COVID-19 has resulted in extraordinary disruptions to the higher education landscape. Here, we provide a brief report on 295 students’ academic perceptions and emotional well-being in late May 2020. Students reported the high levels of uncertainty regarding their academic futures as well as significant levels of stress and difficulty coping with COVID-19 disruptions. These outcomes were related to the higher levels of neuroticism and an external locus of control. Female students reported worse emotional well-being compared to males, and the students (...) of color reported the significantly higher levels of stress and uncertainty regarding their academic futures compared to White students. These results suggest that some students may be at particular risk for academic stress and poor emotional well-being due to the pandemic and highlight the urgent need for intervention and prevention strategies. (shrink)

Ordinal functions may be iterated transfinitely in a natural way by taking pointwise limits at limit stages. However, this has disadvantages, especially when working in the class of normal functions, as pointwise limits do not preserve normality. To this end we present an alternative method to assign to each normal function f a family of normal functions Hyp[f]=〈fξ〉ξ∈OnHyp[f]=〈fξ〉ξ∈On, called its hyperation, in such a way that f0=idf0=id, f1=ff1=f and fα+β=fα∘fβfα+β=fα∘fβ for all α, β.Hyperations are a refinement of the Veblen hierarchy (...) of f. Moreover, if f is normal and has a well-behaved left-inverse g called a left adjoint, then g can be assigned a cohyperationcoH[g]=〈gξ〉ξ∈OncoH[g]=〈gξ〉ξ∈On, which is a family of initial functions such that gξgξ is a left adjoint to fξfξ for all ξ. (shrink)

Dynamic Topological Logic ( $\mathcal{DTL}$ ) is a modal framework for reasoning about dynamical systems, that is, pairs 〈X, f〉 where X is a topological space and f: X → X a continuous function. In this paper we consider the case where X is a metric space. We first show that any formula which can be satisfied on an arbitrary dynamic topological system can be satisfied on one based on a metric space; in fact, this space can be taken to (...) be countable and have no isolated points. Since any metric space with these properties is homeomorphic to the set of rational numbers, it follows that any satisfiable formula can be satisfied on a system based on $\mathbb{Q}$ . We then show that the situation changes when considering complete metric spaces, by exhibiting a formula which is not valid in general but is valid on the class of systems based on a complete metric space. While we do not attempt to give a full characterization of the set of valid formulas on this class we do give a relative completeness result; any formula which is satisfiable on a dynamical system based on a complete metric space is also satisfied on one based on the Cantor space. (shrink)

Dynamic Topological Logic ( ) is a modal logic which combines spatial and temporal modalities for reasoning about dynamic topological systems , which are pairs consisting of a topological space X and a continuous function f : X → X . The function f is seen as a change in one unit of time; within one can model the long-term behavior of such systems as f is iterated. One class of dynamic topological systems where the long-term behavior of f is (...) particularly interesting is that of minimal systems ; these are dynamic topological systems which admit no proper, closed, f -invariant subsystems. In such systems the orbit of every point is dense, which within translates into a non-trivial interaction between spatial and temporal modalities. This interaction, however, turns out to make the logic simpler, and while s in general tend to be undecidable, interpreted over minimal systems we obtain decidability, although not in primitive recursive time; this is the main result that we prove in this paper. We also show that interpreted over minimal systems is incomplete for interpretations on relational Kripke frames and hence does not have the finite model property; however it does have a finite non-deterministic quasimodel property. Finally, we give a set of formulas of which characterizes the class of minimal systems within the class of dynamic topological systems, although we do not offer a full axiomatization for the logic. (shrink)

Dynamic topological logic combines topological and temporal modalities to express asymptotic properties of dynamic systems on topological spaces. A dynamic topological model is a triple 〈X ,f , V 〉, where X is a topological space, f : X → X a continuous function and V a truth valuation assigning subsets of X to propositional variables. Valid formulas are those that are true in every model, independently of X or f. A natural problem that arises is to identify the logics (...) obtained on familiar spaces, such as . It [9] it was shown that any satisfiable formula could be satisfied in some for n large enough, but the question of how the logic varies with n remained open.In this paper we prove that any fragment of DTL that is complete for locally finite Kripke frames is complete for . This includes DTL○; it also includes some larger fragments, such as DTL1, where “henceforth” may not appear in the scope of a topological operator. We show that satisfiability of any formula of our language in a locally finite Kripke frame implies satisfiability in by constructing continuous, open maps from the plane into arbitrary locally finite Kripke frames, which give us a type of bisimulation. We also show that the results cannot be extended to arbitrary formulas of DTL by exhibiting a formula which is valid in but not in arbitrary topological spaces. (shrink)

