Results for 'J. Rott'

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  1. Orientation bibliographique et sources manuscrites.M. Lienhard & J. Rott - 1988 - Revue D'Histoire Et de Philosophie Religieuses 68 (1):145-149.
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  2.  4
    Review of Change, Choice and Inference (Hans Rott, Oxford UP). [REVIEW]Erik J. Olsson - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):332-334.
    Hans Rott is well-known for his work on belief revision theory in the tradition founded by Carlos Alchourro´ n, Peter Ga¨ rdenfors and David Makinson to which he has contributed in a number of fine articles. One of his main achievements is the establishment of far-reaching connections between AGM-style belief revision theory and the classical theory of rational choice, as the latter is understood by mathematical economists like Paul Samuelson and Amartya Sen.
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    Belief Revision, Rational Choice and the Unity of Reason.Erik J. Olsson - 2003 - Studia Logica 73 (2):219 - 240.
    Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to (...)
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  4. Reductive Logic and Proof-Search: Proof Theory, Semantics, and Control.David J. Pym & Eike Ritter - 2004 - Oxford University Press UK.
    This book is a specialized monograph on the development of the mathematical and computational metatheory of reductive logic and proof-search, areas of logic that are becoming important in computer science. A systematic foundational text on these emerging topics, it includes proof-theoretic, semantic/model-theoretic and algorithmic aspects. The scope ranges from the conceptual background to reductive logic, through its mathematical metatheory, to its modern applications in the computational sciences. Suitable for researchers and graduate students in mathematical, computational and philosophical logic, and in (...)
     
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  5.  5
    Belief Revision, Rational Choice and the Unity of Reason.Erik J. Olsson - 2003 - Studia Logica 73 (2):219-240.
    Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to (...)
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  6.  92
    Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning.Hans Rott - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    Change, Choice and Inference develops logical theories that are necessary both for the understanding of adaptable human reasoning and for the design of intelligent systems. The book shows that reasoning processes - the drawing on inferences and changing one's beliefs - can be viewed as belonging to the realm of practical reason by embedding logical theories into the broader context of the theory of rational choice. The book unifies lively and significant strands of research in logic, philosophy, economics and artificial (...)
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  7. Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 1995 - In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 514--534.
    This is a survey paper. Contents: 1 Introduction -- 2 The representation of belief -- 3 Kinds of belief change -- 4 Coherence constraints for belief revision -- 5 Different modes of belief change -- 6 Two strategies for characterizing rational changes of belief - 6.1 The postulates strategy - 6.2 The constructive strategy -- 7 An abstract view of the elements of belief change -- 8 Iterated changes of belief -- 9 Further developments - 9.1 Variants and extensions of (...)
     
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  8.  22
    Difference-Making Conditionals and the Relevant Ramsey Test.Hans Rott - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-39.
    This paper explores conditionals expressing that the antecedent makes a difference for the consequent. A 'relevantised' version of the Ramsey Test for conditionals is employed in the context of the classical theory of belief revision. The idea of this test is that the antecedent is relevant to the consequent in the following sense: a conditional is accepted just in case (i) the consequent is accepted if the belief state is revised by the antecedent and (ii) the consequent fails to be (...)
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  9. Two Dogmas of Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (9):503-522.
    The paper attacks the almost universally held view that belief revison theories, as they have been studied in the literature of the past two decades, are founded on a Principle of Minimal Change, or Principle of Informational Economy. The principle comes in two versions. According to the first, an agent should, when accepting new information, aim at a posterior belief set that minimizes the items on which it disagrees with the prior belief set. If there are different ways to effect (...)
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  10. Conditionals and Theory Change: Revisions, Expansions, and Additions.Hans Rott - 1989 - Synthese 81 (1):91-113.
    This paper dwells upon formal models of changes of beliefs, or theories, which are expressed in languages containing a binary conditional connective. After defining the basic concept of a (non-trivial) belief revision model. I present a simple proof of Gärdenfors''s (1986) triviality theorem. I claim that on a proper understanding of this theorem we must give up the thesis that consistent revisions (additions) are to be equated with logical expansions. If negated or might conditionals are interpreted on the basis of (...)
