According to embodied cognition theory, our physical embodiment influences how we conceptualize entities, whether natural or supernatural. In serving central explanatory roles, supernatural entities (e.g., God) are represented implicitly as having unordinary properties that nevertheless do not violate our sensorimotor interactions with the physical world. We conjecture that other supernatural entities are similarly represented in explanatory contexts.

Fessard, G. Jeanne Hersch, genèse d'une œuvre.--Muralt, A. de. Phénoménologie et métaphysique.--Philonenko, A. Leibniz et le platonisme.--Christoff, D. Représentation et décision dans la temporalité selon Kant.--Tilliette, X. De l'illusion au savoir, la philosophie.--Widmer, G. Variations kierkegaardiennes sur l'édifiant.--Dufour-Kowalska, G. L'imagination maîtresse de vérité.--Leyvraz, J.-P. Des noms.--Piguet, J.-C. Liberté esthétique et liberté éthique.--Schaerer, R. Le philosophe entre oui et non.--Scheurer, P.-B. Vues nouvelles sur la science du temps et l'histoire.--Starobinski, J. La littérature et l'irrationnel.--Aron, R. De la libéralisation.--Werner, E. La (...) digue et la vie.--Cottier, G. La fascination du vide, éléments pour un diagnostic. (shrink)

A translation of an early work by Aron which has become- almost a classic. First published in 1938, it is one of the best discussions of the limitations of objective historical knowledge. Analyzing man as both the subject and object of historical knowledge, Aron argues against the reduction of human history to natural history. There are also some brilliant chapters on the epistemological and sociological problems of historical knowledge.--K. R. D.

A collection of essays on methodology by practitioners of various disciplines. Raymond Aron, in discussing evidence and inference in history, touches on the old problems of uniqueness, relativism, periodization and pattern in history. H. M. Hart and J. T. McNaughton discuss the special problems of evidence which arise in a legal context. Erik Erikson emphasizes the subjective aspects of the clinical psychologist's method of interpreting evidence. Martin Deutsch writes about the role of theoretical assumptions in interpreting evidence in nuclear (...) research. Paul Lazarsfeld's essay, probably the best, deals with problems of logic and technique in social research. The symposium concludes with a case study by Jacob Fine: the investigation of a problem in medical research. The philosophical content of most of the essays is small, though they provide material of which the philosophical methodologist must take account.—R. S. (shrink)

This book consists of five essays written at three different times, 1946, 1955, and 1964. Aron characterizes these essays as "a dialogue between existentialists and the Marxists as interpreted by a third speaker, namely the author of the book." Aron is primarily concerned with the existentialism of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, especially their attempts to reconcile existentialism and Marxism. While Aron tries to present a fair statement of their philosophic positions and Marxism, he is deeply skeptical of a (...) successful synthesis of existentialism and Marxism. He is also critical of the French intellectuals' flirtation with communism as it is practiced in the Soviet Union. Aron writes as a friendly critic, for he has been shaped by the same intellectual trends that shaped Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. For those unacquainted with the debates about the nature and status of Marxism by French intellectuals, these essays will be helpful in setting the scene. One wishes, however, that Aron might have explored key tensions with greater depth and rigor.--R. J. B. (shrink)

The essays in this volume are certainly first rate, as is Natanson's introduction, which attempts to outline the more salient features of phenomenology as a method for philosophy and a philosophical evaluation of the other sciences. Included are Erwin Straus' "The Upright Posture," a translation of Sartre's "Faces" and "Official Portraits," Schutz's "Some Leading Concepts of Phenomenology," and Spiegelberg's "How Subjective is Phenomenology?" A balance between actual phenomenological analyses and historical and critical evaluations of phenomenology itself is attempted and achieved. (...) Other contributors include Aron Gurwitsch, James Street Fulton, Harmon Chapman, Michael Kullman and Charles Taylor, Fritz Kaufmann, and Paul-Louis Landsberg.—E. A. R. (shrink)

RESUMEN El presente artículo intenta elucidar la naturaleza del proyecto político aroniano, recurriendo a su modo de clasificar los regímenes políticos. La tesis central que sub-yace es que, para estos efectos, conviene comprender a Aron más desde Aristóteles que desde Kant, pues en su pensamiento hay una aproximación que intenta utilizar las claves presentes en la Política para comprender el mundo moderno. ABSTRACT The present article elucidates the nature of the Aronian political project, recurring to its mode of classifying (...) the political regimes. The central thesis that underlies is that, for these effects, it is more convenient to understand Aaron from Aristotle than from Kant, because in his thought there is an approach that tries to use the keys present in Politics to understand the modern world. (shrink)

