The paper reports our research aiming at utilization of human interactive communication modeling principles in application to a novel interaction paradigm designed for brain–computer/machine-interfacing (BCI/BMI) technologies as well as for socially aware intelligent environments or communication support systems. Automatic procedures for human affective responses or emotional states estimation are still a hot topic of contemporary research. We propose to utilize human brain and bodily physiological responses for affective/emotional as well as communicative interactivity estimation, which potentially could be used in the (...) future for human–machine/environment interaction design. As a test platform for such an intelligent human–machine communication application, an emotional stimuli paradigm was chosen to evaluate brain responses to various affective stimuli in an emotional empathy mode. Videos with moving faces expressing various emotional displays as well as speech stimuli with similarly emotionally articulated sentences are presented to the subjects in order to further analyze different affective responses. From information processing point of view, several challenges with multimodal signal conditioning and stimuli dynamic response extraction in time frequency domain are addressed. Emotions play an important role in human daily life and human-to-human communication. This is why involvement of affective stimuli principles to human–machine communication or machine-mediated communication with utilization of multichannel neurophysiological and periphery physiological signals monitoring techniques, allowing real-time subjective brain responses evaluation, is discussed. We present our preliminary results and discuss potential applications of brain/body affective responses estimation for future interactive/smart environments. (shrink)

Is the societal-level of analysis sufficient today to understand the values of those in the global workforce? Or are individual-level analyses more appropriate for assessing the influence of values on ethical behaviors across country workforces? Using multi-level analyses for a 48-society sample, we test the utility of both the societal-level and individual-level dimensions of collectivism and individualism values for predicting ethical behaviors of business professionals. Our values-based behavioral analysis indicates that values at the individual-level make a more significant contribution to (...) explaining variance in ethical behaviors than do values at the societal-level. Implicitly, our findings question the soundness of using societal-level values measures. Implications for international business research are discussed. (shrink)

A cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a dominant tendency to rely on a rule’s letter over its spirit when deciding which behaviors violate the rule. This tendency varied markedly across (k = 15) countries, owing to variation in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Compared with laypeople, legal experts were more inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether and consequently exhibited stronger textualist tendencies. Finally, we evaluated a plausible mechanism for the emergence of textualism: (...) in a two-player coordination game, incentives to coordinate in the absence of communication reinforced participants’ adherence to rules’ literal meaning. Together, these studies (total n = 5,794) help clarify the origins and allure of textualism, especially in the law. Within heterogeneous communities in which members diverge in their moral appraisals involving a rule’s purpose, the rule’s literal meaning provides a clear focal point—an identifiable point of agreement enabling coordinated interpretation among citizens, lawmakers, and judges. (shrink)

This article provides current Schwartz Values Survey (SVS) data from samples of business managers and professionals across 50 societies that are culturally and socioeconomically diverse. We report the society scores for SVS values dimensions for both individual- and societal-level analyses. At the individual-level, we report on the ten circumplex values sub-dimensions and two sets of values dimensions (collectivism and individualism; openness to change, conservation, self-enhancement, and self-transcendence). At the societal-level, we report on the values dimensions of embeddedness, hierarchy, mastery, affective (...) autonomy, intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism, and harmony. For each society, we report the Cronbach’s α statistics for each values dimension scale to assess their internal consistency (reliability) as well as report interrater agreement (IRA) analyses to assess the acceptability of using aggregated individual level values scores to represent country values. We also examined whether societal development level is related to systematic variation in the measurement and importance of values. Thus, the contributions of our evaluation of the SVS values dimensions are two-fold. First, we identify the SVS dimensions that have cross-culturally internally reliable structures and within-society agreement for business professionals. Second, we report the society cultural values scores developed from the twenty-first century data that can be used as macro-level predictors in multilevel and single-level international business research. (shrink)

