In the recently published Papyrus Bodmer 30 one of the six poems deals with the story of Genesis 22. At many places the poem drastically deviates from the biblical text, and the editors of the papyrus are insufficiently aware of the background of these deviations. In this article the authors demonstrate that almost all of them have their background in a centuries long process of both Jewish and Christian reflection on this biblical chapter. It is the very specific ‘Wirkungsgeschichte’ of (...) Gen. 22 that explains most of the poem’s specifics. (shrink)

The concept of ‘humane healthcare’ cannot and may not be limited to a personal virtue. For elucidating its meaning and making it functional as a critical ethical criterion for healthcare as a social institution, it is necessary to reflect on the social, cultural, and historical conditions in which modern healthcare finds its offspring and its further development. Doing this is the object and aim of social ethics. Social ethics in itself covers a broad area of different approaches. A main division (...) can be made between a liberal and a communitarian approach. This article focuses on the latter and concentrates on one of its representatives, Charles Taylor. The paper starts with two clarifying paragraphs: one about the terms humane and human, a second about the scope of social ethics. Next, because the term humane presupposes a certain view of man, attention will be paid to the lack of consensus in this respect within modernity, using some reflections of Taylor. In his view, resigning in this lack is a threat for one of the main motives behind modernity: the pursuit of a good and meaningful life. In the following section Taylor's analysis is applied to contemporary healthcare, by means of two examples. At the end the question is raised how to promote humane healthcare? In a short and conclusive sketch, three suggestions are offered for further research: scrutiny of goals and meanings within healthcare and culture, the broadening of the concept of autonomy and the upholding of human dignity as an intrinsic and imperative value. (shrink)

Solidarity belongs to the basic principles of Catholic Social Teaching (CST) and is part of the ethical repertoire of European moral traditions and European healthcare systems. This paper discusses how leaders of Catholic healthcare organizations (HCOs) can understand their institutional moral responsibility with regard to the preservation of solidarity. In dealing with this question, we make use of Taylor's philosophy of modern culture. We first argue that, just as all HCOs, Catholic ones also can embody and strengthen solidarity by just (...) doing their quintessential job, that is, to care for people with ill health. Second, we focus on the Catholic identity of these organizations and argue that this characteristic can empower a radical commitment to solidarity. Finally, we argue that CST provides a critical ethical framework for approaching solidarity from the perspective of the common good. (shrink)

In this paper the moral responsibility of a Healthcare Organization (HCO) is conceived as an inextricable aspect of the identity of the HCO. We attempt to show that by exploring this relation a more profound insight in moral responsibility can be gained. Referring to Charles Taylor we explore the meaning of the concept of identity. It consists of three interdependent dimensions: a moral, a dialogical, and a narrative one. In section two we develop some additional arguments to apply his concept (...) of personal identity to organizations. The final section works out the relationship of three dimensions of identity to some actual issues in contemporary HCOs: the tension between care and justice, the importance of dialogues about the diversity of goods, and the relevance of becoming familiar with the life-story of the HCO. Identity of an HCO is established and developed in commitments to and identification with certain goods that are central for a HCO. However, many of these goods are interwoven with everyday practices and policies. Therefore, moral responsibility asks for articulation of goods that often stay implicit and should not be reduced to a merely procedural approach. However difficult this articulation may be, if it is not tried at all HCOs run the risk of drifting away from their very identity as healthcare institutions: to offer care to patients and to do this in accordance with demands of social justice. (shrink)

In his fascinating doctoral thesis, W.J. Hanegraaff has drawn a clear map to the labyrinth called 'New Age', which he defines as 'the cultic milieu having become conscious of itself as constituting a more or less unified movement'. It is an 'etic' description of 'emic' points of view held by a wide variety of representatives of this movement. The book is divided in three parts: 1. A general orientation; 2. The varieties of New Age experience; 3. An interpretation of the (...) material presented in parts 1 and 2. The author argues that although New Age is composed of many heterogenous elements, nevertheless a measure of coherence can be demonstrated even on the level of beliefs. He holds that as New Age is based on popular culture criticism, thus western esotericism, in which the movement is rooted, it is a third, 'gnostic' option in western culture next to philosophical and scientific rationalism and institutional Christianity. The reviewer, though enthusiastic about the book, questions it on its criteria for distinguishing New Age and Christianity and on the question of possible esoteric influences on apparently Christian movements. The distinction between faith and gnosis could perhaps be profitably related to God's transcendence and his immanence. The platonism of the early Church, adapted for Christian use, ought to be compared with the many platonic elements of present day New Age. (shrink)

