Patrizia Lombardo | : Stendhal et Musil sont les deux écrivains par excellence qui se sont interrogés sur le type de connaissance qui vient de la littérature. Avant Musil et comme Musil, Stendhal répond à cette question fondamentale en montrant que le roman offre une connaissance des émotions humaines et de leur lien avec les valeurs. Il s’agit à la fois de valeurs éthiques — les situations morales dans lesquelles se trouvent les personnages — et des valeurs esthétiques et (...) proprement littéraires — le tragique, le comique, le tragi-comique, le sublime, etc. Surtout, le roman n’est pas simple représentation du réel, mais aussi du possible. L’analyse de quelques phrases hypothétiques, conjectures et expériences de pensée dans Le Rouge et le Noir, confirme la thèse que la littérature propose une connaissance du possible à travers le travail de l’imagination. | : Stendhal and Musil are deeply concerned with the question of theknowledge value of literature. Like Musil and before him, Stendhalanswered this question by showing the potential of the novel :this literary form presents human emotions and their connection tovalues. The characters deal with various situations, therefore conveyethical values, while aesthetic values —such as the comic, thetragic, the tragic-comic, the sublime- emerge from the way in whichhuman actions and emotions are represented. All these values arebrought about by the style of Stendhal, which is both form and content,both ethical and aesthetic. The analysis of some hypotheticalsentences, conjectures and thought experiments in The Red and the Blackconfirms the thesis later endorsed by Musil, that literature allows forthe knowledge of the possible, thanks to the exercise of theimagination. (shrink)
According to the principle known as “the principle of present-tense ascription immunity”, “It is impossible for anyone to have or entertain thoughts without being aware—immediately and self-evidently—that he is thinking that thought”. In other words, my thoughts are fundamentally experienced as mine, and I typically have this experience of mineness immediately, that is, without any inference based on evidence about who is the thinker of the thought. Thought insertion reveals instead that, under particular pathological conditions, people can be startlingly in (...) error about who is thinking a thought. How can this happen? In the attempt to specify how the capacity for self-ascription of a thought can.. (shrink)
The Temptation of Mimicry.Patrizia Marti - 2014 - Interaction Studies. Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies / Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies 15 (2):184-189.details
I thank Dr. Matthew Parrott and Dr. V.Y. Allison-Bolger very much for their valuable comments on my paper. They have given me the chance to reflect further on the account of thought insertion I propose, and I respond to them with enthusiasm. I also thank the Editor of this journal for arranging this discussion and for giving me the opportunity to reply. Both Dr. Parrott and Dr. Allison-Bolger are concerned about whether my account is fundamentally tenable. They suggest that I (...) make two incompatible claims in the paper: I deny that a schizophrenic thinker suffering from thought insertion has the appropriate dispositions to enter the cause/reason-giving practice for the thought that she... (shrink)
Roland Barthes’s work has confronted contemporary culture with the question of what happens when an object turns into language. This question allowed Barthes to “construct” well known cultural objects — from novels to music, from images to classical rhetoric, from love to theatre — in an unthought way, and to create new, even more unknown ones — from contemporary myth to fashion, from Japan to food culture. In this paper, Barthes’s cultural criticism is considered alongside with the issues raised by (...) Cultural Studies. More specifically, Barthes’s constant reflection on the myth undoubtedly entitles us to connect his cultural criticism to the work that, in those same years, was being produced by the English forge of Cultural Studies, namely the so-called “Birmingham school”. Even today, Barthes’s work makes it possible for semiotics to be, to use his expressions, both “the science of every imagined universe”, and a mathesis singularis, rather than universalis, that is to say a systematic way to approach the singularity of the objects of knowledge. On the basis of this “transcendental reduction”, we can therefore wish for a “second birth” and a transvaluation of linguistics and of semiotics, both to be applied through varied and disseminated forms ofintellectual activism. (shrink)
This article contains the notes made by the Italian poetess Antonia Pozzi while attending the university courses held by Antonio Banfi during 1931-1932 and 1932-1933. They are useful for an understanding not only of her academic studies but also of Banfi’s thinking on aesthetics in the 1930s. In two appendices, the Author describes the content of the Italian philosopher’s courses on aesthetics between 1931-1932 and 1934-1935 and Antonia Pozzi’s university career. Unpublished until now, these notes by a student (...) are the only existing record of those courses since Banfi’s lecture notes never appeared in print. (shrink)
Noel and Amanda Sharkey have written an insightful paper on the ethical issues concerned with the development of childcare robots for infants and toddlers, discussing the possible consequences for the psychological and emotional development and wellbeing of children. The ethical issues involving the use of robots as toys, interaction partners or possible caretakers of children are discussed reviewing a wide literature on the pathology and causes of attachment disorders. The potential risks emerging from the analysis lead the authors to promote (...) a multidisciplinary debate on the current legislation to deal with future robot childcare. As a general first consideration, the questions arising from the paper are extremely timely since current robot technology is surprisingly close to achieving autonomous bonding and sustained socialization with human toddlers. The evolution of robot technology has been so speedy in the last few years that even if a discipline like Human-machine Interaction has only recently welcomed human-robot interaction within its disciplinary scope, a variety of social robots have started to populate our life and daily activities. In the past five years human-robot interaction has received a significant and growing interest leading to the development of the so-called robots companions, a term that emphasizes a constant interaction and co-operation between human beings and robotic machines. While Noel and Amanda Sharkey in their paper take a critical stance on the consequences of the use of robots as companions or caretakers, others researchers seem more keen to highlight the potential of caregiver robots in particular in educational settings. In this commentary I’ll try to offer my personal viewpoint on the consequences of using robot companions or caretakers of children on learning and education, and the effects of technologies on cognitive skills development, a controversial area of research where different findings show how little is known. (shrink)
