According to A-theories of time, the metaphysical ground of change and dynamicity is provided by a continuous shifting in which events are past, present and future (A-determinations). It is often claimed that these theories make better sense of our experience of dynamicity than their rival, the B-theories; according to the latter, dynamicity is grounded solely in the irreducible earlier-than relations (B-relations) which obtain between events or states of affairs. In this paper, I argue that the experience of time's dynamicity, on (...) the contrary, cannot be accounted for solely in terms of representations of irreducible A-determinations, because any representation which is adequate to ground these experiences must itself involve representation of irreducible B-relations, while it needs not involve representation of A-determinations. Even if, as a matter of contingent fact, our experiences of dynamicity consisted of representations of successions of A-determinations, what would account for them being experiences of dynamicity would be solely the B-theoretic relations of succession, rather than the irrelevant A-theoretic nature of the relata. (shrink)

There are two no-change objections that can be raised against the B-theory of time. One stems from the observation that in a B-theoretic scenario changes of determinations can only be represented by propositions which have eternal truth values. The other derives from the principle that nothing can vary over a period of time if it doesn’t instantiate a state of change at all the instants of time which compose it. Here I argue that both objections apply to all comparative conceptions (...) of change, regardless of whether they take tense seriously or not. It follows that, contrary to what is widely believed, A-theoretic accounts of time are not immune to no-change objections, just in virtue of being realist about tense. A-theorists must either accept the conclusion that time, according to their account, does not flow, or put forward an account of flow that is not comparative. A number of difficulties with both of these options are discussed. (shrink)

We argue that the view that we misperceive time as passing is self-undermining.

ABSTRACT This essay is an introduction to Time and Reality I, the first part of a special issue dedicated to the philosophy of time. Here I outline a number of new trends in philosophical theorizing about time, detailing how the various contributions fit into the picture. I argue that there has been a potentially misleading tendency to separate the debate over the passage of time from the debate over the reality of tense. This has obscured a number of interesting philosophical (...) questions. One of the aims of this volume is to bring these two issues together, where they belong. I argue that many contributions to it go in the right direction. The contributions to this volume also establish uncharted philosophical junctures between Metaphysics, Aesthetics, Morality, and the Philosophy of Mind. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss Priest’s account of change and motion, contrasting it with its more orthodox rival, the Russellian account. The paper is divided in two parts. In first one we take a stance that is more sympathetic to the Russellian view, arguing that Priest’s arguments against it are inconclusive. In the second part, instead, we take a more sympathetic attitude towards Priest’s objections. We argue, however, that if these objections pose insurmountable difficulties to the Russellian account, then they (...) pose the same difficulties also to Priest’s favoured Hegelian account, and for the same reasons. (shrink)

In his In Contradiction (1987), Priest levelled three powerful arguments against the received Russellian view of change and motion. He argued that his preferred paraconsistent theory of change, the Hegelian account, is immune from these objections. Here I argue that these three arguments are sound, but that the Hegelian account falls pray to them too. I conclude, however, that the Hegelian account is in a better position to tackle these challenges.

The arena of the philosophy of time has been largely concerned with deciding whether tense distinctions reflect absolute metaphysical distinctions or not. After bringing the debate over the metaphysical status of instantaneous velocity to bear on the debate over the nature of temporal passage, I argue that we should further investigate whether aspectual distinctions reflect objective and absolute metaphysical distinctions too. I conclude that those who think that being realist about tense uniquely makes room for the idea that time passes (...) should be realist about the progressive too. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay is a critical introduction to the second part of the special issue Time and Reality. The volume contains responses to papers appeared in the first part, as well as many original articles. The aim of this introduction is to frame these works within the general arena of the philosophy of time, highlighting a number of recurrent themes. A central theme that emerges is a difficulty in pinning down the ontological structure underlying dynamicity and passage without postulating a (...) primitive notion of transiency that is conceptually independent from the instantiation of tense properties. I argue that this has far reaching implications. (shrink)

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ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that a number of influential Millian responses to Frege’s puzzle, which consist in denying that Frege’s data apply to natural languages, are not viable if logic is to play its role in legitimizing the logical appraisal of rational subjects. A notion of validity which does justice to the normativity of logic must make room for a distinction between valid inferences and enthymemes. I discuss the prospects of formal, relevant and manifest validity as candidates for (...) a notion which complies with this desideratum. Their success, or failure is argued to hang on the viability of a semantical account of de jure co-reference, which is in tension with standard Millian tenets. I conclude that these Millian theories face the following dilemma: either accept that there is no notion of logical validity which makes logic normative for reasoning, thus jeopardizing our well entrenched practices of rational appraisal; or accept that de jure co-reference is a real semantical relation. (shrink)

