David Lewis ([1986b]) gives an attractive and familiar account of counterfactual dependence in the standard context. This account has recently been subject to a counterexample from Adam Elga (). In this article, I formulate a Lewisian response to Elga’s counterexample. The strategy is to add an extra criterion to Lewis’s similarity metric, which determines the comparative similarity of worlds. This extra criterion instructs us to take special science laws into consideration as well as fundamental laws. I argue that the Second (...) Law of Thermodynamics should be seen as a special science law, and give a brief account of what Lewisian special science laws should look like. If successful, this proposal blocks Elga’s counterexample. (shrink)
Reliabilism -- the view that a belief is justified iff it is produced by a reliable process -- is often characterized as a form of consequentialism. Recently, critics of reliabilism have suggested that, since a form of consequentialism, reliabilism condones a variety of problematic trade-offs, involving cases where someone forms an epistemically deficient belief now that will lead her to more epistemic value later. In the present paper, we argue that the relevant argument against reliabilism fails because it equivocates. While (...) there is a sense in which reliabilism is a kind of consequentialism, it is not of a kind on which we should expect problematic trade-offs. (shrink)
Many now countenance the idea that certain groups can have beliefs, or at least belief-like states. If groups can have beliefs like these, the question of whether such beliefs are justified immediately arises. Recently, Goldman Essays in collective epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) has considered what a reliability-based account of justified group belief might look like. In this paper I consider his account and find it wanting, and so propose a modified reliability-based account of justified group belief. Lackey :341–396, (...) 2016) has also criticized Goldman’s proposal, but for very different reasons than I do. Some of her objections, however, can be lodged against the modified account that I propose here. I also respond to these objections. Finally, I note how some formal and experimental work is relevant to those who are attracted to the kind of reliability-based account of justified group belief I develop here. (shrink)
Consider: -/- The Evidence Question: When, and under what conditions does an agent have proposition E as evidence (at t)? -/- Timothy Williamson's (2000) answer to this question is the well-known E = K thesis: -/- E = K: E is a member of S's evidence set at t iff S knows E at t. -/- I will argue that this answer is inconsistent with the version of Bayesianism that Williamson advocates. This is because E = K allows an agent (...) to garner evidence via inductive inference whereas standard Bayesian views disallow such a thing. Since Williamson's version of Bayesianism shares the key features with the standard Bayesian view, there is an inconsistency. (shrink)
Finding disjunctivist versions of direct realism unexplanatory, Mark Johnston [(2004). Philosophical Studies, 120, 113–183] offers a non-disjunctive version of direct realism in its place and gives a defense of this view from the problem of hallucination. I will attempt to clarify the view that he presents and then argue that, once clarified, it either does not escape the problem of hallucination or does not look much like direct realism.
ABSTRACTSuppose that beliefs come in degrees. How should we then measure the accuracy of these degrees of belief? Scoring rules are usually thought to be the mathematical tool appropriate for this job. But there are many scoring rules, which lead to different ordinal accuracy rankings. Recently, Fallis and Lewis  have given an argument that, if sound, rules out many popular scoring rules, including the Brier score, as genuine measures of accuracy. I respond to this argument, in part by noting (...) that the argument fails to account for verisimilitude—that certain false hypotheses might be closer to the truth than other false hypotheses are. Oddie [forthcoming], however, has argued that no member of a very wide class of scoring rules can appropriately handle verisimilitude. I explain how to respond to Oddie's argument, and I recommend a class of weighted scoring rules that, I argue, genuinely measure accuracy while escaping the arguments of Fallis and Lewis as well as Oddie. (shrink)
Consider the Evidence Question: When and under what conditions is proposition P evidence for some agent S? Silins (Philos Perspect 19:375–404, 2005) has recently offered a partial answer to the Evidence Question. In particular, Silins argues for Evidential Internalism (EI), which holds that necessarily, if A and B are internal twins, then A and B have the same evidence. In this paper I consider Silins’s argument, and offer two response on behalf of Evidential Externalism (EE), which is the denial of (...) Evidential Internalism. The first response claims that the allegedly unattractive consequence for EE is not so unattractive. The second response takes the form of a tu quoque, demonstrating that a structurally similar argument can be constructed against EI. The two responses play off one another: objecting to the first puts pressure on one to accept the other. Taken together, the two responses have important ramifications for how we answer the Evidence Question, and how we think about evidence in general. (shrink)
Epistemic Consequentialism Consequentialism is the view that, in some sense, rightness is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to goodness. Much of the philosophical discussion concerning consequentialism has focused on moral rightness or obligation or normativity. But there is plausibly also epistemic rightness, epistemic obligation, and epistemic normativity. Epistemic rightness is often denoted with … Continue reading Consequentialism Epistemic →.
