The rise of modern science created a crisis for Western moral and political philosophy, which had theretofore relied either on Christian theology or Aristotelian natural teleology as guarantors of an objective standard for "the good life." This book examines Rousseau's effort to show how and why, despite this challenge from science, nature can remain a standard for human behavior. While recognizing an original goodness in human being in the state of nature, Rousseau knew this to be too low a standard (...) and promoted the idea of "the natural man living in the state of society," notably in _Emile_. Laurence Cooper shows how, for Rousseau, conscience—understood as the "love of order"—functions as the agent whereby simple savage sentiment is sublimated into a more refined "civilized naturalness" to which all people can aspire. (shrink)

The rise of modern science created a crisis for Western moral and political philosophy, which had theretofore relied either on Christian theology or Aristotelian natural teleology as guarantors of an objective standard for "the good life." This book examines Rousseau's effort to show how and why, despite this challenge from science, nature can remain a standard for human behavior. While recognizing an original goodness in human being in the state of nature, Rousseau knew this to be too low a standard (...) and promoted the idea of "the natural man living in the state of society," notably in _Emile_. Laurence Cooper shows how, for Rousseau, conscience—understood as the "love of order"—functions as the agent whereby simple savage sentiment is sublimated into a more refined "civilized naturalness" to which all people can aspire. (shrink)

" In this book, Laurence Cooper focuses his attention on three giants of the philosophic tradition for whom this inner force was a major preoccupation and something separate from and greater than the desire for self-preservation.

Human beings are restless souls, ever driven by an insistent inner force not only to _have_ more but to _be_ more—to be _infinitely_ more. Various philosophers have emphasized this type of ceaseless striving in their accounts of humanity, as in Spinoza’s notion of _conatus_ and Hobbes’s identification of “a perpetual and restless desire of power after power.” In this book, Laurence Cooper focuses his attention on three giants of the philosophic tradition for whom this inner force was a (...) major preoccupation and something separate from and greater than the desire for self-preservation. Cooper’s overarching purpose is to illuminate the nature of this source of existential longing and discontent and its implications for political life. He concentrates especially on what these thinkers share in their understanding of this psychic power and how they view it ambivalently as the root not only of ambition, vigorous virtue, patriotism, and philosophy, but also of tyranny, imperialism, and varieties of fanaticism. But he is not neglectful of the differences among their interpretations of the phenomenon, either, and especially highlights these in the concluding chapter. (shrink)

Preface -- Introduction : after the cave -- Part I. The life of philosophy and the life of Rousseau; The reveries of the solitary walker : an introduction -- Part II. "What am I?" : first walk; "A faithful record" : second walk; Becoming a philosopher : third walk; Being a philosopher : fourth, fifth, and sixth walks; Becoming a more perfect philosopher : seventh, eighth, and ninth walks; Coda : the love of wisdom and the wisdom of love : (...) tenth walk. . (shrink)

This book is a collection of secondary essays on America's most important philosophic thinkers—statesmen, judges, writers, educators, and activists—from the colonial period to the present. Each essay is a comprehensive introduction to the thought of a noted American on the fundamental meaning of the American regime.

Laurence Ricard | : La notion d’autonomie personnelle joue un rôle central dans les théories politiques contemporaines et, plus spécifiquement, dans les théories de la justice. Or, dans le paradigme libéral dominant, elle est définie par une compréhension rationaliste de l’agent individuel. La présente étude défend la nécessité de redéfinir ce concept d’autonomie à la lumière des développements philosophiques et psychologiques qui ont complexifié notre compréhension de la subjectivité. L’emploi du concept d’autonomie relationnelle développé par certains auteurs féministes et (...) par certains théoriciens de la reconnaissance semble pour ce faire prometteur. Cet article cherche à montrer qu’une compréhension relationnelle de l’autonomie est nécessaire pour expliquer la motivation à la coopération sociale et pour redéfinir la justice et l’injustice de façon à ce qu’elles correspondent à l’expérience sociale vécue. | : The notion of personal autonomy plays a central role in contemporary political theories and especially in theories of justice. Generally speaking, the dominant liberal paradigm defines individual agency in a purely rationalistic manner. Against this tradition, the present study argues for the necessity of rethinking and redefining this rationalistic concept of autonomy in light of psychological and philosophical developments that have complicated our understanding of subjectivity. For this purpose, the concept of relational autonomy, developed by feminist authors and some theorists of recognition, is most promising. This article aims to show that a relational understanding of autonomy is necessary to explain motivations for social cooperation and to understand justice and injustice in a way that corresponds to lived social experience. (shrink)

This is a review of Laurence Houlgate's "Family and State: the Philosophy of Family Law. It takes a look at the moral theory from which Houlgate begins and raises questions about is correctness and appropriateness, but it finds more to agree with with respect to his middle-level principles. It considers his definition of "family" in the context of contemporary political controversy over such definitions. It looks at his consequentialist justification for the family, agrees with it, and suggests additional supplementary (...) arguments, primarily from Brigitte and Peter Berger, to give additional support for Houlgate's argument. It looks at his justification for family law and agrees with his principle of optimum communal benefit. It seeks to place Houlgate's views within the context of contemporary political debate about being "pro-family" or "anti-family". It then goes on to look briefly at some of the specific issues of family law that Houlgate considers, taking time to raise a few questions about some of them, and concludes by dealing in a more extensive way with the question of what the extent and limits of state interference in the family should be, agreeing with Houlgate's basic position, but considering further its application to specific issues. (shrink)

The object of this article is to clarify the relationship between morality and family law in a variety of legal situations. This will give the reader a better grasp of the kind of case to be included in the traditionalist claim that the idea of legal intervention in the family is a coherent notion. Once this is sorted, we will be in a position to discuss and clarify the radical thesis that "the personal is political.".

