Karl Popper is one of the greatest and most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. Originally published in German in 2000, Herbert Keuth's book is a systematic exposition of Popper's philosophy covering the philosophy of science (Part 1); social philosophy (Part 2); and metaphysics (Part 3). More comprehensive than any current introduction to Popper, it is suitable for courses in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of social science.

Science progresses if we succeed in rendering the objects of scientific inquiry more comprehensively or more precisely. Popper tries to formalize this venerable idea. According to him the most comprehensive and most precise description of the world is given by the set T of all true statements. A hypothesis comes the closer to T, or has the more verisimilitude, the more true consequences and the fewer false consequences it implies. Popper proposes to order hypotheses by the inclusion relations between the (...) sets of their true and of their false consequences ("truth contents" and "falsity contents"). A partial ordering would permit one to decide whether the substitution of theory t 1 by t 2 represents scientific progress. But because of the logical relations between the elements of the sets of logical consequences, or contents, false hypotheses cannot be compared. As our theories usually turn out to be false sooner or later, they can seldom be compared as to their verisimilitude and when they can, the result depends only on which theory implies the other and on their truth-values. Popper even tries to define a measure of verisimilitude on the partial ordering. It has to fail for the same reason. In addition he tries to relativize the concept of a content and fails. What is more, any attempt at defining a measure of better or worse correspondence to the whole truth must fail, as there is no justification for saying that any true primitive sentence asserts as much about reality as some other primitive sentence, or more. (shrink)

Tarski's definition of truth has rehabilitated the application of the word "true" to sentences of formalized languages. But a correspondence theory according to which a sentence is true if, And only if, It is related in the peculiar way of correspondence to the facts, Is incompatible with tarski's definition. Actually no theory of truth, Which claims to make proper assertions about sentences when calling them true, Is compatible with tarski's definition. Hence they all have to find their own solution to (...) the problem of the semantical antinomies and have to explain what it means to say that sentences are true. (shrink)

Attempts to justify statements or norms lead into the well-known trilemma infinite regress, circular reasoning, dogmatism. Apel's transformed transcendental philosophy is to avoid this problem. A recent version of it is examined. It admits fallibilism to be valid with empirical hypotheses but claims it to be contradictory if applied to philosophical theses on conditions of the possibility of knowledge and argumentation. This claim is refuted. The proposed "final justification" is to start not with what is certain but with doubt. Reflection (...) on the conditions of the possibility of meaningful doubting is to show a borderline beyond which undoubtable certainties are to be found. Such certainties are the rules of argumentation. Whoever utters "The rules of argumentation are not valid in my case" is said to make a necessarily false statement. This line of argument is even carried over to the justification of absolutely binding metanorms of a normative ethics of communication. The whole procedure of "final justification" is shown to be faulty. (shrink)

Summary In his Logic of Scientific Discovery and also in Conjectures and Refutations Karl Popper laid down methodological rules. They were to secure severe tests of our theories so that we might at least prove our false theories to be false, if we cannot prove our true theories to be true. But falsification turned out to be as impossible as verification. What is more, the rules, which are here examined, do not even advance criticism of theories. Either they are trivial (...) or not applicable or even untenable or they refer to problems, which do not exist. There is no reason to expect that those rules, which we could not here examine, are essentially different. Hence applying the methodological rules of critical rationalism in empirical sciences seems out of the question. (shrink)

In his “Logic of Scientific Discovery” and also in “Conjectures and Refutations” Karl Popper laid down methodological rules. They were to secure severe tests of our theories so that we might at least prove our false theories to be false, if we cannot prove our true theories to be true. But falsification turned out to be as impossible as verification. What is more, the rules, which are here examined, do not even advance criticism of theories. Either they are trivial or (...) not applicable or even untenable or they refer to problems, which do not exist. There is no reason to expect that those rules, which we could not here examine, are essentially different. Hence applying the methodological rules of critical rationalism in empirical sciences seems out of the question. (shrink)

In his “Logic of Scientific Discovery” and also in “Conjectures and Refutations” Karl Popper laid down methodological rules. They were to secure severe tests of our theories so that we might at least prove our false theories to be false, if we cannot prove our true theories to be true. But falsification turned out to be as impossible as verification. What is more, the rules, which are here examined, do not even advance criticism of theories. Either they are trivial or (...) not applicable or even untenable or they refer to problems, which do not exist. There is no reason to expect that those rules, which we could not here examine, are essentially different. Hence applying the methodological rules of critical rationalism in empirical sciences seems out of the question. (shrink)