Simple versions of Reliabilism about justification say that S's believing that p is justified if and only if the belief was produced by a belief-forming process that is reliable above some high threshold. Alvin Goldman, in Epistemology and Cognition, argues for a more complex version of the view according to which it is total epistemic systems that are assessed for reliability, rather than individual processes. Why prefer this more complex version of Reliabilism? Two reasons suggest themselves. First, it seems that (...) the interaction of various processes of belief formation is often important. The more complex version appears to account for the interaction of processes. Second, one might doubt whether individual processes will have determinate truth-ratios. If not, the simple version of Reliabilism is a nonstarter. In this paper I argue that, despite these two apparent advantages, the complex version of Reliabilism is untenable. I conclude by arguing that the simple version is actually fine as it is.Export citation Request permission. (shrink)
This paper addresses the reasons why US meat goat producers selected to engage in meat goat production. A mail survey of US meat goat producers was conducted. Potential reasons for entering meat goat production included those associated with lifestyle, farm management, productivity, and economics. Reasons for entering meat goat production were assessed and analyzed using ordered probit models. The most important reasons for entering meat goat production included enjoyment working with goats, goat production fitting well into the farm management plan, (...) goats could be raised on a relatively small acreage, goat grazing preferences were different from other species, and the family could be involved in the goat enterprise. The 12th and 13th most important reasons were goat production profitability and low cost associated with purchasing and raising goats. Larger-scale farmers were more likely to have selected meat goat production for profitability and productivity reasons while smaller-scale farmers were more likely to have selected it for lifestyle reasons. Farmer demographics, farm characteristics, and farm location also impacted reasons why the farmer selected the goat enterprise. Results have implications for development of the meat goat industry. (shrink)
Bayesian Epistemology is a general framework for thinking about agents who have beliefs that come in degrees. Theories in this framework give accounts of rational belief and rational belief change, which share two key features: (i) rational belief states are represented with probability functions, and (ii) rational belief change results from the acquisition of evidence. This dissertation focuses specifically on the second feature. I pose the Evidence Question: What is it to have evidence? Before addressing this question we must have (...) an understanding of Bayesian Epistemology. The first chapter argues that we should understand Bayesian Epistemology as giving us theories that are evaluative and not action-guiding. I reach this verdict after considering the popular ‘ought’-implies-‘can’ objection to Bayesian Epistemology. The second chapter argues that it is important for theories in Bayesian Epistemology to answer the Evidence Question, and distinguishes between internalist and externalist answers. The third and fourth chapters present and defend a specific answer to the Evidence Question. The account is inspired by reliabilist accounts of justification, and attempts to understand what it is to have evidence by appealing solely to considerations of reliability. Chapter 3 explains how to understand reliability, and how the account fits with Bayesian Epistemology, in particular, the requirement that an agent’s evidence receive probability 1. Chapter 4 responds to objections, which maintain that the account gives the wrong verdict in a variety of situations including skeptical scenarios, lottery cases, scientific cases, and cases involving inference. After slight modifications, I argue that my account has the resources to answer the objections. The fifth chapter considers the possibility of losing evidence. I show how my account can model these cases. To do so, however, we require a modification to Conditionalization, the orthodox principle governing belief change. I present such a modification. The sixth and seventh chapters propose a new understanding of Dutch Book Arguments, historically important arguments for Bayesian principles. The proposal shows that the Dutch Book Arguments for implausible principles are defective, while the ones for plausible principles are not. The final chapter is a conclusion. (shrink)
Richard Jeffrey is beyond dispute one of the most distinguished and influential philosophers working in the field of decision theory and the theory of knowledge. His work is distinctive in showing the interplay of epistemological concerns with probability and utility theory. Not only has he made use of standard probabilistic and decision theoretic tools to clarify concepts of evidential support and informed choice, he has also proposed significant modifications of the standard Bayesian position in order that it provide a (...) better fit with actual human experience. Probability logic is viewed not as a source of judgment but as a framework for explaining the implications of probabilistic judgments and their mutual compatability. This collection of essays spans a period of some 35 years and includes what have become some of the classic works in the literature. There is also one completely new piece, while in many instances Jeffrey includes afterthoughts on the older essays. (shrink)
This paper explores allowing truth value assignments to be undetermined or "partial" and overdetermined or "inconsistent", thus returning to an investigation of the four-valued semantics that I initiated in the sixties. I examine some natural consequence relations and show how they are related to existing logics, including ukasiewicz's three-valued logic, Kleene's three-valued logic, Anderson and Belnap's relevant entailments, Priest's "Logic of Paradox", and the first-degree fragment of the Dunn-McCall system "R-mingle". None of these systems have nested implications, and I (...) investigate twelve natural extensions containing nested implications, all of which can be viewed as coming from natural variations on Kripke's semantics for intuitionistic logic. Many of these logics exist antecedently in the literature, in particular Nelson 's "constructible falsity". (shrink)
This brief paperback is designed for symbolic/formal logic courses. It features the tree method proof system developed by Jeffrey. The new edition contains many more examples and exercises and is reorganized for greater accessibility.
