Results for 'Klein, Peter'

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  1. On Peter Klein's Concept of Arbitrariness.Coos Engelsma - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):192-200.
    According to Peter Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows a vicious form of arbitrariness. The present article critically discusses his concept of arbitrariness. It argues that the condition Klein takes to be necessary and sufficient for an epistemic item to be arbitrary is neither necessary nor sufficient. It also argues that Klein's concept of arbitrariness is not a concept of something that is obviously vicious. Even if Klein succeeds in establishing that foundationalism allows what he regards as arbitrariness, this (...)
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  2.  49
    Peter Singer on Global Ethics.Madsen Peter - 2004 - Business Ethics Quarterly 14 (1):183-196.
  3.  40
    Donatella Di Cesare: Heidegger, Die Juden, Die Shoah Und Peter Trawny, Andrew J. Mitchell : Heidegger, Die Juden, Noch Einmal.Donatella Di Cesare, Trawny Peter, Andrew J. Mitchell & Reinhard Mehring - 2016 - Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 69 (2):137-146.
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  4.  37
    Péter Rózsa. Rekurzív Definiciók, Melyek Változó Számu Korábbi Függvényertéket Használnak Fel. Matematikai Lapok , Vol. 5 , Pp. 7–9. An Abstract of XX 176.Péter Rózsa. Ujabb Bizonyítás Arra, Hogy a Csillag-Kalmár-Féle Elemi Függvények Osztálya Szükebb, Mint a Primitiv-Rekurzív Függvényeké. Matematikai Lapok , Vol. 5 , Pp. 244–252. Hungarian Version of XX 282.Péter Rózsa. Kalmár László Matematikai Munkássága . Ebd., Bd. 6 , S. 138–150. [REVIEW]R. Péter - 1957 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 22 (3):295-296.
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  5.  24
    My Life with Censorship: Sís, Peter, 1949- -- Childhood and Youth.SíS. Peter - 2009 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (3):42-45.
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  6. Democratic Legitimacy Without Collective Rationality Fabienne Peter.Fabienne Peter - 2009 - In Boudewijn Paul de Bruin & Christopher F. Zurn (eds.), New Waves in Political Philosophy. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 143.
     
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  7.  11
    Peter Klein Joins Editorial Board.Stephan Kinsella - unknown
    Libertarian Papers is pleased to announce that Peter Klein, Associate Professor of Applied Social Sciences and Director of the McQuinn Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership at the University of Missouri, has joined the Editorial Board.
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  8.  30
    Review of "Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism", Edited by John Turri and Peter Klein. [REVIEW]Adam C. Podlaskowski - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):141-145.
    This is a review of Turri and Klein's "Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism".
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  9.  30
    Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism, Edited by Turri, John and Peter D. Klein: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, Pp. 262, £40. [REVIEW]Cei Maslen - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):629-629.
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  10.  40
    An Austrian Mélange • Eckehart Köler, Peter Weibel, Michael Stöltzner, Bernd Buldt, Carsten Klein, and Werner Depauli-Schimanovich-Göttig, Eds. Kurt Gödel. Wahrheit & Beweisbarkeit. Band 1: Dokumente Und Historische Analysen [Kurt Gödel. Truth and Provability. Vol. 1: Documents and Historical Analyses]. Vienna: Öbv Et Hpt, 2002. Isbn 3-209-03824-1. Pp. 279. • Bernd Buldt, Eckehart Köhler, Michael Stöltzner, Peter Weibel, Carsten Klein, and Werner Depauli-Schimanovich-Göttig, Eds. Kurt Gödel. Wahrheit & Beweisbarkeit. Band 2: Kompendium Zum Werk [Vol. 2: Compendium of Work]. Vienna: Öbv Et Hpt, 2002. Isbn 3-209-03835-X. Pp. 447. [REVIEW]Hannes Leitgeb - 2007 - Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2):245-257.
    While the Gödel centenary year 2006 triggered a lot of conference and workshop activity on Gödel, the years leading to it stand out by exhibiting several excellent publications on Gödel's life and work, most notably the completion of the Kurt Gödel Collected Works series . The two volumes of Kurt Gödel. Wahrheit & Beweisbarkeit, written in German and edited by E. Köhler et al., constitute something like the ‘German-Austrian contribution’ to this renewal of interest in Gödel's legacy, even though not (...)
