This exploratory enquiry seeks to examine the largely unexplored potential of semiotics for intercultural training and education. The proposed three-partdiscussion describes the process by which semiotic theoretical principles were selected and progressively refined into an applied model which was then pilotedthrough a 2007 research initiative entitled Tools for Cultural Development. The case study involved six groups of French and Australian trainees from both theacademic and professional sectors, in collaboration with university, government and community partners. The first part of the article (...) summarizes a review of theliterature on approaches to cultural competence training. The study then outlines the transcoding process by which the stated objectives of intercultural educationwere reformulated in semiotic terms, particularly in reference to cultural semiotics on which the theoretical core of the applied model was subsequently based.Relevant principles from other semiotic schools as well as similar theoretical and methodological stances in the social sciences reinforced the established body of theory for the training design. The third part of the study discusses the process by which semiotic principles were further defined as skill-based outcomes and goals for workshop implementation. This pragmatic defining process facilitated development of questionnaires and surveys, thereby allowing participants to evaluate the training experience by examining their perceptions about the workshop outcomes at the beginning and end of the sessions. This article presents the quantitative results of the evaluation and, in discussing the gains and limits of data obtained, provides the context for a follow-up article on the qualitative findingsof the study. (shrink)

This exploratory enquiry seeks to examine the largely unexplored potential of semiotics for intercultural training and education. The proposed three-partdiscussion describes the process by which semiotic theoretical principles were selected and progressively refined into an applied model which was then pilotedthrough a 2007 research initiative entitled Tools for Cultural Development. The case study involved six groups of French and Australian trainees from both theacademic and professional sectors, in collaboration with university, government and community partners. The first part of the article (...) summarizes a review of theliterature on approaches to cultural competence training. The study then outlines the transcoding process by which the stated objectives of intercultural educationwere reformulated in semiotic terms, particularly in reference to cultural semiotics on which the theoretical core of the applied model was subsequently based.Relevant principles from other semiotic schools as well as similar theoretical and methodological stances in the social sciences reinforced the established body of theory for the training design. The third part of the study discusses the process by which semiotic principles were further defined as skill-based outcomes and goals for workshop implementation. This pragmatic defining process facilitated development of questionnaires and surveys, thereby allowing participants to evaluate the training experience by examining their perceptions about the workshop outcomes at the beginning and end of the sessions. This article presents the quantitative results of the evaluation and, in discussing the gains and limits of data obtained, provides the context for a follow-up article on the qualitative findingsof the study. (shrink)

This second of a two-part series of articles on applied semiotics and intercultural training provides a qualitative evaluation of the research initiative Tools for Cultural Development. Th e discussion will firstly centre on several theoretical and methodological challenges inherent to the qualitative research paradigmand then relate these shifting concerns to convergent findings in poststructuralist (and postcolonial) semiotics, especially with respect to pheno menology and pragmatics. Analysis of four focus group interviews in France and Australia will examine and evaluate the 2007 (...) training experience in light of the culture-specific contexts and stakeholder groups involved. Of particular concern will be the capacity of qualitative evaluative processes to account for the “local meanings”and “voices” within the trainee narratives so as to highlight their perceptions as to the use of semiotics for designing culturally significant practices in educationand praxis. (shrink)

This second of a two-part series of articles on applied semiotics and intercultural training provides a qualitative evaluation of the research initiative Tools for Cultural Development. The discussion will firstly centre on several theoretical and methodological challenges inherent to the qualitative research paradigm and then relate these shifting concerns to convergent findings in poststructuralist semiotics, especially with respect to phenomenology and pragmatics. Analysis of four focus group interviews in France and Australia will examine and evaluate the 2007 training experience in (...) light of the culture-specific contexts and stakeholder groups involved. Of particular concern will be the capacity of qualitative evaluative processes to account for the "local meanings" and "voices" within the trainee narratives so as to highlight their perceptions as to the use of semiotics for designing culturally significant practices in education and praxis. (shrink)

On Becoming an Effective Teacher presents the final unpublished writings of Rogers and as such has a unique historical value. It also documents the research results of four highly relevant, related but independent studies which comprise the biggest collection of data ever accumulated to test a person-centred theory in the field of education. This body of comprehensive research on effective teaching was accomplished over a twenty-year period in 42 States in the U.S. and in six other countries including the UK, (...) Germany, Brazil, Canada, Israel, and Mexico, and is highly relevant to the concerns of teachers, psychologists, students, and parents. The principal findings of the research in this book show that teachers and schools can significantly improve their effectiveness through programs focusing on facilitative interpersonal relationships. Teachers who either naturally have, or are trained to have empathy, genuineness (congruence), and who prize their students (positive regard) create an important level of trust in the classroom and exert significant positive effects on student outcomes including achievement scores, interpersonal functioning, self-concept, and attendance. The dialogues between Rogers and Lyon offer a unique and timeless perspective on teaching, counselling and learning. The work of Reinhard Tausch on person-centered teaching to counselors, parents, athletics, and even textbook materials, as well as research on the interactions of teachers and students, is among the most thorough and rigorous research ever accomplished on the significance and potential of a person-centered approach to teaching and learning. (shrink)

Legitimate parental interests need to be distinguished from any putative rights parents qua parents may be said to possess. Parents have no right to insulate their children from conceptions of the good at variance with those of their own. Claims to the right to faith schools, private schools, home-schooling or to withdraw a child from any aspect of the curriculum designed to enhance a child’s capacity for autonomous decision-making, are refuted.

