_John Stuart Mill_ investigates the central elements of the 19th century philosopher’s most profound and influential works, from _On Liberty_ to _Utilitarianism_ and _The Subjection of Women_. Through close analysis of his primary works, it reveals the very heart of the thinker’s ideas, and examines them in the context of utilitarianism, liberalism and the British empiricism prevalent in Mill’s day. • Presents an analysis of the full range of Mill’s primary writings, getting to the core of the philosopher’s ideas. • (...) Examines the central elements of Mill’s writings in easily accessible prose • Places Mill’s work and thought within the larger cultural and social context of 19th century Britain • Illustrates the continued relevance of Mill’s philosophy to today’s reader. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Qualitative Hedonism Objections to Mill's Qualitative Hedonism: Internal Inconsistency and Value Pluralism The Judgment of Competent Agents: Self‐Development and Value Measurement Self‐Development and Virtue Ethics Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Green Mill? Mill and Radical Environmentalism Mill and Romanticism Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Radical Empiricism Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Biography: John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) Introduction to Part I, Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy Introduction to Part II, Mill's Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology.

This chapter contains sections titled: Mill on Our Knowledge of the External World Mill on Our Knowledge of “Necessary” Truths Mill's “Reduction” of Deductive Reasoning to Inductive Reasoning Mill on the Ground of Inductive Reasoning Mill's Methods Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Liberty of Thought and Expression Autonomy and Individuality Autonomy, Individuality, and Community: The Case of Mormon Polygamy Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Physical Objects as the Permanent Possibility of Sensations Mill's Metaphysics of Causation Mill as Direct Reference Theorist Mill's Metaethics Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Education: Development and Self‐Development Two Senses of Education Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Political and Economic Democracy Objections: Elitism and Egalitarianism Egalitarian or Elitist? Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Mill's Liberal Feminism Objection: Mill's Defense of Gendered Division of Labor Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Art of Life and Morality Morality: Act‐ and Rule‐Utilitarianism Further Reading.

Wendy Donner contends here that recent commentators on John Stuart Mill's thought have focused on his notions of right and obligation and have not paid as much attention to his notion of the good. Mill, she maintains, rejects the quantitative hedonism of Bentham's philosophy in favor of an expanded qualitative version. In this book she provides an account of his complex views of the good and the ways in which these views unify his moral and political thought.

Wendy Donner contends here that recent commentators on John Stuart Mill's thought have focused on his notions of right and obligation and have not paid as much attention to his notion of the good. Mill, she maintains, rejects the quantitative hedonism of Bentham's philosophy in favor of an expanded qualitative version. In this book she provides an account of his complex views of the good and the ways in which these views unify his moral and political thought.

Maria Morales’s striking and thought-provoking argument in Perfect Equality is that John Stuart Mill’s egalitarianism unifies his practical philosophy and that this element of his thought has been neglected in recent revisionary scholarship. Placing Mill’s arguments for the substantive value of “perfect equality” in The Subjection of Women at the center of her analysis, Morales develops a distinctive interpretation of Mill as an egalitarian liberal. Morales also aims to counter many recent communitarian critiques of liberalism as founded upon a conception (...) of the self as atomistic and individualistic. Like other Mill scholars, Morales sees Mill’s liberalism as an appealing alternative to the dominant Rawlsian theory, and she offers Mill’s approach as a response to “the still popular view that liberalism is structurally incompatible with a rich conception of the human good, particularly with a substantive commitment to equality”. Mill’s theory is not “doggedly individualistic,” and it rejects the model of liberal social life as atomistic and abstract. The well-constituted communities of the title are based upon “sympathetic, cooperative, and egalitarian values”. (shrink)

I argue that Mill's view of individuality also plays an important role in promoting social pluralism and respect for difference. Firstly, I argue that in Mill's theory individuality is not merely an individual good but also a social good. Secondly, I argue that by expressing his appreciation of diversity, Mill's liberalism goes beyond tolerating difference and pluralism. His position is that pluralism should be appreciated rather than merely tolerated. Mill's appreciation of difference resonates with Iris Marion Young's ideal of the (...) unoppressive city. However the structure of Mill's theory does place limits on the exercise of individual liberty. These limits are set down by the Liberty Principle in the essay On Liberty. I look at some cases. First, I examine the tensions between individuality and autonomy as they bump up against the needs of human connection. Second, I look at moral progress, for example the recognition of same‐sex marriage. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill's commitment to liberty and individual development is one of the most exoteric themes of his moral and political philosophy. But the linkages between this commitment to liberty and development and Mill's conception of utility and principles of the good are not as commonly recognized. As part of a more general transformation of his utilitarianism, Mill repudiated Bentham's principles of the good and instead adopted a more sophisticated form of hedonism. While Bentham admits only the total quantity of (...) pleasure as contributing to value, Mill expands the circle to admit quality or kind of pleasure as well into the value reckoning. I have elsewhere interpreted and defended Mill's qualitative hedonism, and in this paper I can offer only a brief overview of that account and must largely assume its plausibility. Bentham and Mill agree that only pleasurable experiences and the absence of painful experiences have value and so both are called hedonists. But they have very different views about what properties of pleasures makes them valuable, or in other words what are the good-making properties of pleasure. Bentham thinks that only intensity and duration, or quantity, are good-making properties of pleasures, and thus he includes only these properties in measuring value. As a consequence, in the context of value measurement he is not interested in the kinds of things in which people take pleasure. But Mill is a qualitative hedonist, and thinks that the quality or kind of pleasure is also a good-making characteristic and thus should be included in value measurement. The things that are sources of pleasure matter to Mill. (shrink)

