Un calcul logique, au sens large, est une méthode de résolution appliquée au traitement d'une structure propositionnelle. Les propositions constituant cette structure peuvent aussi bien être des expressions d'une langue naturelle (comme le français) que des expressions d'un langage formalisé (comme l'arithmétique), liées entre elles par une dépendance de nature fonctionnelle. Cet ouvrage constitue une introduction à deux outils de calcul en logique du premier ordre, soit le calcul en arbres de consistance et le calcul en déduction naturelle. La première (...) partie, centrée sur la notion de structure propositionnelle, expose les concepts, les objets et les méthodes propres à la logique propositionnelle. Dans la deuxième partie, la logique propositionnelle est étendue à la logique prédicative au moyen de la quantification et de concepts caractéristiques d'un langage du premier ordre. Les deux outils de calcul sont ensuite enrichis de manière à pouvoir traiter des fonctions propositionnelles, soit des prédicats du premier ordre.De nombreux exemples et exercices, accompagnés de leurs solutions, aideront l'étudiant à progresser vers des calculs toujours plus complexes et à raffiner ses méthodes de calcul logique. (shrink)

Christoph Jäger has argued that Dretske’s information-based account of knowledge is committed to both knowledge and information closure under known entailment. However, in a reply to Jäger, Dretske defended his view on the basis of a discrepancy between the relation of information and the relation of logical implication. This paper shares Jäger’s criticism that Dretske’s externalist notion of information implies closure, but provides an analysis based on different grounds. By means of a distinction between two perspectives, the mathematical perspective and (...) the epistemological perspective, I present, in the former, a notion of logical implication that is compatible with the notion of information in the mathematical theory of information, and I show how, in the latter, Dretske’s logical reading of the closure principle is incompatible with his information-theoretic epistemological framework. (shrink)

The general principle of epistemic closure stipulates that epistemic properties are transmissible through logical means. According to this principle, an epistemic operator, say ε, should satisfy any valid scheme of inference, such as: if ε(p entails q), then ε(p) entails ε(q). The principle of epistemic closure under known entailment (ECKE), a particular instance of epistemic closure, has received a good deal of attention since the last thirty years or so. ECKE states that: if one knows that p entails q, and (...) she knows that p, then she knows that q. It is widely accepted that ECKE constitutes an important piece of the skeptical argument, but the acceptance of an unrestricted version of ECKE is still a matter of debate. On the side of the defenders of ECKE, one finds Stine (1976), Brueckner (1985), Vogel (1990), and Feldman (1995). Others proposed a refutation or a limitation of the principle, like Dretske (1970), Nozick (1981), Hales (1995), Williams (1996), and Sosa (1999). As it turns out, the relevant alternatives view (RAV) elaborated by Dretske, which restricts the scope of ECKE, has been discussed extensively and acknowledged as one of the most important contributions. There is nonetheless a major unsolved difficulty pertaining to Dretske-RAV: the notion of relevant alternatives is defined in such a way that it is bounded by counterfactual possibilities. This ontological import leaves open the door to the skeptic. Some have tried to give more precision to this notion, like Stine (1976), who appealed to a Gricean approach to define relevant alternatives in conversational contexts. My proposal is in accordance with the gist of Dretske’s strategy, i.e. to restrict the validity of ECKE, and I claim that in order to escape the difficulties inherent to RAV one has to introduce a more robust notion, the notion of epistemic context. Epistemic contexts are a subclass of propositional contexts. In that perspective, the closure property is expressed in terms of a property of a relation between epistemic contexts. ECKE holds when and only when either the epistemic context of the premisses is the same as the epistemic context of the conclusion, or the epistemic context change between the premisses and the conclusion is permissible. Permissibility of epistemic context change is a function of consistency. By means of this epistemic context approach, I will show that: (1) epistemic contexts are defined by basic propositions (unchallenged justified beliefs), (2) ECKE holds only under very specific constraints, and (3) the skeptical argument involves a non-permissible change of epistemic context and, by the same token, cannot rely upon ECKE. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a contextualist reading of the KK-thesis. In the first part, I present the general problem and I contrast three concepts of knowledge with respect to the KK-thesis, (Hintikka, Lemmon, and Williamson) that all rely on a univocal interpretation of the K-predicate. In the second part, I provide a contextualist framework based upon an indexical interpretation of the K-predicate and the notion of epistemic context. I show how this framework can integrate different concepts of knowledge, and (...) how it highlights the crucial significance of the KK-thesis for epistemology. (shrink)