Businesses increasingly assume political roles, despite issues of legitimacy. The presented two case studies illustrate how businesses harness their political influence in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices through collaboration and dialog with stakeholders and civil society actors. These cases are set around issues arising in global supply chains in sourcing activities where the core problem is associated with businesses managing extended responsibilities under conflicting institutional conditions. The article seeks to provide empirical examples of Political CSR and illustrates the role of (...) deliberative democracy in contemporary business behavior. It adopts a Western business perspective, more specifically from an end-producer and retailer’s standpoint. Findings suggest that civil society is influential in driving these businesses to act responsibly. Joint collaboration is understood as key to strive toward holistic solutions. Political CSR theory remains an ideal, but offers fruitful grounds for speculating on what the political role of business is or could be and how this translates into pragmatic implications for businesses. (shrink)
In this paper, we argue that ‘good care’ in residential nursing homes is enacted through different care practices that are either inspired by a ‘professional logic of care’ that aims for justice and non-maleficence in the professional treatment of residents, or by a ‘relational logic of care’, which attends to the relational quality and the meaning of interpersonal connectedness in people’s lives. Rather than favoring one care logic over the other, this paper indicates how important aspects of care are constantly (...) negotiated between different care practices. Based on the intricate everyday negotiations observed during an ethnographic field study at an elderly nursing home in Germany, the paper puts forth the argument that care is always a matter of tinkering with different, sometimes competing ‘goods’. This tinkering process, which unfolds through ‘intuitive deliberation’, ‘situated assessment’ and ‘affective juggling’ is then theorized along the conceptualization of a ‘practical ethics of care’: an ethics which makes no a priori judgments of what may be considered as good or bad care, but instead calls for momentary judgments that are pliable across changing situations. (shrink)
Esperimento mentale: siete Immanuel Kant, vi trovate in Australia, e ve ne state andando a passeggio. A un tratto scorgete una strana bestiola in riva al lago. Ha gli occhi di una talpa, ma sarà grande dieci volte tanto. Ha il becco di un’anatra, ma non ha le ali; e non ha piume bensì una fitta pelliccia che la fa assomigliare semmai a una lontra. La coda poi sembra quella di un castoro; e le zampe hanno dita palmate, ma con (...) artigli. Insomma, è proprio uno strano animale (ammesso che sia un animale e non una creatura degli inferi o lo scherzo di un taxidermista) nel quale certamente non vi siete mai imbattuti e di cui sicuramente non aver mai sentito parlare. Domanda: che cosa dunque state vedendo? Siete incappati in un ornitorinco. Ma attenzione: l’esperimento richiede che vi immedesimiate in Kant, e ai tempi di Kant l’ornitorinco non era ancora stato scoperto. Per meglio dire: non era ancora stato scoperto e classificato dai naturalisti europei, che ci avrebbero impiegato quasi un altro secolo prima di trovargli un posto nell’ordine sui generis dei mammiferi ovipari. Il vecchio Immanuel non ne sapeva nulla, non ne aveva il concetto; quindi voi non potete rispondere che state vedendo un ornitorinco. State vedendo quella cosa lì e basta. Il problema è cosa significhi dire che state vedendo quella cosa dato che non avete la più pallida idea di che cosa stiate vedendo. (shrink)
It is human nature to wonder how things might have turned out differently--either for the better or for the worse. For the past two decades psychologists have been intrigued by this phenomenon, which they call counterfactual thinking. Specifically, researchers have sought to answer the "big" questions: Why do people have such a strong propensity to generate counterfactuals, and what functions does counterfactual thinking serve? What are the determinants of counterfactual thinking, and what are its adaptive and psychological consequences? This important (...) work brings together a collection of thought-provoking papers by social and cognitive psychologists who have made important theoretical and empirical contributions to our understanding of this topic. The essays in this volume contain novel theoretical insights, and, in many cases descriptions of previously unpublished empirical studies. The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking provides an excellent overview of this fascinating topic for researchers, as well as advanced undergraduates and graduates in psychology--particularly those with an interest in social cognition, social judgment, decision judgment, decision making, thinking and reasoning. (shrink)
This collectively written article aims to offer a bird's eye view of the Italian debates about precarity in employment and life, as captured in discussions among participants in a focus group held in Milan in 2006. The chief topics that emerged from this discussion include the feminization of labour, feminist practices and methodologies, representation/participation, and guaranteed income. Here, we give as much space as possible to the diverse voices of participants and their strategies for transformation.
