Presents a concise and comprehensive analysis of George Berkeley’s thought and the impact of his intellectual contributions to philosophy In this latest addition to the Blackwell Great Minds series, noted scholar of early modern philosophy Margaret Atherton examines Berkeley’s most influential work and demonstrates the significant conceptual impact of his ideas in metaphysics and the philosophy of religion. A concise and rigorous primer on Berkeley’s essential writings and contributions to modern philosophy Written by a leading scholar of early (...) modern philosophy Offers insight into the foundations of modern metaphysical and religious philosophy Equips readers to find firm footing in Berkeley’s wider body of published work in the canon of Western philosophy. (shrink)

Introduction In 1709 George Berkeley published his first substantial work, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. As a contribution to the theory of ...

An invaluable complement to the standards works in early modern philosophy, this anthology introduces an important selection from the largely unknown writings of women philosophers of the early modern period. Readings comment on major works of the period and are easily integrated into courses in the history of modern philosophy. Included are letters to prominent philosophers, philosophical tracts arguing a particular view, and comments on controversies of the day. Each section is prefaced by a headnote giving a biographical account of (...) its author and setting the piece in historical context. Atherton's introduction provides a solid framework for assessing these works and their place in modern philosophy. -- from back cover. (shrink)

Berkeley has been notoriously charged with inconsistency because he held that spiritual substance exists, Although he argued against the existence of material substance. Berkeley is only inconsistent on the assumption that his argument in favor of spiritual substance parallels the rejected argument for material substance. I show that berkeley is relying on quite a different argument, One perfectly consistent with his theory of ideas, Based on presuppositions the germs of which can be found in the thought of his predecessors in (...) the theory of ideas, Descartes and locke. (shrink)

Virginia Woolf, in A Room of One’s Own, asked why there were no women writers before 1800. If she had been thinking about philosophers instead of writers in the traditional women’s areas of plays and fiction, she might have asked why there were no women philosophers at all, for I suspect that most people would find it very hard to name a woman philosopher before the present day. To help her in answering her question, she invented a fictional character, Judith (...) Shakespeare, a sister to William Shakespeare. The conditions of Judith’s life made it impossible for her to write, and so Woolf speculated that the women who would have been writers did not lead the kinds of lives that permitted them to realize their talents. Woolf’s image of Judith Shakespeare is a very powerful one but her speculation is only half right. There undoubtedly were many women in the past who would have been talented writers or philosophers if their lives had been different, but Judith Shakespeare’s image can also blot out our knowledge of women who, contrary to Woolf’s speculation, did exist and did write. Indeed, we know now there were even women who wrote philosophy. These women were in many ways exceptional, for Woolf is quite right that most women did not live either with enough privacy or with enough income to allow them to write. Often, they were members of the aristocracy, whose position enabled them to behave eccentrically, sometimes to be able to demand privacy, and sometimes to be able to invite contacts with leading intellectuals. Quite often, these women were childless, which in an age before birth control made them exceptions to the general rule, and at a time when many women were bearing their last child in their forties, was the only thing that could have given them private time. Nevertheless, research in the last ten or fifteen years has uncovered the work of quite a number of these women: for example, Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia, the Electress Sophie, Queen Christina of Sweden, Queen Sophie Charlotte of Prussia, Anne, Lady Conway, Mary Astell, Damaris, Lady Masham, Catharine Trotter Cockburn, Emilie du Chatelet, Catherine Macaulay, Lady Mary Shepherd, and many more. Woolf’s question then comes up again in a slightly different form. Why is it that the work of these women was for so long unknown? Why do so many people even today remain ignorant of the existence of women philosophers before the present day? I am not going to answer this question directly; in fact, I suspect it has multiple answers. Instead, I am going to present a case study from amongst all the cases of all of these women. I hope by considering the history of this woman, and, in particular, considering the way in which she was read, it will be possible to gain some insights into the ways in which women have failed to be incorporated into philosophical history. The woman I am going to discuss is Lady Mary Shepherd. Mary Shepherd actually falls outside of Woolf’s target date of 1800, since she flourished in the first half of the nineteenth century, but this merely reflects my point about the greater ignorance that prevails about women in philosophy. (shrink)

Locke, in his discussion of essences, makes extensive use of a distinction he introduces between nominal and real essences. This distinction has always been found interesting and important, and in fact, R.I. Aaron said of it that ‘there is no more important distinction in the Essay.’ Nevertheless, to say there has not been general agreement about what Locke was getting at is putting it mildly. Interpretations of Locke's point in making such a distinction have varied widely, depending upon whether the (...) importance of the real or the nominal essence is stressed. Locke tells us we should distinguish the nominal essence, which is the abstract idea to which a general name is attached and for which it stands, from the real essence, which is the ‘real internal, but generally in Substances, unknown Constitution of Things, whereon their discoverable Qualities depend.’. (shrink)