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  11.  67
    Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery).Hans Rott & Maurice Pagnucco - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):501-547.
    The problem of how to remove information from an agent's stock of beliefs is of paramount concern in the belief change literature. An inquiring agent may remove beliefs for a variety of reasons: a belief may be called into doubt or the agent may simply wish to entertain other possibilities. In the prominent AGM framework for belief change, upon which the work here is based, one of the three central operations, contraction, addresses this concern (the other two deal with the (...)
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  12.  54
    Two Methods of Constructing Contractions and Revisions of Knowledge Systems.Hans Rott - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2):149 - 173.
    This paper investigates the formal relationship between two prominent approaches to the logic of belief change. The first one uses the idea of "relational partial meet contractions" as developed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (Journal of Symbolic Logic 1985), the second one uses the concept of "epistemic entrenchment" as elaborated by Gärdenfors and Makinson (in Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, M. Y. Vardi, Los Altos 1988). The two approaches are shown to be strictly equivalent via direct links between the (...)
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  13.  51
    Preferential Belief Change Using Generalized Epistemic Entrenchment.Hans Rott - 1992 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 (1):45-78.
    A sentence A is epistemically less entrenched in a belief state K than a sentence B if and only if a person in belief state K who is forced to give up either A or B will give up A and hold on to B. This is the fundamental idea of epistemic entrenchment as introduced by Gärdenfors (1988) and elaborated by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988). Another distinguishing feature of relations of epistemic entrenchment is that they permit particularly simple and elegant (...)
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  14.  52
    Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice.Hans Rott - 1993 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (4):1426-1450.
    This paper reorganizes and further develops the theory of partial meet contraction which was introduced in a classic paper by Alchourron, Gardenfors, and Makinson. Our purpose is threefold. First, we put the theory in a broader perspective by decomposing it into two layers which can respectively be treated by the general theory of choice and preference and elementary model theory. Second, we reprove the two main representation theorems of AGM and present two more representation results for the finite case that (...)
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  15.  18
    Unstable Knowledge, Unstable Belief.Hans Rott - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (4):395-407.
    An idea going back to Plato’s Meno is that knowledge is stable. Recently, a seemingly stronger and more exciting thesis has been advanced, namely that rational belief is stable. I sketch two stability theories of knowledge and rational belief, and present an example intended to show that knowledge need not be stable and rational belief need not be stable either. The second claim does not follow from the first, even if we take knowledge to be a special kind of rational (...)
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  16.  41
    Stability and Scepticism in the Modelling of Doxastic States: Probabilities and Plain Beliefs.Hans Rott - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):167-197.
    There are two prominent ways of formally modelling human belief. One is in terms of plain beliefs, i.e., sets of propositions. The second one is in terms of degrees of beliefs, which are commonly taken to be representable by subjective probability functions. In relating these two ways of modelling human belief, the most natural idea is a thesis frequently attributed to John Locke: a proposition is or ought to be believed just in case its subjective probability exceeds a contextually fixed (...)
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  17.  18
    Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-Seven Iterated Theory Change Operators.Hans Rott - 2006 - In David Makinson, Jacek Malinowski & Heinrich Wansing (eds.), Towards Mathematical Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 269–296.
    Prioritized bases, i.e., weakly ordered sets of sentences, have been used for specifying an agent’s ‘basic’ or ‘explicit’ beliefs, or alternatively for compactly encoding an agent’s belief state without the claim that the elements of a base are in any sense basic. This paper focuses on the second interpretation and shows how a shifting of priorities in prioritized bases can be used for a simple, constructive and intuitive way of representing a large variety of methods for the change of belief (...)
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  18.  38
    Two Concepts of Plausibility in Default Reasoning.Hans Rott - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1219–1252.
    In their unifying theory to model uncertainty, Friedman and Halpern (1995–2003) applied plausibility measures to default reasoning satisfying certain sets of axioms. They proposed a distinctive condition for plausibility measures that characterizes “qualitative” reasoning (as contrasted with probabilistic reasoning). A similar and similarly fundamental, but more general and thus stronger condition was independently suggested in the context of “basic” entrenchment-based belief revision by Rott (1996–2003). The present paper analyzes the relation between the two approaches to formalizing basic notions of (...)