Our culture is conflicted about morally judging and condemning. We can't avoid it altogether, yet many layfolk today are loathe to do it for reasons neither they nor philosophers well understand. Their resistance is often confused (by themselves and by theorists) with some species of antiobjectivism. But unlike a nonobjectivist, most people think that (a) for us to judge and condemn is generally (objectively) morally wrong , yet (b) for God to do so is (objectively) proper, and (c) so too (...) for certain persons in certain relations (e.g., self-condemnation, parental child rearing.) Certainly, religious (e.g., Christian) critics of judging and condemning without doubting the objective truth of their tradition's core moral teachings. Most puzzling is that (a) merely judging and condemning in one's heart may be improper, and (b) someone else with no more evidence or expertise might properly judge and condemn the same action. The answer is in condemning's complex structure of presuppostions. Condemning and judging are acts, and attitudes initiated by the act. Condemnation is motivated by two judgments presumed to justify it, a criticism of a target, and a judgment that the criticism justifies some negative response toward the target. Unlike nonpunitive penalties, punishments are motivated and explained by condemnation. Condemnation is an act of a hostile will, wishing some evil for its target, not (just) as a means to some good. Its root is in damning, an act akin to cursing. It declares a degraded status. The hostility makes it harder to justify condemnation than criticism, and punishment than nonpunitive penalties. Condemning claims objectivity and authority. It involves reflexive evaluation, regarding itself justified, approving its hostile feelings toward the target. Condemners presume themselves entitled to sit in judgment, pass judgment, and cast the condemned down. Those presumptions inhere in sitting in judgment, assuming jurisdiction. Unlike mathematical or scientific judgments, passing moral judgment seems to be a political act subject to extraepistemic constraints. "Who are you to judge?" may properly challenge your right to pass judgment. (shrink)

Methylation of DNA plays an important role in the control of gene expression in higher eukaryotes. This is largely achieved by the packaging of methylated DNA into chromatin structures that are inaccessible to transcription factors and other proteins. Methylation involves the addition of a methyl group to the 5‐position of the cytosine base in DNA, a reaction catalysed by a DNA (cytosine‐5) methyltransferase. This reaction occurs in nuclear replication foci where the chromatin structure is loosened for replication, thereby allowing access (...) to methyltransferases. Partly as a result of their recognising the presence of a methylcytosine on the parental strand following replication, these large enzymes are able to maintain the distribution of methyl groups along the DNA of somatic cells and, thereby, maintain tissue‐specific patterns of gene expression. (shrink)

A brief review of the social and educational context of Hong Kong shows that the publication of the General guidelines on moral education in schools in 1981, by the Hong Kong Education Department, marked a milestone in the development of moral education. The Guidelines explicitly asserted moral education as one function of schooling, whilst also formally recognizing the home and the community as two main influences. This paper narrates how three moral sources of influence – namely Confucian‐parental, Christian‐religious and liberal‐civic (...) – have shaped the development of moral education in Hong Kong from 1973 to 2003. It then examines in more detail: parental influence at home – the Confucian moral source in Chinese family; schooling influenced by religious sources – taking Christian schools as an example; and the Independent Commission Against Corruption as an official agency for moral education – a liberal source calling for civic morality. In conclusion, the post‐colonial emergence of nationalistic influence in the recently constituted Chinese Special Administrative Region, advocating national identity as the new core value, is traced and the implications for future moral education in Hong Kong are considered. (shrink)

Efforts to bring science into early 19th century breeding practices in Central Europe, organised from Brno, the Hapsburg city in which Mendel would later turn breeding experiments into a body of timeless theory, are here considered as a significant prelude to the great discovery. During those years prior to Mendel's arrival in Brno, enlightened breeders were seeking ways to regulate the process of heredity, which they viewed as a force to be controlled. Many were specialising in sheep breeding for the (...) benefit of the local wool industry while others were showing an interest in commercial plants, especially fruit trees and vines, and later cereals. Breeders explained their problems in regulating heredity in terms of climatic influences disruption due to crossing sports or saltations. Practical experience led them to the concepts of 'inheritance capacity' and the 'mutual elective affinity' of parents. The former was seen to differ among individuals and also among traits; the latter was proposed as a means of adding strength to heredity. The breeders came to recognise that traits might be hidden and yet transmitted as a 'potential' to future generations. They also grew to understand that heredity would be strengthened when a quality was 'fixed' within a lineage by 'pure blood relations.' Continued selection of the desired quality might then lead to 'a higher perfection.' But the ultimate 'physiological' question about breeding, 'what is inherited and how?,' found no answer. Major figures in this development included Abbot Napp, the one who asked this question and who was due to receive Mendel into the monastery in 1843, and Professor Diebl whose lectures on agriculture and natural science at the Brno Philosophical Institute Mendel would attend in 1846. Here we analyse their progress in theorizing about breeding up until about 1840. In discussing this development, we refer to certain international contacts, especially with respect to information transfer and scientific education, within the wider context of the late Enlightenment. (shrink)

Traditionally, physicians and parents made decisions about children’s health care based on western practices. More recently, with legal and ethical development of informed consent and recognition for decision making, children are becoming active participants in their care. The extent to which this is happening is however blurred by lack of clarity about what children — of diverse levels of cognitive development — are capable of understanding. Moreover, when there are multiple surrogate decision makers, parental and professional conflict can arise concerning (...) children’s ‘best interest’. Giving children a voice and offering choice promotes their dignity and quality of life. Nevertheless, it also presents with many challenges. Case studies using pseudonyms and changed situational identities are used in this article to illuminate the complexity of ethical challenges facing nurses in end-of-life care with children and families. (shrink)

