This volume provides new insights on lying and (intentionally) misleading in and out of the courtroom, a timely topic for scholarship and society. Not all deceptive statements are lies; not every lie under oath amounts to perjury---but what are the relevant criteria? Taxonomies of falsehood based on illocutionary force, utterance context and speakers' intentions have been debated by linguists, moral philosophers, social psychologists and cognitive scientists. Legal scholars have examined the boundary between actual perjury and garden-variety lies. The fourteen previously (...) unpublished essays in this book apply theoretical and empirical tools to delineate the landscape of falsehood, half-truth, perjury, and verbal manipulation, including puffery, bluffing, and bullshit. The papers in this collection address conceptual and ethical aspects of lying vs. misleading and the correlation of this opposition with the Gricean pragmatic distinction between what is said and what is implicated. The questions of truth and lies addressed in this volume have long engaged the attention of scholars in linguistics, philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, organizational research, and the law, and researchers from all these fields will find this book of interest. (shrink)

This book offers a unique synthesis of past and current work on the structure, meaning, and use of negation and negative expressions, a topic that has engaged thinkers from Aristotle and the Buddha to Freud and Chomsky. Horn's masterful study melds a review of scholarship in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics with original research, providing a full picture of negation in natural language and thought; this new edition adds a comprehensive preface and bibliography, surveying research since the book's original publication.

The concept of meaning, since Frege initiated the linguistic turn in 1884, has been the subject of numerous theories, hypotheses, methodologies and distinctions. One distinction of considerable strategic value relates to the location of meaning: some aspects of meaning can be found in language and are modelled with semantic values of various kinds; some aspects of meaning can be found in communicative processes and are modelled with pragmatic inferences of one sort or another. One hypothesis of great heuristic utility concerns (...) the relationship that is assumed between the semantic and the pragmatic. This collection of especially commissioned papers examines current thinking on the plausible nature of the semantic, the possible character of the pragmatic and the mechanics of their intersection. (shrink)

For over four decades feminist linguists and philosophers of language have addressed the semantic, cognitive, and political factors associated with gender asymmetries in nominal and pronominal choice. The sociolinguistic spotlight has focused on the history, extent, and implications of the prescriptively sanctioned use of man and he for sex-neutral reference—he/man language in Martyna ’s term. Bare singular and simple indefinite man in exemplify this use, while the bare singulars in yield the male-specific meaning exhibited by the man or that man.

Litotes, “a figure of speech in which an affirmative is expressed by the negative of the contrary” has had some tough reviews. For Pope and Swift, litotes—stock examples include “no mean feat”, “no small problem”, and “not bad at all”—is “the peculiar talent of Ladies, Whisperers, and Backbiters”; for Orwell, it is a means to affect “an appearance of profundity” that we can deport from English “by memorizing this sentence: A not unblack dog was chasing a not unsmall rabbit across (...) a not ungreen field.” But such ridicule is not without equivocation, given that litotes, or “logical” double negation, may or may not be semantically redundant. When the negation of a logical contrary yields an unexcluded middle, it contributes to expressive power: someone who is not unhappy may not be happy either, and an occurrence may not be infrequent without being frequent. But if something is not possible, what can it be but possible? Why does Crashaw’s “not impossible she” survive rhetorically while Orwell’s “not unsmall rabbit” is doomed? How is Robbie being “not not friends” with Mary on 7th Heaven distinct from being friends with her, if not not-p reduces to p? The key is recognizing in litotes a corollary of MaxContrary, the tendency for contradictory sentential negation ¬p to strengthen pragmatically to a contrary ©p, as when the formal contradictory Fr. “Il ne faut pas partir” is reinterpreted as expressing a contrary. Just as the Law of Excluded Middle can apply where it “shouldn’t”, resulting in pragmatically presupposed disjunctions between semantic contraries, so that “p v ©p” amounts to an instance of “p v ¬p”, the Law of Double Negation can fail to apply where it “should”. When not not-p conveys ¬©p, the negation of a virtual contrary, the middle between p and not-p is no longer excluded, rendering the Fregean dictum that “Wrapping up a thought in double negation does not alter its truth value” not unproblematic. (shrink)

Lepore and Stone seek to replace the rationality-based Gricean picture of coordination between speaker and hearer with one leaning more strongly on the roles of convention and speaker knowledge while doing away with conversational implicature. Focusing on the phenomena of indirect speech acts, asymmetric conjunction, and scalar inferencing, I argue that the case for abandoning implicature as an analytical tool is not ultimately compelling. I seek further to demonstrate the utility of the classical Gricean distinction between what is said and (...) what is implicated in the construction of an intuitively appealing approach to the perennial question of how to distinguish lying from misleading inside and outside the legal domain. (shrink)

Addresses issues that emerged as result of research in pragmatics proper and neighboring fields such as cognitive psychology, philosophy, bilingualism and communication. This book discusses theoretical and empirical work in these paradigms which directed attention to questions that warrant reexamination and revision of some tenets of the field.