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  19.  43
    Ifs, Though, and Because.Hans Rott - 1986 - Erkenntnis 25 (3):345-370.
    The paper proposes a unified analysis of the natural language connectives 'if', 'if … might', 'even if' (all of them with indicative and subjunctive mood), 'because' and 'though'. They are all interpreted as instances of universal (pro)conditionals, unconditionals, or counterconditionals. The paper imports the notion of relevance into the meaning of conditionals, viewing conditionals as close in meaning to explanations and statements about causal relations. The antecedent of a conditional is interpreted as being relevant for its consequent, thus avoiding the (...)
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  20.  33
    Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief. Part II: Iterated Belief Change Without Dispositional Coherence.Hans Rott - 2003 - Journal of Logic and Computation 13 (1):111-145.
    This paper studies the idea of conservatism with respect to belief change strategies in the setting of unary, iterated belief revision functions (based on the conclusions of Rott, ‘Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief, Part I: Finding the Right Framework’, Erkenntnis 50, 1999, 387–412). Special attention is paid to the case of ‘basic belief change’ where neither the (weak) AGM postulates concerning conservatism with respect to beliefs nor the (stong) supplementary AGM postulates concerning dispositional coherence need to (...)
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  21. A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation.Hans Rott - 2004 - Synthese 139 (2):225 - 240.
    In recent years there has been a growing consensus that ordinary reasoning does not conform to the laws of classical logic, but is rather nonmonotonic in the sense that conclusions previously drawn may well be removed upon acquiring further information. Even so, rational belief formation has up to now been modelled as conforming to some fundamental principles that are classically valid. The counterexample described in this paper suggests that a number of the most cherished of these principles should not be (...)
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  22.  21
    Two Dogmas of Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (9):503.
    The paper attacks the widely held view that belief revision theories, as they have been studied in the past two decades, are founded on the Principle of Informational Economy. The principle comes in two versions. According to the first, an agent should, when accepting a new piece of information, aim at a minimal change of his previously held beliefs. If there are different ways to effect the belief change, then the agent should, according to he second version, give up those (...)
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  23.  62
    Basic Entrenchment.Hans Rott - 2003 - Studia Logica 73 (2):257-280.
    In contrast to other prominent models of belief change, models based on epistemic entrenchment have up to now been applicable only in the context of very strong packages of requirements for belief revision. This paper decomposes the axiomatization of entrenchment into independent modules. Among other things it is shown how belief revision satisfying only the 'basic' postulates of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson can be represented in terms of entrenchment.
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  24. A Puzzle About Disputes and Disagreements.Hans Rott - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):167–189.
    The paper addresses the situation of a dispute in which one speaker says ϕ and a second speaker says not-ϕ. Proceeding on an idealising distinction between "basic" and "interesting" claims that may be formulated in a given idiolectal language, I investigate how it might be sorted out whether the dispute reflects a genuine disagreement, or whether the speakers are only having a merely verbal dispute, due to their using different interesting concepts. I show that four individually plausible principles for the (...)
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  25.  59
    Reapproaching Ramsey: Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change in the Spirit of AGM.Hans Rott - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):155-191.
    According to the Ramsey Test, conditionals reflect changes of beliefs: α > β is accepted in a belief state iff β is accepted in the minimal revision of it that is necessary to accommodate α. Since Gärdenfors’s seminal paper of 1986, a series of impossibility theorems (“triviality theorems”) has seemed to show that the Ramsey test is not a viable analysis of conditionals if it is combined with AGM-type belief revision models. I argue that it is possible to endorse that (...)
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  26.  72
    Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief Part I: Finding the Right Framework.Hans Rott - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):387-412.
    In this paper I discuss the foundations of a formal theory of coherent and conservative belief change that is suitable to be used as a method for constructing iterated changes of belief, sensitive to the history of earlier belief changes, and independent of any form of dispositional coherence. I review various ways to conceive the relationship between the beliefs actually held by an agent and her belief change strategies, show the problems they suffer from, and suggest that belief states should (...)