Domino's Pizza is testing “Domicopter” drones to deliver pizzas, which will compete with Taco Bell's “Tacocopter” drones. Not to be outdone, Amazon is working on an army of delivery drones that will cut out the postal service. In Denmark, farmers use drones to inspect fields for the appearance of harmful weeds, which reduces herbicide use as the drones directly apply pesticides only where it is needed. Environmentalists send drones into glacial caves or into deep waters, gathering data that would be (...) too dangerous or expensive for human scientists to procure. Federal Express dreams of pilotless aerial and terrestrial drones that will transport goods more cheaply, reliably, and safely than vehicles operated by humans. Human rights activists deploy drones over conflict zones, intelligently searching for and documenting abuses for both rhetorical and legal purposes. Aid agencies send unmanned drones to villages deep in jungles or behind enemy lines, maneuvering hazardous terrain to bring food and supplies to endangered populations. Medical researchers are experimenting with injecting drone blood cells into humans that can mimic good cholesterol carriers or identify and neutralize cancerous cells. Parents in Vermont are using flying drones to accompany children to school, giving a whole new meaning to helicopter parenting. And Pilobolus, a New York dance company, has choreographed a dance in which drones and humans engage each other in the most human of acts: the creation of art. (shrink)

ObjectiveThe goal of the study was to explore the relationship between parent–children relationships related to using the internet among kids and potentially associated factors.Materials and MethodsA sample of 1.216 Vietnamese students between the ages of 12 and 18 agreed to participate in the cross-sectional online survey. Data collected included socioeconomic characteristics and internet use status of participants, their perceived changes in relationship and communication between parents and children since using the internet, and parental control toward the child’s internet use. (...) An Ordered Logistic Regression was carried out to determine factors associated with parent–children relationship since using the internet.ResultsThe characteristics of the relationship between children and their parents since using the Internet were divided into three levels: deterioration, stability, and improvement. The topics that children most often communicate with their parents include learning, housework, and future directions. Two-way interactive activities, such as supporting parents to use the Internet, have a positive impact on the parent–child relationship. Stubborn parental control, such as establishing rules about contact or allowing Internet access and setting up global positioning system to track negatively affecting parent–child relationships.ConclusionFindings indicated that changes in the quality of the parent–child relationship were self-assessed by participants regard to kids’ internet use, especially in the COVID-19 epidemic context. Educational campaigns and programs to raise awareness of parents as to the dangers and negative influences that their children may encounter online, psychology of children’s behaviors and effects of different responding strategies are recommended. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 159-161 [Access article in PDF] Benedict's Dharma: Buddhist Reflections on the Rule of Saint Benedict. By Norman Fischer, et al. Edited by Patrick Hart, with an afterword by David Steindl-Rast and a translation of the Rule by Patrick Berry. New York: Riverhead Books, 2001. xvi + 222 pp. When Buddhist and Christian monastics meet, they recognize each other as brothers and sisters engaged in a (...) similar quest, despite their doctrinal differences. The nature of this quest is explored in Benedict's Dharma, in which four Buddhists (Norman Fischer, Joseph Goldstein, Judith Simmer-Brown, and Yifa, representing the Zen, Theravadin, Tibetan, and Chinese Buddhist traditions) ruminate on their fraternal and sororal feelings.Venerable Yifa, a nun of the prominent Taiwanese monastery Fo Guang Shan, is the only one of the four in monastic vows, and the reader may wonder what the three non-monastics could offer to a discussion on the monastic life. This is not a new problem. Patrick Henry and Donald Swearer's groundbreaking study, For the Sake of the World: The Spirit of Buddhist and Christian Monasticism (1989), spends a great deal of time on Zen monks, even though there are no Zen monks, theVinaya is kept by the Zen nuns or by the monastics of the parent and sibling lineages of Chan, Son, and Thien. (See my review article, "Why Are There Monks and Nuns?" in Buddhist-Christian Studies 12.) The monastic, it seems, is not confined to the habit.Brother David Steindl-Rast, a monk of Mount Saviour Monastery, grapples with this problem in his afterword, "Conclusions about a Beginning." It was at Mount Saviour that the phrase "the monastic dimension" was coined, to refer to those of monastic bent who for one reason or another did not or could not live in the cloister. One of Brother David's books was to be called, he told me, The Monk in Us, "us" meaning laypeople, but the title had an odd sound and was dropped. So, what is the monastic dimension? Brother David suggests that it is mindfulness, and he comes close to saying that wherever there is mindfulness, there is monasticism. "If mindfulness is all that matters, the monastery is merely a most convenient environment for this kind of life, but it can be lived anywhere, by anyone" (126). He goes on to discuss the phenomenon of monasteries shrinking in size at the same time as the number of long- and short-term visitors to monasteries grows, and proposes that we are moving toward a new understanding of the terms "contemplative," "monastic," and "lay."This insight may point to the most important contribution of this book. It is not about monasticism per se, and it is not a comparative study of the Rule and the Vinaya, with practical suggestions for their mutual reform; rather, it is a meditation on how anyone, monastic or lay, might live the contemplative or mindful life. Throughout the history of the Church and the sangha, laypeople have been in the majority, but attention has been focused on the priests and monastics. Pope Pius X [End Page 159] put it bluntly: the laypeople are the sheep who are to be led, and the clergy are the shepherds who lead. The Church, he added, is not a democracy. I do not know of a Buddhist who has been quite this straightforward, but many have come close, and the history of Buddhism is not that of a democracy. Occasionally, lay movements in both traditions have arisen, basing themselves on the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers or on the teaching of universal Buddha-nature, but they have quickly been co-opted by leaders who proclaimed themselves to be more equal than their fellows. The tragedy for both Buddhism and Christianity is that the contemplative or mindful life has become restricted to a group of professionals, with the attendant belief that such a life is unattainable by most Buddhists and Christians. Now that the dharma has come to the land of the red-faced people, where democracy is... (shrink)