SummaryIn this article, the Syriac version of a letter from Theodoret of Cyrus to Nestorius, hitherto known in three Latin translations only, is edited and taken as the starting point for some considerations on the relationship between, and a few important dates in the lives of, both theologians. Syriac sources suggest that Nestorius was exiled in the year 435 and died in 453. Theodoret's letter gives account of his assent to the formula of union of 433, but solemnly states that (...) he will never agree to Nestorius' condemnation. Since the letter was written when Nestorius was “already in exile”, it must be dated to 435 or perhaps even 436. From other sources it is known that Theodoret did indeed take some time to accept the formula, because he tried in vain to convince his metropolitan, Alexander of Hierapolis. And perhaps after his decision he also took his time to set himself to inform Nestorius of this. In any case, Nestorius' reply leaves no doubt as to his refusal to accept the compromise. Another letter from Theodoret to Nestorius may well be interpreted, as the Latin translator does, as an attempt to bring Nestorius to rethink his position. It is curiously enough worded as a request to Nestorius to try and convince Alexander of Hierapolis to unite with the other party. There seems to have been no reply. A final letter by Nestorius to Theodoret seems to have been written after the latter was deposed in 449. In 451 Theodoret was restored to his see—but only after he had officially condemned Nestorius. (shrink)

Dans sa Théorie des sentiments moraux (1759), Adam Smith classe les passions en trois catégories : passions sociales, asociales, égoïstes. Cette classification résulte directement de leur capacité à susciter ou non la sympathie. Les passions sociales apparaissent ainsi comme les plus propres à susciter un écho sympathique. La question à laquelle tente de répondre l'article est de savoir pourquoi ces mêmes passions sociales sont qualifiées par A. Smith de « naturellement musicales ». L'utilisation du concept de sympathie dans le domaine (...) musical est fréquente aux XVIIème et XVIIIème siècles, mais l'hypothèse avancée ici est que le lien est plus profond chez A. Smith. La sympathie met en effet en évidence une qualité d'ordre à la fois esthétique et morale inhérente à certaines passions, leur « convenance » (propriety) par opposition aux passions « discordantes ». Ces passions, produisant une superposition d'échos sympathiques comparables aux harmoniques d'un ton fondamental, sont les plus susceptibles d'être imitées par la musique, si l'on tient compte de la théorie esthétique originale formulée par A. Smith, pour qui la beauté des arts imitatifs ne tient pas à l'illusion mais au contraire à l'écart entre l'imitation et son objet. (shrink)

Dans sa Théorie des sentiments moraux (1759), Adam Smith classe les passions en trois catégories : passions sociales, asociales, égoïstes. Cette classification résulte directement de leur capacité à susciter ou non la sympathie. Les passions sociales apparaissent ainsi comme les plus propres à susciter un écho sympathique. La question à laquelle tente de répondre l'article est de savoir pourquoi ces mêmes passions sociales sont qualifiées par A. Smith de « naturellement musicales ». L'utilisation du concept de sympathie dans le domaine (...) musical est fréquente aux XVIIème et XVIIIème siècles, mais l'hypothèse avancée ici est que le lien est plus profond chez A. Smith. La sympathie met en effet en évidence une qualité d'ordre à la fois esthétique et morale inhérente à certaines passions, leur « convenance » (propriety) par opposition aux passions « discordantes ». Ces passions, produisant une superposition d'échos sympathiques comparables aux harmoniques d'un ton fondamental, sont les plus susceptibles d'être imitées par la musique, si l'on tient compte de la théorie esthétique originale formulée par A. Smith, pour qui la beauté des arts imitatifs ne tient pas à l'illusion mais au contraire à l'écart entre l'imitation et son objet. (shrink)