The article presents an obituary for Polish philosopher Piotr Lenartowicz.

Since more than hundred years the attempts to explain biological adaptations constitute the main current of evolutionary thinking. In 1901 C. LI. Morgan wrote: „The doctrine of evolution has rendered the study of adaptation of scientific importance. Before that doctrine was formulated, natural adaptations formed part of the mystery of special creation, and played a great role in natural theology through the use of the argument from 'design in nature’". The modem doctrine of biology stresses the importance of the environment (...) in „shaping" the inner properties of every living being. This means an obvious although tacit refusal to assume or recognize any single, integrated agent in the origin of main functional biological traits and in the genesis of new kinds of life. The role ascribed to random mutations, and to „pressures of the environment" is just one aspect of the neodarwinian theory. Another aspect of this doctrine is the widespread conviction that all phenomena of life are a natural, both random and necessary result of interactions between constantly changing material objects. (shrink)

Actio immanens - as many other terms, coined by the Aristotelian-Thomist philosophical tradition - is a biological concept par excellence. It was formed as a mental result of biological observation, on the strength of studies on living beings and so, refers to them first and foremost. During the last century, the term actio immanens gradually disappeared from philosophical encyclopedias and has totally vanished from the biological and philosophical language used to describe the dynamism of life. Moreover, if this term does (...) appear at all, its meaning is rather vague. However, actio immanens belongs to the group of key concepts, without which it would seem not possible to properly describe, nor to properly understand biological phenomena. (shrink)

Actio immanens - as many other terms, coined by the Aristotelian-Thomist philosophical tradition - is a biological concept par excellence. It was formed as a mental result of biological observation, on the strength of studies on living beings and so, refers to them first and foremost. During the last century, the term actio immanens gradually disappeared from philosophical encyclopedias and has totally vanished from the biological and philosophical language used to describe the dynamism of life. Moreover, if this term does (...) appear at all, its meaning is rather vague. However, actio immanens belongs to the group of key concepts, without which it would seem not possible to properly describe, nor to properly understand biological phenomena. (shrink)

Consequence is at the heart of logic, and an account of consequence offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. This text presents what the authors term as 'logical pluralism' arguing that the notion of logical consequence doesn't pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them.

Information transfer implies two independent beings and two distinct, although closely tied levels of reality. In other words the „information transfer" is a multi-layer reality. The investigation of the „causal" mechanisms presupposes a proper description of the phenomenal effects. It is the phenomenal sphere of the directly observable events which provokes - in our mind - the questions driving the effort to explore the „mechanisms". It is absolutely crucial, therefore, to approach the process of description with the sufficiently unbiased means. (...) A premature narrowing on the descriptive level may fatally affect our „explanatory" ideas on the underlying mechanisms. For instance, in the realm of „information theories" there is a deeply rooted, but not too reliable conviction, that the descriptive means, used in the process of the construction and utilization of some technical devices, give us a fair chance to describe the „Information transfer" within or between the living creatures. (shrink)

Since more than hundred years the attempts to explain biological adaptations constitute the main current of evolutionary thinking. In 1901 C. LI. Morgan wrote: „The doctrine of evolution has rendered the study of adaptation of scientific importance. Before that doctrine was formulated, natural adaptations formed part of the mystery of special creation, and played a great role in natural theology through the use of the argument from 'design in nature’". The modem doctrine of biology stresses the importance of the environment (...) in „shaping" the inner properties of every living being. This means an obvious although tacit refusal to assume or recognize any single, integrated agent in the origin of main functional biological traits and in the genesis of new kinds of life. The role ascribed to random mutations, and to „pressures of the environment" is just one aspect of the neodarwinian theory. Another aspect of this doctrine is the widespread conviction that all phenomena of life are a natural, both random and necessary result of interactions between constantly changing material objects. (shrink)