We study an application of gaggle theory to unary negative modal operators. First we treat negation as impossibility and get a minimal logic system Ki that has a perp semantics. Dunn 's kite of different negations can be dealt with in the extensions of this basic logic Ki. Next we treat negation as “unnecessity” and use a characteristic semantics for different negations in a kite which is dual to Dunn 's original one. Ku is the minimal logic that (...) has a characteristic semantics. We also show that Shramko's falsification logic FL can be incorporated into some extension of this basic logic Ku. Finally, we unite the two basic logics Ki and Ku together to get a negative modal logic K-, which is dual to the positive modal logic K+ in . Shramko has suggested an extension of Dunn 's kite and also a dual version in . He also suggested combining them into a “united” kite. We give a united semantics for this united kite of negations. (shrink)
This study provides a comprehensive reinterpretation of the meaning of Locke's political thought. John Dunn restores Locke's ideas to their exact context, and so stresses the historical question of what Locke in the Two Treatises of Government was intending to claim. By adopting this approach, he reveals the predominantly theological character of all Locke's thinking about politics and provides a convincing analysis of the development of Locke's thought. In a polemical concluding section, John Dunn argues that liberal and (...) Marxist interpretations of Locke's politics have failed to grasp his meaning. Locke emerges as not merely a contributor to the development of English constitutional thought, or as a reflector of socio-economic change in seventeenth-century England, but as essentially a Calvinist natural theologian. (shrink)
We present a Kripke model for Girard's Linear Logic (without exponentials) in a conservative fashion where the logical functors beyond the basic lattice operations may be added one by one without recourse to such things as negation. You can either have some logical functors or not as you choose. Commutatively and associatively are isolated in such a way that the base Kripke model is a model for noncommutative, nonassociative Linear Logic. We also extend the logic by adding a coimplication operator, (...) similar to Curry's subtraction operator, which is resituated with Linear Logic's contensor product. And we can add contraction to get nondistributive Relevance Logic. The model rests heavily on Urquhart's representation of nondistributive lattices and also on Dunn's Gaggle Theory. Indeed, the paper may be viewed as an investigation into nondistributive Gaggle Theory restricted to binary operations. The valuations on the Kripke model are three valued: true, false, and indifferent. The lattice representation theorem of Urquhart has the nice feature of yielding Priestley's representation theorem for distributive lattices if the original lattice happens to be distributive. Hence the representation is consistent with Stone's representation of distributive and Boolean lattices, and our semantics is consistent with the Lemmon-Scott representation of modal algebras and the Routley-Meyer semantics for Relevance Logic. (shrink)
Both I and Belnap, motivated the "Belnap-Dunn 4-valued Logic" by talk of the reasoner being simply "told true" (T) and simply "told false" (F), which leaves the options of being neither "told true" nor "told false" (N), and being both "told true" and "told false" (B). Belnap motivated these notions by consideration of unstructured databases that allow for negative information as well as positive information (even when they conflict). We now experience this on a daily basis with the Web. (...) But the 4-valued logic is deductive in nature, and its matrix is discrete: there are just four values. In this