What is the nature or essence of a living thing? According to contemporary modal accounts a natural, i.e. essential, property of an entity x is a property that x cannot exist without or one that x possesses in all possible worlds where it exists. In Aristotle, given the way he introduces "nature" in the Physics, it is doubtful whether such a criterion spells out a sufficient or even a necessary condition for essential properties. This is because Aristotle determines the essential (...) properties of a living thing by considering its nature as a principle of change that determines the generation of that thing as an efficient and a final cause, rather than relying on modal considerations concerning the identity of that thing. In this paper I examine Aristotle’s definition of nature as an inner principle of change in Physics II.1 and analyse his arguments for the claim that the nature of a living thing is its form. Although there is not perhaps one single and univocal concept of nature throughout the corpus, Physics II.1 offers valuable evidence, indicating one of the main directions Aristotle takes in his investigation of the natures of living things. I try to show that his arguments presuppose the identity between the developing living thing and the fully developed one, justified by the potentiality actuality distinction. This identity reflects a teleological understanding of what the nature of a thing is. I conclude that this teleological understanding of nature results in a radically different concept of essence from the one advocated by contemporary modal essentialists. The self-sufficiency of ends in nature guides Aristotle in assuming an inspired principle in his metaphysics of natural substance: the oneness of the driving force and its goal, namely, the oneness of the efficient cause and the final cause of a substance. (shrink)

The De incessu animalium forms an integral part of Aristotle's biological corpus but is one of the least studied Aristotelian works both by ancient and modern interpreters. Yet it is a treatise where we can see, with some clarity and detail, Aristotle's methodology at work. This volume contains a new critical edition of the Greek text, an English translation, and nine in-depth interpretative essays. A general introduction that focuses on the explanatory strategies adopted by Aristotle in the De incessu animalium (...) plus a historical essay on the reception of this work in antiquity and beyond open the volume. No other work of this kind has been published in any modern language. (shrink)

Aristotle was deeply fascinated by animals on account of their self-motion—that is, animals move themselves from one place to another in response to their needs and desires rather than in mechanical or chemical reaction to things in their environment, as inanimate things and plants do. This ability requires sensory awareness of one's environment and sophisticated control of one's body. Moreover, Aristotle was intrigued by the sheer variety of ways animals move themselves and of the parts they employ to do so. (...) Indeed, this variety was something Aristotle systematically observed and held in need of scientific explanation, which is precisely what he delivers in the short treatise, On Progression of Animals (De incessu... Read More. (shrink)

I discuss the volume edited by Andrea Falcon and Stasinos Stavrianeas which includes a new Greek text of Aristotle's De incessu animalium (On the Progression of Animals) by Pantelis Golitsis and nine interpretative essays. Since the De incessu is largely uncharted territory, my main goal is to introduce some of the exegetical debates initiated in this volume and to hint at points of departure for further discussion. I pay particular attention to the famous principle that nature does nothing (...) in vain. (shrink)

The aim of this report is to explore, collect and classify the surface characteristics of texts which contain arguments, and in particular arguments pertaining to policy. Our interest is in the automated identification of publically presented arguments, rather than in their success or failure as arguments. We are therefore not dwelling on their validity or their soundness, but on the way they are typically expressed. Of special interest to us are the policy arguments which give reasons for and against legislation (...) proposals. The automated identification of arguments which are to be found in the public domain is an approximate science. Nevertheless, the redeeming factor is that in building an assistant to the policy maker, the interest is in the main lines of argument that pertain to an issue, which, if significant, will not be expressed only once, in atypical logical language. The computational tool we are constructing will assist the policy maker with texts that display even minute hints that there may be some reason giving enfolded within their content. (shrink)