Teil 1: Entwicklungsgeschichtliche und -- Systematische Aspekte.

O objetivo do presente artigo é interpretar o entendimento hegeliano da liberdade no contexto do pensamento tardio de Fichte e Schelling, cuja característica é a compreensão da liberdade humana como implicação da manifestação do absoluto. Segundo a tese central do artigo, na passagem da Doutrina da Essência para a Doutrina do Conceito – que é decisiva para a Lógica de Hegel – a vinculação entre manifestação e liberdade, presente já em Fichte e Schelling, é retomada e reformulada de tal modo (...) que a efetuação da liberdade e o processo de auto-manifestação são conceitualmente identificados. Tal resultado possibilita entender a estrutura da filosofia hegeliana do direito a partir do seu fundamento lógico e, ao mesmo tempo, avaliar criticamente as leituras pragmatistas da concepção “expressivista” da liberdade de Hegel. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 63 Heft: 3 Seiten: 538-548.

The present volume collects contributions which contextualize Fichte’s theory of image in various respects, focusing on its relation to pre-modern theories of image, its changing role in the development of Fichte’s thinking and its place within Fichte’s foundation of philosophy in the area between theory of truth or validity and ontology. Der vorliegende Band versammelt Beiträge, die Fichtes Bildtheorie in verschiedenen Hinsichten kontextualisieren, wobei ihr Verhältnis zu prä-modernen Bildtheorien, ihre wechselnde Rolle in der Entwicklung von Fichtes Denken und ihre im (...) Spannungsfeld von Wahrheits- bzw. Geltungstheorie und Ontologie angesiedelte Stellung in Fichtes Grundlegung der Philosophie im Mittelpunkt stehen. (shrink)

In the first writings of his Jena period, Hegel defends the conception of an original identity through which subjectivity is "suspended". The present article aims to expound this conception as a contribution to the theory of intentionality which focusses on the unity of conceptual and sensuous (or motivational) elements as a condition of the intentionality of perception and action. In a first step, it is argued that in his early writings, by "philosophy of subjectivity" Hegel understands positions which separate the (...) conceptual and the sensuous elements of perception and action, conceiving at the same time the subject as a distanced controller of sensibility. Thus, the hegelian critique of the philosophy of subjectivity is directed against such a conception of intentionality and its subject. In a second step, the hegelian alternative to this picture is exposed - the conception of an indissoluble unity of thinking and sensibility as being fundamental to perception and action. Finally, the picture of self-consciousness which arises in the Phenomenology of Spirit is analyzed as an implication of the conception of intentionality adopted in the earlier writings. (shrink)

This volume examines Fichte's notion of the image in the systematic domains of ethics, philosophy of history, political philosophy, philosophy of language, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion. Der vorliegende Band untersucht Fichtes bildtheoretisches Denken von der Theorie der Einbildungskraft bis in die systematischen Bereiche der Ethik, der Geschichtsphilosophie, der politischen Philosophie, der Sprachphilosophie, der Kunsttheorie und der Religionsphilosophie.

This paper aims to show that Brandom’s thesis about the intrinsic relation between self-consciousness and self-constitution as a characteristic of essentially self-conscious beings introduces into current philosophical debate a conception that is already present in Fichte’s concept of the ›I‹. Thus, Brandom’s position can be understood as a sign the continued vitality of Fichtean thinking. The leading idea of a correspondence between Fichte’s and Brandom’s conception is made more precise through a closer look at Fichte’s understanding, in the Science of (...) Knowledge nova method, of practical self-reference and of interpersonal recognition as a condition of its possibility. Finally, it is argued that the Fichtean claim that practical self-reference presupposes a pre-reflective self-awareness shows that, in spite of this result, we cannot simply identify the conceptions defended by Fichte and Brandom.In diesem Aufsatz soll gezeigt werden, dass Brandoms Thesen über den inneren Zusammenhang von Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstkonstitution als Charakteristikum wesentlich selbstbewusster Wesen eine bereits in Fichtes Ichbegriff angelegte Konzeption in die gegenwärtige philosophische Debatte einbringen und insofern als Lebenszeichen des Fichteschen Denkens gedeutet werden können. Die Entsprechung zwischen den Konzeptionen Fichtes und Brandoms soll durch eine nähere Betrachtung des Fichteschen Verständnisses des praktischen Selbstbezugs und der interpersonellen Anerkennung als seiner Möglichkeitsbedingung in der Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo herausgearbeitet werden. Dass die Positionen Fichtes und Brandoms dennoch nicht schlichtweg identifiziert werden können, wird durch einen abschließenden Blick auf die bewusstseinstheoretischen Prämissen der Fichteschen Konzeption des praktischen Selbstbezugs gezeigt. (shrink)