Given the adage “older and wiser,” it seems justified to assume that older people may be stereotyped as more moral than younger people. We aimed to study whether assessments of a person’s morality differ depending on their age. We asked 661 individuals from seven societies (Australians, Britons, Burusho of Pakistan, Canadians, Dani of Papua, New Zealanders, and Poles) whether younger (~20-year-old), middle-aged (~40-year-old), or older (~60-year-old) people were more likely to behave morally and have a sense of right and wrong. (...) We observed that older people were perceived as more moral than younger people. The effect was particularly salient when comparing 20-year-olds to either 40- or 60-year-olds and was culturally universal, as we found it in both WEIRD (i.e. Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) and non-WEIRD societies. (shrink)

The paper presents fragments of a Byzantine icon discovered in 2015 during regular archaeological excavations carried out in Chełm, eastern Poland. Iconographic analyses allow the nine surviving fragments to be interpreted as belonging to a diptych wing with the Great Feasts cycle. The icon represents archaic iconography of the subject, with the scene of Transfiguration placed after Entry into Jerusalem and before the Crucifixion. The artefact was created in the second half or at the close of the 12th century, and (...) it was made from steatite, which has been confirmed by petrographic analyses. The icon was discovered in the remains of a palace complex of King Daniel Romanovich, the greatest ruler of the Galicia-Volhynia Lands. The results of the archaeological research allow the terminus ante quem for the icon’s arrival in Chełm to be determined as before the middle of the 13th century. Various possible explanations as to how the icon found its way to Chełm are also explored in the paper. (shrink)

Some simple algebraic properties, described by universally quantified disjunctions of special identities, are established. Such sentences seem to be useful for an investigation on finite algebras and its products. These considerations are exemplified by results concerning distributive lattices. By P the polynomial algebra of a finite type t is understood. P is the n-ary polynomial algebra . No notational distinction is made between an algebra and its underlying set. Similarly by the same symbol is denoted each polynomial and its realization (...) in a given algebra. (shrink)

In this paper, I criticize Ethan Jerzak’s view that ‘want’ has only one sense, the mixed expected utility sense. First, I show that his appeals to ‘really’-locutions fail to explain away the counterintuitive predictions of his view. Second, I present a class of cases, which I call “principled indifference” cases, that pose difficulties for any expected utility lexical entry for ‘want’. I argue that in order to account for these cases, one needs to concede that ‘want’ has a sense, according (...) to which wanting is a matter of subjectively preferring p-alternatives to not-p-alternatives. Finally, I introduce some considerations for and against the view that ‘want’ also has another sense, which is roughly synonymous with ‘need’. (shrink)

According to the so-called "standard account" regarding the problem of material constitution, a statue and a lump of clay that makes it up are not identical. The usual objection is that this view yields many objects in the same place at the same time. Lynne Rudder Baker's theory of constitution is a recent and sophisticated version of the standard account. She argues that the aforementioned objection can be answered by defining a relation of being the same P as (sameP). In (...) this paper I shall examine consequences of her response and show that sameP has wrong formal properties, as a result of which this solution cannot be accepted. (shrink)

In the article "Podstawy analizy metodologicznej kanonów Milla" [2] Jerzy Łoś proposed an operator that refered sentences to temporal moments. Let us look, for example, at a sentence ‘It is raining in Toruń’. From a logical point of view it is a propositional function, which does not have any logical value, unless we point at a temporal context from a fixed set of such contexts. If the sentence was considered today as a description of a state of affairs, it could (...) be true. If it was considered yesterday, it could be false. 1 The operator enables us to connect any sentence p with any temporal context t. Such a complex sentence we read as: a sentence p is realized at a temporal context t (a point of time, an interval of some kind, etc). (shrink)

The paper will compare two methods used in the design of diagnostic strategies. The first one is a method that precises predictive value of diagnostic tests. The second one is based on the use of Bayes’ theorem. The main aim of this article is to identify the epistemological assumptions underlying both of these methods. For the purpose of this objective, example projects of one and multi-stage diagnostic strategy developed using both methods will be considered.