paper I investigate embedding the 4-valued logic into a context of probability. Jøsang's Subjective Logic introduced uncertainty to allow for degrees of belief, disbelief, and uncertainty. We extend this so as to allow for two kinds of uncertainty— that in which the reasoner has too little information (ignorance) and that in which the reasoner has too much information (conflicted). Jøsang's "Opinion Triangle" becomes an "Opinion Tetrahedron" and the 4-values can be seen as its vertices. I make/prove various observations concerning the relation of non-classical "probability" to non-classical logic. (shrink)
The paper considers certain extensions of the system LC introduced in Dunn & Meyer 1997. LC is a structurally free system , but it has combinators as formulas in the place of structural rules. We consider two ways to extend LC with conjunction and disjunction depending on whether they distribute over each other or not. We prove the elimination theorem for the systems. At the end of the paper we give a Routley-Meyer style semantics for the distributive extension, including (...) some new definitions and an algorithm which are used in proving a representation theorem in general, i.e., for arbitrary combinators. (shrink)
John Locke (1632-1704) one of the greatest English philosophers of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, argued in his masterpiece, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, that our knowledge is founded in experience and reaches us principally through our senses; but its message has been curiously misunderstood. In this book John Dunn shows how Locke arrived at his theory of knowledge, and how his exposition of the liberal values of toleration and responsible government formed the backbone of enlightened European (...) thought of the eighteenth century. (shrink)
Dunn, Geoffrey D We continue where we left off from last Sunday with Jesus establishing the ethical foundations of the new Israel. Hypocrisy is really one of the most distasteful of human characteristics and in today's gospel passage Jesus confronts it head on. Hypocrisy is the real 'fake news', for it is nothing other than a sham and a pretence that we are something that we really are not, a contrivance that we are better than others when we are (...) not, a sanctimonious false virtue that we have the right to point out the faults of others while leaving our own failings untouched. When we are the victim of someone else's hypocrisy we feel the injustice and unfairness, we feel the betrayal and deception, we feel the put-down and rejection. (shrink)
Dunn, Geoffrey D We see in Mark's Gospel an interest in Jesus reaching out beyond the Jewish people to bring the good news to other peoples as well. One of the issues associated with that is the extent to which these other people need to adopt Jewish ways in order to become followers of Jesus. That is why, even though we are in a section of Mark's Gospel that deals with Jesus and the disciples, we have today's passage about (...) Jesus and the Jewish religious leaders, the Pharisees. (shrink)
Dunn, Geoffrey D As with the last two years' reflections, it is my intention to give a distinctly patristic flavour to what I write, drawing upon the rich tradition of the church in the youthful flush of its earliest centuries, a time also of great challenge, to see the enduring relevance and beauty of the insights of the earliest Christian preachers, commentators, and authors.
Dunn, Geoffrey D As with last year's reflections, it is my intention to give a distinctly patristic flavour to what I write, drawing upon the rich tradition of the church in the youthful flush of its earliest centuries, a time also of great challenge, to see the enduring relevance and beauty of the insights of the earliest Christian preachers, commentators and authors.