The concept of „fundamental unity of life" belongs to the descriptive element of biology. It contrasts with the equally empirical concept of multiplicity and diversity of living forms. „Fundamental unity of life" means that however peculiar a biological form might be, some of its essential mechanisms are exactly the same as in the rest of the biological world. It is astonishing to realize that so different beings as bacteria, plants and men manifest several evidently non fortuitous identities. For thousands of (...) years man has been aware, that many behavioral traits are common to all living beings. Every living being processes matter, multiplies, regenerates, adapts to its surroundings'. During the last century a new, impressive confirmation and amplification of these resemblances was found on the molecular and subcellular level. One may say that the previous, rather raw concepts of nutrition, reproduction, adaptation and regeneration have been replaced by the more or less direct evidence, observable within the single living cells. So the idea of „fundamental unity of life" underwent a legitimate „reduction" to the level of biochemistry. (shrink)

The concept of „fundamental unity of life" belongs to the descriptive element of biology. It contrasts with the equally empirical concept of multiplicity and diversity of living forms. „Fundamental unity of life" means that however peculiar a biological form might be, some of its essential mechanisms are exactly the same as in the rest of the biological world. It is astonishing to realize that so different beings as bacteria, plants and men manifest several evidently non fortuitous identities. For thousands of (...) years man has been aware, that many behavioral traits are common to all living beings. Every living being processes matter, multiplies, regenerates, adapts to its surroundings'. During the last century a new, impressive confirmation and amplification of these resemblances was found on the molecular and subcellular level. One may say that the previous, rather raw concepts of nutrition, reproduction, adaptation and regeneration have been replaced by the more or less direct evidence, observable within the single living cells. So the idea of „fundamental unity of life" underwent a legitimate „reduction" to the level of biochemistry. (shrink)

Patrząc na osobnika z perspektywy jego rozwoju. można powiedzieć, że w swej najgłębszej istocie jest on nie tyle i nie przede wszystkim całościową funkcjonalną strukturą, która przejawia życie, ile jest raczej żywą dynamiką, której jednym z zasadniczych przejawów jest zintegrowane budowanie, odbudowywanie, naprawianie i modyfikowanie różnorakich skorelowanych struktur ciała, czyli maszyn molekularnych, organelli i organów, które warunkują zachodzenie różnorodnych procesów biochemicznych i fizjologicznych oraz umożliwiają selektywne interakcje ze środowiskiem abiotycznym i biotycznym. Dynamika rozwojowa — w przekonaniu Lenartowicza — jest podstawowym (...) behawiorem każdej istoty żywej i powinna być fundamentem kształtowania właściwej koncepcji życia. (shrink)

Information transfer implies two independent beings and two distinct, although closely tied levels of reality. In other words the „information transfer" is a multi-layer reality. The investigation of the „causal" mechanisms presupposes a proper description of the phenomenal effects. It is the phenomenal sphere of the directly observable events which provokes - in our mind - the questions driving the effort to explore the „mechanisms". It is absolutely crucial, therefore, to approach the process of description with the sufficiently unbiased means. (...) A premature narrowing on the descriptive level may fatally affect our „explanatory" ideas on the underlying mechanisms. For instance, in the realm of „information theories" there is a deeply rooted, but not too reliable conviction, that the descriptive means, used in the process of the construction and utilization of some technical devices, give us a fair chance to describe the „Information transfer" within or between the living creatures. (shrink)

Kluczowe w filozofii Lenartowicza było pojęcie organizmu żywego rozumianego jako cykl życiowy, który będąc powiązany z innymi podobnymi cyklami wplata się w sieć linii pokoleń danego rodzaju istot żywych. Fundamentem cyklu życiowego jest dynamika rozwojowa rozpoczynająca się w momencie poczęcia organizmu. Patrząc na osobnika z perspektywy jego rozwoju, można powiedzieć, że w swej najgłębszej istocie jest on nie tyle i nie przede wszystkim całościową funkcjonalną strukturą, która przejawia życie, ile jest raczej żywą dynamiką, której jednym z zasadniczych przejawów jest zintegrowane (...) budowanie, odbudowywanie, naprawianie i modyfikowanie różnorakich skorelowanych struktur ciała, czyli maszyn molekularnych, organelli i organów, które warunkują zachodzenie różnorodnych procesów biochemicznych i fizjologicznych oraz umożliwiają selektywne interakcje ze środowiskiem abiotycznym i biotycznym. (shrink)

