolic logic. (shrink)

This is the first volume devoted to the aesthetics of the Graz school. V. Raspa’s introduction gives an outline of the aesthetic themes and exponents of the school. D. Jacquette argues for a Meinongian subjectivistic aesthetic value theory. B. Langlet deals with aesthetic properties and emotions. Ch.G. Allesch presents Witasek's aesthetics in its historical context. Í. Vendrell Ferran investigates the aesthetic experience and quasi-feelings in Meinong, Witasek, Saxinger and Schwarz. R. Martinelli illustrates the musical aesthetics of Ehrenfels, Höfler and (...) Witasek. P. Mahr asks if object-theoretical aesthetics is possible at all. M. Potrc and V. Strahovnik concentrate on Veber's aesthetic judgment. N. Dolcini deals with the migration of ficta, and F. Orilia with words and pictures in fictional stories. (shrink)

Łukasiewicz distinguishes three formulations of the principle of contradiction in Aristotle’s works: ontological, logical, and psychological. The first two formulations are equivalent though not synonymous, but neither of them is equivalent to the psychological one, which expresses not a principle but only an empirical law. Furthermore, the principle of contradiction is neither a simple and ultimate law nor is it necessary for conducting an inference, because the syllogism is independent of it. The further explanation of this concept leads Łukasiewicz to (...) formulate the idea of a non-Aristotelian logic, that is, a logic operating without the principle of contradiction. If the principle of contradiction shall be valid, it must be proved. A proof can be supplied only on the basis of a definition of object, as something that cannot have and not have the same property at the same time. However, this definition does not hold for all objects, i.e., for contradictory objects. In virtue of its ontological character the Aristotelian principle of contradiction is then different from that of symbolic logic. (shrink)

Dieses Buch präsentiert die seit Langem erwartete kritische Edition der zuvor unveröffentlichten Vorlesungsnotizen Kazimierz Twardowskis aus seiner Zeit an der Universität Wien (1894/95). Bezüglich seines Umfangs und Themas sowie seiner Sprache ist dieser Text einzigartig im Œuvre Twardowskis. Bekannt vor allem für seine ebenso wichtige wie kurze Abhandlung Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen (1894), entwickelt er im Logik-Manuskript seine Thesen viel detaillierter und in überarbeiteter Form. Die restlichen seiner Werke sind in polnischer Sprache verfasst und damit für (...) viele Leser nur schwer zugänglich. Diese Edition ist von großem Interesse für alle Philosophen, die zur Wiener Wissenschaftsphilosophie vor dem Wiener Kreis forschen, für alle, die sich für die frühe Phänomenologie und Husserls Denken interessieren, und besonders für Spezialisten der österreichischen Philosophie und der kontinentalen Tradition analytischer Philosophie, für die dieser Text eine unverzichtbare Quelle darstellt. (shrink)

At first, I explain how Bergmann reads Meinong. As regards his method, Bergmann’s stated aim is to examine Meinong’s thought through all the stages of its development; but he is very selective in choosing exactly what to consider, not just within each of Meinong’s texts, but equally among his texts – indeed he completely ignores Meinong’s mature works. Moreover, he often alters Meinong’s thought by translating it into his foil ontology. As regards the content, Bergmann interprets Meinong as a reist (...) and a nominalist. I try to show that such a view is not correct. I then discuss this interpretation by focusing on which Meinong Bergmann reads, that is, which writings he refers to and at the same time which of Meinong’s theories he criticizes. I sketch the four phases of the development of Meinong’s thought distinguished by Bergmann: his first theory of relations, the theory of the objects of higher order, of objectives, and finally object theory. I present Bergmann’s critique and compare his distinction of different degrees of independence, which establish differences of status among categories of existents, with Meinong’s distinction between kinds of being. Finally, taking into account also Meinong’s mature work, I offer an assessment of Bergmann’s proposal to rethink object theory. Considering Meinong’s theory of incomplete objects, I show that Bergmann would have found in Meinong an ally not only in the battle against representationalism, as he maintains, but also in that against nominalism. (shrink)

