Results for 'Ruth Chang'

(not author) ( search as author name )
1000+ found
Order:
  1.  6
    Conducting Health Disparities Research with Criminal Justice Populations: Examining Research, Ethics, and Participation.Pamela Valera, Stephanie Cook, Ruth Macklin & Yvonne Chang - 2014 - Ethics and Behavior 24 (2):164-174.
    This study explored the challenges of informed consent and understanding of the research process among Black and Latino men under community supervision. Between February and October 2012, we conducted cognitive face-to-face interviews using open-ended questions on the significant areas of research participation among 259 men aged 35 to 67 under community supervision in Bronx, New York. Content analysis of the open-ended questions revealed limited knowledge concerning the understanding of research participation. The study participants appeared to generally understand concepts such as (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.
    In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  3. The Possibility of Parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
    This paper argues for the existence of a fourth positive generic value relation that can hold between two items beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’: namely ‘on a par’.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  4. Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Harvard University Press.
    And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? In this book, some of the sharpest minds in philosophy struggle with these questions.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  5. Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity.Ruth Chang - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 243-71.
    This paper investigates two puzzles in practical reason and proposes a solution to them. First, sometimes, when we are practically certain that neither of two alternatives is better than or as good as the other with respect to what matters in the choice between them, it nevertheless seems perfectly rational to continue to deliberate, and sometimes the result of that deliberation is a conclusion that one alternative is better, where there is no error in one’s previous judgment. Second, there are (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  6. All Things Considered.Ruth Chang - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):1–22.
    One of the most common judgments of normative life takes the following form: With respect to some things that matter, one item is better than the other, with respect to other things that matter, the other item is better, but all things considered – that is, taking into account all the things that matter – the one item is better than the other. In this paper, I explore how all-things-considered judgments are possible, assuming that they are. In particular, I examine (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  7. Transformative Choices.Ruth Chang - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):237-282.
    This paper proposes a way to understand transformative choices, choices that change ‘who you are.’ First, it distinguishes two broad models of transformative choice: 1) ‘event-based’ transformative choices in which some event—perhaps an experience—downstream from a choice transforms you, and 2) ‘choice-based’ transformative choices in which the choice itself—and not something downstream from the choice—transforms you. Transformative choices are of interest primarily because they purport to pose a challenge to standard approaches to rational choice. An examination of the event-based transformative (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  8. Parity, Interval Value, and Choice.Ruth Chang - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):331-350.
    This paper begins with a response to Josh Gert’s challenge that ‘on a par with’ is not a sui generis fourth value relation beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. It then explores two further questions: can parity be modeled by an interval representation of value? And what should one rationally do when faced with items on a par? I argue that an interval representation of value is incompatible with the possibility that items are on a par (a mathematical (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  9. Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability?Ruth Chang - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):106-126.
    This paper presents an argument against the widespread view that ‘hard choices’ are hard because of the incomparability of the alternatives. The argument has two parts. First, I argue that any plausible theory of practical reason must be ‘comparativist’ in form, that is, it must hold that a comparative relation between the alternatives with respect to what matters in the choice determines a justified choice in that situation. If comparativist views of practical reason are correct, however, the incomparabilist view of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  10. Can Desires Provide Reasons for Action?Ruth Chang - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press. pp. 56--90.
    What sorts of consideration can be normative reasons for action? If we systematize the wide variety of considerations that can be cited as normative reasons, do we find that there is a single kind of consideration that can always be a reason? Desire-based theorists think that the fact that you want something or would want it under certain evaluatively neutral conditions can always be your normative reason for action. Value-based theorists, by contrast, think that what plays that role are evaluative (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  11. Value Incomparability and Incommensurability.Ruth Chang - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press.