Within the historical times, which roughly corresponds with the Holocene epoch, the whole of mankind is believed to be a single species. Homo sapiens. But the human genealogical tree is populated by a really astounding number of paleontological species and paleontological genera: Ardipithecus ramidus, Australopithecus anamensis, Australopithecus afarensis, Australopithecus africanus, Paranthropus robustus, Paranthropus boisei, Homo habilis, Homo georgicus. Homo erectus, Homo ergaster, Homo antecessor, Homo heidelbergensis, Homo neanderthalensis, Homo sapiens.. In fact there are many more but Foley, quite reasonably, states (...) that the evidence for their existence is, at present, insufficient. The existence of these multiple forms is beyond any doubt. The doubt, however arises concerning the human or „prehuman" status of them. Were they really true specific forms, half-way between the apes and Holocene man? Is it possible that they constitute a number of different ecotypes within the same natural species of Homo sapiens? (shrink)

Within the historical times, which roughly corresponds with the Holocene epoch, the whole of mankind is believed to be a single species. Homo sapiens. But the human genealogical tree is populated by a really astounding number of paleontological species and paleontological genera: Ardipithecus ramidus, Australopithecus anamensis, Australopithecus afarensis, Australopithecus africanus, Paranthropus robustus, Paranthropus boisei, Homo habilis, Homo georgicus. Homo erectus, Homo ergaster, Homo antecessor, Homo heidelbergensis, Homo neanderthalensis, Homo sapiens.. In fact there are many more but Foley, quite reasonably, states (...) that the evidence for their existence is, at present, insufficient. The existence of these multiple forms is beyond any doubt. The doubt, however arises concerning the human or „prehuman" status of them. Were they really true specific forms, half-way between the apes and Holocene man? Is it possible that they constitute a number of different ecotypes within the same natural species of Homo sapiens? (shrink)

W artykule Jedna czy wiele dusz? Stanisław Ziemiański SJ omawia dwa stanowiska dotyczące problemu genezy duszy ludzkiej – kreacjonizm i traducjanizm. Według nauki Kościoła Katolickiego „każda dusza duchowa jest bezpośrednio stwarzana przez Boga nie jest ona 'produktem' rodziców - i jest nieśmiertelna : DS 1440.), nie ginie więc po jej oddzieleniu się od data w chwili śmierci i połączy się na nowo z ciałem w chwili ostatecznego zmartwychwstania". Jest to stanowisko kreacjonizmu osobowych, indywidualnych dusz ludzkich. Natomiast traducjanizm stoi na stanowisku, (...) że dusza ludzka jest przekazywana dziecku przez rodziców. Pan Bóg stworzył duszę ludzką tylko jeden raz - w momencie powołania do istnienia naszych Prarodziców. I ta „jedna jedyna" dusza przekazywana jest w procesie biologicznego rozmnazania się osób ludzkich. (shrink)

W artykule Jedna czy wiele dusz? Stanisław Ziemiański SJ omawia dwa stanowiska dotyczące problemu genezy duszy ludzkiej – kreacjonizm i traducjanizm. Według nauki Kościoła Katolickiego „każda dusza duchowa jest bezpośrednio stwarzana przez Boga nie jest ona 'produktem' rodziców - i jest nieśmiertelna : DS 1440.), nie ginie więc po jej oddzieleniu się od data w chwili śmierci i połączy się na nowo z ciałem w chwili ostatecznego zmartwychwstania". Jest to stanowisko kreacjonizmu osobowych, indywidualnych dusz ludzkich. Natomiast traducjanizm stoi na stanowisku, (...) że dusza ludzka jest przekazywana dziecku przez rodziców. Pan Bóg stworzył duszę ludzką tylko jeden raz - w momencie powołania do istnienia naszych Prarodziców. I ta „jedna jedyna" dusza przekazywana jest w procesie biologicznego rozmnazania się osób ludzkich. (shrink)