Karl R. Popper e Raymond Aron foram dois dos mais destacados pensadores do século XX, notadamente a partir da segunda guerra mundial. Sendo o primeiro um destacado epistemólogo e filósofo político e o segundo um filósofo social e político, entre suas mais diversas obras encontramos um denominador comum, a crítica epistemológica das ciências humanas. O presente trabalho tem por objetivo investigar os possíveis pontos de contato entre os dois filósofos, bem como suas divergências. Como metodologia de estudo, nos centraremos (...) nos textos produzidos pelos autores que tenham como tema principal a epistemologia das ciências humanas. Notadamente, encontraremos em ambos uma crítica ao historicismo como fundamento das humanidades. Palavras-chave: Karl Popper, Raymond Aron, Historicismo. (shrink)

Kitap, Aron Zysow’un Harvard Üniversitesinde 1984 yılında sunmuş olduğu doktora tezinin geliştirilerek yayımlanmış halidir. Sunumunun üzerinden yaklaşık otuz yıl gibi uzunca bir süre geçtikten sonra yayımlanmıştır. Ancak yayımlanmasının bu kadar gecikmiş olması, tezin, fıkıh usûlü ve kelâm alanlarında batıda yapılan akademik çalışmalar üzerindeki katkısını ve etkisini azaltmış değildir. Kitap hakkında alan indekslerinde taranan dergilerde pek çok kitap kritiği yazılmış olması da bu etkinin göstergelerindendir.

The eighth and final chapter of Aron Gurwitsch’s major book, Leibniz. Philosophy of Panlogism, a translation of which is presented here, lays the foundations for Gurwitsch’s phenomenological reading of Leibnizian thought as a whole, understood and interpreted as a transcendental philosophy : as an objective correlate of the divine thought that sustains its systematic unity and original coherence, the world is itself thoroughly understood as the realization and “incorporation” of logic, in a broader sense. Examining the ontological status of (...) relations, and Leibniz’s conception of divine understanding as the transcendental subject of “possible worlds”, this final chapter brings together the guidelines that support and sustain his entire interpretation. (shrink)

La Philosophie critique de l'histoire Raymond Aron montre ici comment Dilthey, Rickert, Simmel et Weber s'interrogent sur l'origine de la valeur (subjective et objective) des formes de la science historique : si toutes les démarches de cette science son solidaires d'une volonté et d'une situation, l'historien peut-il écrire une " histoire qui puisse être vraie pour tous "? Si la relativité historique semble un " fait ", qu'en est-il de la vérité universelle, exigée par la raison? D'autre part, quel (...) rapport établir entre les perspectives individuelles, partielles, et la totalité de l'évolution? Cette théorie allemande de l'histoire, fondée sur la relativité de la connaissance, constitue la seule tentative véritable d'une critique de la Raison historique. Raymond Aron (1905-1983) Philosophe, sociologue et historien français. Ses écrits furent porteurs d'une réflexion sur l'engagement de l'intellectuel dans son siècle. (shrink)

The phenomenon of base-rate neglect has elicited much debate. One arena of debate concerns how people make judgments under conditions of uncertainty. Another more controversial arena concerns human rationality. In this target article, we attempt to unpack the perspectives in the literature on both kinds of issues and evaluate their ability to explain existing data and their conceptual coherence. From this evaluation we conclude that the best account of the data should be framed in terms of a dual-process model of (...) judgment, which attributes base-rate neglect to associative judgment strategies that fail to adequately represent the set structure of the problem. Base-rate neglect is reduced when problems are presented in a format that affords accurate representation in terms of nested sets of individuals. (shrink)

The paper presents and defends a Bayesian theory of trust in social networks. In the first part of the paper, we provide justifications for the basic assumptions behind the model, and we give reasons for thinking that the model has plausible consequences for certain kinds of communication. In the second part of the paper we investigate the phenomenon of overconfidence. Many psychological studies have found that people think they are more reliable than they actually are. Using a simulation environment that (...) has been developed in order to make our model computationally tractable we show that in our model inquirers are indeed sometimes better off from an epistemic perspective overestimating the reliability of their own inquiries. We also show, by contrast, that people are rarely better off overestimating the reliability of others. On the basis of these observations we formulate a novel hypothesis about the value of overconfidence. (shrink)

An invaluable reflection on the essence of liberal democracy—and an ideal introduction to the work of political philosopher Raymond Aron Liberty and Equality is the first English translation of the last lecture delivered at the Collège de France by Raymond Aron, one of the most influential political and social thinkers of the twentieth century. In this important work, the most prominent French liberal intellectual of the Cold War era presents his views on the core values of liberal democracy: (...) liberty and equality. At the same time, he provides an ideal introduction to key aspects of his thought. Ranging from Soviet ideology to Watergate, Aron reflects on root concepts of democracy and representative government, articulates a notion of liberty or freedom as equal right as distinct from equal outcome, and discusses different kinds of liberties: personal, political, religious, and social. In search of a common truth or at least a common good, and analyzing what he perceives as the crisis of liberal democracies, Aron opens a space for reexamining the relation between liberty and equality. (shrink)