    This introductory article describes the phenomena of incommensurability and incomparability, how they are related, and why they are important. Since incomparability is the more significant phenomenon, the paper takes that as its focus. It gives a detailed account of what incomparability is, investigates the relation between the incomparability of values and the incomparability of alternatives for choice, distinguishes incomparability from the related phenomena of parity, indeterminacy, and noncomparability, and, finally, defends a view about practical justification that vindicates the importance of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  12. Parity, Imprecise Comparability, and the Repugnant Conclusion.Ruth Chang - 2016 - Theoria 82 (2):183-215.
    This article explores the main similarities and differences between Derek Parfit’s notion of imprecise comparability and a related notion I have proposed of parity. I argue that the main difference between imprecise comparability and parity can be understood by reference to ‘the standard view’. The standard view claims that 1) differences between cardinally ranked items can always be measured by a scale of units of the relevant value, and 2) all rankings proceed in terms of the trichotomy of ‘better than’, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  13.  95
    Making Comparisons Count.Ruth Chang - 2001 - Routledge.
    The central aim of this book is to answer two questions: Are alternatives for choice ever incomparable? and, In what ways can items be compared? The arguments offered suggest that alternatives for choice no matter how different are never incomparable, and that the ways in which items can be compared are richer and more varied than commonly supposed. This work is the first book length treatment of the topics of incomparability, value, and practical reason.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  14. Introduction.Ruth Chang - 1997 - In Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press. pp. 1-34.
    This paper is the introduction to the volume. It gives an argumentative view of the philosophical landscape concerning incommensurability and incomparability. It argues that incomparability, not incommensurability, is the important phenomenon on which philosophers should be focusing and that the arguments for the existence of incomparability are so far not compelling.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  15. Commitment, Reasons, and the Will.Ruth Chang - 2013 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 8. Oxford University Press. pp. 74-113.
    This paper argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model – as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. Incommensurability (and Incomparability).Ruth Chang - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell. pp. 2591-2604.
    This encyclopedia entry urges what it takes to be correctives to common (mis)understandings concerning the phenomenon of incommensurability and incomparability and briefly outlines some of their philosophical upshots.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Value Pluralism.Ruth Chang - 2015 - In James Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Vol. 25. Elsevier. pp. 21-26.
    ‘Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values that cannot be ‘reduced’ to a single supervalue. While it is widely assumed that value pluralism is true, the case for value pluralism depends on resolution of a neglected question in value theory: how are values properly individuated? Value pluralism has been thought to be important in two main ways. If values are plural, any theory that relies on value monism, for example, hedonistic utilitarianism, is mistaken. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Putting Together Morality and Well-Being.Ruth Chang - 2004 - In Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 118--158.
    Conflicts between morality and prudence are often thought to pose a special problem because the normativity of moral considerations derives from a distinctively moral point of view, while the normativity of prudential considerations derives from a distinctively prudential point of view, and there is no way to ‘put together’ the two points of view. I argue that talk of points of view is a red herring, and that for any ‘prumoral’ conflict there is some or other more comprehensive value – (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  19. Against Constitutive Incommensurability or Buying and Selling Friends.Ruth Chang - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s1):33 - 60.
    Recently, some of the leading proponents of the view that there is widespread incommensurability among goods have suggested that the incommensurability of some goods is a constitutive feature of the goods themselves. So, for example, a friendship and a million dollars are incommensurable because it is part of what it is to be a friendship that it be incommensurable with money. According to these ‘constitutive incommensurabilists’ incommensurability follows from the very nature of certain goods. In this paper, I examine this (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  20. “Comparativism: The Ground of Rational Choice,” in Errol Lord and Barry McGuire, Eds., Weighing Reasons , 2016.Ruth Chang - 2016 - In B. Maguire & E. Lord (eds.), Weighing Reasons. Oxford University Press. pp. 213-240.
    What, normatively speaking, are the grounds of rational choice? This paper defends ‘comparativism’, the view that a comparative fact grounds rational choice. It examines three of the most serious challenges to comparativism: 1) that sometimes what grounds rational choice is an exclusionary-type relation among alternatives; 2) that an absolute fact such as that it’s your duty or conforms to the Categorial Imperative grounds rational choice; and 3) that rational choice between incomparables is possible, and in particular, all that is needed (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Practical Reasons: The Problem of Gridlock.Ruth Chang - 2014 - In Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy. Continuum Publishing Corporation. pp. 474-499.