Also in the latest versions of the Science of Knowledge Fichte considers explanation of the structure of consciousness a central task of philosophy. In his late explanation of consciousness, the concepts of life and image play a central role – two concepts that in Fichte’s account are inseparable and mutually elucidate each other. By interpreting the 1810 Science of Knowledge and Fichte’s introductory lecture The facts of Consciousness from 1810/11, this article aims to show that the pair of concepts “life” (...) and ‘image’ occur on two different theoretical levels in Fichte’s late philosophy: first, in the formulation of a view of consciousness that Fichte characterizes as ‘idealist’ and that he considers to be in continuity with Kant’s transcendental philosophy; and, second, in the exposition of the conception of consciousness as an image of a non-constructible absolute that goes beyond the idealist explanation without, however, denying its validity within its own sphere. The second step, which occupies the major part of the 1810 Science of Knowledge, can be understood as Fichte’s late reply to Jacobi’s critique of the Science of Knowledge as a ‘nihilism’. Its final step is the introduction of the concept of ‘sober- mindedness’, in the sense of a self-interpretation of moral consciousness which goes beyond any constructible content. The concluding part of the article interprets and discusses the conception of sober-mindedness as involving Fichte’s final reply to Jacobi’s criticism. (shrink)

O presente trabalho visa elucidar o fundamento lógico da passagem do arbítrio para a vontade livre “em si e para si” na Introdução à Filosofia do Direito de Hegel. Defende-se as seguintes teses: 1. A idéia de tal passagem, concebida como reflexivização da vontade, já está presente na ética de Fichte. No entanto, diferentemente de Fichte Hegel concebe-a num fundamento lógico-conceitual. 2. O fundamento lógico da passagem em Hegel é a passagem da Lógica da Essência para a Lógica do Conceito. (...) 3. A explicitação da vontade livre em si e para si pela Lógica do Conceito não envolve ainda o caráter ético-social da realização da tal liberdade, que só se revela no desdobramento da Filosofia do Direito. (shrink)

The present article discusses the relation of Th. Nagel’s ethics of altruism with kantian ethics. According to Nagel himself, his position resembles that of Kant in two respects: it defends the thesis of the autonomy of moral motivation, and it bases moral on a determinate self-conception of persons. However, differently from Kant, the principle of Nagel’s ethics is just the modest presupposition that persons essentially understand themselves as being one among a plurality of other persons. Starting from the nagelian argument (...) in The Possibility of Altruism (1970), but contemplating also Nagel’s more recent position in The Last Word (1999), it is argued that in order to defend his conception of a rational ethics in a convincing way, Nagel has to approximate himself more to the kantian foundation of ethics than he wants to admit. (shrink)

This paper examines how the critique of abstractions operates in the work of Whitehead and in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. For Whitehead, the critique of abstractions and the recovery of concrete reality entails more than the mere recovery of what our abstractions prevent us from experiencing (as though it were just a matter of each individual having a more comprehensive experience). It also involves a responsibility towards those who are excluded by our abstractions. Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of (...) opinion and their concept of “becoming-minoritarian” have a function similar to the critique of abstractions in Whitehead’s work. This paper argues that the critique of abstractions acts as a counter to the inhibitions that follow from such abstractions and therefore allow for novelty on the part of those inhibited and excluded by dominant abstractions. In other words, the critique of abstractions makes room for the activity of the concrete. (shrink)