Cette etude a pour but d'etablir que l'epistemologie developpee par Kant dans la Critique de la raison pure est holiste. Pour ce faire, nous construirons, dans la Partie I, un cadre conceptuel permettant de definir ce qui peut caracteriser un systeme holiste. La Partie II sera consacree a l'examen de la Critique de la raison pure selon ce cadre conceptuel. Enfin, apres avoir montre que les developpements epistemologiques majeurs de la premiere Critique satisfont les conditions du cadre holiste, nous mettrons (...) en relief, dans la Partie III, les fondements et les implications de la forme de holisme particuliere a l'epistemologie kantienne. Au terme de cette etude, la Theorie des elements de la Critique de la raison pure manifestera une unite fondamentale faisant de l'Esthetique, de l'Analytique et de la Dialectique trois moments d'un mouvement regressif de plus en plus totalisant et dont le point d'achevement se trouve dans l'analyse de l'ideal transcendantal. (shrink)

This paper presents an epistemological framework capable of addressing the opposition between indigenous knowledge and scientific knowledge, an opposition widespread in anthropology especially in relation to the problem of sustainable development. In the first part of the paper, we provide a contextualist framework that satisfies two constraints: a priori neutrality with respect to forms, or types, of knowledge, and explicitness of the conditions with respect to the possibility of knowledge transfer. In the second part, we apply the framework to the (...) specific case of Northern Algonquian knowledge. By means of the framework, we investigate and make explicit the underlying epistemic standard at play by identifying the conditions under which particular beliefs are qualified as knowledge in the Northern Algonquian context. (shrink)

This paper presents an epistemological framework capable of addressing the opposition between indigenous knowledge and scientific knowledge, an opposition widespread in anthropology especially in relation to the problem of sustainable development. In the first part of the paper, we provide a contextualist framework that satisfies two constraints: a priori neutrality with respect to forms, or types, of knowledge, and explicitness of the conditions with respect to the possibility of knowledge transfer. In the second part, we apply the framework to the (...) specific case of Northern Algonquian knowledge. By means of the framework, we investigate and make explicit the underlying epistemic standard at play by identifying the conditions under which particular beliefs are qualified as knowledge in the Northern Algonquian context. (shrink)

In this paper, I show the complementarity of foundationalism and coherentism with respect to any efficient system of beliefs by means of a distinction between two types of proposition drawn from an analogy with an axiomatic system. This distinction is based on the way a given proposition is acknowledged as true, either by declaration (F-proposition) or by preservation (C-proposition). Within such a perspective, i.e., epistemological complementarism, not only can one see how the usual opposition between foundationalism and coherentism is irrelevant, (...) but furthermore one can appreciate the reciprocal relation between these two theories as they refer to two separate epistemological functions involved in the dynamics of constituting and expanding an epistemic system. (shrink)

Our intuitive assumption that only organisms are the real individuals in the natural world is at odds with developments in cell biology, ecology, genetics, evolutionary biology, and other fields. Although organisms have served for centuries as nature’s paradigmatic individuals, science suggests that organisms are only one of the many ways in which the natural world could be organized. When living beings work together—as in ant colonies, beehives, and bacteria-metazoan symbiosis—new collective individuals can emerge. In this book, leading scholars consider the (...) biological and philosophical implications of the emergence of these new collective individuals from associations of living beings. The topics they consider range from metaphysical issues to biological research on natural selection, sociobiology, and symbiosis. -/- The contributors investigate individuality and its relationship to evolution and the specific concept of organism; the tension between group evolution and individual adaptation; and the structure of collective individuals and the extent to which they can be defined by the same concept of individuality. These new perspectives on evolved individuality should trigger important revisions to both philosophical and biological conceptions of the individual. -/- Contributors: Frédéric Bouchard, Ellen Clarke, Jennifer Fewell, Andrew Gardner, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Charles J. Goodnight, Matt Haber, Andrew Hamilton, Philippe Huneman, Samir Okasha, Thomas Pradeu, Scott Turner, Minus van Baalen. (shrink)

