We uncover fundamental dimensions of the process through which organizations embed the practice of fraternity through embarking on an organizational journey in the direction of the common good. Building on the latest encyclical of Pope Francis, _Fratelli Tutti_, about fraternal and social friendship, we offer insight into the understanding of what it means to become a fraternal organization and reflect on the key ethical and paradoxical challenges for organizations aiming at collectively contributing to the common good. We add to previous (...) work by characterizing this journey as a process involving unique ethical challenges that emerge from the paradoxes associated with this process and how this might change the nature of the relationships between organizations and others within the organizational landscape. (shrink)

Singer’s much-discussed replaceability argument states that non-self-conscious animals may be killed and replaced by new animals that will lead equally valuable lives. If sound, this argument can be used to justify the cycle of raising and killing animals for food. Thus, many have argued that Singer’s theory, and utilitarianism in general, while committed to this argument, offers inadequate protection to animals. However, some utilitarians reject the argument and Singer himself was rather tentative in preventing its additional application to self-conscious beings. (...) This tension, within utilitarianism, about how to best deal with the argument is the core of what I call ‘the problem of replaceability’. My main goal here is to provide a precise description of this problem. Firstly, I distinguish between the general question of replacement permissibility and the specific question of whether (a certain version of) utilitarianism implies the replaceability argument. Focusing on the specific question I set the problem apart from other known objections to utilitarianism, like the value receptacles objection and some replacement-like difficulties. I also compare two versions of the replaceability argument and advance a better one. Finally, I point out how different interpretations of the argument affect the way out of the problem. I hope this understanding of the problem offers helpful insight to possible solutions and to further investigate its importance to animal food production and animals’ moral status. (shrink)

We worry about becoming non-existent, but not about coming into being. But both events are similarly bad according to Deprivationism; hence, it seems that we should display symmetric attitudes towards both. This entails the implausible conclusion that we should display negative attitudes towards the time of our birth. In a series of articles Brueckner and Fischer offered one of the most prominent attempts to block this conclusion by appealing to a temporal bias towards future pleasures. Inspired by Yi’s criticism of (...) their view, we argue that there is an appropriate sense of deprivation in which late birth can deprive of future pleasures. Hence, Brueckner and Fischer’s Temporal Bias does not explain the attitudinal asymmetry. In addition, to make sure that one picks out the appropriate sense of deprivation, we offer a restriction, the Historical Condition, that prevents us from considering that every value one would otherwise have is value that one was deprived of due to one’s actual birth/death. Finally, we present a novel account for the attitudinal asymmetry that relies on what we call ‘Interests Proximity Bias’. (shrink)

This work, in English "Struggle for power, organic crisis and judicial independence", has its origin in research academics of the IAEN carried out to provide expert advise to the Inter American Court of Human Rights in the case Quintana and others (Supreme Court of Justice) vs the State of Ecuador. The research is about the nature of the evolution of the ecuadorian state, the dynamics of its institutions, its players, parties, laws, its factors of instability, the way rights have been (...) deployed since the return to democracy in 1979, those who have benefited from neoliberal democracy and those who have paid the costs, and where in all this was the Supreme Court of Justice. The Introduction takes a look at this origin of the work and its intellectual import, provides a brief characterization of the Inter American Sistem of Human Rights Protection, how the Quintana Case fits within it, and an overview of the chapters and their logic. The first chapter analyzes the institutional and sociological factors that have contributed to Ecuador's historically unstable state, based primarily in an antagonistic struggle for power between the Executive and Legislative branches. The second chapter analyzes the economic and political factors that provoked an organic crisis, or crisis of hegemony, between 1997 and 2007 in Ecuador. The third chapter analyzes the evolution of the way in which judges are selected in Europe, the outcomes they have generated, and how they compare with the ecuadorian systems of judge selection in terms of securing judicial independence. The fourth chapter develops a theory of judicial independence in democracy and analyzes how Ecuador measures up to that standard, from when it became a neoliberal minimal democracy in 1981, to when it became a neoliberal false democracy as a consequence of instalation of a system evidently lacking in the people's support under the guise of the 1998 Constitution and its system of judge selection, and the new democratic horizons set by the 2008 Constitution, and the judicial system that springs from it. (shrink)