According to the Argument from Disagreement (AD) widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not influenced by moral facts, either because there are no such facts or because there are such facts but they fail to influence our moral opinions. In an innovative paper, Gustafsson and Peterson (Synthese, published online 16 October, 2010) study the argument by means of computer simulation of opinion dynamics, relying on the well-known model of Hegselmann and Krause (J Artif (...) Soc Soc Simul 5(3):1–33, 2002; J Artif Soc Soc Simul 9(3):1–28, 2006). Their simulations indicate that if our moral opinions were influenced at least slightly by moral facts, we would quickly have reached consensus, even if our moral opinions were also affected by additional factors such as false authorities, external political shifts and random processes. Gustafsson and Peterson conclude that since no such consensus has been reached in real life, the simulation gives us increased reason to take seriously the AD. Our main claim in this paper is that these results are not as robust as Gustafsson and Peterson seem to think they are. If we run similar simulations in the alternative Laputa simulation environment developed by Angere and Olsson (Angere, Synthese, forthcoming and Olsson, Episteme 8(2):127–143, 2011) considerably less support for the AD is forthcoming. (shrink)

“A foreign culture is not revealed in its entirety and its depth except by its view of another culture […] A meaning is revealed in its depth for having encountered and come into contact with another meaning, a foreign meaning: between the two something like a dialogue is installed which because of the closed and onesided nature, inherent in the meaning and culture taken alone […]The dialogue of the meeting of two cultures does not bring about their fusion, their confusion—each (...) of them keeps its own unity and open totality, but they are mutually enriched.”Mikhail M. BakhtiniThe dialogue that we contemporary historians try to have with past cultures is at the same time imperceptibly the beginning of a dialogue with coming generations. The historian of culture in fact has a double and heavy responsibility. On the one hand, his mission is to “resuscitate” the past. His period requires him to do justice to the culture of vanished peoples, to bring life to their thoughts and feelings, even though he knows that a complete and adequate reconstruction of their spiritual universe is only an ideal, a utopia of the scholar. It is in this sense that each scientific reconstruction can only be a modern reconstruction. (shrink)

Silence, Implicite et Non-Dit chez Rousseau/Silence, the Implicit, and the Unspoken in Rousseau prend acte d'un grand nombre de publications ayant trait à l'analyse par Rousseau des langues et du langage, de la parole par rapport à l'écriture, de la voix (y compris la voix de la nature). Mais ce volume se consacre tout particulièrement au fonctionnement et aux effets du silence, de l'implicite et du non-dit dans la pensée de Rousseau. Son approche est à la fois polyvalente et cohérente, (...) et ses réflexions sur le silence sont associées à d'autres préoccupations esthétiques, politiques, et morales de son œuvre. Silence, Implicite et Non-Dit chez Rousseau/Silence, the Implicit, and the Unspoken in Rousseau capitalizes on a great number of publications dealing with Rousseau's analysis of languages and language, speech versus writing, of voice (including the voice of nature). But this volume is particularly dedicated to the study of the functioning and the effects of silence, the implicit and the unspoken in Rousseau's thought. His approach is both polyvalent and consistent, and his reflections on silence are associated with other aesthetic, political, and moral concerns in his work. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that the field of cultural evolution can usefully inform attempts to understand and influence the long-term future. First, I provide an overview of cultural evolution, covering what it means for culture to evolve, the mechanisms by which it happens, the crucial importance of cumulative cultural evolution for hunan history, and how cultural evolution (and in particular intergroup competition) has driven the rise of large-scale cooperation. Second, I draw out some possible lessons from cultural evolution for (...) thinking about the long-term future. In particular, I suggest we should be careful not to prematurely ”lock in” certain values or other cultural features, and instead aim for a society open to variation and competition. I also consider whether the future will bring greater selection pressure for particular kinds of values, such as patience. (shrink)

