Although Levinas’ “il y a” does not directly correspond to Heidegger’s conception of being, his criticism of Heidegger’s temporal ontology is nevertheless justified. With the reduction of every meaning (and being) to its temporal constitution, Heidegger excludes any possibility of transcendence beyond time. The problem of overcoming the radical finitude and historicity of meaning, which is ethically motivated, brings Levinas to the age-old question of metaphysics. However, taking Heidegger’s thought seriously, Levinas is forced to look for an entirely new understanding (...) of the metaphysical quest. (shrink)

In contrast to idealistic denial and Heidegger’s absolutization of death Levinas tries to interpret death on the background of the ethical relation towards fellow men. The boundary which death presents to life he interprets as the experience of passivity of subject in front of the absolute otherness of death. The subject also experiences such passivity in ethical relation towards other people whose otherness and difference nevertheless invert into ethical non-indifference and responsibility of the subject. In this ethical relating Levinas finds (...) the source of meaning, which is alienated from Being, and starting from which he tries to derive new meaning for his own death as well as for the death of my fellow man. (shrink)

Die Arbeit, die das ethische Denken von Levinas im Lichte seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Heidegger zu rekonstruieren und kritisch zu bewerten sucht, ist als Gegenüberstellung der beiden Denkansätze angelegt. Sie gliedert sich in drei Teile, die jeweils eine Grundfrage zum Thema haben (Sein, Zeit, das Gute) und zugleich die Entwicklung von Levinas' Denken nachzeichnen. Ausgehend von einem Heidegger entgegengesetzten Seinsverständnis gelangt Levinas zu seiner spezifischen Auffassung der Transzendenz, die schließlich zur Ethik jenseits des Seins führt. Levinas' Denken zeichnet sich somit durch (...) eine strukturelle Nähe zu Heidegger aus, wenngleich die Distanz zwischen beiden Ansätzen unüberbrückbar bleibt. (shrink)

Although Levinas’ “il y a” does not directly correspond to Heidegger’s conception of being, his criticism of Heidegger’s temporal ontology is nevertheless justified. With the reduction of every meaning (and being) to its temporal constitution, Heidegger excludes any possibility of transcendence beyond time. The problem of overcoming the radical finitude and historicity of meaning, which is ethically motivated, brings Levinas to the age-old question of metaphysics. However, taking Heidegger’s thought seriously, Levinas is forced to look for an entirely new understanding (...) of the metaphysical quest. (shrink)

In contrast to idealistic denial and Heidegger’s absolutization of death Levinas tries to interpret death on the background of the ethical relation towards fellow men. The boundary which death presents to life he interprets as the experience of passivity of subject in front of the absolute otherness of death. The subject also experiences such passivity in ethical relation towards other people whose otherness and difference nevertheless invert into ethical non-indifference and responsibility of the subject. In this ethical relating Levinas finds (...) the source of meaning, which is alienated from Being, and starting from which he tries to derive new meaning for his own death as well as for the death of my fellow man. (shrink)

Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology can be seen as a specific reduction of meaning to its temporal constitution . Temporality as the universal horizon of Being makes any transcendence and meaning beyond time impossible. Levinas opposes such reduction of sense to finitude and historicity for ethical reasons. However, in his attempt to overcome Heidegger's primacy of time and transcend its totality, he must look for a completely different conception of significance which goes hand in hand with a new, "diachronic" understanding of time.

Although Levinas’ “il y a” does not directly correspond to Heidegger’s conception of being, his criticism of Heidegger’s temporal ontology is nevertheless justified. With the reduction of every meaning (and being) to its temporal constitution, Heidegger excludes any possibility of transcendence beyond time. The problem of overcoming the radical finitude and historicity of meaning, which is ethically motivated, brings Levinas to the age-old question of metaphysics. However, taking Heidegger’s thought seriously, Levinas is forced to look for an entirely new understanding (...) of the metaphysical quest. (shrink)

This book examines the wide-ranging implications for historical research of the view that everything is physical and that no immaterial entities, forces, or phenomena exist. It presents the consequences of materialism for our understanding of the historical past, including the rejection of postmodernist perspectives on history.

U ovom članku daje se prikaz hrvatskih sljedbenika teorije relativnosti iz redova matematičara, fizičara, prirodoslovaca i tehničara. Istraživanje se odnosi na sveučilišna predavanja, seminare, znanstvene i popularne članke, prevedene znanstvene, stručne i popularne knjige i ostale publikacije u svezi s Einsteinovom teorijom relativnosti. Prikaz rezultata istraživanja iznosi se povijesnim redoslijedom s kratkim osvrtom na značenje i osnovne biografske podatke sljedbenikâ teorije relativnosti kod nas.Dieser Artikel gibt einen Űberblick der kroatischen Anhänger der Relativitätstheorie aus denReihen der Mathematiker, Physiker, Naturwissenschaftler und Techniker. (...) Die Untersuchungberichtet über Vorlesungen an Universitäten, wissenschaftliche und populäre Artikel, Übersetzungenwissenschaftlicher und populärerBücher sowie übrige Publikationen in VerbindungmitEinsteinsRelativitätstheorie. Die jeweiligen Veranstaltungenund Publikationen werdenin derReihenfolgeihresgeschichtlichen Erscheinens aufgeführt und sind versehen mit einem kurzenKommentarzu ihrerBedeutung sowie mit wesentlichen biografische Angabenzu den Anhängernder Relativitätstheorie hierzulande. (shrink)

In recent decades, a number of authors have relied on the multiple realizability argument to reject methodological individualism. In this article, I argue that this strategy results in serious difficulties and makes it impossible to identify social entities and phenomena.

Introduction -- Plato -- Aristotle -- The rise of modernity -- Immanuel Kant -- Romanticism and historicism -- Phenomenology and hermeneutics -- Philosophes and philosophers -- Analytic philosophy -- Conclusion.