Em analogia com outras discriminações, como o racismo ou o sexismo, o especismo é concebido como uma forma de discriminação moral com base na espécie. Em grande medida, a discussão contemporânea sobre a importância moral dos animais surgiu e desenvolveu-se em torno da crítica e da defesa do especismo. Este artigo oferece uma visão da discussão filosófica contemporânea sobre o especismo. Após uma breve introdução, apresenta-se uma definição de especismo e caracterizam-se vários tipos de especismo, sendo o Antropocentrismo o mais (...) relevante. Depois, expõe-se um argumento proeminente contra o Antropocentrismo: o argumento dos casos marginais. Por fim, algumas posições antropocêntricas são criticamente discutidas. (shrink)

It is a fact that there is ethical criticism about art. Art critics, the general public and even artists point out moral flaws in artworks while evaluating them. Philosophers, however, have maintained a hot debate on the meaning of such criticism. This debate can be understood as a disagreement about the kind of relation between the artistic value of artworks and their alleged moral value. While some claim that moral value can contribute to artistic value (moralism), others claim that there (...) cannot be such a contribution (autonomism). Since at least some works of architecture are artworks, that debate also concerns architecture. A moderate moralist view claims that some works of architecture have moral flaws/merits that bear on their artistic evaluation. In an apparently promising version, the contention is that some moral flaws/merits are aesthetically relevant. In this paper I argue against such contention and defend an autonomist view. Following some taxonomy remarks I distinguish the views in the debate and present two points in favour of autonomism: its simplicity and not having the burden of proof. Then I discuss Carroll’s merited response argument for moralism and I argue that in its best interpretation either it begs the question against autonomism or it is compatible with it. I conclude with some possible objections that may help further investigations on the subject. (shrink)

Animal replaceability is supposed to be a feature of some consequentialist theories, like Utilitarianism. Roughly, an animal is replaceable if it is permissible to kill it because the disvalue thereby caused will be compensated by the value of a new animal’s life. This is specially troubling since the conditions for such compensation seem easily attainable by improved forms of raising and killing animals. Thus, grounding a strong moral status of animals in such theories is somewhat compromised. As is, consequently, their (...) position as an alternative to rights-based theories in animal ethics. Recognising this, some utilitarians tried to disassociate utilitarianism and replaceability. I will here add my voice to this project. However, instead of seeing the culprit in the usual suspects (hedonism, maximisation or the total view), I advance a new proposal. After identifying that the compensating value for a disvaluable action has to be its consequence, I present a restriction on consequences: consequences of sequences of actions cannot be consequences of the isolated actions in the sequences. Given this, the main argument is simple: killing an animal is permissible only if the the value of the new animal’s life is a consequence of the killing; but this value is a consequence of a sequence of actions which involves the killing plus some additional actions; therefore, since, via the restriction, such value is not a consequence of the killing, it is irrelevant to its normative status. I then present two further motivations for the restriction: firstly, it prevents the value of conditional actions from trivially influencing the value of the actions on which they are conditional; secondly, it is useful – even if not a complete solution – to reply other objections to consequentialism: the accordion effect of action and the cluelessness problem. I finally consider a couple of objections. (shrink)

No artigo “O vegetarianismo como obrigação ética” (Crítica, 10 de Setembro de 2015), Moutinho defende que o vegetarianismo é uma obrigação moral. Fá-lo argumentando por duas vias: que o estatuto moral dos animais é incompatível com serem usados pelos humanos para alimentação; e que o vegetarianismo é consequência do nosso dever em preservar o equilíbrio ecológico do planeta. O meu objectivo neste artigo é mostrar que os argumentos apresentados são insuficientes para estabelecer o vegetarianismo como obrigação moral.

