SummaryVisual acuity was tested and the anterior portion of the eye inspected among the Gidra in Lowland Papua New Guinea, who depend on hunting for their animal food. The visual acuity of the youths and adults was as high as that of hunters and gatherers; 88% of the males and 81% of the females had an acuity of 1·2 or better. The elders had far lower acuity, correlated with the advance of cataract. The senescent visual acuity is discussed in relation (...) to little practice and low productivity of the elders' hunting, and to the Gidra traditional age-grade system. (shrink)

Extending techniques of Dowd and those of Poizat, we study computational complexity of in the case when is a generic oracle, where is a positive integer, and denotes the collection of all -query tautologies with respect to an oracle . We introduce the notion of ceiling-generic oracles, as a generalization of Dowd's notion of -generic oracles to arbitrary finitely testable arithmetical predicates. We study how existence of ceiling-generic oracles affects behavior of a generic oracle, by which we show that is (...) not a subset of is comeager in the Cantor space. Moreover, using ceiling-generic oracles, we present an alternative proof of the fact (Dowd) that the class of all -generic oracles has Lebesgue measure zero. (shrink)

This note is a continuation of our former paper ''Complexity of the r-query tautologies in the presence of a generic oracle.'' We give a very short direct proof of the nonexistence of t-generic oracles, a result obtained first by Dowd. We also reconstitute a proof of Dowd's result that the class of all r-generic oracles in his sense has Lebesgue measure one.

In our former works, for a given concept of reduction, we study the following hypothesis: “For a random oracle A, with probability one, the degree of the one-query tautologies with respect to A is strictly higher than the degree of A.” In our former works (Suzuki in Kobe J. Math. 15, 91–102, 1998; in Inf. Comput. 176, 66–87, 2002; in Arch. Math. Logic 44, 751–762), the following three results are shown: The hypothesis for p-T (polynomial-time Turing) reduction is equivalent (...) to the assertion that the probabilistic complexity class R is not equal to NP; The hypothesis for p-tt (polynomial-time truth-table) reduction implies that P is not NP; The hypothesis holds for each of the following: disjunctive reduction, conjunctive reduction, and p-btt (polynomial-time bounded-truth-table) reduction. In this paper, we show the following three results: (1) Let c be a positive real number. We consider a concept of truth-table reduction whose norm is at most c times size of input, where for a relativized propositional formula F, the size of F denotes the total number of occurrences of propositional variables, constants and propositional connectives. Then, our main result is that the hypothesis holds for such tt-reduction, provided that c is small enough. How small c can we take so that the above holds? It depends on our syntactic convention on one-query tautologies. In our setting, the statement holds for all c < 1. (2) The hypothesis holds for monotone truth-table reduction (also called positive reduction). (3) Dowd (in Inf. Comput. 96, 65–76, 1992) shows a polynomial upper bound for the minimum sizes of forcing conditions associated with a random oracle. We apply the above result (1), and get a linear lower bound for the sizes. (shrink)

Zen Buddhism as it has been discovered by the West in our time emerges as one of the great challenges to Western philosophy, psychology, and religion. The present volume, composed of the work of D. T. Suzuki, Zen's chief exponent in English, and presented to Western readers by William Barrett, is intended to introduce the general reader to the history and spirit of Zen.

This paper considers the boundary that separates marketable from non-marketable items. First, it examines the issue of blocked exchanges, that is, exchanges that cannot and/or should not take place. Second, it proposes to synthesise the seemingly separate issues of blocked exchanges from a single perspective based on critical realist ontology. Finally, it tackles some scepticism and criticism that has been levelled against the idea that ontology can be useful in determining a market boundary.

We tend to think every ought statement implies that an actual agent can comply. However, our uses of “ought” suggest that some ought statements fail to have this implication: it is possible that the actual agent ought to do something she has no chance of accomplishing even if she intends to do so. Rather they imply that if the agent and her circumstances were defect-free, she could and would perform the prescribed action. There are two types of evaluation for ought (...) statements. One type of evaluation addresses the question of what to do given the agent’s peculiar capacity and condition. The point of this evaluation is giving personalized action guidance, and so recommends only what the actual agent can do under the actual condition. Another type of evaluation addresses a different question, that of what to do as a type of agents. The point of this evaluation is the coordination of individuals by selecting a shared norm for them: the standard that prescribes all of them to perform the same action and classifies for all of them the same traits as defect. This is why it endorses the ought statements that some actual agents cannot comply with, but that a normal agent could and would do so under normal conditions. (shrink)