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  11.  19
    Test-Tube Babies: A Guide to Moral Questions, Present Techniques and Future PossibilitiesWilliam A. W. Walters and Peter Singer, Editors Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. 165. $16.95 Cloth: $8.95 Paper - Test-Tube Women: What Future for Motherhood?Rita Arditti, Renate Duelli Klein, and Shelley Minden, Editors London: Pandora Press, 1984. Pp. X, 482. $8.95. [REVIEW]Christine Overall - 1985 - Dialogue 24 (4):728-730.
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  12.  10
    Spomenica za austrijskog filozofa Ericha Heintela; ed. H.-D. Klein u J. Reikerstofer: Philosophia parennis, E Heintel zum 80. Geburtstag, Teil 1und 2, Peter Lang, Frankfurt etc, 1993. [REVIEW]Milan Damnjanović - 1994 - Theoria 37 (4):131-132.
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  13.  4
    "Certainty: A Refutation of Skepticism" by Peter Klein. [REVIEW]Richard Foley - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (4):560.
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  14. Peter Klein: "Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism". [REVIEW]Patrick Lee - 1984 - The Thomist 48 (4):690.
     
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  15. Arbitrary Foundations? On Klein’s Objection to Foundationalism.Coos Engelsma - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):389-408.
    This paper evaluates Peter Klein’s objection to foundationalism. According to Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows arbitrariness “at the base.” I first explain that this objection can be interpreted in two ways: either as targeting dialectical foundationalism or as targeting epistemic foundationalism. I then clarify Klein’s concept of arbitrariness. An assertion or belief is assumed to be arbitrary if and only if it lacks a reason that is “objectively and subjectively available.” Drawing on this notion, I evaluate Klein’s objection. (...)
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  16. Does Klein's Infinitism Offer a Response to Agrippa's Trilemma?Stephen Wright - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1113-1130.
    The regress of reasons threatens an epistemic agent’s right to claim that any beliefs are justified. In response, Peter Klein’s infinitism argues that an infinite series of supporting reasons of the right type not only is not vicious but can make for epistemic justification. In order to resist the sceptic, infinitism needs to provide reason to think that there is at least one justified belief in the world. Under an infinitist conception this involves showing that at least one belief (...)
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  17. Knowledge, Scepticism, and Defeat: Themes From Klein.Rodrigo Borges, Branden Fitelson & Cherie Braden (eds.) - forthcoming - Springer.
    This is a collection of new essays written in honor of the work of Peter D. Klein, who has had and continues to have a tremendous influence in the development of epistemology. The essays reflect the breadth and depth of Klein’s work by engaging directly with his views and with the views of his interlocutors.
     
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  18. On the Regress Argument for Infinitism.John Turri - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):157 - 163.
    This paper critically evaluates the regress argument for infinitism. The dialectic is essentially this. Peter Klein argues that only an infinitist can, without being dogmatic, enhance the credibility of a questioned non-evident proposition. In response, I demonstrate that a foundationalist can do this equally well. Furthermore, I explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of justification. I conclude that the regress argument for infinitism should not convince us.
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  19. Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support.Daniel Howard-Snyder & E. J. Coffman - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564.
    Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
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  20. Foundationalism and Arbitrariness.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):18–24.
    Nonskeptical foundationalists say that there are basic beliefs. But, one might object, either there is a reason why basic beliefs are likely to be true or there is not. If there is, then they are not basic; if there is not, then they are arbitrary. I argue that this dilemma is not nearly as decisive as its author, Peter Klein, would have us believe.
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  21.  71
    Still a New Problem for Defeasibility: A Rejoinder to Borges.John N. Williams - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):83-94.
    I objected that the defeasibility theory of knowledge prohibits you from knowing that you know that p if your knowledge that p is a posteriori. Rodrigo Borges claims that Peter Klein has already satisfactorily answered a version of my objection. He attempts to defend Klein’s reply and argues that my objection fails because a principle on which it is based is false.I will show that my objection is not a version of the old one that Klein attempts (unsuccessfully) to (...)
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  22.  38
    Finite Reasons Without Foundations.Ted Poston - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):182-191.