Mit "propensity" meint Popper die Neigung oder Tendenz einer Versuchsanordnung ein bestimmtes Versuchsergebnis zu produzieren. Sie wird durch die Wahrscheinlichkeit des Ergebnisses gemessen oder ist sogar mit ihr identisch. Zunächst hatte er behauptet, jeder Wahrscheinlichkeitskalkül lasse sich als Axiomatisierung sowohl der Theorie subjektiver Wahrscheinlichkeiten als auch der propensity-Theorie der Wahrscheinlichkeit interpretieren. Ohne diese Position ausdrücklich aufzugeben hat er nun einen Kalkül vorgelegt, der die einzig adäquate Axiomatisierung der propensity-Theorie darstellen soll. Seine Postulate widersprechen aber nicht nur allen herkömmlichen Wahrscheinlichkeitskalkülen. Da (...) die meisten seiner Axiome gleichzeitig für die logische Wahrscheinlichkeit von Sätzen gelten sollen und da er ausdrücklich bestimmte Zusammenhänge zwischen logischer Wahrscheinlichkeit und propensity postuliert, ist seine Axiomatisierung auch inkonsistent, zumal selbst seine Axiome für die logische Wahrscheinlichkeit mit den herkömmlichen Kalkülen logischer Wahrscheinlichkeit nicht vereinbar sind. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie Jahrgang: 2 Heft: 1 Seiten: 171-181.

Summary The dispute about positivism in German sociology dealt basically with the question, whether we can know what we ought to do or whether we must be content to decide what we want to do. Habermas questioned the distinction which positivists and decisionists draw between science on the one hand and ethics on the other. Later he proposed his own notion of knowledge about reality and along with it a notion of normative or ethical knowledge and he claimed the two (...) notions were comparable. He developed the first notion in the form of a consensus theory of the truth of statements and the second one in the form of a consensus theory of the rightness of norms and values. The consensus theories are examined and it is shown that both are untenable for various reasons. (shrink)

Holzkamp hat einen der zahlreichen Versuche unternommen, einer "bürgerlichen", sprich empirischen, Humanwissenschaft eine "kritische", sprich marxistische, entgegenzustellen. Dabei begeht er den inzwischen klassischen Fehler, Korrekturen an der Zielsetzung wissenschaftlicher Forschung und der Forscher durch Korrekturen ihrer Methoden bewirken zu wollen. Tatsächlich errichtet er dadurch nur Erkenntnisschranken. Da auch anderes als marxistisches Engagement mit moralischem Anspruch zu ähnlichen Argumentationen verführt, hielt der Verfasser es für sinnvoll, Holzkamps Beitrag im einzelnen zu diskutieren um zu zeigen, daß sein Vorschlag bereits an der Formulierung (...) des Anspruchs, mit dem er den empirischen Wissenschaften entgegentritt, nicht erst daran scheitert, daß die Verhältnisse nicht so sind, wie Holzkamp meint. (shrink)

Summary Kuhlmanns critique of fallibilism is refuted. It is shown that he wins the dispute, because his fallibilist adopts Kuhlmanns language, which does not even permit to state the position of falliblism properly.

Karl Raimund Popper war einer der bedeutendsten Philosophen unserer Zeit. Die 'Logik der Forschung' ist sein Hauptwerk. Sie enthält die Grundlagen des „Kritischen Rationalismus“. Carnap zählte sie 1935 „zu den wichtigsten gegenwärtigen Arbeiten auf dem Gebiet der Wissenschaftslogik“ und sie zählt heute zu den wichtigsten wissenschaftstheoretischen Arbeiten des 20. Jahrhunderts. Der kritische Rationalismus zeigt, warum unser Wissen fehlbar ist und erklärt den Erkenntnisfortschritt als Resultat von Versuch und Irrtum, von Hypothesenbildung und -widerlegung. Wir lernen nicht primär aus erfüllten, sondern aus (...) gescheiterten Erwartungen. In seinen Büchern 'Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde' und 'Das Elend des Historizismus' übertrug Popper diese Gedanken auf die Sozialwissenschaften und die politische Philosophie. Der vorliegende Sammelband übernimmt im wesentlichen die Gliederung der 'Logik der Forschung'. Seine Beiträge kommentieren die jeweiligen Themen gemäß dem heutigen Stand der Forschung. (shrink)

Die Logik der Forschung ist Poppers Hauptwerk. Sie entstand in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Neopositivismus des Wiener Kreises. Sein Abgrenzungskriterium löste Wittgensteins Sinnkriterium ab und seine Lösung des Basisproblems beendete die Protokollsatzdebatte. Er zeigt, dass Theorien nicht beweisbar, sondern fehlbare Vermutungen sind. Die Erkenntnistheorie versteht er als Methodologie. Sie soll die Prüfbarkeit unserer Theorien sichern, damit wir aus Versuch und Irrtum lernen können.