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The property of being the implementation of a computational structure has been argued to be vacuously instantiated. This claim provides the basis for most antirealist arguments in the field of the philosophy of computation. Standard manoeuvres for combating these antirealist arguments treat the problem as endogenous to computational theories. The contrastive analysis of computational and other mathematical representations put forward here reveals that the problem should instead be treated within the more general framework of the Newman problem in structuralist accounts (...) of mathematical representation. It is argued that purely structuralist and purely functionalist accounts of implementation are inadequate to tackle the problem. An extensive evaluation of semantic accounts is provided, arguing that semantic properties are, unlike structural and functional ones, suitable to restrict the intended domain of implementation of computational properties in such a way as to block the Newman problem. The semantic hypothesis is defended from a number of recent objections. (shrink)

Frege’s puzzling remarks on the beginning of On Sense and Reference challenge us to explain how true identity sentences of the form a = a can differ in cognitive value from sentences of the form a = b when they are made true by the same object’s self-identity. Some philosophers (e.g. Almog, Glezakos and Paganini) suggest that the puzzle cannot be set up in the context of natural languages since natural sentences, unlike those of regimented formal ones, do not wear (...) their logical properties on their sleeves. In this paper we argue that, on the contrary, there exists a notion of coordination between names which is apt to track the relevant logical properties of natural sentences and therefore to set up the puzzle in natural languages. Frege’s puzzle is here to stay. (shrink)

The book answers long-standing questions on scientific modeling and inference across multiple perspectives and disciplines, including logic, mathematics, physics and medicine. The different chapters cover a variety of issues, such as the role models play in scientific practice; the way science shapes our concept of models; ways of modeling the pursuit of scientific knowledge; the relationship between our concept of models and our concept of science. The book also discusses models and scientific explanations; models in the semantic view of theories; (...) the applicability of mathematical models to the real world and their effectiveness; the links between models and inferences; and models as a means for acquiring new knowledge. It analyzes different examples of models in physics, biology, mathematics and engineering. Written for researchers and graduate students, it provides a cross-disciplinary reference guide to the notion and the use of models and inferences in science. (shrink)

Although Husserlian phenomenology appears to require that practitioners bracket all metaphysical questions and claims, this requirement runs against the evidence of experience in which objects themselves are presented as constituents of experience. Moreover, to completely bracket metaphysical considerations would suggest that phenomenology is compatible with metaphysical views it should in principle deny. Nonetheless, permitting metaphysical claims threatens to contravene the critical limits of phenomenology, to invite claims that would require a perspective different in kind than our own to verify. These (...) tensions raise an important question, namely, what are the metaphysical implications of the phenomenologically intuitive claim that objects themselves are constituents of experience? To answer this question, I draw on a broad swath of thought on transcendental idealism and phenomenology. I argue that a modest metaphysics of appearance is warranted within the critical limits of Husserlian phenomenology. Through discussing and addressing the problems that typically plague transcendental arguments, I show that Husserlian phenomenology permits stronger claims about objects of experience than deflationary accounts allow but does not permit claims about intrinsic properties allowed by some forms of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

"Schiller versus Fichte" ist die Geschichte eines Widerstreits zwischen Sinn-Konstellationen im Kern der post-kantischen Philosophie. Die Originalitat dieser neuen Interpretation des Verhaltnisses zwischen Schiller und Fichte liegt darin, dass der Fokus - im Gegenteil zu den bisherigen Interpretationen - auf den agonistischen Charakter des Verhaltnisses liegt. Die agonistische Rekonstruktion dieses Ereignisses der Geschichte der abendlandischen Philosophie zeigt, dass der Ursprung des sogenannten Deutschen Idealismus eine Krise bzw. ein Widerstreit zwischen asthetischer und praktischer Vernunft, zwischen absoluter Dualitat und absoluter Einheit als (...) regulativen Prinzipien des Denkens ist. "Emiliano Acostas klare Darstellung auf hohem Reflexionsniveau ist eben so grundlich wie kenntnisreich (...) Seine anregende und konzentrierte Untersuchung ist vorzuglich geeignet, eine vertiefte Diskussion uber den Widerstreit des asthetischen und ethischen Idealismus in der Jenaer Hochzeit zu befruchten." Prof. em. Dr. Wolfgang Janke. (Universitat zu Wuppertal) "Die Rekonstruktion der Schillerschen und Fichteschen Position erfolgt - stets auf der Hohe der Forschungsdiskussion - auf uberzeugende und auch sprachlich klare Weise. Hierbei bewahrt sich das zugrundegelegte hermeneutische Schema des AGON auf hervorragende Weise. Dem Verf. Gelingt gegenuber den bisherigen Lesarten eine fruchtbare Neubestimmung des Verhaltnisses zweier eminenter Denker. Daruber hinaus vermag er auch in weiterfuhrenden Uberlegungen das systematische Potential des AGON auszuspielen." Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Andreas Speer. (Universitat zu Koln). (shrink)