    This article develops a theory of reasons that has strong similarities to Peter Klein's infinitism. The view it develops, Framework Reasons, upholds Klein's principles of avoiding arbitrariness (PAA) and avoiding circularity (PAC) without requiring an infinite regress of reasons. A view of reasons that holds that the “reason for” relation is constrained by PAA and that PAC can avoid an infinite regress if the “reason for” relation is contextual. Moreover, such a view of reasons can maintain that skepticism is (...)
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  23. Is Klein an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification?Michael Bergmann - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):19 - 24.
    This paper is a response to Peter Klein's "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning". After briefly discussing what Klein says about the requirement, for doxastic justification, that a belief be formed in the right way, I'll make the following three points: Klein's solution to the regress problem isn't an infinitist solution, Klein's position on doxastic justification faces a troubling dilemma, and Klein's objection to foundationalism fails.
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  24. Can Foundationalism Solve the Regress Problem?Declan Smithies - 2014 - In Ram Neta (ed.), Current Controversies in Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 73-94.
    This chapter has two goals: to motivate the foundationalist solution to the regress problem and to defend it against arguments from Sellars, BonJour and Klein. Both the motivation and the defence of foundationalism raise larger questions about the relationship between foundationalism and access internalism. I argue that foundationalism is not in conflict with access internalism, despite influential arguments to the contrary, and that access internalism in fact supplies a theoretical motivation for foundationalism. I conclude that foundationalism and access internalism form (...)
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  25. Defending Klein on Closure and Skepticism.E. J. Coffman - 2006 - Synthese 151 (2):257-272.
    In this paper, I consider some issues involving a certain closure principle for Structural Justification, a relation between a cognitive subject and a proposition that's expressed by locutions like 'S has a source of justification for p' and 'p is justifiable for S'. I begin by summarizing recent work by Peter Klein that advances the thesis that the indicated closure principle is plausible but lacks Skeptical utility. I then assess objections to Klein's thesis based on work by Robert Audi (...)
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  26. Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein.Carl Gillett - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):709–717.
    Foundationalist, Coherentist, Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect--all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non-repeating, chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls "Infinitism"--the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, but I will argue that he fails to address a venerable metaphysical concern about a certain type of (...)
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  27.  46
    Epistemic Infinitism and the Conditional Character of Inferential Justification.Erhan Demircioglu - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2313-2334.
    In this paper, I will present and defend an argument from the conditional character of inferential justification against the version of epistemic infinitism Klein advances. More specifically, after proposing a distinction between propositional and doxastic infinitism, which is based on a standard distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, I will describe in considerable detail the argument from conditionality, which is mainly an argument against propositional infinitism, and clarify some of its main underlying assumptions. There are various responses to be found (...)
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  28.  60
    Another Blow to Knowledge From Knowledge.Peter Murphy - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3): 311–317.
    A novel argument is offered against the following popular condition on inferential knowledge: a person inferentially knows a conclusion only if they know each of the claims from which they essentially inferred that conclusion. The epistemology of conditional proof reveals that we sometimes come to know conditionals by inferring them from assumptions rather than beliefs. Since knowledge requires belief, cases of knowing via conditional proof refute the popular knowledge from knowledge condition. It also suggests more radical cases against the condition (...)
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  29.  7
    Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein.Carl Gillett - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):709-717.
    Foundationalist, Coherentist, Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect---all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non-repeating, chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls “Infinitism”---the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, but I will argue that he fails to address a venerable metaphysical concern about a certain type of (...)
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  30.  21
    Klein on Relative Certainty.Rod Bertolet - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:271-274.
    Peter Klein claims to have explicated the notion of relative certainty and shown how it is related to the notion of absolute evidential certainty in his book Certainty. I argue that he has not succeeded at this because the account of relative certainty provided only applies to a subset of the pairs of propositions about which we make judgments of relative certainty.
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  31.  15
    Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier.Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 14 (2):175-200.
    Nós tentamos mostrar neste ensaio que as propostas anulabilistas de Peter Klein e de Marshall Swain não resolvem o problema de Gettier. Klein postula que, para qualquer contra-exemplo de tipo-Gettier, há uma proposição verdadeira que, ao ser conjugada com a evidência e de S, anula de modo legítimo a justificação de p para S. Swain postula que, para qualquer contra-exemplo de tipo-Gettier, há uma proposição verdadeira que, ao ser conjugada com o conjunto de razões R de S, anula de (...)