Levinas is a thinker for the future, concerned with the future. He inverts the priority of the declaration of the French Revolution "Freedom, Equality, Brotherhood", by designating "brotherhood" first among modern European society's most cherished values. Levinas sees brotherhood as the fundamental condition of our shared humanity and as the foundation of freedom and equality. Thus, he presents himself as a Western thinker who sets modern thought on its head and at the same time enriches it. His radical view of (...) the other, responsibility, subjectivity and the Infinite remains a challenge, today more than ever. Calling out to both religious and secular seekers alike, Levinas asks for an alert and critical dialogue of the ethical and metaphysical meaning of our inter-human and social relationships. In this work, a new generation of philosophers, ethicists and theologians embark on a conversation with Levians, with due appreciation for his genius and uninhibitedness in their questioning. The intermediaries in this provocative dialogue are: Hannah Arendt, Henri Bergson, Anders Nygren, Paul Ricoeur and Hans Urs von Balthasar. The following themes are thus treated: - ethics as liberation and redemption beyond the self - time, duration and alterity - freedom, society and politics - desire between eros and agape - 'good enough' parenting and family ethics - conversational processes and pastoral counselling - asymmetry and reciprocity between the self and the other - modern humanism vs. post-modern anti-humanism as an inspiration for a renewed secular humanism - suffering, death and euthanasia - perspectives and boundaries of interreligious dialogue - the (im)possibility of a Christian interpretation of Levinas' Jewish-inspired thought - a new Christian theology of Trinitarian praxis. This volume likewise includes contributions by: Roger Burggraeve, W. Wolf Diedrich, Annemie Dillen, Thomas Folens, Glen Morrison, Marianne Moyaert, Marina Riemslagh, Anya Topolski, Emilie Van Daele, Jean Vanheessen, Sophie Veulemans and Torben Wolfs. In this book Levinas is presented as an 'extra-ordinary' other who awakes into vigilance the conscience of not only the contributors, but the readers as well: one speaks and the other responds differently. (shrink)

As children, we are often told both what to do and what to think. For a child to learn at all, it must in the first instance simply trust those, such as parents, who teach it things; and this goes for practical as well as theoretical learning. Doubting is necessarily something that comes later, for to be able to doubt one must have some beliefs already, e.g. concerning what sort of reasons count as good reasons, and what count as bad. (...) But in growing up, a person does, or should, develop the capacity for rational doubt, and also the capacity for rational resistance to being told what to do. The first capacity constitutes a critical faculty, and the second is an essential constituent of practical autonomy. (shrink)

Efforts to bring science into early 19th century breeding practices in Central Europe, organised from Brno, the Hapsburg city in which Mendel would later turn breeding experiments into a body of timeless theory, are here considered as a significant prelude to the great discovery. During those years prior to Mendel's arrival in Brno, enlightened breeders were seeking ways to regulate the process of heredity, which they viewed as a force to be controlled. Many were specialising in sheep breeding for the (...) benefit of the local wool industry while others were showing an interest in commercial plants, especially fruit trees and vines, and later cereals. Breeders explained their problems in regulating heredity in terms of (1) climatic influences (2) disruption due to crossing (3) sports or saltations. Practical experience led them to the concepts of 'inheritance capacity' and the 'mutual elective affinity' of parents. The former was seen to differ among individuals and also among traits; the latter was proposed as a means of adding strength to heredity. The breeders came to recognise that traits might be hidden and yet transmitted as a 'potential' to future generations. They also grew to understand that heredity would be strengthened when a quality was 'fixed' within a lineage by 'pure blood relations.' Continued selection of the desired quality might then lead to 'a higher perfection.' But the ultimate 'physiological' question about breeding, 'what is inherited and how?,' found no answer. Major figures in this development included Abbot Napp, the one who asked this question and who was due to receive Mendel into the monastery in 1843, and Professor Diebl whose lectures on agriculture and natural science at the Brno Philosophical Institute Mendel would attend in 1846. Here we analyse their progress in theorizing about breeding up until about 1840. In discussing this development, we refer to certain international contacts, especially with respect to information transfer and scientific education, within the wider context of the late Enlightenment. (shrink)

Parents can benefit their offspring by conserving resources that the offspring stand to inherit. Thus, inheritance of resources should promote the evolution of propensities to conserve. But inheritance also has another, less obvious effect: it can reduce the fertility of the conserver’s grandchildren, thus reducing the expected number of great-grandchildren. Consequently, inheritance of resources promotes the evolution of conservation less than might be supposed.