Kommunikation ist ohne Kontextualisierung nicht realisierbar, Texte sind ohne Kontexte nicht denkbar. Die moderne kognitive Textlinguistik und die linguistische Diskursanalyse setzen diese Erkenntnis häufig in ihren Arbeiten voraus. Dabei bleibt aber der Kontextbegriff theoretisch fast stets marginal, und das, was er bezeichnet, vage und/oder arbiträr. Dies hat sicherlich damit zu tun, dass Kontext keine unabhängig spezifizierbaren Sachverhalte oder Klassen von Sachverhalten bezeichnet. Der Begriff benennt vielmehr ein Verhältnis: Fast beliebige Sachverhalte können zu Kontexten dadurch werden, dass sie mit einem im (...) Fokus stehenden kommunikativen Ereignis in Verbindung stehen oder gesetzt werden, und erst diese Verbindung ermöglicht es, das fokussierte Element zu verstehen. Der vorliegende Sammelband versucht, diesen Mangel an begrifflicher Fundierung anzusprechen und ihm in Form theoretischer und text-analytischer Beiträge z.B. zu literalen Praktiken in verschiedenen sozio-kulturellen, medialen und literarischen Kontexten entgegenzutreten. Dabei soll die Macht der Kontexte, wie sie sich in den Texten manifestiert sowie - in umgekehrter Perspektive - die Kontextualisierungspotenz und -notwendigkeit von Texten und damit ihre Macht über die Kontexte herausgestellt werden. (shrink)

The population of most non-dominant ethnic groups in the USA is growing dramatically. Faculty members are challenged to develop curricula that adequately prepare our future nurses. An increased focus on clinical ethics has resulted from the use of sophisticated technology, changes in health care financing, an increasing elderly population and the shift of care from inpatient to outpatient settings. Nurses frequently face situations demanding resolution of ethical dilemmas involving cultural differences. Nursing curricula must include content on both ethics and cultural (...) sensitivity. Active student participation is an important element providing a foundation for ethical practice. A proposed educational format was introduced with graduating baccalaureate students. In a pilot study, curricular content on cultural sensitivity and ethical practice was taught in separate modules. Students were then asked to identify and problem solve an ethical dilemma involving patients and professional caregivers from vastly different cultures. Course faculty members provided discussion questions to guide the students' thinking. (shrink)