Science fiction has been an inexhaustible source for the creation of technoscientific imaginary that has marked certain historical periods and influenced the production of subjectivity. This imaginary evokes complex ontological, epistemological, political, social, environmental and existential questions on the present and the future. The aim of this study was to identify and characterize the cultural productions accessed by the public to form an opinion about the genetic manipulation of human beings. A survey about sources of information that influence opinions on (...) the genetic manipulation of human beings was applied to 360 medical students (70.8% female). Movies were the most commonly mentioned source of information, followed by books, documentaries, news programs, television series, informational videos, soap operas and videogames. Science fiction was the most frequent genre and dystopian views of the future of humanity predominated. (shrink)

The Vegan Society is one of the most influential vegan organisations worldwide. In 1990 VS created a trademark, The Vegan Trademark, which certifies products as being suitable for vegans. While this, without doubt, has been beneficial in many ways, a change in their present labelling practice is in order. This, I argue, is due to inobservance of a simple coherence requirement to treat morally similar cases alike: the fundamental moral reason that is precluding some products from vegan certification is not (...) precluding other products from such certification. I start by presenting the standard definition of veganism and briefly describing the two relevant cases. I then go on to argue that the treatment of such cases involves incoherence of the labelling practice. In addition, I propose a way of removing the incoherence that fits better with veganism’s future-orientedness. I finally consider and respond to some objections. (shrink)

Será que somos livres para comer o que queremos? Será que a alimentação pode ser errada, não por não ser saudável, mas por ser moralmente incorrecta? Neste ensaio filosófico o leitor é levado, numa linguagem acessível e directa, a acompanhar uma análise crítica da racionalidade que suporta a alimentação humana padrão (baseada no consumo de carne de outros animais). Tal racionalidade é aqui qualificada como especista, pois pressupõe e dissemina a descriminação com base na pertença a uma espécie. Descriminação essa (...) que o autor, através de discussão argumentativa, típica dos textos filosóficos, denuncia como injustificável. Isto torna aquela alimentação moralmente incoerente. Afinal, quais são as diferenças moralmente relevantes entre a carne dos animais produzidos para alimentação humana e a dos animais de estimação? Sem compromissos maiores que a coerência da razão, o autor desacredita algumas das justificações mais comuns associadas ao consumo de carne e discute as alternativas à aceitação irreflectida da herança histórica do domínio humano sobre os outros animais. Neste pequeno livro o leitor não encontrará uma resposta única ao problema levantado sobre a moralidade da alimentação, mas encontrará certamente uma discussão útil para alcançar essa resposta por próprio. (shrink)

Automatic public malware analysis services provide controlled, isolated and virtual environments to analyse malicious software samples. Unfortunately, malware is currently incorporating techniques to recognize execution onto a virtual or sandbox environment; when an analysis environment is detected, malware behaves as a benign application or even shows no activity. In this work, we present an empirical study and characterization of automatic PMAS, considering 26 different services. We also show a set of features that allow to easily fingerprint these services as analysis (...) environments; the lower the unlikeability of these features, the easier for us to fingerprint the analysis service they belong to. Finally, we propose a method for these analysis services to counter or at least mitigate our proposal. (shrink)

We argue that Anthropocentrism – the kind of speciesism that privilegies the human species – is morally unacceptable. We distinguish and criticize three varieties of Anthropocentrism: unqualified, qualified empirical and qualified non-empirical. Firstly, unqualified Anthropocentrism is dismissed because it is grounded on a moral principle which implies that discriminations like racism and sexism are justified. Secondly, qualified empirical Anthropocentrism falls victim to the marginal cases argument, an argument that shows that properties which allegedly attribute moral status to every human and (...) to no animal, ultimately, if they exclude every animal, they also exclude some humans. Lastly, qualified non-empirical Anthropocentrism is rejected due to implausible consequences about which individuals have moral status. After rejecting Anthropocentrism, we consider a generalization of the marginal cases argument against all forms of speciesism. We show that only a species entirely comprised of essentially moral individuals would be unaffected by this argument. However, the possibility of such a species has limited practical import. Contrarily, Anthropocentrism’s moral unacceptability requires profound changes in the way humans relate with animals. (shrink)

