Abstract Daniel Dennett advocates the use of the intentional stance in adaptationist biology and in cognitive ethology. He sees intentional system theory as closely related to decision theory and game theory. In biological decision and game theory models, nature ?chooses? the strategy by which the animal chooses a course of action. The design of the animal imposes constraints on the model. For Dennett, by contrast, the description of nature's rationale imposes constraints on the design of the animal. Dennett's oversimplified conception (...) of nature's rationale undermines the usefulness of the intentional stance as a tool in cognitive ethology. Intentional system theory can be made more useful in investigating animal cognition by modifying its application to questions of biological function. (shrink)

In 1979 Harvard biologists Stephen Jay Gould and Richard C. Lewontin published an essay entitled “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme.” The target of their critique is a style of thinking rooted in “the near omnipotence of natural selection in forging organic design and fashioning the best among possible worlds.” According to Gould and Lewontin, adaptationists assume that all traits of an organism are products of natural selection, and that the traits (...) were favored by natural selection because they were optimal solutions to problems posed by the environment. Gould and Lewontin called the adaptationist program the Panglossian paradigm because they saw strong parallels between the arguments of Dr. Pangloss in Voltaire’s Candide and the arguments of adaptationists and optimality theorists in biology. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Animal Consciousness. By Daisie Radner and Michael Radner The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and Science. By Bernard E. Rollin.

Descartes uses the term "conscientia" (conscience) to apply both to consciousness of thinking and to the act of thinking itself. These are two different sorts of consciousness, And they stand in different relations to their objects. Consciousness as a way of thinking (c1) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of its object. Consciousness of thinking (c2) is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of its object. The distinction between c1 and c2 provides descartes with a way out (...) of hobbes's infinite regress and frees descartes from problematic theses concerning the evidence and incorrigibility of mental states. (shrink)

In order to explain the possibility of causal interaction between the mind and the body, Descartes claims that they are substantially united. It is argued that descartes is unsuccessful in reconciling this union with the radical dualism which is fundamental to his philosophy. Recent claims that the union of mind and body poses no problem for descartes are shown to be untenable.

Human action theory, with its emphasis on intentions and reasons, does little to enhance our understanding of the actions of nonhuman animals. Many animal (and human) actions are directed to objects in the world, including other animals. The notion of directedness can be analysed without attributing intentions or reasons to the agent. An action is directed to object X if and only if: (1) the agent singles out X, either by orientation or by selective performance of the action in the (...) presence of X; (2) the agent recognizes X as a suitable object; and (3) the goal of the action is that X should be in a certain relation to the agent or to some other object. The goal of an action is not necessarily attributable to the agent as the agent's goal in acting. Moreover, an agent can have a goal in acting without understanding how the action achieves the goal. The usefulness of the concept of directed action in the study of animal communication is illustrated with examples from the recent ethological literature. (shrink)

Functional hypotheses about animal signalling often refer to mental states of the sender or the receiver. Mental states are functional categorizations of neurophysiological states. Functional questions about animal signals are intertwined with causal questions. This interrelationship is illustrated in regard to avian distraction displays. In purposive signalling, the sender has a goal of influencing the behavior of the receiver. Purposive signalling is innovative if the sender's goal is unrelated to the biological function of the signal. This may be the case (...) in some instances of false alarm calling. Biological functionalism differs from philosophical functionalism in its concept of identity and in the specification of relevant inputs and outputs. (shrink)

Human action theory, with its emphasis on intentions and reasons, does little to enhance our understanding of the actions of nonhuman animals. Many animal (and human) actions are directed to objects in the world, including other animals. The notion of directedness can be analysed without attributing intentions or reasons to the agent. An action is directed to object X if and only if: (1) the agent singles out X, either by orientation or by selective performance of the action in the (...) presence of X; (2) the agent recognizes X as a suitable object; and (3) the goal of the action is that X should be in a certain relation to the agent or to some other object. The goal of an action is not necessarily attributable to the agent as the agent's goal in acting. Moreover, an agent can have a goal in acting without understanding how the action achieves the goal. The usefulness of the concept of directed action in the study of animal communication is illustrated with examples from the recent ethological literature. (shrink)