E. O. Wilson (1974: 54) describes the problem that social organisms pose: “On what bases do we distinguish the extremely modified members of an invertebrate colony from the organs of a metazoan animal?” This framing of the issue has inspired many to look more closely at how groups of organisms form and behave as emergent individuals. The possible existence of “superorganisms” test our best intuitions about what can count and act as genuine biological individuals and how we should study them. (...) As we will discuss, colonies of certain organisms display many of the properties that we usually reserve only to individual organisms. Although there is good reason to believe that many social insects form genuine emergent biological individuals, the conclusion offered here is of a slightly different sort. I will argue that to understand some social insects' interactions and the emergent traits they give rise to, it may be helpful to shift our understanding from a community-level approach to an ecosystem-level approach. I will argue that viewing certain insect colonies (termites) as parts of ecosystems allows us to better understand some of the adaptations that have emerged from their evolution. (shrink)

Peu de textes de Pascal semblent relever de l'expérience ou du discours mystique. Outre le Mémorial, qui garde mémoire d'une expérience de Dieu sur une feuille de papier, outre la Prière pour demander à Dieu le bon usage des maladies, certaines lettres à Mlle de Roannez contiennent des conseils pour se rapprocher de Dieu, et d'autres lettres spirituelles, comme celle écrite après la mort de son père, traitent de l'attitude du chrétien face à la mort. L'Ecrit sur la conversion du (...) pécheur nous livre les difficultés de l'homme à la recherche de Dieu. Cependant, malgré la pauvreté quantitative des textes traitant assez clairement de la mystique, il nous est apparu qu'elle constitue la clé de voûte de l'édifice pascalien, sans laquelle l'oeuvre de Pascal ne fait pas sens. A partir de ce point ultime et transcendant, expliqué en partie par le contexte familial et social de Pascal, on peut relire et comprendre sa démarche scientifique, et la relation entretenue avec la Bible. Ainsi nous proposons une relecture de l'intégralité de l'oeuvre pascalienne, en la replaçant dans l'histoire de la mystique judéo-chrétienne, et en mettant notamment en relief la façon dont Pascal s'est approprié l'esprit et la mystique bibliques, dans une tradition où l'influence du dualisme platonicien n'est pas étrangère. La mystique pascalienne se définit ainsi comme le désir d'une union à Dieu, médiatisée par la figure du Christ, et il en résulte une relation de chaque instant, où l'homme se sent transformé, déifié, dans un sentiment de joie. (shrink)

This article addresses the conditions that are necessary for non-Indigenous people to learn from Indigenous people, more specifically from women and feminists. As non-Indigenous scholars, we first explore the challenges of epistemic dialogue through the example of Traditional Ecological Knowledge. From there, through the concept of mastery, we examine the social and ontological conditions under which settler subjectivities develop. As demonstrated by Julietta Singh and Val Plumwood, the logic of mastery—which has legitimated the oppression and exploitation of Indigenous peoples—has been (...) reproduced in academia, leaving almost no room for Indigenous knowledge and epistemes. In the same vein, Sámi scholar Rauna Kuokkanen reclaims and suggests the logic of the gift as a means to render academia more hospitable to Indigenous peoples and epistemes. In our view, reclaim as a concept-practice is a promising way to disrupt colonial, racist, and sexist power relations. Thus, we in turn propose to reclaim vulnerability as defined by Judith Butler in order to deconstruct masterful settler subjectivities and reconstruct relational ones instead. As theorized by Erinn Gilson, we propose epistemic vulnerability to imagine the conditions of our learning from Indigenous peoples and philosophies. (shrink)

For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary normative authority? According to what I call epistemic constitutivism, it is ultimately because belief constitutively aims at truth. In this paper, I examine various versions of the aim of belief thesis and argue that none of them can plausibly ground the normative authority of epistemic norms. I conclude that epistemic constitutivism is not a promising strategy for (...) grounding epistemic normativity. (shrink)