According to the traditional Bayesian view of credence, its structure is that of precise probability, its objects are descriptive propositions about the empirical world, and its dynamics are given by conditionalization. Each of the three essays that make up this thesis deals with a different variation on this traditional picture. The first variation replaces precise probability with sets of probabilities. The resulting imprecise Bayesianism is sometimes motivated on the grounds that our beliefs should not be more precise than the evidence (...) calls for. One known problem for this evidentially motivated imprecise view is that in certain cases, our imprecise credence in a particular proposition will remain the same no matter how much evidence we receive. In the first essay I argue that the problem is much more general than has been appreciated so far, and that it’s difficult to avoid without compromising the initial evidentialist motivation. The second variation replaces descriptive claims with moral claims as the objects of credence. I consider three standard arguments for probabilism with respect to descriptive uncertainty—representation theorem arguments, Dutch book arguments, and accuracy arguments—in order to examine whether such arguments can also be used to establish probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty. In the second essay, I argue that by and large they can, with some caveats. First, I don’t examine whether these arguments can be given sound non-cognitivist readings, and any conclusions therefore only hold conditional on cognitivism. Second, decision-theoretic representation theorems are found to be less convincing in the moral case, because there they implausibly commit us to thinking that intertheoretic comparisons of value are always possible. Third and finally, certain considerations may lead one to think that imprecise probabilism provides a more plausible model of moral epistemology. The third variation considers whether, in addition to conditionalization, agents may also change their minds by becoming aware of propositions they had not previously entertained, and therefore not previously assigned any probability. More specifically, I argue that if we wish to make room for reflective equilibrium in a probabilistic moral epistemology, we must allow for awareness growth. In the third essay, I sketch the outline of such a Bayesian account of reflective equilibrium. Given that this account gives a central place to awareness growth, and that the rationality constraints on belief change by awareness growth are much weaker than those on belief change by conditionalization, it follows that the rationality constraints on the credences of agents who are seeking reflective equilibrium are correspondingly weaker. (shrink)

In our everyday discourse, most of us use modal statements to express possibility, necessity, or contingency. Logicians, linguists, and philosophers of language tend to use the possible world discourse to analyse the semantics of this kind of sentences. There is a disadvantage of this method: in the usual Quinean meta-ontology it commits the users to the existence of possible worlds. Even though there are many theories on metaphysics of these possible worlds, I will focus on the fictionalist approach, which aims (...) to suspend the undesired ontological commitment. Therefore it is an anti-realist theory. The fictionalist strategy is based on the idea that according to our common-sense ontology, fictions and fictional entities do not exist, and one can treat the possible world discourse as a fiction, and the possible worlds as fictional entities. However, in the last two decades, realist theories about fictions and fictional entities have arisen, especially the abstract artefact theory. In this paper I try to revise the fictionalist approach to modality by keeping the main idea that possible worlds are fictional entities, while accepting that fictional entities are abstract artefacts. The result is a new realist theory of modal fictionalism. (shrink)

Performing surgery in the developing world presents unique challenges and dilemmas for the visiting physician from an industrialized country. Language barriers, widespread, profound pathology, and lack of adequate facilities are obvious hurdles. A more subtle problem, though every bit as significant, is that the principles and procedures we routinely utilize at home to uphold ethical standards of care and to aid us in decision-making are often poorly applicable in the developing world. Acknowledging that cultural factors play a primary role in (...) every aspect of their interaction with patients, physicians must scrutinize and even modify the tools they employ when attempting to deliver ethical care in foreign .. (shrink)

Aron Vinegar’s essay explores art history and visual culture’s dependence on a phenomenological conception of world, which is based on a hermeneutics of facticity, intentionality, and ontological difference. He argues that the ‘basic concept’ of world has structured the field of art history and visual culture in implicit and explicit ways, thus dictating many of its commitments and concerns. One of the primary limitations of this commitment to world, is that it has resulted in art history and visual culture’s (...) tendency to concern itself with a very small portion of existence, usually human existence, in its emphasis on hermeneutics and facticity, thus foreclosing on a more generous and speculative ontology, ethics, and politics. The concept of “world” suggests an overarching totality, an interconnected field of meaning and sense, often indicated by a tacit and resonate tonality. But there is no overarching “world” or “world-view” that can provide us with an overview of or container for the myriad worlds of things. An art history that is willing to consider that the world does not exist would acknowledge and embrace the fact that there is no overall focus, which can encompass things and events in all their spatio-temporal complexity. It would entail a practice attentive to a “supple and inflected bathmology” (Vinegar prefers this phrase to “flat ontology”) in its refusal to emphasize “privileged ontological scenes” predicated on hierarchies of ontological difference, and subsuming things and experience within the structures of phenomenological intentionality. To initiate such a practice, Vinegar suggests an embrace of what he terms “ontological indifference,” a robust notion of habit, and a temporal logic that would be fully attentive to a pluriverse of multiple existences and eruptions of substance, which extend well beyond ‘our’ realms of significance and meaning, cares and concerns, laughter and joy, losses and mournings. (shrink)