Popper schätzt Kant als Erkenntnistheoretiker, Aufklärer und Moralphilosophen. Er teilt Kants kritischen Realismus und rückt dessen ‚kopernikanische Wende‘ ins Zentrum der Erkenntnistheorie, deutet sie aber im Sinne der denkpsychologischen These, dass wir empirische Theorien nicht anhand von Beobachtungen bilden, sondern frei erfinden. Er glaubt, der kritische Rationalismus könne als Vervollständigung der kritischen Philosophie Kants gelten. Auch bei den Themen Ethik und Aufklärung geht seine Interpretation über das hinaus, was sich mit dem Wortlaut der Texte Kants vereinbaren lässt.

Meehl's statement "in most psychological research, Improved power of a statistical design leads to a prior probability approaching 1/2 of finding a significant difference in the theoretically predicted direction" (philosophy of science, Volume 34, Pages 103-115), Is without foundation. The computation of prior probabilities of accepting or rejecting a hypothesis presupposes knowledge of the prior probabilities that this hypothesis or any of its conceivable alternatives are true. As we do not have such knowledge, We cannot give any numerical values of (...) prior probabilities of accepting or rejecting hypotheses in any statistical test procedure. Only topological statements are possible, As for example: when the region of acceptance of a hypothesis narrows, The prior probability that it will be accepted remains constant or increases. (shrink)

Das Ideal der Objektivität i. S. wahrer und unpersönlicher Darstellung der Realität wird von Vertretern der "kritischen Theorie" mit der Behauptung angegriffen, es könne Tatsachen, die epistemologisch von unseren Theorien unabhängig sind, nicht geben. Insbesondere wurde Popper von Habermas wegen seines Festhaltens an der Korrespondenz-theorie der Wahrheit angegriffen. Habermas nimmt an, daß die Standards, nach denen wir über die Annahme oder Verwerfung einer Aussage entscheiden, von unseren Interessen abhängen und daß wir deshalb nicht in der Lage sind unparteilich zu entscheiden. (...) Der vorliegende Beitrag soll zeigen, daß es unmöglich ist, wissenschaftliche Tätigkeit am Ideal der Suche nach solchen Sätzen zu orientieren, die existierende Sachverhalte bezeichnen, und daß Objektivität in diesem Sinne daher tatsächlich nicht verlangt werden kann, daß aber unsere Standards für die Beurteilung von Hypothesen, welche die verschiedensten Interessen berühren, die gleichen sind und deshalb Objektivität i. S. unparteilicher, von Interessen unbeeinflußter Entscheidung über die Annahme von Hypothesen möglich ist. (shrink)

Predication and the problems of universals and individuation have preoccupied philosophers from Plato (if not before) to the present. Concerns about relations and the special problems posed by relational predication came later - along with the explicit recognition of facts as purported entities that make a judgment true, rather than false, and resultant questions about the structure of such grounds of truth. The essays in the volume explore aspects of the history of the classic issues raised as well as alternative (...) attempts to deal with such issues. (shrink)

-- Douglas Kellner, University of Texas, Austin.

Herbert Spencer, Victorian philosopher, biologist, sociologist and political theorist, one of the founders of Social Darwinism and author of the phrase 'survival of the fittest', was nominated for the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1902, losing out to Theodor Mommsen. Spencer left his post at The Economist in 1857 to focus on writing his ten-volume System of Synthetic Philosophy, a work that offers an ethics-based guide to human conduct to replace that provided by conventional religious belief. Published in 1879, (...) this volume seeks to demonstrate that social evolution tends towards greater individualism, altruism and co-operation. Spencer argues that it is possible to establish rules of right conduct on a scientific basis, and declares that this work is the culmination of his life's study. He was anxious to publish it outside the planned order of the System, because he feared that his death would prevent its completion. (shrink)

Continuing his exploration of the organization of complexity and the science of design, this new edition of Herbert Simon's classic work on artificial ...

The foundation of historical materialism.--A study on authority.--Sartre's existentialism.--Karl Popper and the problem of historical laws.--Freedom and the historical imperative.

Existential-Ontologie und historischer Materialismus bei Herbert Marcuse, von A. Schmidt.--Das Ganze und das ganz Andere; zur Kritik der reinen revolutionären Transzendenz, von W.F. Haug.--Technik und Eindimensionalität; eine Version der Technokratiethese? Von C. Offe.--Technologische Rationalität und spätkapitalistische ökonomie, von J. Bergmann.--Die geschichtliche Dimension des Realitätsprinzips, von H. Berndt und R. Reiche.--Marcuse and the New Left in America, by P. Breines.--Ausgewählte Bibliographie der Schriften Herbert Marcuses (p. 155-[161]).

The original publication of this volume drew Herbert into the epistemological debate with John Stuart Mill. It was to be of relevance to future psychologists, including William James, a pioneer of experimental psychology.