This article provides current Schwartz Values Survey data from samples of business managers and professionals across 50 societies that are culturally and socioeconomically diverse. We report the society scores for SVS values dimensions for both individual- and societallevel analyses. At the individual- level, we report on the ten circumplex values sub- dimensions and two sets of values dimensions. At the societal- level, we report on the values dimensions of embeddedness, hierarchy, mastery, affective autonomy, intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism, and harmony. For each (...) society, we report the Cronbach' s? statistics for each values dimension scale to assess their internal consistency as well as report interrater agreement analyses to assess the acceptability of using aggregated individual level values scores to represent country span sp. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to study the refutation system consisting of the refutation axiom p ∧ ¬p → q and the refutation rules: reverse substitution and reverse modus ponens (B/A, if A → B ∈ RM). It is shown that the refutation system is characteristic for the logic of the 3-element RM algebra.

In this paper we examine Prior’s reconstruction of Master Argument [4] in some modal-tense logic. This logic consists of a purely tense part and Diodorean definitions of modal alethic operators. Next we study this tense logic in the pure tense language. It is the logic K t 4 plus a new axiom ( P ): ‘ p Λ G p ⊃ P G p ’. This formula was used by Prior in his original analysis of Master Argument. ( P ) (...) is usually added as an extra axiom to an axiomatization of the logic of linear time. In that case the set of moments is a total order and must be left-discrete without the least moment. However, the logic of Master Argument does not require linear time. We show what properties of the set of moments are exactly forced by ( P ) in the reconstruction of Prior. We make also some philosophical remarks on the analyzed reconstruction. (shrink)

In this paper we examine Prior's reconstruction of Master Argument [4] in some modal-tense logic. This logic consists of a purely tense part and Diodorean definitions of modal alethic operators. Next we study this tense logic in the pure tense language. It is the logic $K_t 4$ plus a new axiom $:p \wedge Gp \supset PGp'$. This formula was used by Prior in his original analysis of Master Argument. is usually added as an extra axiom to an axiomatization of the (...) logic of linear time. In that case the set of moments is a total order and must be left-discrete without the least moment. However, the logic of Master Argument does not require linear time. We show what properties of the set of moments are exactly forced by in the reconstruction of Prior. We make also some philosophical remarks on the analyzed reconstruction. (shrink)

The main aim of the paper is to discuss some recent definitions of lie and lying, particularly that proposed recently in Edukacja Filozoficzna by Andrzej Stępnik. First I point out that his proposals share common conviction that among other things one has to have intention to deceive someone in order to lie. But this is wrong since it is quite clear that in a case of bold-face lies one can lie without having this intention. And bold-face lies are lies. It (...) follows that not only Stępnik’s definitions but all descriptive definitions of lies and lying sharing this condition are too narrow, so are inadequate. Instead of giving another descriptive definition of lying and lie, some précising definitions are proposed. According to first of them: A person x lies to y iff (i) x claims to y something that x doesn’t believe, and (ii) x doesn’t inform y that she doesn’t believe what she clams. According to another; A person x lies to y iff (i) by uttering something x expresses some propositional attitude (belief, desire, knowledge etc.), (ii) x doesn’t have this attitude, (ii) x doesn’t inform y that (ii) And the last states: A person x lies to y iff (i) x performs some speech act, (ii) some propositional attitude is one of the necessary conditions of sincery condition of this act, (iii) x doesn’t have this propositional attitude, (iv) x doesn’t inform y that (iii). We also propose crucial definition of claiming: A person x claims at a context C that p iff there is some sentence S of some language L (which x understands perfectly): (i) x utters S at C, (ii) according to semantic rules of L: uttering at C sentence S means that p, (iii) x is disposed at C to confirm the truthfulness of S. and expressing: A person x by uttering S expresses some kind of propositional attitude that p iff for all who are acquainted with proper linguistic or social convention is reasonable to attribute this kind of propositional attitude that p to x. (shrink)

The Gettier problem concerns the definition of knowledge as justified true belief. In the paper I argue that Gettier's cases are not cases of justified true belief because Gettier's examples rely on some problematic assumptions. The first is rather elementary definition of justification and the other is that justification is preserved by entailment, that is, (A) for all agents X, if X is justified in believing that p , and X realizes that the truth of p entails the truth of (...) q , then X would also be justified in believing that q . For the simplistic conception of justification has some alarming consequences we pursue more adequate definition of justification which would satisfy the idea that a necessary condition of justification is to entail or to be entailed by a true proposition. We also show that the (A) is not necessary to provide an elegant counter-example to the definition of knowledge if the elementary definition of justification is adopted. (shrink)