Resumen: Alfonsina Storni es una escritora que se ha labrado un lugar dentro del canon literario argentino, por mucho tiempo bajo una imagen de escritora que anudaba sentimentalismo, fatalidad y poesía “femenina”, aunque más recientemente la crítica literaria de orientación feminista haya desmontado esa imagen. Este trabajo se interesa, no obstante, por los años en que Alfonsina Storni publicaba sus primeros poemarios y comenzaba a pugnar por un lugar en el incipiente campo literario, dominantemente masculino. El objetivo es visualizar, desde (...) una perspectiva de género, las prácticas culturales emergentes, dominantes y residuales que contribuyeron o condicionaron su camino hacia la profesionalización como escritora, en un contexto de cambios por los procesos modernizadores y de avances del movimiento feminista.: Alfonsina Storni is a writer who has forged a position within the Argentinian literary canon, under the image of a writer who revokes sentimentalism, fatality and “feminine” poetry. Recently, the feminist-oriented literary criticism has dismantled this image finding out other areas in her literary production. This work is focused on the years in which Alfonsina Storni published her first collections of poems and started struggling for a certain position in the emerging literary field, which was mainly under male domain. Taking a gender perspective, the aim is to visualize emerging dominant, and residual cultural practices that contributed or determined her path towards becoming a professional writer, in a context of changes due to modernizing processes and the feminist movement advance. (shrink)
Exploring Textual Action questions how we analyse works of art after the performative turn and shows how the interplay of performativity, space and topography, and the converging of genres and art forms is essential in modern drama, theatre, prose fiction, poetry and film. The volume also fosters a keen concern for the development of congenial theory. Its 14 detailed essays analyse works of art ranging from Balzac, Melville and George Eliot, to Breton, Kafka, Benjamin, Blixen and Woolf; and from W.C. (...) Williams, Bresson and Scorsese, to Sarraute, Duras, Reygadas, Dumont and Waltz. The approach of these studies discloses the art works as creative and dynamic utterances with active and shaping forces so powerful, and consequential, that they have the potential to transform human perception and blur clear distinctions between art and "real" life. Using an alternative and dynamic method and suggesting a direction towards the detailed analysis of literature, art, media and culture, Exploring Textual Action addresses current debates within the humanities. (shrink)
In the first decades of the nineteenth century the French mechanicians—Cauchy and Poisson amongst them—developed a theory of linear elasticity according to which matter is composed of material points. They believed that these points interact by means of opposite central forces, whose magnitude depends on the length of the segment joining the particles. This theory suggested that homogeneous isotropic materials were characterized by a unique elastic constant. Later experiments, however, showed that two elastic constants were necessary. These results undermined the (...) corpuscular model of matter as well as the interpretation of elasticity in terms of central intermolecular actions. The continuous theory of Green, based on the postulate that a potential function exists, gained fresh consensus in light of these experiments. These opposite views continued throughout the nineteenth century until Woldemar Voigt proposed a molecular model confirmed by experiments. This article presents the theories of each of these scientists and describes the contrasting views of nineteenth-century mechanicians. (shrink)
Plotinus represent a constant reference in all of Šestov's philosophy. For the Russian philosopher Plotinus is, on the one hand, the one who thought up thesynthesis of Greek philosophy, on the other, the one who first broke with that same tradition precisely when it was at its peak. However, Šestov does lift from the Enneadi certain passages which he marries - as if in a sort of contrapuntal rewriting exercise - to others in which Plotinus seems to contradict himself. What (...) interests Šestov are precisely those discontinuities in the thought of the last great philosopher of old in an anti-Greek function. That of Šestov is once again a marked criticism of Rationalism as creator of an autonomous set of ethics that he judges according to an intellect which everything is subject to. Autonomousethics, affirms Šestov, is a fruit of Greek schools of thought to the extent that it shows distrust for what is mutable, unforeseen and arbitrary, of everything which, in short, is irrational, as it is not inserted in the One/All necessitating, justifying, regulating. In the alternative between Athens and Jerusalem, between the Rationalism and the Bible, Šestov opts to assume a stance, in no uncertain terms, on the side Jerusalem, taking with him the Plotinus of the awakening andheading towards a greater reality capable of overturning the throne occupied for too long by reason. That Plotinus who at a certain point was obliged to say thatin this other dimension "the intellect before God represents a reckless, ungodly apostate" (VI.9.5). That Plotinus, who ultimately, in one of those most particularmoments, realized that he was predestined for something loftier with respect to the world of evil and death. (shrink)