A lie is neither a false proposition, nor a mistake, nor a mere fiction; it is a type of fiction, an act, and precisely an intentional act. An act calls for a subject, and therefore a lie is inseparable from its subject. Together, they make up a real object: it has to be real, since a lie produces effects, and the cause-effect relationship only holds between real beings. Like every real object, a lie unfolds in a context. But there is (...) more: it identifies a context. Laz nije ni pogresna tvrdnja, ni greska, niti pak puka fikcija; ona predstavlja odredjeni tip fikcije, cin - tacnije - intencionalni cin. Cinu je potreban subjekat, te je stoga laz neodvojiva od svog subjekta. Oni zajedno cine stvaran objekat: on mora biti stvaran,buduci da laz proizvodi posledice, a odnos uzroka i posledice vazi jedino izmedju stvarnih bica. Kao i svaki objekat, laz se obelodanjuje u kontekstu. Ali to nije sve, ona identifikuje kontekst. (shrink)

Stories express hypotheses, interpretations of the world that have a certain degree of probability. To demonstrate this thesis I have adopted the notion of hypothesis, in a sense very close to the Meinongian concept of assumption, and a ‘metric’ conception of the values of the truth or falsity of a proposition – as that has been proposed in several ways by Peirce, Vasil’ev and Meinong. To show the the cognitive value of literary texts, and therefore their truth value, I take (...) my move from chapter 9 of Aristotle’s Poetics, where he holds that poetry is imitative of reality, not in the sense of history – which relates what has happened – but rather, in so far as it expresses “the kinds of things that might happen, that is, that could happen because they are either probable or necessary.” The probable admits variations of degree. By means of an examination of the Meinongian concepts of assumption and objective (i.e. state of affairs), which also allow different modes of gradation, I introduce, with examples drawn from Dante’s Divine Comedy and The Description (Tradimento) by Machiavelli, a theory of degrees of truth that makes it possible to apply the concept of probability to literary as well as to historical texts. Finally, I connect the universal character of the literary text with the ontological notion of incomplete object and argue that a fictional object, as it is incomplete, is not an individual but a type. (shrink)

In this paper I trace a theoretical path along Meinong’s works, by means of which the notion of aesthetic object as well as the changes this notion undergoes along Meinong’s output will be highlighted. Focusing especially on "Über emotionale Präsentation", I examine, on the one hand, the cognitive function of emotions, on the other hand, the objects apprehended by aesthetic emotions, i.e. aesthetic objects. These are ideal objects of higher order, which have, even though not primarily, the capacity to attract (...) aesthetic experiences to themselves. Hence, they are connected to emotions, being what is presented by them. These results are achieved on the basis of a fundamental analogy between the domain of value and the aesthetic domain. Finally, the notion of an absolute beauty is discussed. (shrink)

Focusing mainly on Meinong’s "Über emotionale Präsentation" and Veber’s "Die Natur des Sollens", I examine their respective conceptions of ought. Meinong has not written a specific work on the ought, he deals with it as a part of his value theory. In "Über emotionale Präsentation" the ought is a property of being, which cannot be viewed as separated from a desiring subject. The ought is an ideal object of higher order; it concerns neither factuality nor non-factuality, but subfactuality, that is (...) the realm of possibility. In "Die Natur des Sollens", Veber proposes a structured theory of ought, which is grounded on Meinongian concepts. The ought is the object of a volition, it is a genuine object, even though ideal. I conclude by portraying the differences between Veber's and Meinong's conceptions of the ought. (shrink)

Truth is not only a semantic notion, because it can involve our whole being, both intellectual and emotional. The emotional character of the truth determines its relevance for us. In this paper I will first discuss Ronald de Sousa’s theory of emotional truth and the idea of the appropriateness of emotions in relation to judgment. Secondly, I will deal with Meinong’s conception that emotions have both an evaluative and a cognitive character, allow us to know what the world is like, (...) and consequently are related to truth. Truth then turns out to be a value. If something is valuable to me, it stirs an emotion. That is why truth is capable of attracting feelings. Emotional truth is that truth which attracts a justified knowledge-feeling. This is the basis on which we might develop an aesthetics of concepts whereby theories, in order to be established, need not only to be regarded as true but to produce an emotional involvement of the subjects. (shrink)

The paper examines the constitutive rule of the Documentality (object = written act), its explanatory power, and the role that writing and relations play in it. The social object is explained as a hybrid object, of higher order, consisting of heterogeneous parts; its identity is determined, amongst other things, by the relations it entertains with other entities. In the second part, after criticizing Searle’s notion of collective intentionality, which fails to explain conflict situations, the article focuses on some political implications (...) of social ontology, examining the role of immigrants sans papiers. (shrink)