Para J. Bennett el núcleo del tercer paralogismo está en decir algo sobre los juicios, basados en un aparente recuerdo, de la forma “Era yo quien era F en t”. La idea es que el juicio de una persona de que era ella quien era F en t podría ser erróneo en lo relativo a la identidad de la persona que realmente era F en t. Según A362-4, el rol del observador externo sería corregir un juicio de esa clase. Pero (...) P. F. Strawson sostiene que lo que el tercer paralogismo trata de decir es algo derivado del hecho de que el “Yo pienso” expresa el pensamiento de la identidad de la conciencia. El error del psicólogo racional está en creer que el “Yo pienso” realmente expresa un conocimiento de objetos de la identidad del sujeto pensante como la identidad de un Ego cartesiano. Entonces, el rol del observador externo consiste en no estar sujeto a una tal ilusión de conocimiento del sujeto pensante. La tesis defendida en este artículo es que el error del psicólogo racional está en creer que el “Yo pienso” realmente expresa un conocimiento a priori de la identidad del sujeto de experiencias como la identidad de una sustancia pensante. El rol del observador externo consiste en no estar sujeto a una tal ilusión de conocimiento. (shrink)

In this paper, drawing on evidence internal to the Platonic dialogues (supplemented with some ancient testimonia), I answer the question, “How did Plato teach in the Academy?” My reconstruction of Plato’s pedagogy in the Academy is that there was a single person who read the dialogue aloud like a rhapsode (this is in contrast to the dramatic theatrical hypothesis, in which several speakers function as actors in the performance of a dialogue). After the rhapsodic reading, students were allowed to ask (...) that portions of the text to be re-read, to ask a question about the text, and were encouraged to enter into a broader conversation about the topic and themes brought out by the text. This later pedagogical method of interrogating and investigating a dialogue is of more importance than the mere reading of a dialogue. I contend that Plato’s experiences teaching were woven into some of the dialogues, and that Plato’s pedagogy reflects some of the ways that he taught in the Academy. I propose that excellent points made by students may have been written into revised forms of the dialogue. And not only good points, but also mistakes in reasoning may have been added into the dialogues. I suggest that the way certain dialogues are organized with “guest lecturers” and “tag-team” philosophical debates reflect Plato’s pedagogy in the Academy. Plato’s broadmindedness, his openness to various and opposing viewpoints, is also evident from both outside and inside of the dialogue. Lastly, drawing on the idea of Socratic mimēsis, I give a plausible curriculum for how Plato may have used the dialogues to teach them: he had his students “play” with them. Plato may have asked his students to enter into the roles of the characters in the dialogues to better understand them and the type of person they represent. Plato may have also asked students to take over from the position of the character in the dialogue and to suggest a better, truer account of things than what the characters said or did. (shrink)

In the "Republic," Plato has Socrates attack poetry’s use of mimēsis, often translated as ‘imitation’ or ‘representation.’ Various scholars (e.g. Blondell 2002; Frank 2018; Halliwell 2009; K. Morgan 2004) have noticed the tension between Socrates’ theory critical of mimēsis and Plato’s literary practice of speaking through various characters in his dialogues. However, none of these scholars have addressed that it is not only Plato the writer who uses mimēsis but also his own character, Socrates. At crucial moments in several dialogues, (...) Socrates takes on a role and speaks as someone else. I call these moments “Socratic mimēsis.” While previous commentators have noticed some of these moments, they have either overstated their rarity or they have not studied them collectively. My dissertation is the first in-depth investigation of this phenomenon in the dialogues. Socrates’ dramatic imitation of others is way of teaching in a voice separate from his own, and it is also a way for Plato to speak to, and to educate, different kinds of audiences. Although “Socratic mimēsis” occurs throughout the Platonic corpus, I focus on three passages from three different dialogues, which are paradigm instances: [1] in the "Crito" Socrates plays the part of ‘the Laws’ (50a-54c); [2] in the "Theaetetus" he acts the part of ‘Protagoras’ (166a-168c); and [3] in the "Menexenus" he recites a funeral speech learned from ‘Aspasia’ (236d-249c). Instead of one-sidedly reading the dialogues as either only literary works of art or as only a series of philosophical arguments, this study gleans philosophic insights from the literary and dramatic details of the dialogues. In chapter one I argue that in the "Crito" Socrates tries to convince Crito of a universal and absolute ethics based on never committing injustice, but Crito is not able to understand. In order to make Crito more just—but not yet at the level of Socratic ethics—Socrates creates ‘the Laws’ to persuade Crito to expand his personal notion of justice. Socrates instills a political obedience in place of Crito’s existing lawlessness as a second-best recourse. Plato expects the astute listener or reader to see the contrast between Socrates’ earlier ethical principles, said in his own voice, with what he says in the voice of ‘the Laws.’ In chapter two I argue that in the part of the "Theaetetus" where Socrates defends Protagoras (often called ‘the Defense’), Socrates, by imitating ‘Protagoras,’ is actually criticizing Protagorean relativism. The Protagorean theory cannot account for mimēsis and Socrates’ mimetic act performatively contradicts the identity of appearance and reality, which the theory presupposes. Finally, in chapter three I argue that in the Menexenus the funeral oration that Socrates recounts for Menexenus that he heard from ‘Aspasia’ is actually a disguised criticism of political rhetoric and of Athenian imperialism. Although the speech is never interrogated within the dialogue, Plato provokes the listener or reader outside the dialogue to question its message and to see how it conflicts with many of Socrates’ positions in other dialogues. Beyond reconsidering the long-standing and persistent view that Plato was against poetry and mimetic performance, I re-examine the role that performance and role-playing can have in philosophy and pedagogy more generally. Actors, by taking on other personas, and audience members, in observing actors and their actions, are both involved in acts of imagination that can expand their horizon of thinking and feeling. (shrink)