ABSTRACT In this paper we argue that sex‐selective abortion (SSA) cannot be morally justified and that it should be prohibited. We present two main arguments against SSA. First, we present reasons why the decision for a woman to seek SSA in cultures with strong son‐preference cannot be regarded as autonomous on either a narrow or a broad account of autonomy. Second, we identify serious harms associated with SSA including perpetuation of discrimination against women, disruption to social and familial networks, and (...) increased violence against women. For these reasons, SSA should be prohibited by law, and such laws should be enforced. Finally, we describe additional strategies for decreasing son‐preference. Some of these strategies rely upon highlighting the disadvantages of women becoming scarce, such as lack of brides and daughters‐in‐law to care for elderly parents. We should, however, be cautious not to perpetuate the view that the purpose of women is to be the consorts for, and carers of, men, and the providers of children. Arguments against SSA should be located within a concerted effort to ensure greater, deeper social and cultural equality between the sexes. (shrink)

The mass childhood immunization programme has traditionally been viewed as a safe and effective preventative measure by health promoters, primary health care professionals and governments. This consensus has meant that immunization has rarely been viewed as ethically problematic. A number of recent changes in the context of the delivery of health care, particularly the emphasis on consumerism and the effect of the marketization of services, makes timely an examination of ethical, social and political issues. This article examines four main grounds (...) for problematizing the mass childhood immunization programme. These are: clinical research evidence about the safety and efficacy of vaccines; the masking of wider social and political determinants of ill health; the contradictory strictures about collective and individual rights in relation to immunization; and the uniqueness of childhood immunization as a physical intrusion into a healthy body. The implications of these ethical issues are discussed in relation to informed consent and the need for a 'greenfield' review that includes the views of dissenting parents, lawyers and moral philosophers, as well as health professionals. Les promoteurs de santé, les soignants et les gouvernements ont tous traditionellement vu le programme d'immunisation globale des enfants comme sain et efficace. Cela voulait dire que l'immunisation a rarement posé un problème éthique. Pourtant, actuellement des changements dans les contextes de la distribution des soins, le consumérisme et de l'effet de la commercialisation des services de santé, exigent une revue des problèmes éthiques, sociaux et politiques. Cet article discute quatre éléments problématiques du programme d'immunisation globale: les données des recherches médicales sur la sûreté et l'efficacité des vaccins; la dissimulation des déterminatifs sociaux et politiques des maladies; les critiques contradictoires des droits individuels et collectifs concernant l'immunisation; et le caractère unique de l'immunisation des enfants comme une intrusion physique dans un corps sain. Les effets de ces questions éthiques sont repris en rapport du consentement informé et de la nécessité d'une revue 'verte' qui comprend les vues des parents dissidents, des juristes, des philsophes et des membres des professions soignantes. Das Massenimpfungsprogramm von Kindern wurde allgemein von Gesundheits behörden, medizinischem Fachpersonal und Regierungen als sichere und wirksame Vorbeugungsmassnahme betrachtet. Diese Uebereinstimmung bedeutete, dass Imp fungen selten ein ethisches Problem darstellten. Eine Anzahl von Aenderungen im Gesundheitswesen - besonders im Hinblickin auf Konsum und Marktwirtschaft im Dienstleistungsbereich - berechtigen jedoch zu einer Untersuchung der ethischen, sozialen und politischen Fragen. Dieser Artikel untersucht vier Hauptgründe, die das Massenimpfungsprogramm für Kinder in Frage stellen: Forschungsergebnisse über die Sicherheit und Wirksamkeit der Impfstoffe; die Verschleierung von andern sozialen und politischen Krankheitsursachen; die widersprüchlichen Anordnungen über kollektive und individuelle Rechte mit Bezug auf die Impfungen; und die aussergewöhnliche Art der Impfung als physische Verletzung eines gesunden Körpers. Die Bedeutung dieser ethischen Fragen werden hier diskutiert im Zusammenhang mit der informierten Vereinstimmung und der Notwendigkeit eines 'grünen' Ueberblickes, der die Ansichten andersdenkender Eltern, Rechtsanwalte, Philosophen und Gesund heitsexperten einschliesst. (shrink)

John Rogers explores the concepts of recognition, command and authority and tests their validity in several cases presented by Hobbes, ranging from parental authority to the omnipotence of God. The general thesis he defends is that, for Hobbes, autonomy always goes hand in hand with the possession of power. Even for the individuals in a civil society, there is no autonomy but in a condition of empowerment. But, at the same time, the strength of the laws of nature rests in (...) their rationality, and there can be no doubt that their compelling force comes from their being rational. The comparison with mathematical theorems furnishes an important element of understanding, since the laws of nature are conclusions concerning that which conduces to the conservation of oneself. Although there is an empirical element in the deduction of those practical theorems, this is no objection to the analogy being drawn, since this empirical element belongs to the learning process and not to the rationality of the law itself. In the light of this conception of natural law, Hobbes thus appears as a rationalist in morals and politics. (shrink)

Boarding school is a major educational option for many students (e.g., students living in remote areas, or whose parents are working interstate or overseas, etc.). This study explored the motivation, engagement, and achievement of boarding and day students who are educated in the same classrooms and receive the same syllabus and instruction from the same teachers (thus a powerful research design to enable unique comparisons). Among 2,803 students (boardingn= 481; dayn= 2,322) from 6 Australian high schools and controlling for background (...) attributes and personality, we found predominant parity between boarding and day students in their motivation, engagement, and achievement. We also found that classroom-average motivation, engagement, and achievement was not significantly affected by the number of boarders (relative to day students) in the classroom. In addition, the effects of boarding were generally not moderated by students’ background or personality attributes. We conclude that boarders have academic opportunities and outcomes that are comparable to their day student counterparts. Implications for students, teachers, and parents are discussed. (shrink)

