In order to lay the ground for the construction of a philosophy of culture the origin, meaning and some of the implications of the word „culture” are examined and discussed in light of a working definition of the anthropological concept of culture taken from C. Dawson. In Section II another concept of culture is examined, based on the idea of culture as human perfection. Then in Section III the concept of cultural levels is introduced, that is, the differing levels at (...) which the central concept of a culture can be understood or embodied. (shrink)

In order to lay the ground for the construction of a philosophy of culture the origin, meaning and some of the implications of the word „culture” are examined and discussed in light of a working definition of the anthropological concept of culture taken from C. Dawson. In Section II another concept of culture is examined, based on the idea of culture as human perfection. Then in Section III the concept of cultural levels is introduced, that is, the differing levels at (...) which the central concept of a culture can be understood or embodied. (shrink)

Using Tõnu Viik's statement of the relationship between philosophy and culture as a framework, after discussing both nature and world, I investigate how culture affects the ways human beings live in nature and the world, then the implications of living in culture for philosophy and human knowledge, and finally the philosophy of culture, what it is or might be and its place as a focal point for a philosophical understanding of human life and activity.

Gordon P. Barnes has recently argued that presence by power is inadequate as an explanation of the way elements are present in complex bodies, and that it would be better to explain the elements’ presence by claiming that simpler substances—carbon atoms, for example—are actually and substantially present in living things. In order to address his arguments, this paper begins by briefly presenting St. Thomas’s understanding of presence by power, and then argues that Barnes’s proposal—that there is a multiplicity of (...) substantial forms in one matter—is unsatisfactory. First, the paper explains why the scientific facts do not require a plurality of substantial forms. Second, it shows how Barnes’s theory does not adequately explain living things. Third, it argues against Barnes’s claim that St. Thomas’s explanation is insufficient because it denies "the universal causality of nature.". (shrink)

Em uma famosa passagem de suas Institutas, o jurista romano Gaio dividiu o direito privado em duas partes: o direito civil e o direito dos povos. O primeiro é o direito criado pelo povo romano enquanto o segundo é o direito seguido por todas as nações. A despeito de sua origem clássica, os especialistas discordam acerca do modo de interpretar essa tese. No início do século XX, historiadores como Michel Villey viram na distinção sinais da influência da filosofia grega entre (...) os juristas romanos. Posteriormente Levy e mais recentemente Kelly contestaram essa afirmação e defenderam que filósofos e juristas possuíam, no período clássico, noções de natureza e direito natural completamente distintas. O objetivo desse artigo não está em provar a exata influência da filosofia grega entre os juristas, mas apenas em sugerir que não é possível fornecer uma interpretação dos textos clássicos sem atribuir a eles uma concepção teórica do direito natural. (shrink)

In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.

This volume brings together for the first time a significant number of Reid's manuscript papers on natural history, physiology and materialist metaphysics. An important contribution not only to Reid studies but also to our understanding of eighteenth-century science and its context.

v. 1. Editorial introduction -- v. 2. The English and Latin texts (i) -- v. 3. The English and Latin texts (ii).