Przedmiotem pracy są uwagi Jerzego Pelca dotyczące pojęcia kłamstwa i kłamania opublikowane w O pojęciu kłamstwa – z punktu widzenia semiotyki (1990). Przedstawioną w niej definicję kłamania porównuję z warunkami nakładanymi na to pojęcie przez innych autorów. Pokazuję, że zdaniem Pelca, warunek ekstensji przekonań nie jest koniecznym warunkiem na kłamstwo. Dodatkowo, zauważam, iż pewne uwagi Pelca skłaniają do wniosku, że można kłamać implikując coś, co uważa się za fałsz, nie zaś wyraźnie to stwierdzając. Argumentuję, że przyjmowany w analizowanej pracy warunek (...) chęci oszukania adresata jest wątpliwym warunkiem koniecznym kłamania. Ostatecznie, uwzględniając spostrzeżenia Pelca, proponuję następująca definicję: (DEF. Kłamania*) Osoba A kłamie w określonym kontekście K osobie B, że p, zawsze i tylko wtedy, gdy: (1) A posługuje się w K pewnym znakiem Z, zaś zgodnie z pewną przyjętą lub utartą konwencją posłużenie się Z przez A wobec B w K może być zasadnie uznane za twierdzenie przez A wobec B, że p, i (2) A nie uznaje w K, że p, oraz (3) nie powiadamia uprzednio o tym B, albo też (2*) A uznaje w K, że p, ale (3*) zakłada, że pomimo (1) B uzna, że A nie sądzi, że p. (shrink)

The paper concerns the semantics of belief reports. The following definition is proposed: if rational agent x does not accept any sentence, which is true under x’s interpretation of expressions iff not-p, and x does not reject any sentence, which is true under x’s interpretation iff p, then (x believes that p iff x accepts  which is true under x’s interpretation iff p). The term ‘x’s interpretation of an expression e’ is to be understood: something which x actually refers (...) to by using e (rather than a object she intends to refer). This is to say that to ascribe a belief to rational agent one should use words which have the same reference as words used by the agent. We believe it could solve Krpike’s puzzles about belief on the price that sometimes names used by the agent refer to others entities than when we use them. (shrink)

The subject of this article is to discuss epistemological issues related to the pro-cess of obtaining empirical evidence in medicine. This paper will present how N. Cartwright, J. Worrall and P. Urbach describe the function of the randomisation pro-cedure in this process. Based on these findings, it will be possible to define an alter-native method of obtaining empirical evidence for the purpose of making clinical decisions. This method involves data analysis using the Rough Set Theory proposed by Z. Pawlak. By (...) applying this method, a deterministic algorithm for making clinical decisions can be formulated. Being an interesting alternative to statistical approaches that dominate in medicine, the RST method generates specific epistemological problems. Therefore, it seems to constitute an interesting subject of analysis for philosophers of science. (shrink)

The paper deals with the procedure of explaining the secondary immune response. First, the basic concepts of the mechanistic account of explanation developed by Machamer, Darden and Craver will be considered. Subsequently, I will focus on the concepts describing the activation of the elements of the immunological system viewed as a signal decoding process. The analysis will make it possible to argue for the thesis that the explanations of the secondary immune response, formulated in immunology, aim to describe the possible (...) procedures of simplifying the signal decoding process. The following considerations will make it possible to show the specificity of the mechanistic explanations formulated in immunology, and to demonstrate their significance for medical sciences. (shrink)