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  27.  35
    Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs.Hans Rott - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. pp. 301--339.
    This paper combines various structures representing degrees of belief, degrees of disbelief, and degrees of non-belief (degrees of expectations) into a unified whole. The representation uses relations of comparative necessity and possibility, as well as non-probabilistic functions assigning numerical values of necessity and possibility. We define all-encompassing necessity structures which have weak expectations (mere hypotheses, guesses, conjectures, etc.) occupying the lowest ranks and very strong, ineradicable ('a priori') beliefs occupying the highest ranks. Structurally, there are no differences from the top (...)
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  28.  81
    Modellings for Belief Change: Prioritization and Entrenchment.Hans Rott - 1992 - Theoria 58 (1):21-57.
    We distinguish the set of explicit beliefs of a reasoner, his "belief base", from the beliefs that are merely implicit. Syntax-based belief change governed by the structure of the belief base and the ranking ("prioritization") of its elements is reconstructed with the help of an epistemic entrenchment relation in the style of Gärdenfors and Makinson. Though priorities are essentially different from entrenchments, distinguished relations of epistemic entrenchment may be obtained from prioritized belief bases by a number of different constructions. An (...)
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  29.  45
    Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision.Hans Rott - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):173-200.
    This paper presents the model of ‘bounded revision’ that is based on two-dimensional revision functions taking as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence and a reference sentence. The key idea is that the input sentence is accepted as far as (and just a little further than) the reference sentence is ‘cotenable’ with it. Bounded revision satisfies the AGM axioms as well as the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) saying that the set of beliefs accepted after the revision does not depend (...)
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  30.  92
    Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief Into Knowledge.Hans Rott - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):469-493.
    In this paper I discuss the relation between various properties that have been regarded as important for determining whether or not a belief constitutes a piece of knowledge: its stability, strength and sensitivity to truth, as well as the strength of the epistemic position in which the subject is with respect to this belief. Attempts to explicate the relevant concepts more formally with the help of systems of spheres of possible worlds (à la Lewis and Grove) must take care to (...)
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  31.  49
    A Nonmonotonic Conditional Logic for Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 1991 - In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Berlin: Springer. pp. 135–181.
    Using Gärdenfors's notion of epistemic entrenchment, we develop the semantics of a logic which accounts for the following points. It explains why we may generally infer `If ~A then B´ if all we know is AvB while must not generally infer `If ~A then B´ if all we know is {AvB, A}. More generally, it explains the nonmonotonic nature of the consequence relation governing languages which contain conditionals, and it explains how we can deduce conditionals from premise sets without conditionals. (...)
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  32.  22
    Safe Contraction Revisited.Hans Rott & Sven Ove Hansson - 2014 - In Sven Ove Hansson (ed.), David Makinson on Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems (Outstanding Contributions to Logic, Vol. 3). Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 35–70.
    Modern belief revision theory is based to a large extent on partial meet contraction that was introduced in the seminal article by Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson that appeared in 1985. In the same year, Alchourrón and Makinson published a significantly different approach to the same problem, called safe contraction. Since then, safe contraction has received much less attention than partial meet contraction. The present paper summarizes the current state of knowledge on safe contraction, provides some new results (...)
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  33. Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the Concept of Belief.Hans Rott - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2695–2720.
    Pragmatists have argued that doxastic or epistemic norms do not apply to beliefs, but to changes of beliefs; thus not to the holding or not-holding, but to the acquisition or removal of beliefs. Doxastic voluntarism generally claims that humans acquire beliefs in a deliberate and controlled way. This paper introduces Negative Doxastic Voluntarism according to which there is a fundamental asymmetry in belief change: humans tend to acquire beliefs more or less automatically and unreflectively, but they tend to withdraw beliefs (...)
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  34.  34
    The Value of Truth and the Value of Information : On Isaac Levi's Epistemology.Hans Rott - 2006 - In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press. pp. 179.