According to moral error theorists, moral claims necessarily represent categorically or robustly normative facts. But since there are no such facts, moral thought and discourse are systematically mistaken. One widely discussed objection to the moral error theory is that it cannot be true because it leads to an epistemic error theory. We argue that this objection is mistaken. Objectors may be right that the epistemic error theory is untenable. We also agree with epistemic realists that our epistemological claims are not (...) systematically in error. However, this is not because there are robustly normative facts, but rather because the truth of our epistemic claims doesn’t turn on whether there are such facts. Epistemic facts, we argue, are not robustly or categorically normative. Moral error theorists should therefore respond to the objection that their view does not commit them to the epistemic error theory. (shrink)

What is the source of epistemic normativity? In virtue of what do epistemic norms have categorical normative authority? According to epistemic teleologism, epistemic normativity comes from value. Epistemic norms have categorical authority because conforming to them is necessarily good in some relevant sense. In this article, I argue that epistemic teleologism should be rejected. The problem, I argue, is that there is no relevant sense in which it is always good to believe in accordance with epistemic norms, including in cases (...) where the matter at hand is completely trivial. Therefore, if epistemology is normative, its normativity won't come from value. (shrink)

According to epistemic instrumentalism, epistemic normativity arises from and depends on facts about our ends. On that view, a consideration C is an epistemic reason for a subject S to Φ only if Φ-ing would promote an end that S has. However, according to the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, this cannot be correct since there are cases in which, intuitively, C is an epistemic reason for S to Φ even though Φ-ing would not promote any of S’s ends. After (...) clarifying both EI and the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, I examine three major instrumentalist replies and argue that none of them is satisfactory. I end by briefly sketching a fourth possible response, which is, I suggest, more promising than the other three. (shrink)

Epistemic instrumentalism views epistemic norms and epistemic normativity as essentially involving the instrumental relation between means and ends. It construes notions like epistemic normativity, norms, and rationality, as forms of instrumental or means-end normativity, norms, and rationality. I do two main things in this paper. In part 1, I argue that there is an under-appreciated distinction between two independent types of epistemic instrumentalism. These are instrumentalism about epistemic norms and instrumentalism about epistemic normativity. In part 2, I argue that this (...) under-appreciated distinction matters for the debate surrounding the plausibility of EI. Specifically, whether we interpret EI as norm-EI or as source-EI matters for the widely discussed universality or categoricity objection to EI, and for two important motivations for adopting EI, namely naturalism and the practical utility of epistemic norms. I will then conclude by drawing some lessons for epistemic instrumentalism going forward. (shrink)

Epistemology is widely seen as a normative discipline like ethics. Just like moral facts, epistemic facts – i.e. facts about our beliefs’ epistemic justification, rationality, reasonableness, correctness, warrant, and the like – are standardly viewed as normative facts. Yet, whereas many philosophers have rejected the existence of moral facts, few have raised similar doubts about the existence of epistemic facts. In recent years however, several metaethicists and epistemologists have rejected this Janus-faced or dual stance towards the existence of moral and (...) epistemic facts. As recent developments in metaethics and normativity theory have made clear, objections to the existence of moral facts really are metanormative objections that target the existence of normative facts more generally. But since epistemic facts are no less normative than moral facts, the argument goes, the existence of the former is equally threatened by metaethical objections. In this thesis, I argue that this rejection of the dual stance fails because epistemic facts are not normative facts. Although they imply norms, they do not imply genuine normativity since the epistemic norms of belief that they imply lack necessary normative authority or force. Unlike moral norms and just like e.g. norms of etiquette and the law, there is not automatically a normative reason to conform to epistemic norms. Therefore, even if metaethical objections target all normative facts, it does not follow that they also target epistemic facts. I offer a two-part abductive argument in favour of that conclusion. First, I argue that epistemic facts lack five commonly cited features of normative facts (but not of merely norm-implying facts). Then, I argue that this is best explained by the thesis that epistemic facts are merely norm-implying and not genuinely normative. I end by exploring the potential consequences of this conclusion for epistemology and metaethics. (shrink)