This volume provides new insights on lying and (intentionally) misleading in and out of the courtroom, a timely topic for scholarship and society. Not all deceptive statements are lies; not every lie under oath amounts to perjury--but what are the relevant criteria? Taxonomies of falsehood based on illocutionary force, utterance context and speakers' intentions have been debated by linguists, moral philosophers, social psychologists and cognitive scientists. Legal scholars have examined the boundary between actual perjury and garden-variety lies. The fourteen previously (...) unpublished essays in this book apply theoretical and empirical tools to delineate the landscape of falsehood, half-truth, perjury, and verbal manipulation, including puffery, bluffing, and bullshit. The papers in this collection address conceptual and ethical aspects of lying vs. misleading and the correlation of this opposition with the Gricean pragmatic distinction between what is said and what is implicated. The questions of truth and lies addressed in this volume have long engaged the attention of scholars in linguistics, philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, organizational research, and the law, and researchers from all these fields will find this book of interest. (shrink)

One of the many problems that would have t o be solved by a satisfactory theory of empirical knowledge, perhaps the most central is a general structural problem which I shall call the epistemic regress problem: the problem of how to avoid an in- finite and presumably vicious regress of justification in ones account of the justifica- tion of empirical beliefs. Foundationalist theories of empirical knowledge, as we shall see further below, attempt t o avoid the regress by locating a (...) class of empirical beliefs whose justification does not depend on that of other empirical beliefs. Extemalist theories, the topic of the present paper, represent one species of foundationalism. (shrink)

Introduction: there is no justice in Heidegger or for Marx -- Interpretations of Heidegger and Marx -- The history of Marx and Heidegger -- The history and negation of metaphysics -- Logic and dialectic -- Metaphysics of the human state -- The situation of Germany -- The ideology of Germany -- Nazism, liberalism, humanism -- The Jewish question -- Speaking of the essence of man -- Production-previously this was called God -- The end of humanism -- Between men and gods (...) -- Conclusion. (shrink)

Research to improve the health of pregnant and fetal patients presents ethical challenges to clinical investigators, institutional review boards, funding agencies, and data safety and monitoring boards. The Common Rule sets out requirements that such research must satisfy but no ethical framework to guide their application. We provide such an ethical framework, based on the ethical concept of the fetus as a patient. We offer criteria for innovation and for Phase I and II and then for Phase III clinical trials (...) to improve the health of pregnant patients and of fetal patients and also criteria to responsibly manage the transition from investigation to clinical practice. Basing ethical criteria for research involving pregnant women on the ethical concept of the fetus as a patient insulates the proposed ethical framework and therefore research on pregnant women from the divisive and politicized concepts and discourses of personhood, fetal rights, and unborn child. (shrink)

In the massive plot twist at the end of BioShock Infinite, the writers beautifully put forth a hypothesis that individuals might exist in more than one possible world. In philosophy, the idea that an individual can exist in more than one world is called transworld identity. An important rival to transworld identity theory is counterpart theory, the idea that individuals cannot exist in more than one possible world and are therefore “world bound.” Modal realism is the thesis according to which (...) there is an infinite number of possible worlds that really exist in the most robust sense, relative to themselves. The world of Columbia is one possible world. The world of Rapture is another possible world. Both the actualist and the possibilist agree on these claims. Most important to the themes present in BioShock, transworld individuality has profound implications for differing notions of freedom. (shrink)

In this paper I present a novel account of achievement and I argue that, all other things being equal, the presence of this particular type of achievement in a person’s life makes that life more meaningful. In arguing for this conclusion, I explore the connections between m-achievements and a person’s self-conception and especially the idea that m-achievements provide a reason for the revision of one’s self-conception.