The paper examines the constitutive rule of the Documentality (object = written act), its explanatory power, and the role that writing and relations play in it. The social object is explained as a hybrid object, of higher order, consisting of heterogeneous parts; its identity is determined, amongst other things, by the relations it entertains with other entities. In the second part, after criticizing Searle’s notion of collective intentionality, which fails to explain conflict situations, the article focuses on some political implications (...) of social ontology, examining the role of immigrants sans papiers. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz stellt Ehrenfels’ Schönheitsbegriff als den eigentlichen Gegenstand der Ästhetik dar. Gegen den ästhetischen Skeptizismus, nach dem wir die Schönheit Gegenständen zuschreiben, die sich sehr voneinander unterscheiden und nur den Namen „schön“ gemein haben, behauptet Ehrenfels, dass nicht die äußeren physischen Gegenstände schön sind, sondern die Phantasiegebilde, die von jenen hervorgerufen werden. Es gebe eine absolute Schönheit als „Einheit in der Mannigfaltigkeit“, die in jedem „wahrhaft schönen“ Gegenstand der Kunst oder der Natur enthalten sei und jedem Menschen „unbedingt wohlgefallen (...) müsse“. (shrink)

Il lavoro si interroga principalmente sul significato di «verità effettuale della cosa». Dopo aver esaminato la nozione di vero da un punto di vista semantico e gnoseologico – nel primo senso, è vero, secondo Machiavelli, il discorso che riscontra le cose, nel secondo, il discorso che si fonda sull’esperienza, intesa come esperienza sia diretta (vissuta e osservata) che mediata (letta e ascoltata) –, giunge a definire la «verità effettuale della cosa» come «il discorso storicamente e empiricamente verificabile negli effetti, o (...) nei fatti, che concerne la cosa in oggetto, ossia lo stato». A questo si contrappone «l’immaginazione della cosa», il discorso che, mancando del riscontro delle cose e di esperienza dello stato, non può che ricorrere all’immaginazione, la quale svolge pertanto la funzione di un surrogato. Ma l’immaginazione non è solo fonte di inganni, in un altro senso svolge un ruolo altamente positivo: l’immaginazione che muove dal riscontro permette di individuare un «rimedio» possibile per «questo guasto mondo»; e consente al principe, nella situazione contingente, di agire e apparire anche contro i dettami di una certa mortale, se necessario. L’individuazione di un rimedio possibile e l’attuazione di un agire necessario, contrapposti al pericolo incombente della rovina, richiedono la conoscenza delle regole e leggi dell’agire politico. La verità come coerenza, coerenza del discorso che risulta dall’esame dell’agire storico e politico, ossia coerenza delle argomentazioni machiavelliane che traducono in proposizioni l’agire politico, nella fattispecie, quello del principe, è condizione necessaria, anche se non sufficiente, per preservarsi dalla rovina e mantenere uno stato. (shrink)

In Meinong’s object theory there is, alongside a classificatory aspect, one having to do with degrees, increase and variation. This other aspect comes out of Meinong’s intention of extending his object theory’s aprioristic method to the empirical world. The forms of ‘more’ and ‘less’ concerning psychical experiences are first investigated; they consist in degrees of certainty of judgment and of shadiness (Schattenhaftigkeit) and seriousness (Ernstartigkeit) of imaginary representations and assumptions. Secondly, forms of variability regarding objects are shown, specifically the incompleteness (...) (Unvollständigkeit) of the objects of representations and the subfactuality (Untertatsächlichkeit) of the objectives, i.e., the objects of judgments and assumptions. There is a correspondence between such variability in objects and a variability in psychical experiences. Finally, an application of such concepts to fictional objects is proposed. (shrink)

The theses exposed by Alexius Meinong in two newspaper articles in 1873 are taken as the paradigm of a feeling that was common to young Austrian intelligentsia. Meinong upholds a conception of life as struggle and of history as a series of struggles among nations. In his view, the defence of the interests of a people is absolute and generates conflicts among nations that will increasingly dominate future scenarios. The concept of nation has an identification function inward and one of (...) dissociation outward. This discourse is contextualised within the framework of the various student corporations of the University of Vienna, where the new ruling class was forming which, despite different political ideas, was united by nationalism. Finally, the paper analyses the opposing views of Eric J. Hobsbawm and Anthony D. Smith on the idea of nation and suggests some similarities between the Habsburg Empire and the European Union. (shrink)