The central purpose of this paper is to sketch the logic of being a democrat. That is, what is involved in being a democrat will be defined and delineated. I shall proceed by first examining Richard Wollheim's alleged paradox of democratic theory. Wollheim's solution to the paradox will then be shown to be unsatisfactory. Next, the concept of being a democrat will be clarified. The stage will then be set for showing that Wollheim's alleged paradox of democratic theory dissolves upon (...) discerning what a democrat qua democrat is committed to believe. In the process of clarifying what is involved in being a democrat and dissolving the alleged paradox of democratic theory, it will become evident that one popular argument often levelled against resistance to democratic law is without foundation. This is the argument that any democrat who conscientiously disobeys valid democratic law is necessarily behaving inconsistently with his democratic principles; and, therefore, if someone does conscientiously disobey valid democratic law, it proves he is not ‘really’ a democrat after all. (shrink)
The central purpose of the paper is to elucidate the inalienable rights thesis, I.E. That there is at least one inalienable right. Various senses of 'natural right' and 'inalienable' are analyzed so as to further clarify what is or could be the meaning and the truth of that thesis. A widespread confusion between the meaning of the terms 'inalienable natural right' and 'indefeasible natural right' is dispelled. It is concluded that present thinking about inalienable natural rights does not reveal precisely (...) why and in what sense there is such a right. A successful defense of the inalienable rights thesis is suggested. (shrink)
Mathematical proofs generally allow for various levels of detail and conciseness, such that they can be adapted for a particular audience or purpose. Using automated reasoning approaches for teaching proof construction in mathematics presupposes that the step size of proofs in such a system is appropriate within the teaching context. This work proposes a framework that supports the granularity analysis of mathematical proofs, to be used in the automated assessment of students' proof attempts and for the presentation of hints and (...) solutions at a suitable pace. Models for granularity are represented by classifiers, which can be generated by hand or inferred from a corpus of sample judgments via machine-learning techniques. This latter procedure is studied by modeling granularity judgments from four experts. The results provide support for the granularity of assertion-level proofs but also illustrate a degree of subjectivity in assessing step size. (shrink)
The central purpose of this paper is to examine the case for political authority, i.e., the argument for having political authority rather than for having none. Thus, the case for political authority is the case against anarchism. My construction of that case owes much, no doubt, to observations made long ago by Thomas Hobbes and john locke. Nevertheless, these observations have never been stated in a satisfactory and systematic fashion, not even by Hobbes and locke themselves. Hobbes’ observations have, more (...) often than not, been misunderstood, and those of locke have generally been overlooked. However, this paper is not intended to be an exercise in the history of political philosophy. Rather, it is an assessment of a philosophical thesis, namely, that political authority is essential to man's survival and well-being. Although this thesis is rarely contested and, in fact, borders on the commonplace, it is contestable. Moreover, since disenchantment with authority and how it is exercised is growing, an examination of how men are likely to fare in its absence is appropriate. Such an examination is complex, but it is not impossible. (shrink)
Schiller's 1795 essay on the educative function of art is one of the most important contributions to the history of ideas in modern times. This English-German parallel text edition includes a long analytical introduction and extensive notes.
It seems to me that the ingredients of most theories both in Artificial Intelligence and in Psychology have been on the whole too minute, local, and unstructured to account–either practically or phenomenologically–for the effectiveness of common-sense thought. The "chunks" of reasoning, language, memory, and "perception" ought to be larger and more structured; their factual and procedural contents must be more intimately connected in order to explain the apparent power and speed of mental activities.
Received by the IRE, October 24, 1960. The author's work summarized here—which was done at the MIT Lincoln Laboratory, a center for research operated by MIT at Lexington, Mass., with the joint Support of the U. S. Army, Navy, and Air Force under Air Force Contract AF 19-5200; and at the Res. Lab. of Electronics, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., which is supported in part by the U. S. Army Signal Corps, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, and the ONR—is based (...) on earlier work done by the author as a Junior Fellow of the Society of Fellows, Harvard University. (shrink)
In his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, Friedrich Schiller draws a striking connection between aesthetic value and individual and political freedom, claiming that, ‘it is only through beauty that man makes his way to freedom’. However, contemporary ways of thinking about freedom and aesthetic value make it difficult to see what the connection could be. Through a careful reconstruction of the Letters, we argue that Schiller’s theory of aesthetic value serves as the key to understanding not (...) only his view of aesthetic engagement, but also his distinctive account of individual and political freedom. In Part I, we develop a reconstruction of Schiller's view that aesthetic value is the only path to individual freedom and in Part II we analyze how Schiller connects aesthetic value to political freedom. In the end, we show that Schiller defends a non-hedonic, action-oriented, communitarian theory of aesthetic value and a theory of freedom that makes the aesthetic not just supererogatory but fundamental for any fully autonomous life. Although we have lost touch with this way of thinking about aesthetic value and freedom, we submit that it is illuminating for contemporary thinking about both. (shrink)