    The paper has two aims. The first is to propose a general framework for organizing some central questions about normative practical reasons in a way that separates importantly distinct issues that are often run together. Setting out this framework provides a snapshot of the leading types of view about practical reasons as well as a deeper understanding of what are widely regarded to be some of their most serious difficulties. The second is to use the proposed framework to uncover and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22.  96
    Raz on Reasons, Reason, and Rationality: On Raz's From Normativity to Responsibility.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies:1-21.
    This is a synoptic and critical commentary on Joseph Raz’s From Normativity to Responsibility.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. 10. Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Pp. 422-427). [REVIEW]Sarah Buss, Angela M. Smith, Sophia R. Moreau, Maria Merritt, Ruth Chang & Cass R. Sunstein - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2).
  24. Review: Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action. [REVIEW]Ruth Chang - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447 - 453.
    On a ‘comparative’ conception of practical reasons, reasons are like ‘weights’ that can make an action more or less rational. Bernard Gert adopts instead a ‘toggle’ conception of practical reasons: something counts as a reason just in case it alone can make some or other otherwise irrational action rational. I suggest that Gert’s conception suffers from various defects, and that his motivation for adopting this conception – his central claim that actions can be rational without there being reasons for them (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  4
    Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason.Ruth Chang - 2001 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  26.  41
    Parity: An Intuitive Case.Ruth Chang - 2016 - Ratio 29 (4):395-411.
    In other work I have argued that items can be on a par, where being on a par is a fourth, basic, sui generis value relation beyond the usual trichotomy of ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. In this paper, I aim to marshal non-technical, intuitive arguments for this view. First, I try to cast doubt on the leading source of intuitive resistance to parity, the conviction that if two items are comparable, one must be better than the other, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  26
    Manuscript Referees for The Journal of Ethics Volume 8: September 2003–August 2004.Justin D’Arms, Jovan Babic, Eric Cavallero, Ruth Chang, Kai Draper, A. E. Fuchs, Ann Garry, Ishtiyaque Haji, George W. Harris & Richard G. Hensen - 2004 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (473):473-473.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28.  4
    Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action.Ruth Chang - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447-453.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29.  24
    Ethylene Hormone Receptor Action in Arabidopsis.Caren Chang & Ruth Stadler - 2001 - Bioessays 23 (7):619-627.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  5
    II—Reflections on the Reasonable and the Rational in Conflict Resolution.Ruth Chang - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):133-160.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Preventing the Existence of People with Disabilities.Ruth Chang - unknown
    It is commonly held that there are both cases in which there is a strong moral reason not to cause the existence of a disabled person and cases in which, although it would be permissible to cause a disabled person to exist, it would be better not to. Yet many disabled people are affronted by the idea that it is sometimes better to prevent people like themselves from existing, precisely because these people would be disabled. One of their grounds for (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  3
    Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action.Ruth Chang - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447-453.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  3
    II—R Eflections on the R Easonable and the R Ational in C Onflict R Esolution.Ruth Chang - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):133-160.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Comparison and the Justification of Choice.Ruth Chang - 1998 - University of Pennsylvania Law Review 146:1569-98.
    This paper takes some steps toward defending the idea that justified choice always depends on the comparability of the alternatives. If the arguments are right, there can be no justified choice among incomparable alternatives.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Making Comparisons Count.Ruth Chang - 2014 - Routledge.
    This book attempts to answer two questions: Are alternatives for choice ever incomparable? and In what ways can items be compared? The arguments offered suggest that alternatives for choice no matter how different are never incomparable, and that the ways in which items can be compared are richer and more varied than commonly supposed.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Making Comparisons Count.Ruth Chang - 2015 - Routledge.