The neuroscience of language studies the relationship between linguistic phenomena and the structure and functioning of the human brain. In this chapter, the authors focus on the neural basis supporting the remarkable human capacity to effortlessly assemble single words into more complex hierarchical structures, thus enabling the production and comprehension of unbounded arrays of different linguistic expressions. They begin with a brief discussion of language as a biological system that includes a historical sketch of the understanding of language in the (...) brain. The authors provide an overview of the early days of brain‐syntax research in neuropsychology, primarily on the basis of lesion studies. They end with a reflection on the impact that Noam Chomsky's ideas have had on the neuroscience of language. (shrink)

Long-standing psychiatric practice confirms the pervasive use of pharmacological therapies for treating severe mental disorders. In many circumstances, drugs constitute the best allies of psychotherapeutic interventions. A robust scientific literature is oriented on finding the best strategies to improve therapeutic efficacy through different modes and timing of combined interventions. Nevertheless, we are far from triumphal therapeutic success. Despite the advances made by neuropsychiatry, this medical discipline remains lacking in terms of diagnostic and prognostic capabilities when compared to other branches of (...) medicine. An ethical principle remains as the guidance of therapeutic interventions: improving the quality of life for patients. Unfortunately, psychotropic drugs and psychotherapies do not always result in an efficient remission of symptoms. In this paper I corroborate the idea that therapists should provide drug-resistant patients with every effective and available treatment, even if some of such interventions could be invasive, like Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT). ECT carries upon its shoulders a long and dramatic history that should be better investigated to provide new insights. In fact, ECT has attracted renewed interest in recent years. This is due to the fact that antidepressant drugs in younger patients show often scarce effectiveness and unpleasant side-effects. Moreover, I show that, thanks to modern advances, ECT may work as a successful form of treatment for specific and rare cases, such as severe depression (with suicide attempts) and catatonia. (shrink)

I argue that the construction of representation theorems is a powerful tool for creating novel objects and theories in mathematics, as the construction of a new representation introduces new pieces of information in a very specific way that enables a solution for a problem and a proof of a new theorem. In more detail I show how the work behind the proof of a representation theorem transforms a mathematical problem in a way that makes it tractable and introduces information into (...) it that it did not contain at the beginning of the process. (shrink)

Husserl’s theory of types is most often associated with his account of perception. Here, types operate as pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception of objects. In this paper, I will argue that Husserl’s theory of types is also central to his account of intersubjectivity. More specifically, I will show that a foundational kind of typical subjectivity is entailed by his discussion of the sphere of ownness. It is by way of this type that even a solitary subject can (...) tacitly anticipate the possibility of other subjects. It is also this type that is enriched through interactions between actual subjects. (shrink)

The visuospatial system integrates inner and outer functional processes, organizing spatial, temporal, and social interactions between the brain, body, and environment. These processes involve sensorimotor networks like the eye–hand circuit, which is especially important to primates, given their reliance on vision and touch as primary sensory modalities and the use of the hands in social and environmental interactions. At the same time, visuospatial cognition is intimately connected with memory, self-awareness, and simulation capacity. In the present article, we review issues associated (...) with investigating visuospatial integration in extinct human groups through the use of anatomical and behavioral data gleaned from the paleontological and archaeological records. In modern humans, paleoneurological analyses have demonstrated noticeable and unique morphological changes in the parietal cortex, a region crucial to visuospatial management. Archaeological data provides information on hand–tool interaction, the spatial behavior of past populations, and their interaction with the environment. Visuospatial integration may represent a critical bridge between extended cognition, self-awareness, and social perception. As such, visuospatial functions are relevant to the hypothesis that human evolution is characterized by changes in brain–body–environment interactions and relations, which enhance integration between internal and external cognitive components through neural plasticity and the development of a specialized embodiment capacity. We therefore advocate the investigation of visuospatial functions in past populations through the paleoneurological study of anatomical elements and archaeological analysis of visuospatial behaviors. (shrink)