This article aims to analyse one specific type of memorial site that furnishes an indexical link to past traumatic events which took place in precisely these places. Such memorials will be defined here as trauma sites. It will be shown how the semiotic trait of indexicality produces unique meaning effects, forcing a reframing of the issue of representation, with all its aesthetic and ethical dimensions. In contrast to other forms of memorial site, trauma sites exist factually as material testimonies of (...) the violence and horror that took place there. The fact they still exist, more or less as they were, implies a precise choice on the part of post-conflict societies regarding which traces of the past ought to be preserved and in which ways. In other words, a decision is made about what politics of memory to adopt in each case. Trauma sites thus become unique, privileged observatories that allow us to understand better the emergence of post-conflict societies. The various forms of conservation, transformation, memorialization of places where slaughter, torture and horror have been carried out are key clues to better understandings of the relationship between memory and history in each post-conflict society studied. This article presents a close reading of three very different trauma sites: the Tuol Sleng Museum of the Crimes of Genocide in Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Villa Grimaldi in Santiago, Chile; and a third, more recent, museum: The Ustica Memorial Museum in Bologna, Italy. These memorials represent instances of three very different traumatic memory politics: in Tuol Sleng, visitors are relocated in the trauma space, in a sort of ‘frozen past’; in Villa Grimaldi, a process of attenuation is at work, the traces of the past are less evident, and their emotional effects weaker. The Ustica Museum represents yet another option, a movement towards an artistic and creative reinterpretation of the traumatic event itself. (shrink)
The study of the history of ideas is usually devoted to big problems and to concluded debates. We have attempted to analyze a current theory whose fate and explanatory power is still not determined. The term microparadigm is used to define a currently and widely accepted theory limited in time and in the field of application, compared to the greater problems usually investigated by historians of science. Among the characteristics defining a microparadigm we found: 1) the status of an accepted (...) theory with creative scientific power; 2) the presence of anomalies and unproven inferences; 3) a limited field of application; 4) the peculiarity of interaction with non-scientific ideas. In this context, we discuss the rise of the current microparadigm concerning the pathogenesis and biology of lymphoid neoplasms. We show that the current view of the neoplastic lymphoid cells as populations frozen at a particular differentiative stage has been creative for the last 10 years, thus allowing the generation of a large body of data that would not have been collected within the previous view of the leukemic cell as completely “anarchic”. This paradigm, although containing some anomalies, has survived the impact of molecular biology in hematology and is still creative. We think that microparadigms are widely distributed in everyday science and that an analysis of them is as useful for active scientist as is the study of macroparadigms, which by themselves cannot be representative of everyday science. Finally, the study of microparadigms while they are still operative can be useful to evidence the weakness of the theory and to suggest where new data should be sought. (shrink)
Patrizia Pedrini | : In this paper, I argue that paradigmatic-state accounts of self-deception suffer from a problem of restrictedness that does not do justice to the complexities of the phenomenon. In particular, I argue that the very search for a paradigmatic state of self-deception greatly overlooks the dynamic dimension of the self-deceptive process, which allows the inclusion of more mental states than paradigmatic-state accounts consider. I will discuss the inadequacy of any such accounts, and I will argue that (...) we should replace them with a dynamic view of self-deception that is more liberal regarding the mental states in which self-deceivers may find themselves. | : Dans cet article, je soutiens que les explications de l’auto-illusion en termes d’un état « paradigmatique » souffrent d’un problème de limitation qui ne rend pas justice à la complexité du phénomène. Plus précisément, j’avance que la recherche même d’un état paradigmatique néglige tout à fait la dimension dynamique du processus d’auto-illusion, de sorte à inclure davantage d’états mentaux que ne le font les explications en termes d’un état paradigmatique. Après avoir démontré l’insuffisance de ces dernières, je proposerai que nous devrions les remplacer par une conception dynamique de l’auto-illusion qui serait plus flexible quant aux états mentaux potentiellement vécus par des personnes sous l’emprise de l’auto-illusion. (shrink)