Conviene subrayar en la época de la ciencia, cuando las prácticas más aberrantes y las especulaciones más desaforadas compiten por arrogarse el título de ciencias, que la filosofía no es una ciencia, ni necesita serlo para ejercer sus funciones críticas. No obstante, mantiene una relación íntima y constante con las ciencias desde sus orígenes hasta nuestros días (relación histórica), utiliza el mismo instrumento metodológico, la razón crítica (relación metódica) y recorre el mismo ámbito de la experiencia cognoscitiva humana (relación sistemática). (...) En ese sentido, la filosofía no se arredra ante el discurso postmoderno de la deslegitimación —Lyotard, Baudrillard, Vattimo, etc.—. Aunque las soluciones filosóficas son legitimadoras, no se reducen a mera ideología, ni tecnocrática ni progresista. (shrink)

In this research, a sliding mode regulator with sine mapping is suggested for the stabilization of electricity generators being affected by magnet interaction nonlinearities and generator nonlinearities. To reach this goal, our suggested regulator has the following contributions: it starts from the sliding mode regulator with the modifications that the saturation mapping is used to reach a smoother performance instead of the signum mapping, and the sine mapping is applied to reach an upper bound in the proportional gain error, it (...) is used to reach some chosen constant behaviors for the angle position, angle speed, and current in the electricity generators, and its stabilization is ensured based on the Lyapunov approach. We show the simulation of the suggested regulator in two electricity generators. (shrink)

The neural correlates of software programming skills have been the target of an increasing number of studies in the past few years. Those studies focused on error-monitoring during software code inspection. Others have studied task-related cognitive load as measured by distinct neurophysiological measures. Most studies addressed only syntax errors. However, a recent functional MRI study suggested a pivotal role of the insula during error-monitoring when challenging deep-level analysis of code inspection was required. This raised the hypothesis that the insula is (...) causally involved in deep error-monitoring. To confirm this hypothesis, we carried out a new fMRI study where participants performed a deep source-code comprehension task that included error-monitoring to detect bugs in the code. The generality of our paradigm was enhanced by comparison with a variety of tasks related to text reading and bugless source-code understanding. Healthy adult programmers participated in this 3T fMRI experiment. The activation maps evoked by error-related events confirmed significant activations in the insula [p < 0.05]. Importantly, a posterior-to-anterior causality shift was observed concerning the role of the insula: in the absence of error, causal directions were mainly bottom-up, whereas, in their presence, the strong causal top-down effects from frontal regions, in particular, the anterior cingulate cortex was observed. (shrink)

With the following two approaches to Cervantes it is intended to: 1. contextualize in literary, cultural, and historical terms the place where the writer was born, and high light some aspects which are relevant to the formation, relations and difficulties that his work will assume; 2. go through his vital and literary trajectory, in a double movement, from the chronological history: life and work. These two aspects offer the reader and the literature student precise parameters to approach to his place (...) of origin, life and work, which are not always precisely and clearly established. (shrink)

Interpretações recentes da obra de Maquiavel têm inscrito o pensamento do autor florentino em uma tradição política republicana. Entretanto, essa convergência de leituras não é ponto pacífico que encerra a discussão, haja vista que diversos comentadores debatem em que medida Maquiavel se insere nessa tradição. Este é o caso de Miguel Vatter, o qual retoma a obra do florentino em chave crítica para questionar alguns dos fundamentos de certa tradição republicana, como o vínculo entre liberdade e lei. Com efeito, (...) para o comentador, o autor florentino abre uma nova perspectiva de republicanismo ao desfazer esse vínculo e associar a liberdade ao desejo do povo como não-governo. Assim, pretendemos retomar a interpretação de Miguel Vatter acerca da liberdade como não-governo em Maquiavel e fazer algumas considerações a respeito de seu comentário, sobretudo no que toca ao estatuo da lei e do povo no discurso maquiaveliano. (shrink)

Esta entrevista fue realizada a Ricardo Pallares, miembro de la Academia Nacional de Letras de Uruguay. Uno de los objetivos medulares de este encuentro fue que el académico brindara un panorama de cómo se percibe la Literatura en sus manifestaciones heterogéneas, ya sea a nivel local o internacional. Para ello, el referente de esta entrevista hizo una apreciación en torno a algunas áreas donde se desenvuelve esta disciplina, tales como en el ámbito educativo, la sociedad, los concursos literarios y (...) las producciones que pretenden alcanzar un espacio en la canonización de la Literatura. Con todas estas propuestas, Ricardo Pallares explica con entusiasmo y pormenores aquellas experiencias que le permitieron asegurar que lo literario es un componente fundamental para la vida de los ciudadanos y que no deja de ser neurálgico en las actividades culturales y académicas. (shrink)