«Obra en Blanco» es un libro sobre la obra temprana de Julio Enrique Blanco de la Rosa (1890-1986), un olvido más en la historia de la filosofía colombiana. Salvo en notas al margen, a Blanco no se lo encuentra en los estudios sobre la historia de la filosofía. Algunos han atribuido su desconocimiento a la incomprensión de un medio que no supo de su genialidad, otros creen que se debe a que su filosofía fue una necedad que consistió en poner (...) nuevos nombres a las viejas cosas. «Obra en Blanco» no intenta defender su genialidad o censurar a quienes lo han acusado de necedad: analiza y presenta una selección de un periodo juvenil de su obra, comprendido entre 1909-1920. Con ello sólo se busca aportar a la construcción de una historia de la filosofía nacional, y alimentar la discusión sobre la historia de la contribución filosófica de un hombre, cuyas páginas se encuentran aún en blanco. (shrink)

Las acciones que articulan simbióticamente élites empresariales y políticas, mafias, grupos militares legales e ilegales, se posibilitan bajo la búsqueda de dos fines: uno, reordenar el territorio de manera violenta hiper-acumulando tierras, con el fin de salvaguardar sus intereses económicos e inversiones; dos, hiper-acumular poder político con el fin de sostener sus privilegios, usando dicho poder para la reconfiguración del diseño institucional y la planeación de los territorios imponiendo sus condiciones. Este fenómeno que marca la historia de Colombia es lo (...) que ampliamente podríamos comprender como Criminalidad Corporativa Instaurada. Es el caso y modelo impuesto en el Urabá el cual se fue extendiendo al resto del país. (shrink)

Este volumen es el resultado del deseo común de un grupo de amigos de ofrecer un texto, el texto que cada uno ha juzgado oportuno, a un eminente profesor de la Universidad española; un profesor al que, ciertamente, la edad ha jubilado, pero que en absoluto ha dejado, y no solo por su actual condición de Emérito, de mantenerse en activo; un maestro del pensamiento cuyo recorrido intelectual ha suscitado en esos amigos suficiente atención y simpatía como para avenirse a (...) participar en esta tarea de reconocimiento. El profesor en cuestión es Félix Duque; un nombre que cualquiera que haya mínimamente seguido las aventuras filosóficas europeas de los últimos decenios, incluidas las españolas, sin duda habrá de reconocer de inmediato. Pues se trata de alguien que ha practicado con éxito todas las artes que se supone ha de frecuentar un universitario de primer rango, un transmisor crítico del saber, un investigador de vanguardia: el profesor Félix Duque, en efecto, no solo ha ocupado multitud de estrados, universitarios o no, multitud de aulas y de salas, universitarias o no; también ha dedicado no pocas horas a ofrecer al investigador traducciones y ediciones, tan rigurosas como útiles, de textos clásicos de la filosofía; y ha encontrado tiempo, además, para ofrecer una panorámica monumental de esa aventura crucial del intelecto que fue el idealismo alemán brotado de la crítica kantiana. Pero tampoco se ha detenido ahí una actividad como la suya, infatigable y paciente —aunque también a las veces, cómo no, relampagueante—. Y así, Félix (que es como le conocemos sus amigos), no ha vacilado en poner su ordenador al servicio de cuestiones estéticas, y políticas, y ciudadanas, como tampoco ha dudado en embarcarse, cuando la ocasión lo requería, en alguna polémica de fuste; intervenciones hechas siempre en el contexto de un análisis poderoso, y en absoluto complaciente, de las muchas tradiciones difíciles que heredamos los europeos. (shrink)

This is a short entry on "Metatheatre" in Section 4, "Concepts, Themes and Topics Treated in the Dialogues," in The Bloomsbury Handbook of Plato, edited by Gerald Press and Mateo Duque.

This is a short entry on "Comedy" in Section 3, "Important Features of the Dialogues," in The Bloomsbury Handbook of Plato, edited by Gerald Press and Mateo Duque.