We tend to think every ought statement implies that an actual agent can comply. However, our uses of “ought” suggest that some ought statements fail to have this implication: it is possible that the actual agent ought to do something she has no chance of accomplishing even if she intends to do so. Rather they imply that if the agent and her circumstances were defect-free, she could and would perform the prescribed action. There are two types of evaluation for ought (...) statements. One type of evaluation addresses the question of what to do given the agent’s peculiar capacity and condition. The point of this evaluation is giving personalized action guidance, and so recommends only what the actual agent can do under the actual condition. Another type of evaluation addresses a different question, that of what to do as a type of agents. The point of this evaluation is the coordination of individuals by selecting a shared norm for them: the standard that prescribes all of them to perform the same action and classifies for all of them the same traits as defect. This is why it endorses the ought statements that some actual agents cannot comply with, but that a normal agent could and would do so under normal conditions. (shrink)

Branching Streams Flow in the Darkness: Zen Talks on the Sandokai. Shunryu Suzuki, edited by Mel Weitsman and Michael Wenger. University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles 1999. viii, 195 pp. $22.50. ISBN 0-52-21982-1.

We develop a series of small infinitary epistemic logics to study deductive inference involving intra-/interpersonal beliefs/knowledge such as common knowledge, common beliefs, and infinite regress of beliefs. Specifically, propositional epistemic logics GL are presented for ordinal α up to a given αo so that GL is finitary KDn with n agents and GL allows conjunctions of certain countably infinite formulae. GL is small in that the language is countable and can be constructive. The set of formulae Lα is increasing up (...) to α = ω but stops at ω We present Kripke-completeness for GL for each α ≤ ω, which is proved using the Rasiowa–Sikorski lemma and Tanaka–Ono lemma. GL has a sufficient expressive power to discuss intra-/interpersonal beliefs with infinite lengths. As applications, we discuss the explicit definability of Axioms T, 4, 5, and of common knowledge in GL Also, we discuss the rationalizability concept in game theory in our framework. We evaluate where these discussions are done in the series GL, α ≤ ω. (shrink)

D.T. Suzuki. A Biography. A. Irwin Switzer III. Edited and enlarged by John Snelling. The Buddhist Society, London 1985. 63 pp. I11.

The small connective words “soku” and “sokuhi,” typically found in the writings of the Kyoto school thinkers, have baffled many a Western reader. Describing what he termed the “logic of sokuhi,” Daisetz T. Suzuki famously wrote: “To say ‘A is A’ is to say ‘A is not A.’ Therefore, ’A is A.’” “Soku” is a connective word, meaning “that is,” or “id est”; “hi” negates the compound-word, adding the meaning of “not.” Nishida adopted and situated the “logic of sokuhi” (...) in a philosophical context, especially in his final essay “Bashoteki ronri to shūkyōteki sekaikan” or “The Logic of Topos and the Religious Worldview”. This logic of sokuhi, however, came to Nishida’s attention only in the very last years of his life, leaving him very little time to develop it fully. In this paper, I explore the birth of this “logic of sokuhi” in Suzuki’s writings, its context and the import in the Diamond Sūtra, and Nishida’s elaboration of this logic. The goal of this paper is to elucidate this key phrase of Nishida’s thought and to evaluate its philosophical relevance. (shrink)

This paper analyses the concept of the Imagination of Henry Corbin (1903–1978) in relation to Daisetsu T. Suzuki (1870–1966). Besides being a renowned orientalist and scholar of Islamic thought, Corbin was a philosopher par excellence whose original thought deserves to be studied. So, I present this paper as a contribution to the evaluation of Corbin as a philosopher. In doing so, I shall shed light upon the philosophical affinity between Corbin and Suzuki, which has thus far rarely been (...) discussed in depth. Their ideas, in fact, resonate with each other—or Corbin is sympathetic to Suzuki—at a deep level, especially on the argument of Imagination, through Suwedenborgian thought, into whom both channel their interests. An exploration of this relationship of influence with Suzuki shall make a great contribution to a better understanding of Corbin’s own concept of Imagination, which could shake up our taken-for-granted idea of “imagination.”. (shrink)

The logic of soku-hi is presented as an articulation of a post-Kantian view of reality that embraces the truths of science with the assumption of the transcendental subject. As such, soku-hi represents the philosophical posture of both the secular Zen of the Kyoto School and the new materialists of contemporary continental philosophy. It describes how material reality is not all even though there is nothing else.