In recent years, the so-calledindispensability argument has been given a lotof attention by philosophers of mathematics.This argument for the existence of mathematicalobjects makes use of the fact, neglected inclassical schools of philosophy of mathematics,that mathematics is part of our best scientifictheories, and therefore should receive similarsupport to these theories. However, thisobservation raises the question about the exactnature of the alleged connection betweenexperience and mathematics (for example: is itpossible to falsify empirically anymathematical theorems?). In my paper I wouldlike to address this (...) question by consideringthe explicit assumptions of different versionsof the indispensability argument. My primaryclaim is that there are at least three distinctversions of the indispensability argument (andit can be even suggested that a fourth,separate version should be formulated). I willmainly concentrate my discussion on thisvariant of the argument, which suggests thepossibility of empirical confirmation ofmathematical theories. A large portion of mypaper will focus on the recent discussion ofthis topic, starting from the paper by E.Sober, who in my opinion put reasonablerequirements on what is to be counted as anempirical confirmation of a mathematicaltheory. I will develop his model into threeseparate scenarios of possible empiricalconfirmation of mathematics. Using an exampleof Hilbert space in quantum mechanicaldescription I will show that the most promisingscenario of empirical verification ofmathematical theories has neverthelessuntenable consequences. It will be hypothesizedthat the source of this untenability lies in aspecific role which mathematical theories playin empirical science, and that what is subjectto empirical verification is not themathematics used, but the representabilityassumptions. Further I will undertake theproblem of how to reconcile the allegedempirical verification of mathematics withscientific practice. I will refer to thepolemics between P. Maddy and M. Resnik,pointing out certain ambiguities of theirarguments whose source is partly the failure todistinguish carefully between different sensesof the indispensability argument. For thatreason typical arguments used in the discussionare not decisive, yet if we take into accountsome metalogical properties of appliedmathematics, then the thesis that mathematicshas strong links with experience seems to behighly improbable. (shrink)

The paper consists of two parts. The first part begins with the problem of whether the original three-valued calculus, invented by J. Łukasiewicz, really conforms to his philosophical and semantic intuitions. I claim that one of the basic semantic assumptions underlying Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic should be that if under any possible circumstances a sentence of the form "X will be the case at time t" is true (resp. false) at time t, then this sentence must be already true (resp. false) (...) at present. However, it is easy to see that this principle is violated in Lukasiewicz's original calculus (as the cases of the law of excluded middle and the law of contradiction show). Nevertheless it is possible to construct (either with the help of the notion of "supervaluation", or purely algebraically) a different three-valued, semi-classical sentential calculus, which would properly incorporate Łukasiewicz's initial intuitions. Algebraically, this calculus has the ordinary Boolean structure, and therefore it retains all classically valid formulas. Yet because possible valuations are no longer represented by ultrafilters, but by filters (not necessarily maximal), the new calculus displays certain non-classical metalogical features (like, for example, nonextensionality and the lack of the metalogical rule enabling one to derive "p is true or q is true" from" 'p ∨ q' is true"). The second part analyses whether the proposed calculus could be useful in formalizing inferences in situations, when for some reason (epistemological or ontological) our knowledge of certain facts is subject to limitation. Special attention should be paid to the possibility of employing this calculus to the case of quantum mechanics. I am going to compare it with standard non-Boolean quantum logic (in the Jauch-Piron approach), and to show that certain shortcomings of the latter can be avoided in the former. For example, I will argue that in order to properly account for quantum features of microphysics, we do not need to drop the law of distributivity. Also the idea of "reading off" the logical structure of propositions from the structure of Hilbert space leads to some conceptual troubles, which I am going to point out. The thesis of the paper is that all we need to speak about quantum reality can be acquired by dropping the principle of bivalence and extensionality, while accepting all classically valid formulas. (shrink)

In this paper, we apply relating semantics to the widely discussed problem of free choice between permitted actions or situations in normative systems. Leaving aside contexts in which the free choice principle is obviously unacceptable or uncontroversially valid, we concentrate on free choice for explicit permissions. In order to construct a formal representation of explicit permissions, we introduce a special constant, $\texttt {permit}$, which is analogous to the constant $\texttt {violation}$ used in the Andersonian–Kangerian approach to deontic logic with respect (...) to prohibition and obligation. Consequently, we define a permission operator on the basis of the $\texttt {permit}$ constant and a relation of legitimization. The general idea is that $P \varphi $ is true if and only if $\texttt {permit}$ is true, which means that a permission is actually issued and $\varphi $ is legitimized by $\texttt {permit}$. The intuitive notion of legitimization is formally represented by an operator of relating implication: a non-classical implication that is semantically defined by adding a constraint to the classical meaning of implication to the effect that arguments are related by a special relation. The properties of this relation are based on an informal, intuitive meaning of legitimization and determine the properties of the permission operator. We show that the resulting permission operator possesses the free choice property and avoids certain unwanted consequences that follow from alternative approaches. (shrink)