Dunn, Geoffrey D Older Catholics would have grown up hearing about the sacrifice of the Mass, while in the last fifty years we have increasingly spoken of the celebration of the eucharist. Of course, the eucharist is sacrifice, but it is other things besides, like meal and celebration, and the word 'sacrifice' is easy to misinterpret. For many of us the word 'sacrifice' conjures up thoughts of the killing and slaughter of animals or even people. It is true that (...) the word can mean this, but it has a much broader meaning. To sacrifice something is to remove it from the realm of the everyday and hand it over or dedicate it to some other purpose. Thus, a bloodless sacrifice, like the libation or pouring out of wine, is the offering up of something for someone else's use rather than one's own. Naturally, the killing of a living victim ensures that one cannot change one's mind later on and take it back, especially when the burnt sacrificial animal has often then been eaten by those who had participated in or witnessed the ritual slaughter. (shrink)
Dunn, Geoffrey D Lent is a time of preparation for Easter. It developed during the fourth century as a time when sinners, who could no longer participate as full members of the church due to the serious and public nature of their offences, prepared for reconciliation with the church through penance, and adult catechumens, who were seeking to join the church as new members, prepared for initiation into the church. The season is a time of renewal of relationships for (...) the community, of renewal of our relationship with God and of renewal of our relationships with others. The central theme is conversion: a conversion as radical as reorienting one's whole life according to the gospel of Jesus, and as total as requiring the surrender of life. We surrender our old way of life and allow the Spirit to conform us to the new way of life as a disciple of Jesus. The Year A readings have a particular focus on the initiation of catechumens, who, at the start of Lent, celebrate the rite of election and enter the final period of purification and enlightenment before initiation at Easter. On the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Sundays the elect celebrate the scrutinies, when the community examines their readiness for initiation. The symbols of the Easter liturgy feature in the readings of these three Sundays: water, light, and life. (shrink)
In this collection of recent essays (several appearing in English for the first time), John Dunn brings his characteristically acute and penetrative insight to a wide range of political issues. In the first essay, 'The history of political theory', Professor Dunn argues for the importance of a historical perspective in the study of political thought. Other pieces engage with central concepts of political philosophy such as obligation, trust, freedom of conscience and property. A group of studies tackle specific (...) contemporary problems and future dangers, for example racism and the dilemma of humanitarian intervention. The volume as a whole articulates the many dangers, but also the huge importance of, contemporary politics, and provides a representative collection of work by one of the most astute political commentators writing today. (shrink)
Dunn, Geoffrey D In the past two weeks we have heard of covenants God made with people: the covenant with Noah symbolised by the rainbow and the covenant with Abraham symbolised by the stars in the night sky. God made fantastic promises and it would seem that God asked for little in return. Perhaps that is unfair. Noah had to suffer seeing the rest of humanity destroyed and Abraham endured the torment of preparing his son for sacrifice. They both (...) offered a significant display of faith and their descendants enjoyed the benefits. (shrink)
Dunn, Geoffrey D One of my philosophy professors told me there were two sets of alternatives at the heart of philosophy, which is another way of saying that there are two fundamental choices between two different ways at the heart of understanding life. The years have proven, at least as far as I am concerned, just how insightful this observation was. The two sets of alternatives are one and many, and being and flux. The solemn feast of Pentecost, the (...) last day of our Easter season, gives us the opportunity to reflect on the first set: one and many. When we look out at the world, are we the kind of persons who see what we have in common with others and see what unites us, or are we the kind of persons who first notice the differences between us and other people: either our gender, or our skin colour, or our language, or our religion, or our social status, or our nationality, or our education, or our occupation? There are so many things that make us different from one another that it is a rare person who is able to focus on what makes us one. (shrink)
Dunn, Geoffrey D As a seminary student I was taught that a homily ought to end with a eucharistic link. Mature reflection leads me to conclude that the entire homily is itself the eucharistic link. It joins together the interplay of the life of the assembly and the Scriptures, on the one hand, and the great prayer of thanksgiving on the other. My reflections are missing the element of the life of the assembly, which can be supplied only by (...) individual preachers in touch with their communities, but hopefully they provide something of the reason why, on this particular occasion, the assembly can move on to offer God thanks. (shrink)
In this work, Brian Philip Dunn focuses on the South Indian theologian A. J. Appasamy's "embodiment theology." This is the first book on Appasamy, a not insignificant Indian, Christian theologian. This study argues for the distinctive theological voice of Appasamy who develops a theology strongly influenced by the medieval Hindu theologian Ramanuja, in particular offering a reading of the Gospel of John. Dunn shows how Appasamy sees the Christian God in Ramanuja's theology and how his theology, particularly about (...) the presence of God in the icon in a temple, can become a heuristic device through which to understand the fourth Gospel in the context of its own time. This allows the reader to develop a rooted Christology that otherwise would remain hidden. Through Ramanuja, Appasamy can contribute to a constructive and important Theology that grounds the text and ideas of the incarnation in the Jewish context, particularly about priestly atonement. This reading of Ramanuja allows us to see a Christology in the Christian text that would otherwise not have been seen. (shrink)