La ciudad y los perros ha sido expuesta para el análisis de la comunidad hermenéutica durante más de cincuenta años. En ese sentido, es insoslayable recurrir al criterio sistematizador que fundamenta Hans-Georg Gadamer en su texto Verdad y método, que es de utilidad para catalogar y criticar condicionalmente las propuestas que se han desarrollado en torno a la diversidad de representaciones literarias que han sido manifestadas en este libro. Para la efectividad de este trabajo, se asume que este objeto de (...) estudio está comprendido en función de los siguientes tratamientos: la percepción de la realidad real en la obra literaria, su clasificación autobiográfica, la articulación del lenguaje como estilo, la ironía como estrategia discursiva y canalizadora de la violencia y, para terminar, la técnica del final abierto con respecto a la muerte del personaje Ricardo Arana (el Esclavo). Con estos seis planteamientos enfocados desde lo hermenéutico, se pretende producir la confrontación y el diálogo intertextual con los aportes referenciados, con el propósito de que resulte utópica la configuración de un panorama exégeta de la primera novela de Mario Vargas Llosa. (shrink)

La configuración del personaje Alberto Fernández (el Poeta) de La ciudad y los perros (1963) es camaleónica en función de la violencia, por el hecho de asumir que su comportamiento, en algunas ocasiones, era agresivo para adquirir un respeto determinado; por el contrario, el personaje tenderá a querer experimentar un poco más su agresividad al tratar de derrotar al Jaguar y al querer vengarse por la muerte de su compañero Ricardo Arana. Asimismo, su lado humano se destaca (con esa (...) actitud, se contrarresta esa violencia, la cual controla mayormente): es pacífico, sabe convivir en aquel espacio violento, no busca pleitos y llega también a convertirse en cobarde y delator (en el momento que es chantajeado por las autoridades del Leoncio Prado al no mencionar nada sobre la muerte del Esclavo, ya que de hacerlo se le expulsará por ser el autor de novelitas pornográficas que ha difundido en toda su sección). (shrink)

Los espacios de la violencia (direccionalidad), en la primera novela de Vargas Llosa, La ciudad y los perros (1963), se representan en sus ámbitos intelectual, físico, emocional, social y cultural. La frecuencia con la que los personajes ejecutan estas acciones, en un determinado lugar, acentuará el proceso de la conformación de su identidad violenta, como cuando los cadetes pelean entre ellos; únicamente, en lugares apartados donde las autoridades militares del Leoncio Prado no pueden verlos ni controlarlos. El personaje Ricardo (...) Arana practica la no violencia, pero ni aun así puede librarse de las perversidades de sus otros compañeros; la resistencia que ejerce tan solo provoca que los demás muchachos lo envidien y terminen abusando de él, más que de cualquier otro estudiante. (shrink)

Estas líneas están escritas como homenaje a Ricardo Sánchez Ortiz de Urbina, con todo el cariño y con la esperanza de ser acogido con la benevolencia que demanda el ensayo. En todo caso, nunca podré dejar de agradecer a nuestro maestro que me permitiera salir sin brusquedad del encierro al que me había conducido el sujeto gnoseológico, el sujeto de la ciencia, siempre omnipresente en toda investigación. Siguiendo la estela de la matriz fenomenológica configurada por Urbina, entreví en el (...) nivel superior ―el nivel de máxima ambigüedad―, y mediante trasposiciones sucesivas, el origen humano de los celos, que desbordan el simple comportamiento o el mero afecto. Los celos como fondo siempre desbordante en el proceso que nunca concluye de fijación de la identidad humana. Un camino que habían recorrido, con los medios de que disponían, los escritores del Barroco español en el contexto de los conversos hispanos y Miguel de Cervantes como centro. (shrink)