    This book attempts to answer two questions: Are alternatives for choice ever incomparable? and In what ways can items be compared? The arguments offered suggest that alternatives for choice no matter how different are never incomparable, and that the ways in which items can be compared are richer and more varied than commonly supposed.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason.Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Hasok Chang. 2012. Is Water H2O? Evidence, Realism and Pluralism.Hasok Chang - 2013 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (2):331-334.
  39. Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, Ruth Chang (Ed.), Harvard University Press, 1998, 303 Pages. [REVIEW]Adam Morton - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):147-174.
    review of Ruth Chang's collection in which I argue that the apparent agreements between the authors disguise underlying important differences.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  18
    Scientific Progress: Beyond Foundationalism and Coherentism1: Hasok Chang.Hasok Chang - 2007 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 61:1-20.
    Scientific progress remains one of the most significant issues in the philosophy of science today. This is not only because of the intrinsic importance of the topic, but also because of its immense difficulty. In what sense exactly does science makes progress, and how is it that scientists are apparently able to achieve it better than people in other realms of human intellectual endeavour? Neither philosophers nor scientists themselves have been able to answer these questions to general satisfaction.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Sagye Kim Chang-Saeng Ŭi Yehak Sasang.Se-ho Chang - 2007 - Kyŏngin Munhwasa.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Chang Chü-Shêng Hsien Shêng Ch'i Shih Shêng Jin Chi Nien Lun Wên Chi.Shih Hu, Yüan-chi Chang, Yüan-P'ei Ts'ai & Yün-wu Wang - 1937 - Shang Wu Yin Shu Kuan.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  68
    Ruth Chang, Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason.Norbert Anwander - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):193-195.
  44. Ruth Chang, Ed., Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason Reviewed By.Matthew D. Adler - 1999 - Philosophy in Review 19 (3):168-171.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45.  20
    Ruth Chang, Ed., Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason:Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason.Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong - 1999 - Ethics 110 (1):190-192.
  46. Heaps and Chains: Is the Chaining Argument for Parity a Sorites?Luke Elson - 2014 - Ethics 124 (3):557-571.
    I argue that the Ruth Chang’s Chaining Argument for her parity view of value incomparability trades illicitly on the vagueness of the predicate ‘is comparable with’. Chang is alert to this danger and argues that the predicate is not vague, but this defense does not succeed. The Chaining Argument also faces a dilemma. The predicate is either vague or precise. If it is vague, then the argument is most plausibly a sorites. If it is precise, then the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  47. Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.
    According to the Desire-Based Reasons Model reasons for action are provided by desires. Many, however, are critical about the Model holding an alternative view of practical reason, which is often called valued-based. In this paper I consider one particular attempt to refute the Model, which advocates of the valued-based view often appeal to: the idea of reason-based desires. The argument is built up from two premises. The first claims that desires are states that we have reason to have. The second (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  48. Parity Demystified.Erik Carlson - 2010 - Theoria 76 (2):119-128.
    Ruth Chang has defended a concept of "parity", implying that two items may be evaluatively comparable even though neither item is better than or equally good as the other. This article takes no stand on whether there actually are cases of parity. Its aim is only to make the hitherto somewhat obscure notion of parity more precise, by defining it in terms of the standard value relations. Given certain plausible assumptions, the suggested definiens is shown to state a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  49. Reason and Desire: The Case of Affective Desires.Attila Tanyi - 2010 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (2):67-89.
    The paper begins with an objection to the Desire-Based Reasons Model. The argument from reason-based desires holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of this argument by Ruth Chang. Chang invokes a counterexample: affective desires. The aim of the paper is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Value Relations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2008 - Theoria 74 (1):18-49.
    Abstract: The paper provides a general account of value relations. It takes its departure in a special type of value relation, parity, which according to Ruth Chang is a form of evaluative comparability that differs from the three standard forms of comparability: betterness, worseness and equal goodness. Recently, Joshua Gert has suggested that the notion of parity can be accounted for if value comparisons are interpreted as normative assessments of preference. While Gert's basic idea is attractive, the way (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000