This paper is an analysis of the concept "Mistake in Performance," a phrase first coined by Miss Elizabeth Anscombe in her monograph On Intention. The author shows that examples of a mistake in performance are nothing but cases of ordinary mistakes of judgment. The only difference between the two is that in cases of mistake in performance the agent acts on the basis of an erroneous judgment, that is, he fails to do what he intended to do.

This paper is a critique of Norman Malcolm's claim that things that do not have the human form (e.g. trees, tables, computers) cannot' understand' or 'think' because they cannot point at, reach for, go to, look at, fetch or get something.

The aim of this book is to provide a better foundation for the legal rights of children than what now exists. The first part of the book describes the current legal status of children and critically discusses the traditional arguments for denying certain legal rights to children while granting them others. The second part describes and defends a general theory of children's rights, based on the principles of utility and egalitarian justice. The third part shows how the theory justifies significant (...) change in the current legal system. (shrink)

ONE Introduction The history of psychology in the twentieth century is a story of the divorce and remarriage of psychology and philosophy. ...

The human genome is not a uniform structure but, instead, is a mosaic of bands. Some of these bands can be seen by the eye. Stained with Giemsa and viewed under the microscope each human chromosome has a prototypical pattern of light and dark bands (G and R bands respectively). Other bands are not so easily viewed. The human genome is, for example, a mosaic of isochores, blocks of DNA within which the proportion of the bases G and C at (...) silent sites (introns, third positions in codons, intergene spacer) is fairly uniform. Recent work by Matassi and colleagues(1) has revealed what might be a new and unexpected banding pattern. They have found that the genes which are close together on the chromosome have similar rates of evolution. BioEssays 22:105–107, 2000. ©2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

This book is about the eminent behavioral scientist B. F. Skinner, the American culture in which he lived and worked, and the behaviorist movement that played a leading role in American psychological and social thought during the twentieth century. From a base of research on laboratory animals in the 1930s, Skinner built a committed and influential following as well as a utopian movement for social reform. His radical ideas attracted much public attention and generated heated controversy. By the mid-1970s, he (...) had become the most widely recognized scientist in America, surpassing even Margaret Mead and Linus Pauling. Yet Skinner himself was an unassuming family man from a modest middle-class background, a machine-shop tinkerer whose tastes ran to English and French literature. Drawing on archival research, interviews, and historical styles appropriate to the evidence, the authors assembled in this volume examine Skinner's remarkable rise to prominence in the wider context of America's intellectual, cultural, and social history. (shrink)

The neobehaviorist Clark L. Hull and his disciple Kenneth Spence shared in common many views on the nature of science and the role of theories in psychology. However, a telling exchange in their correspondence of the early 1940s reveals a disagreement over the nature of intervening variables in behavior theory. Spence urged Hull to abandon his interpretations of intervening variables in terms of physiological models in favor of positivistic, purely mathematical interpretations that conflicted with Hull's mechanistic explanatory aims and ontological (...) commitment to materialism. This dispute is set against the background of similar disputes in physics, and the origins of Hull's and Spence's divergent views on theoretical explanation are described. (shrink)

This author (1) offers an analysis of the familiar type of excuse that Aristotle categorized as "acts owing to ignorance." (2) exhibits the conditions under which ignorance of fact either fails or succeeds in absolving an agent of responsibility, and (3) shows how these considerations can be used to illuminate the nature of the mental element in responsibility.

Xenophon’s Oeconomicus presents the boldest possible response to the city’s charge that Socrates corrupted the young: the city itself, not Socrates, is guilty of this charge. The city’s teaching about what constitutes a noble human being cannot be reconciled with the good of the human being as such; it actually opposes this good. While the would-be gentleman’s desire to be noble shapes his understanding of household management, it fails to bring him the god-like self sufficiency he seeks. Socrates’ critique of (...) the perfect gentleman’s education of his wife demonstrates why the sacrifices made for the household and the gods do not benefit those who seek to be noble. Over the course of the dialogue, images of the Socratic way of life emerge. By revealing the nature of philosophy and its relationship to the good and noble things which the city extols, this dialogue teaches its readers why the Socratic way of life benefits human beings. (shrink)

A critical discussion of the "recipe" theory of causation, as proposed by Douglas Gasking. The author also proposes his own theory of the ordinary meaning of statements of the form "A causes B.".