According to epistemic deontologism, attributions of epistemic justification are deontic claims about what we ought to believe. One of the most prominent objections to this conception, due mainly to William P. Alston, is that the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ rules out deontologism because our beliefs are not under our voluntary control. In this paper, I offer a partial defense of Alston’s critique of deontologism. While Alston is right that OIC rules out epistemic deontologism, appealing to doxastic involuntarism is not (...) necessary for generating that tension. Deontologists would still have a problem with OIC if doxastic voluntarism turned out to be true or if deontologism did not require voluntarism. This is because, in short, epistemic justification does not imply ‘can’. If, as deontologists maintain, epistemic justification implies ‘oughts’, then epistemic justification must also imply ‘can’ given OIC. But since epistemic justification does not imply ‘can’, OIC dictates that we reject deontologism. I end by exploring the possible consequences of this incompatibility between OIC and deontologism. My conclusion is that at least one of the following claims must be true. Either ‘ought’ does not imply ‘can’, attributions of epistemic justification are not deontic claims, or epistemic claims lack necessary or categorical normative authority. (shrink)

Présenter un aperçu de la « mystique chrétienne médiévale » n’est possible qu’en la situant brièvement dans l’histoire de la « mystique » en Occident. Le terme n’est pas dénué d’ambiguïté. Apparaissant dans le contexte des religions à mystères, la mystique évolue vers une expérience silencieuse que les mots ne peuvent capter, avant de désigner des phénomènes anormaux décrits dans une rhétorique de l’étrange. Par rapport à la littérature moderne, les textes médiévaux sont très sobres. Faisant à écho à la (...) théologie mystique de Denys l’Aréopagite (ve-vie s.), ils présentent une voie d’union à l’Un en deçà des mots et des concepts. Il ne suffit pas de connaître (mathein) Dieu par un savoir notionnel, il faut en faire l’expérience, « en pâtir » (pathein). Ce « pâtir Dieu » sera repris par Maître Eckhart (1260-1328), le chef de file de la mystique rhénane. (shrink)

We argue that ecology in general and biodiversity and ecosystem function research in particular need an understanding of functions which is both ahistorical and evolutionarily grounded. A natural candidate in this context is Bigelow and Pargetter’s evolutionary forward-looking account which, like the causal role account, assigns functions to parts of integrated systems regardless of their past history, but supplements this with an evolutionary dimension that relates functions to their bearers’ ability to thrive and perpetuate themselves. While Bigelow and Pargetter’s account (...) focused on functional organization at the level of organisms, we argue that such an account can be extended to functional organization at the community and ecosystem levels in a way that broadens the scope of the reconciliation between ecosystem ecology and evolutionary biology envisioned by many BEF researchers. By linking an evolutionary forward-looking account of functions to the persistence-based understanding of evolution defended by Bouchard and others, and to the theoretical research on complex adaptive systems, we argue that ecosystems, by forming more or less resilient assemblages, can evolve even while they do not reproduce and form lineages. We thus propose a Persistence Enhancing Propensity account of role functions in ecology to account for this overlap of evolutionary and ecological processes. (shrink)

Why does something please us? Is there right and wrong in aesthetics? What is the value of art? What do philosophical and aesthetic problems have in common? Wittgenstein worked intensively on these and other questions and wrote of the strange resemblance between aesthetics and philosophy. This study shows how Wittgenstein s arguments have substantially contributed to explaining systematic questions in aesthetics.".

Le constat est maintenant partout: la puissance du fondamentalisme religieux, la montee des populismes de droite comme de gauche, le discredit de la classe politique, le rejet de la construction europeenne, rendent caducs les schemas anciens. En particulier l'idee que la democratie, a force de bienveillance, peut tolerer toutes les differences, toutes les croyances. Oui! Il y a des croyances insupportables et intolerables. Non! Le populisme n'est pas une illusion qui se dissipera d'elle-meme avec un peu de pedagogie et de (...) bonne volonte. Non! La politique internationale n'obeit pas aux chartes du droit international. Il faut denoncer la tyrannie des bons sentiments, la politique de l'emotion et de la compassion. Non que la bienveillance soit un sentiment indigne, mais nous devons cesser de croire qu'on peut batir sur elle une communaute politique. (shrink)