Versiones revisadas de las conferencias pronunciadas en el congreso "Pensamiento, arte, poesía.

At the end of the first hypothesis, Parmenides gets Aristotle to agree that being [οὐσίας] must be in time; that is, that being must partake in at least one of the temporal modes: either to have been in the past, to be in the present, or it will be in the future (140e-142a). If this is true, then “the one does not partake in being” (141e7-8), meaning temporal being—to which Aristotle agrees, saying “Apparently not” (141e9). Parmenides then gets Aristotle to (...) agree that “Therefore, ‘the one’ in no way is” (141e9-10). This, however, contradicts the very first premise that begins Parmenides’ entire gymnastic exercise, “if one is” (137c4). The problem with the previous conclusion—that to be is to be in time—is that in professing his assent to it, Aristotle, in fact, gainsays it. He performatively contradicts the very thing he wants to assert. Aristotle answers Parmenides question, “Therefore could something partake of being in any way other than in one of those ways?” (141e7-8) with a two-word answer in Greek: “οὐκ ἔστιν [It’s not possible].” We can, therefore, ask of the very claim Aristotle is making—that it is impossible for something to be and not be in time—when in time does it hold true? At what time is it “not possible [οὐκ ἔστιν]” for something to not partake of temporal being? Is it not possible only in the present moment, in the past, or in the future? If Aristotle’s assertion is to have any force it must hold always. It has the same tenselessness as mathematical propositions, like ‘1+1=2.’ Forms, like mathematical entities, must necessarily have atemporal existence. Accordingly, in atemporally maintaining that anything that is must be in time, Aristotle undermines his own assertion. He performatively contradicts the very thing that he wants to affirm. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This study analyses the impact of Oswald Spengler’s work in Spain during the interwar period. It proceeds with three steps as follows: The first part investigates the reception of Spengler’s historic morphology of cultures in the so-called circle of the Revista de Occidente. The second part delves into the early echo of Spengler’s work among the Spanish left up to the Second Spanish Republic. The third part focuses on the impact of Spengler’s historic morphology among conservative traditionalists and members (...) of the radical right prior to the Spanish Civil War. This analysis point towards broad, transideological debate on Spengler in Spain that the Spanish right then usurped and radicalised during the 1930s. (shrink)

In the Preface to the second edition of the Science of Logic, Hegel speaks of an instinctive and unconscious logic whose forms and determinations 'always remain imperceptible and incapable of becoming objective even as they emerge in language.' In spite of Hegel's ambitions to provide a philosophical system that might transcend messy human nature, Félix Duque argues that human nature remains stubbornly present in precisely this way. In this book he responds to the 'remnants' of Hegel's work not to (...) explicate his philosophy, but instead to explore the limits of his thought. He begins with the tension between singularity and universality, both as a metaphysical issue in terms of substance and subject, and as a theological issue in terms of ideas about the human and divine nature of Jesus. Duque argues that the questions these issues bring out require a search for some antecedent authority, for which he turns to Hegel's theory of "second nature" and the idea of nature as reflected in the nation state. He considers Hegel's evaluation of the French Revolution in the context of political and civil life, and in a religious context, how Hegel saw considerations of authority and guilt sublimated and purified in the development of Christianity. (shrink)

In topological modal logic, it is well known that the Cantor derivative is more expressive than the topological closure, and the ‘elsewhere’, or ‘difference’, operator is more expressive than the ‘somewhere’ operator. In 2014, Kudinov and Shehtman asked whether the combination of closure and elsewhere becomes strictly more expressive when adding the Cantor derivative. In this paper we give an affirmative answer: in fact, the Cantor derivative alone can define properties of topological spaces not expressible with closure and elsewhere. To (...) prove this, we develop a novel theory of morphisms which preserve formulas with the elsewhere operator. (shrink)

b>—Several paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integra- tion) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. However, those studies almost always rely on explicit reports. It remains a possibility that the visual system can implicitly detect change, but that in the absence of focused attention, the change does not (...) reach awareness and consequently is not reported. To test this possibility, we used a simple change detection paradigm coupled with a speeded orien- tation discrimination task. Even when observers reported being unaware of a change in an item’s orientation, its nal orientation effectively biased their response in the orientation discrimination task. Both in aware and unaware trials, errors were most frequent when the changed item and the probe had incongruent orientations. These results demonstrate that the _nature _of the change can be represented in the absence of awareness. (shrink)

Evidence from many different paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integration) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. In four experiments we use modified change blindness tasks to demonstrate (a) that sensitivity to change does occur in the absence of awareness, and (b) this sensitivity does not rely on (...) the redeploy- ment of attention. We discuss these results in relation to theories of scene percep- tion, and propose a reinterpretatio n of the role of attention in representing change. (shrink)