Die Frage der »guten Behandlung im Alter« gehört zu den Schlüsselthemen unserer Gesellschaft. Wie können wir gute Pflege für ältere Menschen, eine adäquate medizinische Versorgung im Alter und ganz allgemein Generationengerechtigkeit erreichen? Wie kann Inklusion auch für Menschen mit Demenz oder stigmatisierenden psychischen Erkrankungen erreicht werden? Dieser Band versammelt Expert*innen aus Philosophie, Soziologie, Medizin, Ethik, Psychogerontologie und Pflegewissenschaft sowie weiteren Feldern, die Möglichkeiten gelingender Therapie für Ältere - und damit auch Grundfragen von Menschenrechten und Ethik auf allen gesellschaftlichen Ebenen - (...) diskutieren. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Intentionalität aus semiotischer Sicht. Peirceanische PerspektivenChristian StrubStefan Kappner Intentionalität aus semiotischer Sicht. Peirceanische Perspektiven. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter2004, ISBN 3–11-018288–2, 432 pp.1. Problem focusKappner intended only partially a Peirce-interpretation; he attempts to think further along with Peirce, and he succeeds as well. The first chapter serves as a sketch of the problem of intentionality from a historical perspective, starting from Brentano. Kappner formulates the problem correctly by stating (...) that from the contemporary standpoint on the one hand every sort of methodological mind—body dualism is obsolete, because the mainstream of research has adopted a methodological physicalism along with an anti-foundationalistic epistemology; yet on the other hand our common sense view of psychic and thus also of intentional phenomena, which is inclined towards just such a dualism, must be taken into consideration. The systematic task thus consists in describing the particular quality of psychic phenomena in such a manner that this description "is compatible with methodological naturalism" (47). Kappner's main concern is thus the attempt to anchor the intentionality of thoughts and of human consciousness in more primitive forms of intentionality which are already exhibited by non-psychic goal-oriented natural processes. The solution to this task must accomplish two things: firstly, Kappner must justify the distinction between three types of "carriers" of "intentionality": concrete objects which intentionally contain an object in themselves, i.e. signs (381f.): Ch. 7; organisms which are capable of producing "inner signs for the simulation of external processes" (cf. 320–326: insightful behavior) (382f): Ch. 8; organisms which are capable of understanding this production as their own (self-consciousness) (383): Ch. 9. I will call this distinction the "internal differentiation thesis" (IDT). Secondly, Kappner must demonstrate that these three types of carriers are founded in one another. Over and above this, Kappner asserts that sign-intentionality is founded in something which he (with Arno Ros, 263, cf. 144) calls "quasi-intentionality" (Ch. 6). I will call this the "founding thesis" (FT). Obviously FT presupposes IDT, but not vice versa. Kappner claims to have successfully concluded such an ambitious naturalization program (342). Even when one [End Page 439] does not always agree with the partial solutions of Kappner, reading the book is definitely rewarding, as it shows in what a precisely differentiated manner one can reflect on a central problem of the "philosophy of mind" using Peirce's array of semiotic instruments.The reader is, naturally, astonished to hear the name Peirce in the context of a program for the naturalization of intentionality, for Peirce himself never used the concepts of "intention" and "intentionality" in the sense in which Brentano used them (47, 66), and himself clearly espoused an antifoundationalism and a methodological monism—but never a methodological naturalism; rather its opposite, namely a methodological idealism which can only conceive of physical properties as derived from psychic properties (synechism; 50–54). The reader is all the more eager to see how Kappner will prove his thesis to the effect that Peirce nevertheless has made a systematic contribution to the solution of the problem of intentionality under contemporary conditions. The decisive methodological step of Kappner (60) in Ch. 2 consists in declaring Peirce's metaphysics to be independent of his epistemic realism, which holds reality to be independent of the subject's mode of access to this reality. It is first at the end of the work that Kappner can precisely formulate what he means by Peircean naturalism: "For [Peirce], it is not primarily a question of how in (mere) thought relations to real things can be produced [as it is for Brentano and Husserl], but rather the opposite, namely how the progressive distancing of humans from the linguistic or mentally denoted object was and is possible [ellipsis]. In my opinion Peirce's approach can above all for this reason be characterized as 'naturalistic'" (376). This is plausible—of course, only under the assumption (not acknowledged as such by Kappner) that something like a "protodistancing" from the world can already be ascertained in the realm of quasi-intentionality. Nevertheless, Kappner employs two different concepts of "naturalistic": a naturalistic theory of intentionality means (1... (shrink)

New Jersey residents who tested their homes for radon and found more than four picocuries per liter were surveyed about their knowledge, emotions, attitudes, and intentions to take remedial action Respondents proved well informed, but radon levels were not highly correlated with any of the response variables. Overoptimism was more common than overreaction. The results suggest that active guidance is needed to ensure appropriate responses to environmental hazards, like radon, that require individual remediation. Simple information dissemination alone seems inadequate.

Die Frage der »guten Behandlung im Alter« gehört zu den Schlüsselthemen unserer Gesellschaft. Wie können wir gute Pflege für ältere Menschen, eine adäquate medizinische Versorgung im Alter und ganz allgemein Generationengerechtigkeit erreichen? Wie kann Inklusion auch für Menschen mit Demenz oder stigmatisierenden psychischen Erkrankungen erreicht werden? Dieser Band versammelt Expert*innen aus Philosophie, Soziologie, Medizin, Ethik, Psychogerontologie und Pflegewissenschaft sowie weiteren Feldern, die Möglichkeiten gelingender Therapie für Ältere - und damit auch Grundfragen von Menschenrechten und Ethik auf allen gesellschaftlichen Ebenen - (...) diskutieren. (shrink)

This book examines the epistemic function of perception and the relation between language and conceptual thought, and provides new ways of conceptualizing the Buddhist defense of the reflexivity thesis of consciousness: namely, that each cognitive event is to be understood as involving a pre-reflective implicit awareness of its own occurrence.