Berkeley published the New Theory in 1709, the Principles in 1710, and Three Dialogues in 1713. These three books, while differing from one another in form and in content, nevertheless display considerable overlap with one another, covering much the same ground. There is no reason to regard the use Berkeley makes of idealism and claims based on idealism to be significantly different in the New Theory from the other works, and the conclusions he draws there are similar to those of (...) the later works. The Principles certainly differs from the New Theory but is like Three Dialogues in explicitly endorsing an idealist ontology. Nevertheless, the Principles does differ from Three Dialogues in offering considerably less argumentation for this ontology. It can be surmised that Berkeley was acutely aware of the difficulties of convincing others of the truth of his theory, and was prepared to think and re‐think the best way of putting his arguments persuasively. (shrink)

Ruth Boeker’s Locke on Persons and Personal Identity is a tightly argued and illuminating account, containing much to ponder. The presence of both terms, ‘persons’ and ‘personal identity’, in the t...

This chapter discusses the work of Margaret Cavendish (1623‐73), Anne Conway (1631‐79), Damaris Cudworth Masham (1659‐1708), Mary Astell (1666‐1731), and Catharine Trotter Cockburn (1679‐1749).

George Berkeley's first published work, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision was prepared simultaneously with his second, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. In the New Theory, Berkeley argues that visual objects are in the mind, mind‐dependent ideas, but he appears to leave tactile objects outside the mind in mind‐independent space. The position the New Theory refutes is not the one that Berkeley identifies as causing problems for the Principles. But he still sees the New Theory (...) as contributing an important step in the argument of the Principles. He is frequently said to have employed a language analogy, to have compared vision to language, and indeed he does just that through the New Theory. Berkeley apparently assumed that anyone who read both the New Theory and the Principles would be in a position to appreciate the usefulness of the New Theory for the moral and theological aims of the Principles. (shrink)

Berkeley has made the bold claim on behalf of his theory that it is uniquely able to justify the claim that snow is white. But this claim, made most strikingly in the Third of his "Three Dialogues," has been held, most forcefully by Margaret Wilson, to conflict with Berkeley's argument in the First Dialogue that, because of various facts to do with perceptual variation, colors are merely apparent and hence, mind-dependent. This paper develops an alternative reading of the First (...) Dialogue arguments, in which their project is not to establish the mind-dependence of colors but instead to undermine the position that colors are also mind-independent. Under these circumstances, the coherence of the First and the Third Dialogue arguments is assured, just so long as the Third Dialogue claim to have established that snow is really white is not taken to mean that snow is mind-independently white, but instead, something like that our experiences of snow are stably and regularly white. (shrink)

(2008). ‘The books are in the study as before’: Berkeley's claims about real physical objects. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 85-100.

George Berkeley was born on 12 March 1685 in Ireland, in or near Kilkenny. Berkeley's education began in Kilkenny, at the Duke of Ormonde's school. Berkeley took his BA in 1704 and, while waiting for a fellowship vacancy, worked on some mathematical issues, the results of which he published in 1707 as Arithmetica and Miscellanea Mathematica. In 1709, he published his first significant work, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, rapidly followed in 1710 by A Treatise Concerning the (...) Principles of Human Knowledge. In 1724, Berkeley published A Proposal for the Better Supplying of Churches, in which he laid out his plans for his university, to be situated in Bermuda. There are several important lessons to be learned from Berkeley's continued involvement with The Querist throughout the period of his life at Cloyne. Dying at age 68, Berkeley can be said to have lived out close to his allotted three‐score‐and‐ten years. (shrink)

This book is, as the editor claims, the first collection of essays dedicated to Berkeley’s Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. It also derives largely from a conference held at Trinity College, Dublin in 2014. The editor, therefore, was somewhat at the mercy of those who submitted papers to the conference to determine the contents of the volume. In pointing this out, I do not intend to be casting aspersions on the quality of the papers included. By and large, the (...) contributors are among the most prominent Berkeley scholars working today and the quality is high. I will want, however, to think about the extent to which this collection provides materials for an overall understanding and assessment of Three... (shrink)

This book, a collection of articles on women's contributions to the history of philosophy, can accurately be described as long-awaited. Originally conceived in, I gather, roughly its present form in 2006, it is now finally in 2019 reaching the light of day. Although unavoidable delays are always a pity, in this case the result is certainly worth the wait, and the significantly high quality of the volume has not been undercut by its belated appearance. In 2006, the editors secured contributions (...) from most of the leading contributors to the field of women in the history of philosophy, and since twelve years is not all that long a time, they remain leading contributors. Anyone interested in teaching, writing about, or... (shrink)