    The paper aims at a perspicuous representation of Isaac Levi's pragmatist epistemology, spanning from the 1967 classic "Gambling with Truth" to his 2004 book on "Mild Contraction". Based on a formal framework for Levi's notion of inquiry, I analyse his decision-theoretic approach with truth and information as basic cognitive values, and with Shackle measures as emerging structures. Both cognitive values figure prominently in Levi's model of inductive belief expansion, but only the value of information is employed in his model of (...)
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  35.  66
    Preservation and Postulation: Lessons From the New Debate on the Ramsey Test.Hans Rott - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):609–626.
    Richard Bradley has initiated a new debate, with Brian Hill and Jake Chandler as further participants, about the implications of a number of so-called triviality results surrounding the Ramsey test for conditionals. I comment on this debate and argue that ‘Inclusion’ and ‘Preservation’, which were originally introduced as postulates for the rational revision of factual beliefs, have little to recommend them in the first place when extended to languages containing conditionals. I question the philosophical method of postulation that was applied (...)
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  36.  19
    On the Logic of Theory Change: More Maps Between Different Kinds of Contraction Function.Hans Rott - unknown
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  37.  45
    Reduction: Some Criteria and Criticisms of the Structuralist Concept.Hans Rott - 1987 - Erkenntnis 27 (2):231 - 256.
    Inter-theoretical reduction has always been a major topic in the structuralist philosophy of science. This paper reviews criteria of adequacy which were put forward by Adams, Sneed, Stegmuller, Mayr, Pearce, Kamlah, and Mormann. The criteria are formalized in a simplified structuralist model, and the logical relations between them are investigated. It turns out that various parts of these criteria are incompatible.
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  38. 60 Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Professor Wlodek Rabinowicz.Various Authors - manuscript
    Contributing Authors: Lilli Alanen & Frans Svensson, David Alm, Gustaf Arrhenius, Gunnar Björnsson, Luc Bovens, Richard Bradley, Geoffrey Brennan & Nicholas Southwood, John Broome, Linus Broström & Mats Johansson, Johan Brännmark, Krister Bykvist, John Cantwell, Erik Carlson, David Copp, Roger Crisp, Sven Danielsson, Dan Egonsson, Fred Feldman, Roger Fjellström, Marc Fleurbaey, Margaret Gilbert, Olav Gjelsvik, Kathrin Glüer & Peter Pagin, Ebba Gullberg & Sten Lindström, Peter Gärdenfors, Sven Ove Hansson, Jana Holsanova, Nils Holtug, Victoria Höög, Magnus Jiborn, Karsten Klint Jensen, (...)
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  39. Interpolation and Definability: Modal and Intuitionistic Logics.Dov M. Gabbay & Larisa Maksimova - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    This book is a specialized monograph on interpolation and definability, a notion central in pure logic and with significant meaning and applicability in all areas where logic is applied, especially computer science, artificial intelligence, logic programming, philosophy of science and natural language. Suitable for researchers and graduate students in mathematics, computer science and philosophy, this is the latest in the prestigous world-renowned Oxford Logic Guides, which contains Michael Dummet's Elements of intuitionism, J. M. Dunn and G. Hardegree's Algebraic Methods in (...)
     
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  40. From Probabilities to Categorical Beliefs: Going Beyond Toy Models.Igor Douven & Hans Rott - 2018 - Journal of Logic and Computation 28 (6):1099-1124.
    According to the Lockean thesis, a proposition is believed just in case it is highly probable. While this thesis enjoys strong intuitive support, it is known to conflict with seemingly plausible logical constraints on our beliefs. One way out of this conflict is to make probability 1 a requirement for belief, but most have rejected this option for entailing what they see as an untenable skepticism. Recently, two new solutions to the conflict have been proposed that are alleged to be (...)
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  41.  10
    Unvergleichbarkeit und unabhängige Bedeutung.Hans Rott - 2014 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 68 (2):237–241.
    This is a short discussion review of Wolfgang Spohn, The Laws of Belief, Oxford UP 2012. I argue, first, that it is important to account for incomparabilities in the plausibilities of possible worlds or propositions, and second, that the meaning of input parameters specifying the degree to which a proposition is to be accepted should be independent of the agent's belief state.