« Déconstruire l’idée que l’animal serait sans intelligence, sans conscience, sans langage, etc., n’est qu’une étape vers une entreprise plus essentielle : la reconnaissance de la richesse des mondes animaux, dans leur diversité, sans céder à la tentation de les hiérarchiser. Tel est l’esprit qui m’anime dans cet ouvrage. Parce que les animaux, humains ou non humains, ne sont pas les jouets passifs du monde qui les entoure et qu’ils en sont au contraire les créateurs actifs, parce qu’ils sont porteurs (...) d’une vision du monde, je les considère comme des philosophes. Ils ne se contentent pas de percevoir passivement leur environnement, ils l’élaborent, ils l’anticipent. Ils donnent du sens aux choses. » Y. C. Biologiste et journaliste scientifique, Yves Christen préside la Fondation Ipsen. Il a notamment publié Le Peuple léopard, Les Surdoués du monde animal et L’animal est-il une personne?. (shrink)

ABSTRACT According to G.E. Moore’s ‘Open Question’ argument, moral facts cannot be reduced or analyzed in non-normative natural terms. Does the OQA apply equally in the epistemic domain? Does Moore’s argument have the same force against reductionist accounts of epistemic facts and concepts? In a recent article, Daniel Greco has argued that it does. According to Greco, an epistemological version of the OQA is just as promising as its moral cousin, because the relevant questions in epistemology are just as ‘open’ (...) as those in ethics. In this paper, I offer a two-part reply to Greco. First, I argue that his argument in favor of the openness of epistemology is not persuasive. Second, I offer a case against the openness of epistemology. Unlike claims linking natural and moral properties, claims linking natural and epistemological properties do give rise to closed questions. An epistemological OQA is therefore not as promising as its moral cousin. (shrink)

Our intuitive assumption that only organisms are the real individuals in the natural world is at odds with developments in cell biology, ecology, genetics, evolutionary biology, and other fields. Although organisms have served for centuries as nature's paradigmatic individuals, science suggests that organisms are only one of the many ways in which the natural world could be organized. When living beings work together--as in ant colonies, beehives, and bacteria-metazoan symbiosis--new collective individuals can emerge. In this book, leading scholars consider the (...) biological and philosophical implications of the emergence of these new collective individuals from associations of living beings. The topics they consider range from metaphysical issues to biological research on natural selection, sociobiology, and symbiosis. (shrink)

Que peut nous apporter aujourd’hui la lecture des Idéologues, ces penseurs qui ont reconfiguré le champ des savoirs au début du XIXe siècle? La mise au jour d’un moment idéologique. Ce moment est celui qui voit une radicalité des Lumières se scinder entre divers branchements disciplinaires, entre diverses conceptions de la subjectivité et de l’émancipation. Le moment idéologique est un moment de passage, mais surtout de décantation. On y voit émerger, quoiqu’encore entremêlés et solidaires, ce que nous sommes habitués à (...) distinguer : Lumières et romantisme, rationalisme et sentiment, radicalité et conservatisme, nécessité et volontarisme, colonialisme et soif d’altérité, science et littérature. Les dix chapitres de cet ouvrage ont en commun de visiter ce moment idéologique à partir de questions concrètes, analysées sur des objets textuels précisément circonscrits : une fausse polémique, un cours d’histoire, une analogie hydraulique, des théories de l’imagination, des épisodes de réminiscence involontaire, un voyage à Alexandrie, un projet d’alphabet universel, une explication de l’amitié, une réécriture romanesque de la folle « science des idées ». C’est à partir de ces cas particuliers que prend forme une image d’ensemble du moment idéologique, où se révèlent à la fois la reconfiguration des champs du savoir et ce que cette reconfiguration a occulté : l’inséparabilité de ce qui devient alors, d’un côté, « la littérature » et, de l’autre, « les sciences » (de l’homme) – le moment idéologique nous faisant voir que ce sont les deux faces d’une même pièce. (shrink)