En un artículo anterior, titulado «Del Diálogo del Guerrero al Diálogo del Hogar: para una fenomenología de los celos» y en homenaje a Ricardo Sánchez Ortiz de Urbina, concluía que el amor y los celos forman el arranque mismo de la condición humana en su dimensión del exceso: no es la dualidad discreta Amor/Odio la expresión de la base y el fundamento de los afectos, sino la dualidad continua Amor/Celos. Las preguntas surgen de suyo: ¿con qué concepto quedaría vinculado (...) por continuidad y exceso el odio? ¿Y cuál es la posición que le corresponde al odio respecto del amor? A partir de un comentario de Maimónides —en el que vincula la enemistad con el odio y del que sólo el conocimiento de la verdad puede alejarnos—, argumentaré que el odio es generado por la crítica, por el saber crítico, que destruye la verdad absoluta. Y propondré un cuadro semiótico-topológico explicativo con ejemplos literarios e históricos. (shrink)

This book develops a philosophical analysis of economic reality and economic science from an Aristotelian point of view. It is the result of many years of thinking and philosophical study about these topics. It differs from other philosophy of economics books as it also deals with economic reality (not only the science) and approaches its subject from an Aristotelian perspective. It differs from other Aristotelian studies about economics as it covers the whole of philosophy of the economy. This book argues (...) why Aristotle's thinking guarantees an appropriate interdisciplinary synthesis. (shrink)

In this chapter, Ricardo Silvestre and Alan Herbert offer a reconstruction of the Gītā’s concept of God with a focus on the relationship between God and the world. They try to explain the claim that the Gītā is panentheistic. This is done with the help of some key notions of contemporary metaphysics (such as ontological dependence and fundamentality) along with the Indic notion of prakṛti, considered as a metaphysical primitive denoting the intimate relationship that exists between matter and conscious (...) living beings on the one hand, and God on the other. (shrink)

The use of new paradigms of false belief tasks allowed to reduce the age of children who pass the test from the previous 4 years in the standard version to only 15 months or even a striking 6 months in the nonverbal modification. These results are often taken as evidence that infants already possess an—at least implicit—theory of mind. We criticize this inferential leap on the grounds that inferring a ToM from the predictive success on a false belief task requires (...) to assume as premise that a belief reasoning is a necessary condition for correct action prediction. It is argued that the FBT does not satisfactorily constrain the predictive means, leaving room for the use of belief-independent inferences. These heuristics, when applied to the FBT, can achieve the same predictive success of a belief-based inference because information provided by the test stimulus allows the recognition of particular situations that can be subsumed by their ‘laws’. Instead of solving this issue by designing a single experimentum crucis that would render unfeasible the use of non-representational inferences, we suggest the application of a set of tests in which, although individually they can support inferences dissociated from a ToM, only an inference that makes use of false beliefs is able to correctly predict all the outcomes. (shrink)

In developing a theory of consciousness, one of the main problems has to do with determining what distinguishes conscious states from non-conscious ones—the delimitation problem. This paper explores the possibility of solving this problem in terms of self-awareness. That self-awareness is essential to understanding the nature of our conscious experience is perhaps the most widely discussed hypothesis in the study of consciousness throughout the history of philosophy. Its plausibility hinges on how the notion of self-awareness is unpacked. The idea that (...) consciousness involves self-awareness has been understood in two different ways: either as awareness of oneself—the subject of experience—or as awareness of the conscious episode itself. In this paper I argue (i) that every experience concerns the subject in a very specific way, involving what I will call ‘perspectival de se representation’, and (ii) that there is no need to appeal to the experience itself in order to characterize the awareness within that experience. The view I articulate explains the subjective nature of experience without over-intellectualizing it, accommodates the phenomenology of experience, and dispels any doubt about the need to find the self in introspection. (shrink)

It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. (...) I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness : a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects. (shrink)

¿Ciencias sociales o ciencias de la sociedad? -- La adquisición e intercambio de conocimiento -- La formación y evolución del lenguaje -- La formación de valores, moral y costumbre -- Bases metodológicas para el estudio histórico de los fenómenos sociales -- Cooperación social y gobierno.

Any plausibly just market exchange must balance two conflicting moral considerations: non-worseness (Wertheimer, 1999) and euvoluntariness (true voluntariness; Munger, 2011). We propose an analytical theory of just market exchange that partly resolves this conflict.