George Berkeley's arguments have attracted a good deal of attention, but the account of abstraction has been often treated as if it were an entirely independent piece of writing. Berkeley links Locke's use of abstract general ideas to a belief in the possibility of an idea of existence abstracted from perception, that is, to the central issue of the Principles of Human Knowledge. The mistake Berkeley has been pointing to, the reliance on abstract general ideas, is a philosophical mistake, but (...) here it is clear Berkeley takes this mistake to have far‐reaching consequences, diverting the search for knowledge from what would be useful to know into trivial byways. Having identified the consequences of a mistaken belief in abstract ideas, Berkeley returns to his earlier claim, that it is language that leads us into this error. (shrink)

In precisely 33 paragraphs that begin his Principles of Human Knowledge George Berkeley lays out the argument that establishes his position. There are strong reasons for adopting “immaterialism” as the name for Berkeley's theory. Another term frequently used in connection with Berkeley is “idealism”. This term too has a lengthy pedigree: Kant referred to Berkeley as a Dogmatic Idealist. Berkeley does go on to offer an elucidation of what it means to say that spirit is the only substance, but he (...) does not do so right away. The only argument that he has offered rests on the anti‐abstraction claim. Berkeley has not, for example, argued that the reason sensible qualities exist only in the mind is because there is no material substance for them to exist in. Anti‐abstractionism also turns out to be central to his argument that ideas cannot resemble mind‐independent real things. (shrink)

Since replying to objections is a familiar philosophical practice, there is nothing very surprising about the presence of such replies here in the Principles of Human Knowledge. The author of the objections is George Berkeley and he decided which objections to answer and in what order they would appear. Berkeley points out that on his criterion, an idea of a thing that is extended, solid, and heavy will be the idea of a real thing. Berkeley says that extension belongs to (...) mind because it exists when perceived; it is a manner of being perceived by a mind. It is not an accident of mind, but instead exists because of something a mind does. The mistake the philosophers are driven to making, according to Berkeley, lies in misunderstanding the nature of the cause of our ideas. Berkeley's own position then is designed specifically to address the mistakes of the philosophers and to provide a better theory. (shrink)

Berkeley begins his discussion of the consequences of his principles negatively, by identifying a rival principle, one that has adverse consequences for human knowledge. About natural philosophers, Berkeley wants it to be known that they are the worst offenders when it comes to encouraging scepticism. This is because they have added what amounts to a new principle to a general mistrust of the senses engendered by the twofold existence principle. Berkeley attributes the error philosophers have fallen into a belief in (...) abstract ideas, linking the issue of external existence with that of abstraction. Berkeley's refutation of scepticism together with his positive account of the knowledge of nature constitutes his evidence for his proof that we have knowledge of God. Understanding the nature of knowledge that is actual allows us to identify the agent of that knowledge as a wise and good spirit, that is to say, as God. (shrink)

In the first few pages of the Third Dialogue, several interesting things happen that provide a framework for this final dialogue. The first is that Hylas embraces skepticism with noticeable fervor. At the beginning of the Third Dialogue, Hylas is ripe for the kind of skepticism to which philosophers fall prey. Philonous's reply to the annihilation objection does depend, however, on a claim he has made previously, that sensible things that are independent of my mind must depend on God's mind, (...) for the reason that ideas can only depend upon minds. Philonous's argument rests on the allegation that ideas are inert and only spirits like God are agent. Hylas's response to Philonous's claim, that he is merely adopting the standard theistic position that God is the ultimate cause, is to offer his own standard objection to any such theistic claim, a version of the problem of evil. (shrink)

The First Dialogue of Three Dialogues covers a lot of ground. It introduces the two characters of the Dialogues, lays down the issue to be discussed, and, by means of the conversation, wrings from Hylas two important concessions. Hylas, who is apparently accustomed to sleeping in, opens the dialogue by revealing that he is up early due to a problem on his mind arising from a late night discussion. Philonous responds with a flowery and enthusiastic account of the beauties of (...) nature to be enjoyed by the early riser. Philonous gets from Hylas the willing admission that nothing is perceived immediately except the proper objects of the senses. George Berkeley leads into the discussion of primary and secondary qualities from a last ditch attempt by Hylas to resurrect his argument about sound with respect to color. He proposes that color is nothing more than the motion of light particles. (shrink)

In Hylas's first attempt to retrieve his original intuition he tries to repair matters by offering a more complicated account of what a perception is. He is not quarreling with the position that the understanding of the world begins with having perceptions, but he does want to maintain that perceptions can consist of two elements, what Hylas calls an object and a sensation. Hylas calls himself a “thinking being” but one who is affected by sensations. Berkeley concludes the First Dialogue (...) with a discussion that aims at undercutting the view that ideas can be thought of as pictures of the objects they represent. He kicks off this discussion by having Philonous restate Hylas's position. The last point of agreement reached by Hylas and Philonous at the end of the First Dialogue is the Likeness Principle: an idea can be like nothing but another idea. (shrink)