I argue that its appearing to you that P does not provide justification for believing that P unless you have independent justification for the denial of skeptical alternatives – hypotheses incompatible with P but such that if they were true, it would still appear to you that P. Thus I challenge the popular view of ‘dogmatism,’ according to which for some contents P, you need only lack reason to suspect that skeptical alternatives are true, in order for an experience as (...) of P to justify belief that P. I pursue three lines of objection to dogmatism, having to do with probabilistic reasoning, considerations of future or hypothetically available justification, and epistemic circularity. I briefly sketch a fall-back position which avoids the problems raised. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:I am delighted to have the opportunity to speak on a topic that is of interest to all of us, inasmuch as it pertains to our summer endeavor, Franciscan education. I will do so, however, from the perspective of Roger Bacon – the Doctor Mirabilis – a friar who held his Order's education system in contempt. His scathing attacks included equally strong words for the Augustinians, Carmelites and (...) Dominicans, whom he lumped together with the Franciscans and dismissed as the ordines puerorum. Although he was a Franciscan, let me assure you that Bacon did not intend the "order of young boys" to be an endearing description of his confreres – but more about this later.Bacon's sharpest attacks are found in his Compendium studii philosophiae, written around 1271-1272. For those of you who are not familiar with this English friar, let me sketch out his biography. In all seriousness, what we know of his provenance, education, and career is indeed sketchy. Depending on how we read selected autobiographical remarks, he was born around 1214 or 1220 and died around 1292. After studying in Oxford, he became one of the first masters to comment on Aristotle in the Faculty of Arts in Paris during the 1240s and subsequently returned to England. Whether it was there, or perhaps later in France that he entered the Minorite Order is uncertain, nevertheless we find him in the Franciscan habit in 1256 and living in Paris. It will be from the vantage point of Paris that Brother Bacon will argue for radical curricular reform and critique the prevailing mendicant educational system. Later, perhaps back in England after 1268, he continues his criticism until his death in 1292.As I begin, allow me a few moments to explain why I think Bacon's critique should not be ignored by Franciscans nor relegated to an obscure footnote by educators. To offer a critique of a position, belief, or view is something that is to be expected from those in colleges and universities who have been educated in what we call "critical thinking." However, as Michael Roth noted in The Chronicle of Higher Education, to critique is the beginning, not the end or goal of the process. His article, entitled "Beyond Critical Thinking," warns educators that many of our best students are considered intelligent because of their sharply-honed, acquired ability to take apart, unmask, or deconstruct the beliefs of others. Experts at exorcizing and banishing meaning from firmly held texts, they are likewise unable to find or construct meaning in their own lives from these sources which have inspired, formed, and challenged countless individuals through the centuries.Let me offer you an example from my own experience at Flagler College. I have taught everything from Introduction to the Old Testament to upper-level Contemporary Theological Thought. Over the years I have seen that taking a critical approach to the material is crucial, yet there is a corresponding need to assist students along the path toward wisdom through the integration of our academic critique within a coherent worldview. For any number of reasons it is an exhilarating, empowering, and I would say, even a liberating experience for some to learn that the Scriptures are problematic, and thereby open to various interpretations. This opens the door for some to challenge the authority their parents and pastors have wielded over them, while emboldening other students to challenge and even embarrass peers. For example, one of my students discovered that the King James Bible contained John 5:4 which many modern translations eliminated since scholars hold that it was something similar to a gloss. He subsequently challenged others by questioning how they could believe that God had an eternal claim on anyone when scholars were not even sure what parts of the Bible were legitimate, or even true. His proof text in these discussions.. (shrink)

Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are versions of ‘‘weak awareness internalism’’ that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the ‘‘Subject’s Perspective Objection’’ horn of the dilemma. Second, we show that there are versions of ‘‘strong awareness internalism’’ that do not fall prey to the dilemma’s ‘‘vicious regress’’ horn. We note along the way that (...) these versions of internalism do not, in avoiding one horn of the dilemma, succumb to the dilemma’s other horn. The upshot is that internalists have many available strategies for avoiding dilemmatic defeat. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to Roger Mantie, Book Review, Thomas A. Regelski, A Brief Introduction to a Philosophy of Music and Music Education as Social Praxis in Philosophy of Music Education Review 24, no. 2 (Fall, 2016): 213–219.Thomas A. RegelskiWhile I am appreciative of Roger Mantie’s generous compliments about my past scholarship, his review is often misleading and philosophically misinformed. In particular, what he refers to as my “editorialized, (...) overview of the history of aesthetics,”1 I clearly describe as a critical philosophy2 of the aesthetic theory of art according to recent philosophy of art.3Kantian aesthetic theory was not a theory of art.... It is primarily a theory of free beauty and of the sublime, of our responses to flowers and cascades and the starry sky at night.... [I]t is hotly disputed and probably false.... [T]he theory hardly suffices to characterize art in general, for the obvious reason that art as we know it is not divorced from the rest of society.4Therefore distinguishing between an aesthetic rationale for justifying school music and a philosophy of music education is vitally important. [End Page 99]The legitimation crisis facing music education in today’s schools (viz., declining schedules and resources) is one result of taken-for-granted belief by many teachers of music’s automatic aesthetic benefits as their supposition for advocating its inclusion in schooling. Such a tacit belief assumes, with Kant, that “being in an aesthetic state is as easy as rolling off a log, and, furthermore, it is available to everyone.”5 It supposedly occurs spontaneously in the presence of so-called “aesthetic properties.” According to analytic aesthetics, these properties qualify the “autonomania”6 (spelled incorrectly in the review) of music’s “for its own sake” value, and its “sacralization” (also misspelled) as a spiritual source of veneration. Unfortunately, the autonomy of school music from music’s social roots and role, under the aegis of an aesthetic paradigm, drastically limits its contribution to the general education of all students.Moreover, my position on what music “is” and “is good for” does not represent the “is/ought fallacy,” as Mantie mistakenly asserts.7 That fallacy in ethics depends on an unwarranted deduction from “is” (fact, description) to “ought” (value, norm)8 which is not at stake in my discussion. A Finnish child came home upset that he had left his “notes” on the tram. In English, he probably would have bemoaned leaving his “music” behind. Teachers who are content to stress mainly notation can miss “the music” (for example, what is meant when judging a performance to be unmusical). The “ersatz Kantian theory of art”9 postulates that art and music are created to evoke the aesthetic responses the theory hypothesizes (according to an aesthetic attitude, disinterestedness, free beauty, and many other putative criteria). When, instead, viewing music’s origins and purposes (for example, as in anthropology and ethnomusicology) as always social in meaning, consequences, and worth, then teaching that stresses music’s sociality (not its autonomy) is promoted and becomes a warranted curricular goal.Moreover, the aesthetic experiences postulated by aesthetic theory are covert, thus lacking empirical evidence of teaching or learning effectiveness, or for curricular planning! Their effects are just presumed. In praxis-based teaching, instead, results are amply observable to learners (thus motivating), to administrators (thus promoting curricular support), and to parents (thus for taxpayers). This is all the more the case when musicing is chosen as “worthwhile” (that is, literally, “good time”) after school and graduation: the ongoing disposition to engage in musicing is thus my praxial definition of music appreciation. All this is argued in my book, but is neglected in the review, except where, in minimizing the effects of the resulting legitimation crisis facing music educators, Mantie concedes that school music has “almost always been contested and fragile”10—as though it has not progressively suffered from recent trends (No Child Left Behind Act in the US, common core, testing mania, and so on). [End Page 100]Mantie proposes that because musical praxes exist in society does not justify their inclusion as part of school music.11 That leaves out a lot of commonplace... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Life as Dialogue:Remembering RogerHarry WellsI first met Roger when we both attended a colloquium on "Buddhist Thought and Culture" at the University of Montevello, Alabama, in April 1988. Roger read a paper that was thoroughly engaging, called "Becoming a Dialogian: How to do Buddhist-Christian Dialogue without Really Trying." At that point, I was hooked on getting to know this funny little man with a British accent who (...) could deliver an excellent reflection without being bothered by his occasional stammering.What struck me about Roger's paper was that it was meant to engage the one who heard it. It was written with a sense of interpretive transparency—a reflection on experience that was his own but also bigger than his own. It was one of those times where in hearing the account of his experience, one found one's own experience mirrored and affirmed. The paper was an autobiographical reflection on his journey into the interior ambiguity of interreligious dialogue, which at times can be very challenging when one tries truly to listen deeply to the visions of two distinct religious traditions. But his life was testament to the integrity of the journey and to an emergent overarching trust, or faith, that something very real and true was being birthed in the midst of it all.In the paper, which I use as an introductory essay for my Interreligious Dialogue course, he delightfully describes his boyhood "conversions" from one religious tradition to another in his own imagination as his pocket money purchases from Penguin Press "brought the world to my front door." One evening he emerges from his bedroom to inform his parents that he had become a Buddhist. "I had been reading all about it, I explained, and it was clear that I was already a Buddhist. It was as if I were remembering something from a past life. 'That's nice dear' commented my mother, 'have you finished your homework yet?' "He goes on to describe his theological studies, and his ever increasing grasp of, and being grasped by, the Eucharistic celebration. But he recounts:I was now in a quandary. Buddhism made sense to me, Meditation worked, and the Four Noble Truths seemed indeed to be true. But, now Christianity also made sense. In the Bible and the Mass some Power greater, more serene, and more loving than any other power I had known, was trying to contact me. Apparently, it was God, the same God, I presumed, that Buddhism denied.I did not know what to do, other than to be loyal somehow or another to what I had discovered, even though what I had discovered was self-contradictory. [End Page 157]The rest of the paper discusses his journey of that loyalty, becoming a Roman Catholic along the way, and later "the Buddhism erupted and demanded to be taken just as seriously as my Christianity."From that starting point twenty years ago, Roger and I shared our thoughts and reflections along the way at academic conferences and Buddhist-Christian dialogues. I always looked forward to hearing Roger speak, because he had a unique way of taking scholarship seriously by not being stuck in the mold of academic presentation. What I mean is this: Roger thoroughly researched what he was studying, but he is always studied for the engagement of life. As a result, his presentations were always lively in the best sense of that word—"alive," reflection seeking insight, and the "playful" embrace of living life within that insight.Here are some of the ways Roger impacted my life:• Roger taught me about "faith." He helped me learn to trust my experience of being compelled into interreligious experience, which takes immense effort and internal conflict initially but is a "burning in one's bones," to quote the prophet Jeremiah, for those called to be in that stance.• He taught me how to be a better teacher-scholar. He modeled for me the ability to present papers that were written to make a difference in the lives of those present, to connect with them in a way that led me and them to participate in insight as it was manifesting. Scholarship was... (shrink)