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  42.  9
    Modellings for Belief Change: Base Contraction, Multiple Contraction, and Epistemic Entrenchment.Hans Rott - unknown
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  43.  36
    J. G. Fichte: Three Arguments For Idealism.J. Douglas Rabb - 1976 - Idealistic Studies 6 (2):169-177.
    John Lachs in his paper, “Fichte’s Idealism,” suggests that he can detect in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre “three major lines of argument for his idealistic conclusion.” Lachs examines each of these arguments in turn and concludes that the first “appears … to have no merit.” The second has nothing to recommend it; and the third simply “begs the question.” I wish to argue that much of Lachs’ criticism simply misses its mark. First, Lachs presents each argument independently, as if it were meant (...)
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  44.  19
    Idealizations, Intertheory Explanations and Conditionals.Hans Rott - 2011 - In Erik J. Olsson & Sebastian Enqvist (eds.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 59–75.
    Drawing inspiration from Lakatos’s philosophy of science, the paper presents a notion of intertheory explanation that is suitable to explain, from the point of view of a successor theory, its predecessor theory’s success (where it is successful) as well as the latter’s failure (where it fails) at the same time. A variation of the Ramsey-test is used, together with a standard AGM belief revision model, to give a semantics for open and counterfactual conditionals and ’because’-sentences featuring in such intertheory explanations. (...)
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  45.  12
    J. G. Fichte: Three Arguments For Idealism.J. Douglas Rabb - 1976 - Idealistic Studies 6 (2):169-177.
    John Lachs in his paper, “Fichte’s Idealism,” suggests that he can detect in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre “three major lines of argument for his idealistic conclusion.” Lachs examines each of these arguments in turn and concludes that the first “appears … to have no merit.” The second has nothing to recommend it; and the third simply “begs the question.” I wish to argue that much of Lachs’ criticism simply misses its mark. First, Lachs presents each argument independently, as if it were meant (...)
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  46.  3
    Lehrer's Dynamic Theory of Knowledge.Hans Rott - 2003 - In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 219--242.
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  47.  8
    Theoretical Concepts in Flux: Conceptual Knowledge and Theory Change.Hans Rott - 2003 - In Regine Eckardt, Klaus von Heusinger & Christoph Schwarze (eds.), Words in Time: Diachronic Semantics From Different Points of View. Mouton de Gruyter. pp. 143-175.
    A theoretical term gets its meaning from a set of meaning-constitutive or 'analytic' sentences of the relevant theory. The meanings of theoretical terms may change when the theories change. After a discussion of Kant and Frege, I propose a broadly Quinean view of analyticity, without adopting Quine's meaning skepticism. A sentence of a given theory in a certain language is called analytic if revising the theory so that this sentence is lost entails the abandonment of the given linguistic (alternatively, of (...)
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  48.  12
    Zur Wissenschaftsphilosophie von Imre Lakatos.Hans Rott - 1994 - Philosophia Naturalis 31:25-62.
    Dogmatic, naive and sophisticated falsificationism are construed as being distinguished by different views on the revisability of scientific theories. Then Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programs (SRP) is reinterpreted: The structure of an SRP is a target theory equipped with a priority structure for hypothetical revisions that accommodate idealizing assumptions. Idealizations pointing "backwards" capture predecessor theories, thus showing both their virtues and limitations. The core of an SRP is assigned top priority; its positive heuristics consists in a strategy of how (...)
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  49.  6
    Coherent Choice and Epistemic Entrenchment.Hans Rott - unknown
  50.  66
    How Not to Change the Theory of Theory Change: A Reply to Tennant.Sven Ove Hansson & Hans Rott - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):361-380.
    A number of seminal papers on the logic of belief change by Alchourrön, Gärden-fors, and Makinson have given rise to what is now known as the AGM paradigm. The present discussion note is a response to Neil Tennant's [1994], which aims at a critical appraisal of the AGM approach and the introduction of an alternative approach. We show that important parts of Tennants's critical remarks are based on misunderstandings or on lack of information. In the course of doing this, we (...)
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