W artykule Jedna czy wiele dusz? Stanisław Ziemiański SJ omawia dwa stanowiska dotyczące problemu genezy duszy ludzkiej – kreacjonizm i traducjanizm. Według nauki Kościoła Katolickiego „każda dusza duchowa jest bezpośrednio stwarzana przez Boga nie jest ona 'produktem' rodziców - i jest nieśmiertelna : DS 1440.), nie ginie więc po jej oddzieleniu się od data w chwili śmierci i połączy się na nowo z ciałem w chwili ostatecznego zmartwychwstania". Jest to stanowisko kreacjonizmu osobowych, indywidualnych dusz ludzkich. Natomiast traducjanizm stoi na stanowisku, (...) że dusza ludzka jest przekazywana dziecku przez rodziców. Pan Bóg stworzył duszę ludzką tylko jeden raz - w momencie powołania do istnienia naszych Prarodziców. I ta „jedna jedyna" dusza przekazywana jest w procesie biologicznego rozmnazania się osób ludzkich. (shrink)

Providing an original and systematic treatment of foundational issues in philosophy of religion, J. L. Schellenberg's new book addresses the structure of..

What happens when someone acts? A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. I think that the standard story is flawed in several respects. The flaw (...) that will concern me in this paper is that the story fails to include an agent-or, more precisely, fails to cast the agent in his proper role. (shrink)

Abstract I argue that meaning in life is importantly influenced by bioloical ties. More specifically, I maintain that knowing one's relatives and especially one's parents provides a kind of self-knowledge that is of irreplaceable value in the life-task of identity formation. These claims lead me to the conclusion that it is immoral to create children with the intention that they be alienated from their bioloical relatives?for example, by donor conception.

It is our intention to re-investigate only a few of the innumerable epistemological problems concerning Paley's argumentation for the existence of God. Nowadays this argumentation is commonly considered as invalid. Modern philosophers believe that the Humean Dialogs on Natural Religion and the Darwinian theory of evolution deprived Paley's reasoning of any cognitive validity. This judgment seems to us unjustified. We shall try to demonstrate that the very meaning and the logical structure of Paley's argumentation are continuously misunderstood, and that critics (...) have attacked rather a false image of Paley's cognitive pathway. Furthermore, we will show that Paley actually argues for the existence of a single agent producing biological organs. Indeed Paley demonstrates, that a biological organ is a kind of objective whole, and by necessity one produced by a single agent. However, Paley's form of argumentation is not sufficient to indicate whether this agent might be identified with a divine Creator, or Aristotelian "soul" building and commanding biological organs, or the recently discovered, described and deciphered deoxynucleotide polymer present in the reproductive biological cell. (shrink)

Retributive theories of punishment argue that punishing a criminal for a crime she committed is sufficient reason for a justified and morally permissible punishment. But what about when the state gets lucky in its decision to punish? I argue that retributive theories of punishment are subject to “Gettier” style cases from epistemology. Such cases demonstrate that the state needs more than to just get lucky, and as these retributive theories of punishment stand, there is no anti-luck condition. I’ll argue that (...) Gettier-style cases demonstrate an impermissible instance of punishment, even though they meet the conditions of retributive theories of punishment. Retributive theories are, therefore, too weak. The safety condition from epistemology provides the anti-luck condition needed for permissible punishment. I argue that two forms of retributivism, rights-forfeiture and what I call standard retributivism, are both subject to Gettier-style cases. Unlike the literature on standards of proof, this paper argues that safety is a condition on punishment itself, i.e., in all nearby possible worlds, the accuser must correctly accuse the convicted for the crime they actually committed. (shrink)

Supervaluationism is often described as the most popular semantic treatment of indeterminacy. There’s little consensus, however, about how to fill out the bare-bones idea to include a characterization of logical consequence. The paper explores one methodology for choosing between the logics: pick a logic thatnorms beliefas classical consequence is standardly thought to do. The main focus of the paper considers a variant of standard supervaluational, on which we can characterizedegrees of determinacy. It applies the methodology above to focus ondegree logic. (...) This is developed first in a basic, single-premise case; and then extended to the multipremise case, and to allowdegreesof consequence. The metatheoretic properties of degree logic are set out. On the positive side, the logic is supraclassical—all classical valid sequents are degree logic valid. Strikingly, metarules such as cut and conjunction introduction fail. (shrink)