In this timely and important work, eminent political theorist John Dunn argues that democracy is not synonymous with good government. The author explores the labyrinthine reality behind the basic concept of democracy, demonstrating how the political system that people in the West generally view as straightforward and obvious is, in fact, deeply unclear and, in many cases, dysfunctional. Consisting of four thought-provoking lectures, Dunn’s book sketches the path by which democracy became the only form of government with moral (...) legitimacy, analyzes the contradictions and pitfalls of modern American democracy, and challenges the academic world to take responsibility for giving the world a more coherent understanding of this widely misrepresented political institution. Suggesting that the supposedly ideal marriage of liberal economics with liberal democracy can neither ensure its continuance nor even address the problems of contemporary life, this courageous analysis attempts to show how we came to be so gripped by democracy’s spell and why we must now learn to break it. (shrink)
Certain hypotheses cannot be directly confirmed for theoretical, practical, or moral reasons. For some of these hypotheses, however, there might be a workaround: confirmation based on analogical reasoning. In this paper we take up Dardashti, Hartmann, Thébault, and Winsberg’s (in press) idea of analyzing confirmation based on analogical inference Baysian style. We identify three types of confirmation by analogy and show that Dardashti et al.’s approach can cover two of them. We then highlight possible problems with their model as a (...) general approach to analogical inference and argue that these problems can be avoided by supplementing Bayesian update with Jeffrey conditionalization. (shrink)
We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires (...) that revised beliefs incorporate what has been learnt, and "conservativeness", which requires that beliefs on which the learnt input is "silent" do not change. To illustrate the use of non-Bayesian belief revision in economic theory, we sketch a simple decision-theoretic application. (shrink)
We investigate the notion of classical negation from a non-classical perspective. In particular, one aim is to determine what classical negation amounts to in a paracomplete and paraconsistent four-valued setting. We first give a general semantic characterization of classical negation and then consider an axiomatic expansion BD+ of four-valued Belnap–Dunn logic by classical negation. We show the expansion complete and maximal. Finally, we compare BD+ to some related systems found in the literature, specifically a four-valued modal logic of Béziau (...) and the logic of classical implication and a paraconsistent de Morgan negation of Zaitsev. (shrink)
One of the problems we face in many-valued logic is the difficulty of capturing the intuitive meaning of the connectives introduced through truth tables. At the same time, however, some logics have nice ways to capture the intended meaning of connectives easily, such as four-valued logic studied by Belnap and Dunn. Inspired by Dunn’s discovery, we first describe a mechanical procedure, in expansions of Belnap-Dunn logic, to obtain truth conditions in terms of the behavior of the Truth (...) and the False, which gives us intuitive readings of connectives, out of truth tables. Then, we revisit the notion of functional completeness, which is one of the key notions in many-valued logic, in view of Dunn’s idea. More concretely, we introduce a generalized notion of functional completeness which naturally arises in the spirit of Dunn’s idea, and prove some fundamental results corresponding to the classical results proved by Post and Słupecki. (shrink)
J. Michael Dunn’s Theorem in 3-Valued Model Theory and Graham Priest’s Collapsing Lemma provide the means of constructing first-order, three-valued structures from classical models while preserving some control over the theories of the ensuing models. The present article introduces a general construction that we call a Dunn–Priest quotient, providing a more general means of constructing models for arbitrary many-valued, first-order logical systems from models of any second system. This technique not only counts Dunn’s and Priest’s techniques as (...) special cases, but also provides a generalized Collapsing Lemma for Priest’s more recent plurivalent semantics in general. We examine when and how much control may be exerted over the resulting theories in particular cases. Finally, we expand the utility of the construction by showing that taking Dunn–Priest quotients of a family of structures commutes with taking an ultraproduct of that family, increasing the versatility of the tool. (shrink)
During the 1920s and 1930s geneticist L. C. Dunn of Columbia University cautioned Americans against endorsing eugenic policies and called attention to eugenicists' less than rigorous practices. Then, from the mid-1940s to early 1950s he attacked scientific racism and Nazi Rassenhygiene by co-authoring Heredity, Race and Society with Theodosius Dobzhansky and collaborating with members of UNESCO on their international campaign against racism. Even though shaking the foundations of scientific discrimination was Dunn's primary concern during the interwar and post-World (...) War II years, his campaigns had ancillary consequences for the discipline. He contributed to the professionalization of genetics during the 1920s and 1930s and sought respectability for human genetics in the 1940s and 1950s. My article aims to elucidate the activist scientist's role in undermining scientific discrimination by exploring aspects of Dunn's scientific work and political activism from the 1920s to 1950s. Definitions are provided for scientific discrimination and activist scientist. (shrink)