La poeta Gloria Dünkler nació en Pucón, Chile, en 1977. Sus padres se dedicaban a la artesanía, la pesca y la música en la región de la Araucanía. Ella estudió Pedagogía en la Universidad de la Frontera y Bibliotecología y Documentación en la Universidad Tecnológica Metropolitana. Actualmente trabaja en la Biblioteca Central de la Facultad de Ciencias de la Universidad de Chile. Su obra editada está compuesta por Quillaco seducido (Edición de autor, 2003), Füchse von Llafenko (Ediciones Tácitas, 2009), Spandau (...) (Ediciones Tácitas, 2012), Yatagán (Ediciones Tácitas, 2015) y Castrato (Ediciones Tácitas, 2020). Además, poemas suyos fueron incluidos en las antologías Mujeres en la poesía chilena actual (Semejanza, 2000), Desde todo el silencio (Los puños de la paloma, 2008), Comer con la mirada (Desde la gente, 2008) y Doce en punto (UNAM, 2012). La obra de Dünkler ha alcanzado amplio reconocimiento en su país, donde obtuvo tres importantes premios: el de la Academia Chilena de Letras (2009), el Premio Municipal de Literatura de Santiago (2012) y el Premio Pablo Neruda de Poesía Joven (2015). Su obra ha sido traducida al alemán, al polaco y al catalán. (shrink)

La pensée de Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995) connaît un regain d'intérêt dans les lieux académiques et de recherche. Ainsi, eut lieu à l'Université Paris-1 un colloque international intitulé «Un nouveau Canguilhem? » pour la parution des Oeuvres complètes jetant une nouvelle lumière sur des écrits de jeunesses peu connus. Mais que peut-on apprendre de ces manuscrits privés? Ces écrits inédits confirment-ils l'opinion vague qui lie le philosophe aux sciences naturelles? Ce livre privilégie un autre angle: Canguilhem en philosophe de l'action.

What is a financial crash, and why does it happen? The answers to these fundamental questions require an investigation of the ontological and epistemic state of the financial markets which will identify the causes of a financial crash, the entities involved, and the relations between them.To this end, I examine several theories on financial systems which have conceptualized financial crashes. I analyze how these theories: a) identify different causes of a crash; b) deal with the basic entities and units of (...) analysis; c) define what we can know about those causes and entities, and what they can reveal about an impending crash. On this basis, I outline some ontological and epistemic preconditions that are necessary for a financial crash to occur. I also examine an example of a price drop on the stock market and the role played by the epistemic and ontic states of the market in that event. (shrink)

Abstraction, Thomas Aquinas, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Gnoseology, Essence, Form, Philosophy.

Las valoraciones estéticas de György Lukács sobre Franz Kafka han generado tanto un interés genuino por su análisis como circunstanciales polémicas. En este sentido, el presente artículo indaga fundamentalmente las lecturas del filósofo húngaro y las del teórico brasileño Carlos Nelson Coutinho sobre la obra del artista praguense. A partir del análisis detallado de las apreciaciones estéticas de ambos teóricos, el trabajo se propone disipar las aparentes controversias y hallar puntos de encuentro teóricos en la ponderación artística del literato.

El texto aborda la idea de poema en Walter Benjamin, aconsiderando tanto el contexto histórico como el literario que da pie a su particular concepción. La obra de arte en general y el poema en particular, suponen una instancia no representable, que permanece en un espacio indefinido, sin embargo, aprehensible mediante una dialéctica que tiene lugar en la propia obra.