It is our intention to re-investigate only a few of the innumerable epistemological problems concerning Paley's argumentation for the existence of God. Nowadays this argumentation is commonly considered as invalid. Modern philosophers believe that the Humean Dialogs on Natural Religion and the Darwinian theory of evolution deprived Paley's reasoning of any cognitive validity. This judgment seems to us unjustified. We shall try to demonstrate that the very meaning and the logical structure of Paley's argumentation are continuously misunderstood, and that critics (...) have attacked rather a false image of Paley's cognitive pathway. Furthermore, we will show that Paley actually argues for the existence of a single agent producing biological organs. Indeed Paley demonstrates, that a biological organ is a kind of objective whole, and by necessity one produced by a single agent. However, Paley's form of argumentation is not sufficient to indicate whether this agent might be identified with a divine Creator, or Aristotelian "soul" building and commanding biological organs, or the recently discovered, described and deciphered deoxynucleotide polymer present in the reproductive biological cell. (shrink)

v. 1. Nicomachean ethics. Politics. The Athenian Constitution. Rhetoric. On Poetics.--v. 2. Logic.--v. 3. Physics. Metaphysics. On the soul. Short physical treaties.--v. 4. On the heavens. On generation and corruption. Meteorology. Biological treatises.

Since the discovery of the Neandertal bones 1856, the extremely old, fragmentary fossil remains of hundreds of man-like bodies have been discovered in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Even the oldest ones - usually the most incomplete - look man-like and „un-apish", even to a layman, if compared with a modem apish and human correlate. Sometimes, in the vicinity of these remains, primitive stone tools or the evidence of their production have been found. At present, it seems absolutely certain — within (...) the limits of our present physical and biological knowledge - that at least four million years ago, in Africa, some creatures resembling modern man were living, and that at least two and half million years ago, in Africa, stone tools were produced. In contrast with the firm, scientifically-arguable belief that all modem human tribes - however different they are - belong to a single species, in paleoanthropology an equally firm scientific belief is maintained that the extinct man-like forms belong to several different, „presapient", „prehuman'', more ape-like species. (shrink)

Since the discovery of the Neandertal bones 1856, the extremely old, fragmentary fossil remains of hundreds of man-like bodies have been discovered in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Even the oldest ones - usually the most incomplete - look man-like and „un-apish", even to a layman, if compared with a modem apish and human correlate. Sometimes, in the vicinity of these remains, primitive stone tools or the evidence of their production have been found. At present, it seems absolutely certain — within (...) the limits of our present physical and biological knowledge - that at least four million years ago, in Africa, some creatures resembling modern man were living, and that at least two and half million years ago, in Africa, stone tools were produced. In contrast with the firm, scientifically-arguable belief that all modem human tribes - however different they are - belong to a single species, in paleoanthropology an equally firm scientific belief is maintained that the extinct man-like forms belong to several different, „presapient", „prehuman'', more ape-like species. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to elaborate on the phenomenological approach to expertise as proposed by Dreyfus and Dreyfus and to give an account of the extent to which their approach may contribute to a better understanding of how athletes may use their cognitive capacities during high-level skill execution. Dreyfus and Dreyfus's non-representational view of experience-based expertise implies that, given enough relevant experience, the skill learner, when expert, will respond intuitively to immediate situations with no recourse to deliberate actions (...) or mental representations. The paper will subsequently outline some implications and consequences of such an approach and will also examine to what extent Dreyfus and Dreyfus's skill model is capable to resist different attacks that have been made against their view, and in particular regarding the practical application of their approach to the skill domain of competitive sport. (shrink)

This paper offers an alternate explanation of cases from the doxastic wronging literature. These cases violate what I call the degree of inquiry right—a novel account of zetetic obligations to inquire when interests are at stake. The degree of inquiry right is a moral right against other epistemic agents to inquire to a certain threshold when a belief undermines one’s interests. Thus, the agents are sometimes obligated to leave inquiry open. I argue that we have relevant interests in reputation, relationships, (...) and the well-being of our social groups. These interests generate obligations against others to “do their homework” before closing inquiry. This alternate account makes better sense of puzzles that accounts of doxastic wronging fall prey to. (shrink)