A classic of 18th-century thought, Schiller’s treatise on the role of art in society ranks among German philosophy’s most profound works. An important contribution to the history of ideas, it employs a political analysis of contemporary society—and of the French Revolution, in particular—to define the relationship between beauty and art. Schiller’s proposal of art as fundamental to the development of society and the individual remains an influential concept, and this volume offers his philosophy’s clearest, most relevant expression. Translated (...) and with an introduction by Reginald Snell. (shrink)
Fred Beiser, renowned as one of the world's leading historians of German philosophy, presents a brilliant new study of Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805), rehabilitating him as a philosopher worthy of serious attention. Beiser shows, in particular, that Schiller's engagement with Kant is far more subtle and rewarding than is often portrayed. Promising to be a landmark in the study of German thought, Schiller as Philosopher will be compulsory reading for any philosopher, historian, or literary scholar engaged with (...) the key developments of this fertile period. (shrink)
What do corporations look like when they have integrity, and how can we move more companies in that direction? Corporate Integrity offers a timely, comprehensive framework- and practical business lessons - bringing together questions of organizational design, communication practices, working relationships, and leadership styles to answer this question. Marvin T. Brown explores the five key challenges facing modern businesses as they try to respond ethically to cultural, interpersonal, organizational, civic and environmental challenges. He demonstrates that if corporations are to (...) meet the needs of civil society, they must facilitate inclusive communication patterns based on mutual recognition and civic cooperation. Corporate Integrity is essential reading for professionals in organizational ethics, business leaders, and graduate students looking for practical and reflective insights into doing business with integrity and purpose. (shrink)
Recent years have seen the rise of a new family of non-probabilistic accounts of epistemic justification. According to these views—we may call them Normalcy Views—a belief in P is justified only if, given the evidence, there exists no normal world in which S falsely beliefs that P. This paper aims to raise some trouble for this new approach to justification by arguing that Normalcy Views, while initially attractive, give rise to problematic accounts of epistemic defeat. As we will see, on (...) Normalcy Views seemingly insignificant pieces of evidence turn out to have considerable defeating powers. This problem—I will call it the Easy-Defeat Problem—gives rise to a two-pronged challenge. First, it shows that the Normalcy View has counterintuitive implications and, second, it opens the door to an uncomfortable skeptical threat. (shrink)
You don a comfortable jacket lined with sensors and muscle-like motors. Each motion of your arm, hand, and fingers is reproduced at another place by mobile, mechanical hands. Light, dexterous, and strong, these hands have their own sensors through which you see and feel what is happening. Using this instrument, you can "work" in another room, in another city, in another country, or on another planet. Your remote presence possesses the strength of a giant or the delicacy of a surgeon. (...) Heat or pain is translated into informative but tolerable sensation. Your dangerous job becomes safe and pleasant. (shrink)
The primary aim of this paper is to defend the Lockean View—the view that a belief is epistemically justified iff it is highly probable—against a new family of objections. According to these objections, broadly speaking, the Lockean View ought to be abandoned because it is incompatible with, or difficult to square with, our judgments surrounding certain legal cases. I distinguish and explore three different versions of these objections—The Conviction Argument, the Argument from Assertion and Practical Reasoning, and the Comparative Probabilities (...) Argument—but argue that none of them are successful. I also present some very general reasons for being pessimistic about the overall strategy of using legal considerations to evaluate epistemic theories; as we will see, there are good reasons to think that many of the considerations relevant to legal theorizing are ultimately irrelevant to epistemic theorizing. (shrink)
Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch, and Christopher Deubert are right in their article “A Proposal to Address NFL Club Doctors’ Conflicts of Interest and to Promote Player Trust” that the problem with the medical care rendered to National Football League players is not that the doctors are bad, but that the system in which they provide care is structured badly. We saw some of the problems this system causes last season in what happened to Case Kenum, a quarterback for the (...) Los Angeles Rams who, despite having a possible concussion from a game injury, was allowed to continue to play, with a concussion spotter in the booth and coaches, teammates, seven game officials, and two full training staffs present. From my experience playing in the league from 1989 to 1999, I do not believe that you can eliminate the conflict of interest completely, but I think it can be limited to the point that it does not harm the player. As the structure is now, with the team paying the club doctor, it is impossible to put the players’ health and well-being before the team's on-field priorities. (shrink)
The primary objective of this paper is to introduce a new epistemic paradox that puts pressure on the claim that justification is closed under multi premise deduction. The first part of the paper will consider two well-known paradoxes—the lottery and the preface paradox—and outline two popular strategies for solving the paradoxes without denying closure. The second part will introduce a new, structurally related, paradox that is immune to these closure-preserving solutions. I will call this paradox, The Paradox of the Pill. (...) Seeing that the prominent closure-preserving solutions do not apply to the new paradox, I will argue that it presents a much stronger case against the claim that justification is closed under deduction than its two predecessors. Besides presenting a more robust counterexample to closure, the new paradox also reveals that the strategies that were previously thought to get closure out of trouble are not sufficiently general to achieve this task as they fail to apply to similar closure-threatening paradoxes in the same vicinity. (shrink)