Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers: Knowing Our Own Minds gives a much-needed overview of current work on the subject, bringing together new essays by leading figures. Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. The contributors examine philosophical questions raised by the distinctive character of self-knowledge, relating it to knowledge of other minds, to rationality and agency, externalist (...) theories of psychological content, and knowledge of language. Together these original, stimulating, and closely interlinked essays demonstrate the special relevance of self-knowledge to a broad range of issues in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. (shrink)

Wittgenstein finished part 1 of the _Philosophical Investigations_ in the spring of 1945. From 1946 to 1949 he worked on the philosophy of psychology almost without interruption. The present two-volume work comprises many of his writings over this period. Some of the remarks contained here were culled for part 2 of the _Investigations_; others were set aside and appear in the collection known as Zettel. The great majority, however, although of excellent quality, have hitherto remained unpublished. This bilingual edition of (...) the _Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology_ presents the first English translation of an essential body of Wittgenstein's work. It elaborates Wittgenstein's views on psychological concepts such as expectation, sensation, knowing how to follow a rule, and knowledge of the sensations of other persons. It also shows strong emphasis on the "anthropological" aspect of Wittgenstein's thought. Philosophers, as well as anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists will welcome this important publication. (shrink)

Wittgenstein finished part 1 of the _Philosophical Investigations_ in the spring of 1945. From 1946 to 1949 he worked on the philosophy of psychology almost without interruption. The present two-volume work comprises many of his writings over this period. Some of the remarks contained here were culled for part 2 of the _Investigations_; others were set aside and appear in the collection known as Zettel. The great majority, however, although of excellent quality, have hitherto remained unpublished. This bilingual edition of (...) the _Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology_ presents the first English translation of an essential body of Wittgenstein's work. It elaborates Wittgenstein's views on psychological concepts such as expectation, sensation, knowing how to follow a rule, and knowledge of the sensations of other persons. It also shows strong emphasis on the "anthropological" aspect of Wittgenstein's thought. Philosophers, as well as anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists will welcome this important publication. (shrink)

The first English translation of Fichte’s second set of 1804 lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre.

In den bisherigen Auseinandersetzungen hat der Schriftsteller eine besondere Hierarchie des Denkens angewandt, nämlich ontologisch... anthropologisch... pädagogisch. Ontologisches Denken in der Pädagogik ist heutzutage an der Tagesordnung. Die Fundamentalpädagogik soll in der ersten Linie eine Ontologie der Erziehung sein: “Als Strukturanalyse der Seinsweise von Erziehung erscheint die Erziehungsphilosophie also zunächst Ontologie der Erziehung...”27 Fundamentalpädagogik als ontologisch-anthropologische Pädagogik ist daher eine Suche nach ontischen Strukturen als Seinsbedingungen für das In-Erscheinung-Treten des Pädagogischen. Klafki erklärt, dass es dem Pädagogen als Wissenschaftler der Seinsweise (...) von Erziehung unmöglich ist, wissenschaftliche Aussagen zu geben, wenn sie nicht fortfliessen aus einer ontologischen Bestimmung der Erziehungswirklichkeit: “Es gibt kein pädagogisches Sein ohne pädagogisches Denken, aber auch kein pädagogisches Denken, das abgelöst wäre vom pädagogischen Sein.”28 In diesem pädagogischen Aufsatz hat der Schriftsteller einen Versuch gemacht, pädagogische Kategorien und Kriterien ontologisch-anthropologisch zu fundieren. (shrink)

1. Letting go of each particular and determinate instance of knowing, the science of knowledge starts directly with knowing in its unity which seems real to it, and initially asks itself the question, How is this knowing possible? What might it be in its inner and simple essence?

This article is part of a For-Discussion-Section of Methods of Information in Medicine about the paper "Biomedical Informatics: We Are What We Publish", written by Peter L. Elkin, Steven H. Brown, and Graham Wright. It is introduced by an editorial. This article contains the combined commentaries invited to independently comment on the Elkin et al. paper. In subsequent issues the discussion can continue through letters to the editor.

A subspace V of an infinite dimensional fully effective vector space V ∞ is called decidable if V is r.e. and there exists an r.e. W such that $V \oplus W = V_\infty$ . These subspaces of V ∞ are natural analogues of recursive subsets of ω. The set of r.e. subspaces forms a lattice L(V ∞ ) and the set of decidable subspaces forms a lower semilattice S(V ∞ ). We analyse S(V ∞ ) and its relationship with L(V (...) ∞ ). We show: Proposition. Let U, V, W ∈ L(V ∞ ) where U is infinite dimensional and $U \oplus V = W$ . Then there exists a decidable subspace D such that U |oplus D = W. Corollary. Any r.e. subspace can be expressed as the direct sum of two decidable subspaces. These results allow us to show: Proposition. The first order theory of the lower semilattice of decidable subspaces, Th(S(V ∞ )), is undecidable. This contrasts sharply with the result for recursive sets. Finally we examine various generalizations of our results. In particular we analyse S * (V ∞ ), that is, S(V ∞ ) modulo finite dimensional subspaces. We show S * (V ∞ ) is not a lattice. (shrink)

Is there ever any reason for a doctor to lie to a patient? In this paper, we critically review the literature on lying to patients and challenge the common notion that while lying is unacceptable, a related entity--'benevolent deception' is defensible. Further, we outline a rare circumstance when treating psychotic patients where lying to the patient is justified. This circumstance is illustrated by a clinical vignette.