I believe that Tom is the proud father of a baby boy. Why do I think his child is a boy? A natural answer might be that I remember that his name is ‘Owen’ which is usually a boy’s name. Here I’ve given information that might be part of a causal explanation of my believing that Tom’s baby is a boy. I do have such a memory and it is largely what sustains my conviction. But I haven’t given you just (...) any causally relevant information, I’ve given my grounds for my belief. I’ve given reasons that might justify me in supposing that Tom’s baby is a boy. Less naturally, the question might be taken as a request for a broader causal explanation of my holding this belief. Appropriate answers might cite all manner of facts concerning the evolution of the human race, why I chose to pursue philosophy and hence came to know Tom, the mechanisms of email transmission, the firing of various neurons, the circumstances of concept formation as a result of which I’m able to grasp the thought that Tom’s baby is a boy, and so on. It is an interesting question what distinguishes the narrower set of answers that I first suggested. I won’t pursue that here. I assume you have a good enough sense of the distinction I’m drawing. We might call the narrower set of answers justifying reasons, the kind of reasons I might cite in justifying my belief. Answers of the first sort are clearly relevant to epistemological evaluation. In assessing whether you know p or are rational in believing it to the degree you do, I will naturally want to consider what reasons you have for your belief. In deliberating myself about whether to believe p, in seeking an answer to the question of whether p, I will naturally consider what reasons or grounds I have to suppose that p. But what I want to focus on here is how explanations of the broader sort bear on such questions as whether to believe p. From a third-person perspective we can ask, ‘In assessing the epistemic status of S’s belief that p, what is the relevance of causal information that lies outside of the realm of justifying reasons?’ From the first-person standpoint we can ask ‘In seeking to answer whether p, how should such causal information affect my deliberations?’ At first it might seem that such broader causal information could have little relevance if any. Like any belief my belief that p can be traced back to innumerable causes from far and wide.. (shrink)

This is a three-part exchange on the relationship between belief and credence. It begins with an opening essay by Roger Clarke that argues for the claim that the notion of credence generalizes the notion of belief. Julia Staffel argues in her reply that we need to distinguish between mental states and models representing them, and that this helps us explain what it could mean that belief is a special case of credence. Roger Clarke's final essay reflects on the (...) compatibility of the previously discussed views with dualist and monist interpretations of our mental states and our ways of modeling them. (shrink)

Offers an in-depth exposition of the Confucian conception of persons as the starting point of Confucian ethics.

A substantial body of recent philosophy envisages a close, congenial relationship between blame and morality. It has been posited, assumed or argued, for instance, that blame is responsive to moral...

The preface paradox does not show that it can be rational to have inconsistent beliefs, because preface writers do not have inconsistent beliefs. I argue, first, that a fully satisfactory solution to the preface paradox would have it that the preface writer's beliefs are consistent. The case here is on basic intuitive grounds, not the consequence of a theory of rationality or of belief. Second, I point out that there is an independently motivated theory of belief – sensitivism – which (...) allows such a solution. I sketch a sensitivist account of the preface writer's doxastic state. (shrink)

Abstract Scientific advances have made the end of life into the primary concern of medicine. But medicine also postpones the end of life, often until the time when we no longer have the mental and physical capacity to deal with it. I argue that we need to develop Nietzsche's idea of timely death, in order to find a moral basis for health care at the end of life, and that the crucial factor is the cultivation of the virtues that would (...) enable us to live in another and more reckless way. We should look on the problem not from the first-person point of view, but from the perspective of the other, and ask ourselves what is most admirable in another person, in his or her attitude to death. The point of timely death is to make death into the completion of life, where life is understood as a moral rather than a biological idea. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Understanding and Reality Tradition and Interpretation Forms of Realism Works cited.

What can fashionable ideas, blind faith, or pure fantasy possibly have to do with the scientific quest to understand the universe? Surely, theoretical physicists are immune to mere trends, dogmatic beliefs, or flights of fancy? In fact, acclaimed physicist and best-selling author Roger Penrose argues that researchers working at the extreme frontiers of physics are just as susceptible to these forces as anyone else. In this provocative book, he argues that fashion, faith, and fantasy, while sometimes productive and even (...) essential in physics, may be leading today's researchers astray in three of the field's most important areas--string theory, quantum mechanics, and cosmology... The result is an important critique of some of the most significant developments in physics today from one of its most eminent figures."--Jacket. (shrink)

Argues that the only way to understand the Confucian vision of the consummate moral life is to take the tradition on its own terms.

My intention is to show that, starting from an empiricist philosophy of mind, it is possible to give a systematic account of aesthetic experience. I argue that empiricism involves a certain theory of meaning and truth; one problem is to show how this theory is compatible with the activity of aesthetic judgment. I investigate and reject two attempts to delimit the realm of the aesthetic: one in terms of the individuality of the aesthetic object, and the other in terms of (...) 'aesthetic properties'. I go on to argue that aesthetic descriptions must not be thought to ascribe properties to their objects, and I show how the suggestion that they are non-descriptive need not conflict with the empiricist view of meaning. The problem is then seen to lie with the analysis of the 'acceptance-conditions' of aesthetic descriptions. I counter certain idealist objections to this approach, and then present a theory of imagination, in terms of which the acceptance conditions of aesthetic judgments may be described. This theory attempts to explain how the element of thought in aesthetic appreciation may become inseparable from an experience of its object, and how the aesthetic emotions are both like and unlike their equivalents in life. The first part concludes with an analysis of the general conditions of aesthetic experience. I try to show that aesthetic experience can be described in terms of certain 'formal' properties, independently of its material object. In the second part I am concerned to show that this empiricist theory of aesthetics does not, like most empiricist theories, make nonsense of our appreciation of art. First, I attempt to show that 'understanding' art is not merely a cognitive process, but involves certain experiences that can be accounted for in terms of the previous theory. I then analyse the concepts of representation and expression, and in the course of this analysis I attempt to refute what I take to be the most serious rival analysis of our appreciation of art - the semantic theory. (shrink)

Entry on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. A summary of the literature on whether externalism about thought content precludes non-empirical knowledge of one's own thoughts.