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  32.  3
    Klein on Relative Certainty.Rod Bertolet - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:271-274.
    Peter Klein claims to have explicated the notion of relative certainty and shown how it is related to the notion of absolute evidential certainty in his book Certainty. I argue that he has not succeeded at this because the account of relative certainty provided only applies to a subset of the pairs of propositions about which we make judgments of relative certainty.
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  33. Epistemic Closure, Skepticism and Defeasibility.Claudio Almeida - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):197-215.
    Those of us who have followed Fred Dretske's lead with regard to epistemic closure and its impact on skepticism have been half-wrong for the last four decades. But those who have opposed our Dretskean stance, contextualists in particular, have been just wrong. We have been half-right. Dretske rightly claimed that epistemic status is not closed under logical implication. Unlike the Dretskean cases, the new counterexamples to closure offered here render every form of contextualist pro-closure maneuvering useless. But there is a (...)
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  34. Infinitism, Finitude and Normativity.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):791-795.
    I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding all our beliefs. I show how resources deployed in response to the most popular objection to infinitism, the original finite-mind objection, (...)
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  35. Space-Time Dimension Problem as a Stumbling Block of Inflationary Cosmology.Rinat M. Nugayev - 2013 - In Vadim V. Kazutinsky, Elena A. Mamchur, Alexandre D. Panov & V. D. Erekaev (eds.), Metauniverse,Space,Time. Institute of Philosophy of RAS. pp. 52-73.
    It is taken for granted that the explanation of the Universe’s space-time dimension belongs to the host of the arguments that exhibit the superiority of modern (inflationary) cosmology over the standard model. In the present paper some doubts are expressed . They are based upon the fact superstring theory is too formal to represent genuine unification of general relativity and quantum field theory. Neveretheless, the fact cannot exclude the opportunity that in future the superstring theory can become more physical. Hence (...)
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  36. Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief.Avram Hiller - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (1):7-19.
    Richard Feldman and William Lycan have defended a view according to which a necessary condition for a doxastic agent to have knowledge is that the agent’s belief is not essentially based on any false assumptions. I call this the no-essential-false-assumption account, or NEFA. Peter Klein considers examples of what he calls “useful false beliefs” and alters his own account of knowledge in a way which can be seen as a refinement of NEFA. This paper shows that NEFA, even given (...)
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  37. (Hard Ernst) Corrigendum Van Brakel, J., Philosophy of Chemistry (U. Klein).Hallvard Lillehammer, Moral Realism, Normative Reasons, Rational Intelligibility, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Does Practical Deliberation, Crowd Out Self-Prediction & Peter McLaughlin - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1).
  38.  20
    680 ACKNOWLEDGMENT King, Jeff Klein, Elaine Kobes, Bernie.Angelika Kratzer, Manfred Krifka, Bill Ladusaw, Shalom Lappin, Young-Suk Lee, Harold Levin, Godehard Link, Jan Tore LCnning, Peter Ludlow & Bill Lycan - 1995 - Linguistics and Philosophy 17:679-680.
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  39.  9
    Mutilation and Reparation: Writing in Melanie Klein.Peter Lock - 1979 - Substance 8 (1):17.
  40.  6
    Peter Schmitter, Hg., Zur Theorie und Methode der Geschichtsschreibung der Linguistik.Carsten Klein - 1997 - Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 2 (1):303-311.
  41.  5
    Peter Schmitter, Hg., Zur Theorie und Methode der Geschichtsschreibung der Linguistik. [REVIEW]Carsten Klein - 1997 - Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 2 (1):303-311.
  42. Useful False Beliefs.Peter D. Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--63.
  43.  20
    Belief, Truth and Knowledge.Peter D. Klein & D. M. Armstrong - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):225.
  44. Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):297-325.
  45. Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.
    The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are tweaked. Then, (...)
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  46. Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails.Peter Klein - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213-236.
  47. What Price Coherence?Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):129 - 132.
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  48. Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of ReasonsMetaepistemology and Skepticism. [REVIEW]Peter Klein & Richard Fumerton - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919.
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his account of inferential justification.
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  49.  20
    Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):297-325.
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  50. Reply to Ginet.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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