The purpose of the paper is to discover a rationale for the practice of attaching excuses to criminal responsibility. I do this by criticizing the theory of h l a hart that we adopt this practice largely because it gives persons more power to predict and determine their liability to punishment than would a system of "strict" liability. I extract from my criticisms of hart the alternative theory that we adopt the institution of excuses because it insures that persons do (...) not assume burdens beyond what it is necessary to assume for the benefits of the legal system to accrue to all. (shrink)

The author contends that none of the rationales for not allowing ignorance of the law as an excuse in criminal law cases is persuasive. The paper begins by analyzing the condition under which "reasonable" ignorance of the law ought to be allowed as an excuse. Second, the author indicates in greater detail the sense in which 'justice' requires that we recognize these conditions. Third, the author critically examines the arguments used by legal theorists for disregarding the claims of justice to (...) the individual defendant in cases where reasonable ignorance of law is alleged. Finally, the author wants to show that philosophy matters. A philosophical reading of ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorance of the law does not excuse) can expose conceptual errors that are not seen in legal readings. (shrink)

This book is a unique introduction to the philosophy of law that repairs an enormous gap in the philosophy of law -- a lack of philosophical attention to family law. (In fact, PhilPapers does not recognize the philosophy of family law as a category.) This book uses only cases drawn from family law to illustrate the traditional problems of legal philosophy. This is why I wrote this book as a textbook rather than as a monograph. My hope is that students (...) will learn more about the problems of legal philosophy by using cases with which they might be more familiar than from criminal law cases. Questions for thought and discussion follow each chapter. (shrink)

This book begins with an overview of the current legal status of children under U.S. federal and state law, It includes an analysis of relevant Supreme Court decisions and an extended critique of the philosophical arguments for treating children differently from adults under the law. Sections in the book include discussions of the need for a theory of juvenile rights, the moral arguments that prop up such theories, Professor Houlgate's proposal for a theory, and a final discussion of the applications (...) of his theory to the debates about status offenses, child neglect, and rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. (shrink)

I. Although there has been considerable recent dispute as to what Socrates meant by saying that Virtue is Knowledge, if the claim is, as it is sometimes taken to be, that knowledge of the essential nature of virtue is sufficient for virtuous behavior, then it is only necessary to point out what seem to be quite obvious counter in stances. The fact of moral weakness, coupled with what large numbers of scientists and lawyers and plain men now believe about the (...) capacity of human beings for self-control, demonstrates that a man can surely know the good and yet fail to do the virtuous thing. What, then, is left of the view that Virtue is Knowledge? (shrink)

A musical phrase, or, for that matter, a musical unit of any size or shape, becomes an image whenever we imagine it to be invested with a content whose origins lie outside music. Such a content, according to the theory developed here, constitutes the image's conventional significance; it accounts for whatever strikes us about the image as having a common and familiar ring. That being so, the origins in question must be coincident with the fundamental ideas--the archetypes--that have been traditionally (...) represented as underlying and unifying Western culture. As the theoretical constructs they are, arehctypes are never encountered directly. It is in the form of their local variants that we make contact with the archetypes, and it is at this local level that the present book sets its sights: style, the typical or shared element in the musical imagery of a time and place, is studies as a function of Zeitgeist, the complex of beliefs, values, and ideals of a community. The approach is both thematic and historical, in keeping with a key objective of archetypal criticism. Far from repudiating the popular notion that music expresses the human emotions, this study attempts to recast emotion theory by examining musical images for kinds of behavior from which we may infer not only emotion (pathos, effectus) but also personality (ethos). Ethical and affective distinctions are very sharply drawn, in an effort to clarify and widen the vocabulary of musical commentary, as well as to provide cultural and historical backing for contents long considered the cliches of musical expression. (shrink)

Robert Cummins has recently used the program of Clark Hull to illustrate the effects of logical positivist epistemology upon psychological theory. On Cummins's account, Hull's theory is best understood as a functional analysis, rather than a nomological subsumption. Hull's commitment to the logical positivist view of explanation is said to have blinded him to this aspect of this theory, and thus restricted its scope. We will argue that this interpretation of Hull's epistemology, though common, is mistaken. Hull's epistemological views were (...) developed independently of, and in considerable contrast to, the principles of logical positivism. (shrink)

This article is primarily a defense of the Paradigm Case Argument (PCA). It is secondarily a comment on a recent controversy over the validity of its use in philosophy. I argue that the controversy rests on a misinterpretation. By extending the analysis of the objections (and here I invoke Descartes' famous method of possible doubt) I show that the occurrence of a paradigm and the fact that a concept is normally used to describe that paradigm logically entails not that the (...) paradigm is instantiated, but only that it is correct to apply that concept to that paradigm. In this manner the ontological fallacy is avoided, and further, this enforces the important separation between saying something about the correct application of a concept and saying something about its meaning. (shrink)

Mary P. Nichols, Socrates on Friendship and Community: Reflections on Plato’s Symposium, Phaedrus, and Lysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp. viii + 229. ISBN 978-0-521-89973-4. Laurence D. Cooper, Eros in Plato, Rousseau, and Nietzsche: The Politics of Infinity. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008. Pp. xii + 357. ISBN 978-0-271-03330-3.