In his genetic phenomenology, Husserl introduces types, pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception and cognition of objects. In this essay, I argue that there are two types that are functionally almost identical to Kant’s schemata. To support this conclusion, I first present an interpretation of Kant’s discussion of schemata. I argue that we must see schemata as pure, a priori cognitions that involve only pure intuition, pure concepts of the understanding, and the imagination. I offer two analogies to (...) explain how schemata function to subsume objects under concepts and to anticipate possible objects of experience before moving on to discuss the schema of substance. Next, I present a brief explanation of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, organizing my presentation around the idea of apperception. This paves the way for a demonstration of how the fundamental type is best understood as standing at the center of a cluster of concepts, including apperception, passive belief, natural bodies, and the one spatio-temporal horizon of experience. I argue that the fundamental type is central to Husserl’s attempt to ground logic in pre-predicative experience. Finally, I compare two specific types with schemata on the grounds cultivated in the previous sections. The first of these types, the fundamental type, functions to pre-predicatively anticipate objects of possible experience, just as schemata do. The second of these types, which is implied by but never discussed in Husserl’s work, serves to mediate between a formal system of rules and an intuitive grasp of the world, just as schemata do. (shrink)

Jusqu’à récemment, les deux textes écrits par Georges Canguilhem sur l’écologie restaient peu connus. Aujourd’hui, ils sont réunis dans le tome V des Œuvres complètes. Chez Can-guilhem, le sujet de l’écologie est intrinsèquement lié aux concepts de technique et de milieu, dont la généalogie théorique remonte à ses premiers ouvrages des années 1930. Ce qui éclaire ces questions : l’être humain doit-il renoncer aux techniques pour restaurer un équilibre supposé avec la nature, ne serait-il pas plutôt nécessaire de rendre à (...) ses besoins leur priorité sur les intérêts économiques? (shrink)

The ampliativity of deduction has been defended in several ways—such as the semi-decidability of the theories, the surprise of unexpected consequences, the need of new individuals in deduction, or ampliative inference as deduction with suppressed premises (Dummett, Frege. Philosophy of mathematics. Duckworth, London, 1991; Hintikka, Logic, language-games and information. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973; Musgrave, Imre Lakatos and theories of scientific change. Kluwer, Boston, 1989; Rota, Indiscrete thoughts. Birkhäuser, Boston, 1997). These lines of defensive arguments fail if we characterize ampliativity (...) in a strong way, that is, in terms of ‘novelty’ stricto sensu, as an inferential process producing genuinely new pieces of information in the conclusion of a reasoning (Cellucci, Rethinking logic. Springer, Dordrecht, 2013; Ippoliti, Heuristic reasoning. Springer, Basel, 2015). Nevertheless, it is possible to defend a weaker stance of the ampliativity of deduction and its usefulness. This requires interpreting novelty more loosely, that is, as the inferential production of new relations among known entities. This stance maintains that, in this sense, deduction can provide us with new knowledge. Thus, a typical deductive activity, as re-proving theorems, can be thought as heuristic and ampliative because it establishes new relations between known elements (e.g. between given axioms or properties and the statement of the theorem). I argue that also this line of defence is defective for it does not account for the necessity and usefulness of reproving theorems. In particular, a foundationalist, axiomatic-deductive viewpoint does not fully account for the usefulness and the weak ampliative power of deduction. (shrink)

An Archaeology of Educational Evaluation: Epistemological Spaces and Political Paradoxes outlines the epistemology of the theories and models that are currently employed to evaluate educational systems, education policy, educational professionals and students learning. It discusses how those theories and models find their epistemological conditions of possibility in a specific set of conceptual transferences from mathematics and statistics, political economy, biology and the study of language. The book critically engages with the epistemic dimension of contemporary educational evaluation and is of theoretical (...) and methodological interest. It uses Foucauldian archaeology as a problematizing method of inquiry within the wider framework of governmentality studies. It goes beyond a mere critique of the contemporary obsession for evaluation and attempts to replace it with the opening of a free space where the search for a mode of being, acting and thinking in education is not over-determined by the tyranny of improvement. This book will appeal to academics, researchers and post-graduate students in the fields of educational philosophy, education policy and social science. (shrink)

We present a modal logic called (logic of intention and attempt) in which we can reason about intention dynamics and intentional action execution. By exploiting the expressive power of , we provide a formal analysis of the relation between intention and action and highlight the pivotal role of attempt in action execution. Besides, we deal with the problems of instrumental reasoning and intention persistence.

We develop a conceptual and formal clarification of notion of surprise as a belief-based phenomenon by exploring a rich typology. Each kind of surprise is associated with a particular phase of cognitive processing and involves particular kinds of epistemic representations (representations and expectations under scrutiny, implicit beliefs, presuppositions). We define two main kinds of surprise: mismatch-based surprise and astonishment. In the central part of the paper we suggest how a formal model of surprise can be integrated with a formal model (...) of belief change. We investigate the role of surprise in triggering the process of belief reconsideration. There are a number of models of surprise developed in the psychology of emotion. We provide several comparisons of our approach with those models. (shrink)