La philosophie cartésienne se décline en un refrain tranquille : « je pense, donc je suis », la méthode, le doute, le triomphe de la raison, Dieu lui-même soumis à la logique de l’entendement et toutes les passions domestiquées. Ce refrain semble même être devenu celui de la nation française toute entière : y a-t-il un autre philosophe auquel il soit fait aussi couramment référence? Mais ce « cartésianisme » que la tradition a retenu n’est justement pas cartésien. A rebours (...) de nos a priori sur Descartes, Laurence Devillairs souligne le caractère inclassable de sa philosophie : Descartes revendique le droit de la raison à s’exercer librement mais il se définit aussi comme « philosophe chrétien » ; il déclare l’homme capable de connaître l’essence même de Dieu mais en affirme l’irréductible incompréhensibilité ; il rétablit les droits de l’âme contre toute confusion avec le corporel mais fait de l’homme l’union intime d’un corps et d’un esprit. Ainsi se fait jour le portrait d’un maître à penser sans réel disciple, critique de la philosophie de l’École, désireux de voir le cartésianisme enseigné au titre de philosophie officielle, premier philosophe de la modernité et meilleur théologien de son siècle. Descartes n’a d’autre école que la sienne. (shrink)

Against the “universal consent of the people” and “the crowd of philosophers”, Pascal proves the existence of the void, thus re-establishing the truth where only the force and falsity of opinions had prevailed. Nature “has no repugnance for the void”, it “makes no effort to avoid it” but “admits it without difficulty or resistance”. Pascal defines the void as neither matter nor nothingness. Can this definition be found in Philosophy, in the Anthropology of the Pensées? We would like to show (...) the importance of the notion of the capacity of empty nature, which is decisive when it comes to describing the condition of man, troubled by a desire for truth and happiness that he cannot satisfy. Nature is thus, for him, what is “most contrary” to him, depriving him of what is rightfully his. The void has a cardinal function in Physics, but also in Philosophy. (shrink)

The Minos is one of thirty-five dialogues that ancient editors and commentators regarded as one of the authentic works of Plato. Although it is now regarded as spurious, in both the classical and modern eras, the Minos was treated as a suitable problematic introduction to Plato's Laws. The co-authors (Houlgate and Hathaway) believe that it is still an excellent introduction to the Laws. It has philosophical significance whether or not it is authentic. It is the philosophical significance that is discussed (...) in this article. (shrink)

The essays in Politics, Nature, and Piety take up the central question of political philosophy: What is the good life, and what place do nature, politics, and piety have in that life? 'The unity of the essays,' Alex Priou writes in his introduction, 'lies in the various tensions explored: between ancients and moderns, religion and philosophy, magnanimity and prudence, justice and friendship, and, most fundamentally, spiritedness and the intellect.' Laurence Berns proves an excellent guide for beginning one's study of (...) the great books of political philosophy, from Plato to the present." --Publisher's description. (shrink)

Chaque fois que les hommes parlent du temps, ils le connotent d'une valorisation typiquement humaine : "Prendre du bon temps", "perdre son temps", "la fuite du temps". Cette expérience immédiate, affective et bouleversante favorise un discours quasi simpliste ou nostalgique sur ce temps considéré comme ce qui enferme le tragique ou le pathétique de la condition humaine, vouée à la finitude. Le paradoxe réside donc, en ce fait qu'il paraît complexe de dire l'essence du temps, d'autant que souvent chacun en (...) est réduit à n'en faire qu'une description mesurable, chronologique ou phénoménologique. Toutefois cette conception d'un temps essentiellement linéaire ne semble pas rendre compte de l'aspect cyclique ou rythmé de certaines manifestations (notamment naturelles), ni même des résurgences du passé par l'intermédiaire de la mémoire, ou encore des projets et des anticipations envisagés en prévention d'un "à-venir". L'embarras réside, spécifiquement, dans cette aporie à donner une consistance au temps typiquement humain face à la perfection ontologique d'une éternité : Ontologie qu'il importe de situer en l'homme par opposition à une entité extérieure rendue visible par l'instrument de mesure, mais qui ne peut coïncider avec l'intériorisation du temps intuitionné au coeur de l'être en plein étance. Ontologie à distinguer notamment d'un Etre suprême qui échappe à toute temporalité et présuppose son immuabilité et dont l'homme, dans son statut d'être livré au temps, est coupé. Au regard de cette complexité, nous pouvons réitérer la question : Qu'est-ce que le temps et comment le penser? Comment égrener une philosophie du temps comparable à la saisie de l'écoulement de grains de sable dans un sablier et palper au coeur même de la vie, dans son efflorescence la puissance de l'instant? L'ouvrage de Laurence Vanin fournit un ensemble d'éléments susceptibles d'orienter le lecteur vers des réponses... (shrink)

One of the most important abilities we have as humans is the ability to think about number. In this chapter, we examine the question of whether there is an essential connection between language and number. We provide a careful examination of two prominent theories according to which concepts of the positive integers are dependent on language. The first of these claims that language creates the positive integers on the basis of an innate capacity to represent real numbers. The second claims (...) that language’s function is to integrate contents from modules that humans share with other animals. We argue that neither model is successful. (shrink)

This volume is a comprehensive survey of contemporary thought on a wide range of issues and provides students with the basic background to current debates in metaphysics.