In this article I consider whether Aquinas’ arguments for the claim that God is His essence are conclusive, and what was his purpose of upholding this thesis. I show his proofs from Summa Theologiae and Summa Contra Gentiles to be problematic and argue that the defense of Aquinas’ views on that matter suggested by certain remarks of P. T. Geach is flawed.

ON SPINOZA’S PROOFS OF (SPINOZIAN) GOD’S EXISTENCE AND THE PROOF OF THE UNIQUENESS OF THE SPINOZIAN SUBSTANCE In this paper I analyze Spinozian ontological arguments for God’s existence from Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata. I argue that the first proof suffers from circulus vitiosus, whereas the others have at least one non-obvious premise. I also consider P. Gut’s modification of the first proof, reported to me during the conference “The Philosophy of the 17th Century—Its Origins and Continuations” (Gdańsk, 16.06.2011). Meanwhile, I (...) address D. Chlastawa’s remark that theorem 7 and 14 from Ethica… makes Spinoza’s theory inconsistent. Keywords: SPINOZA, GOD’S EXISTENCE, PROOF, UNIQUENESS, SUBSTANCE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY. (shrink)

BackgroundIn this study, we analyze the association of social isolation in the first phase of the pandemic with perceived stress among residents of Poland and Italy with a look at how these populations adjust to and comply with implemented regulations, guidelines, and restrictions.Materials and MethodsInternet survey with Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-10) and questions regarding mobility patterns, attitude, and propensity to adjust toward the implemented measures and current health condition was made among Polish and Italian residents (Cronbach’s alpha 0.86 and 0.79, (...) respectively). The sample size was 7,108 (6,169 completed questionnaires in Poland and 939 in Italy).ResultsThe Polish group had a higher stress level than the Italian group (mean PSS-10 total score 22,14 vs 17,01, respectively;p< 0.01). There was a greater prevalence of chronic diseases among Polish respondents. Italian subjects expressed more concern about their health, as well as about their future employment. Italian subjects did not comply with suggested restrictions as much as Polish subjects and were less eager to restrain from their usual activities (social, physical, and religious), which were more often perceived as “most needed matters” in Italian than in Polish residents.ConclusionHigher activity level was found to be correlated with lower perceived stress, but the causality is unclear. Difference in adherence to restrictions between Polish and Italian residents suggests that introducing similar lockdown policies worldwide may not be as beneficial as expected. However, due to the applied method of convenience sampling and uneven study groups, one should be careful with generalizing these results. (shrink)

David Lewis’s latest theory of causation defines the causal link in terms of the relation of influence between events. It turns out, however, that one event’s influencing another is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for its being a cause of that event. In the article one particular case of causality without influence is presented and developed. This case not only serves as a counterexample to Lewis’s influence theory, but also threatens earlier counterfactual analyses of causation by admitting a particularly (...) troublesome type of preemption. The conclusion of the article is that Lewis’s influence method of solving the preemption problem fails, and that we need a new and fresh approach to the cases of redundant causation if we want to hold on to the counterfactual analysis of causation. (shrink)

In the late 2010s, various international committees, expert groups, and national strategy boards have voiced the demand to ‘open’ the algorithmic black box, to audit, expound, and demystify artificial intelligence. The opening of the algorithmic black box, however, cannot be seen only as an engineering challenge. In this article, I argue that only the sort of transparency that arises from critique—a method of theoretical examination that, by revealing pre-existing power structures, aims to challenge them—can help us produce technological systems that (...) are less deceptive and more just. I relate the question of AI transparency to the broader challenge of responsible making, contending that future action must aim to systematically reconcile design—as a way of concealing—with critique—as a manner of revealing. (shrink)