In this controversial new book, Daisy Christodoulou offers a thought-provoking critique of educational orthodoxy. Drawing on her recent experience of teaching in challenging schools, she shows through a wide range of examples and case studies just how much classroom practice contradicts basic scientific principles. She examines seven widely-held beliefs which are holding back pupils and teachers: - Facts prevent understanding - Teacher-led instruction is passive - The 21st century fundamentally changes everything - You can always just look it up -We (...) should teach transferable skills - Projects and activities are the best way to learn - Teaching knowledge is indoctrination. In each accessible and engaging chapter, Christodoulou sets out the theory of each myth, considers its practical implications and shows the worrying prevalence of such practice. Then, she explains exactly why it is a myth, with reference to the principles of modern cognitive science. She builds a powerful case explaining how governments and educational organisations around the world have let down teachers and pupils by promoting and even mandating evidence-less theory and bad practice. This blisteringly incisive and urgent text is essential reading for all teachers, teacher training students, policy makers, head teachers, researchers and academics around the world. (shrink)

This book draws on both the historical context & contemporary research evidence to present the roles of mental health social work, AMHP & BIA, within an ethical framework. Codes of practice & statutory legal requirements, such as the Mental Health Act, Mental Capacity Act & the Human Rights Act, are all considered.

In a professional learning community, teachers are organized into teams, committed to meeting on a regular basis to study their teaching strategies and the effects of those strategies on the students in their classrooms. Whatever the organizational structure, the teams have one goal, that is to improve teaching so that student learning is improved.

There is widespread and growing concern among U.S. consumers about the treatment of farmed animals, and consumers are consequently paying attention to food product labels that indicate humane production practices. However, labels vary in their standards for animal welfare, and prior research suggests that consumers are confused by welfare-related labels: many shoppers cannot differentiate between labels that indicate changes in the way animals are raised and those that do not. We administered a survey to 1,000 American grocery shoppers to better (...) understand the extent to which consumers purchase and pay more for food with certain labels based on an assumption of welfare improvement. Results showed that 86% of shoppers reported purchasing at least one product with the following labels in the last year: “cage or crate-free”, “free-range”, “pasture-raised”, “natural”, “organic”, “no hormone”, “no antibiotic”, “no rBST”, “humane”, “vegetarian-fed”, “grass-fed”, “farm-raised”. Of those who purchased one of the aforementioned labels, 89% did so because they thought the label indicated higher-welfare production practices, and 79% consciously paid more for the product with the label because they thought that the label indicated better-than-standard animal welfare. However, many of these labels lack uniform standards for the production practices they represent, and some labels represent production practices that do not influence animal welfare, thus the degree of the animal welfare impact of a given label is highly variable. These results indicate that labels need to clearly and accurately specify their animal welfare benefits to improve the consumers’ ability to purchase products that align with their expectations. (shrink)

A robust stakeholder analysis requires extensive conceptual and empirical work. Yet it is often unclear how to effectively do so. This paper introduces a new method—the Stakeholder Tokens—for designers to elicit a more inclusive set of stakeholders and gain better understanding of stakeholder interrelationships and dynamics. Stakeholder Tokens present a playful hands-on design approach to support value sensitive design stakeholder analyses by employing a style of role play.

Nietzsche's GM 1 is now a recognized masterpiece, but there are still widely varying views about its historical aims and methods.2 What is clear is that Nietzsche's decision to call this work a "genealogy" signals that its purpose is to trace morality's ancestors in the history of human valuing.3 It is also generally agreed that this genealogy is intended to serve a critical function, as Nietzsche himself says, "we need a critique of moral values, for once the value of these (...) values must itself be called into question—and for this we need a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances out of which they have grown [...] developed and shifted [...]". Indeed, Nietzsche's GM is regarded as strikingly... (shrink)