3. Inherent Value and Moral Standing in Environmental Change was published in Earthly Goods on page 52.

I offer here an interpretation and defense of John Stuart Mill's qualitative hedonism. One of the results of Mill's well-known mental crisis was a concept of utility substantially different from the orthodox Benthamite quantitative hedonism which Mill came to regard as being fraught with difficulties. He saw Bentham's concept as being excessively narrow, and he sought to overcome its limitations by enlarging his own concept of utility. He did this by including the quality of pleasures along with the quantity in (...) the estimation of their worth. At the same time, Mill was highly critical of the intuitionist ethical theories of his day, and propounded utilitarianism as the rational, objective, and scientific alternative. So if Mill is to succeed in his enterprise of countering intuitionism while avoiding the pitfalls of Benthamite utilitarianism, he must retain the objectivity of Benthamism while repudiating its narrowness. Mill's critics have argued that when he opened up his concept of utility to include quality, he modified his theory so radically that he can no longer be called a hedonistic utilitarian, and that he relinquished the consis- tency and objectivity of Benthamite utilitarianism along with its weak- nesses. I argue here that Mill abandons neither hedonism nor utilitarianism, and that the objectivity and consistency of his theory are not undermined. (shrink)

The articles collected in this critical edition represent a variety of interpretations both of the kind of feminism Mill represents and of the specific arguments he offers in The Subjection of Women including their lexical ordering and relative merit. Each selection is preceded by a brief and useful summary of the author's position intended to assist introductory students.

This book contains the 1992 Tanner Lectures on Human Values delivered by Christine M. Korsgaard at Cambridge University, along with commentaries by G. A. Cohen, Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams, as well as a reply by Korsgaard. The theme taken up in these lectures is the source and authority of norms, what Korsgaard calls “the normative question,” which asks “what justifies the claims that morality makes on us”. With clarity and elegance, she examines four proposed answers to this (...) question: voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and the appeal to autonomy. (shrink)

Maria Morales’s striking and thought-provoking argument in Perfect Equality is that John Stuart Mill’s egalitarianism unifies his practical philosophy and that this element of his thought has been neglected in recent revisionary scholarship. Placing Mill’s arguments for the substantive value of “perfect equality” in The Subjection of Women at the center of her analysis, Morales develops a distinctive interpretation of Mill as an egalitarian liberal. Morales also aims to counter many recent communitarian critiques of liberalism as founded upon a conception (...) of the self as atomistic and individualistic. Like other Mill scholars, Morales sees Mill’s liberalism as an appealing alternative to the dominant Rawlsian theory, and she offers Mill’s approach as a response to “the still popular view that liberalism is structurally incompatible with a rich conception of the human good, particularly with a substantive commitment to equality”. Mill’s theory is not “doggedly individualistic,” and it rejects the model of liberal social life as atomistic and abstract. The well-constituted communities of the title are based upon “sympathetic, cooperative, and egalitarian values”. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Editor's Prologue Descartes John Locke John Stuart Mill.

Informal political representation can be a political lifeline, particularly for oppressed and marginalized groups. Such representation can give these groups some say, however mediate, partial, and imperfect, in how things go for them. Coeval with the political goods such representation offers these groups are its particular dangers to them. Mindful of these dangers, skeptics challenge the practice for being, inter alia, unaccountable, unauthorized, inegalitarian, and oppressive. These challenges provide strong pro tanto reasons to think the practice morally impermissible. This paper (...) considers the question: On what conditions is the informal political representation of oppressed and marginalized groups permissible? By responding to skeptics’ challenges, I develop a systematic account of moral constraints that, if adopted, would make such representation permissible. The account that emerges shows that informal political representatives (IPRs) must aim to fulfill two sets of sometimes conflicting duties to the represented: democracy within duties, which concern how the representative treats and relates to the represented, and justice without duties, which concern how the representative’s actions advance the aims of the representation. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 429-455, December 2021.