Hobbes' philosophy of geometry was eccentric to contemporary movements and worsted in specific controversy. But he laid down stipulations defining geometry and its method which might provide a significant and workable alternative "meta-geometry". Some of these are isolated and reinterpreted here, especially those concerned with describing magnitudes, motions and quantities, and with his use of proportions. Rather than refutation of commentaries and historical rehash, the effort here is to isolate definitive texts and to offer a reinterpretation of their arguments in (...) succinct form showing their coherence and their interdependence with his other philosophic principles. (shrink)

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It is fairly usual to argue or to assume that there is a single pattern of proper scientific endeavor for the behavioral sciences. This is based, one is inclined to say, on the superb model afforded by the natural science successes of the past few hundred years and on the common method which underlies and determines that model. Consequently, a protagonist can argue that within his own science, all opposed modes of thinking are archaic, peripheral, or unscientific, while his own (...) at least prefigures fulfillment of true science. And it may even be claimed that other behavioral fields are special offshoots, subordinate provinces, or particularizations which are reducible to his favored scheme of analysis. Such diversity and disagreement as there is, it can be said, stems from either of two causes. The first is the stubbornness of men, whereby they refuse to face the facts, to employ reasoning processes properly, or to foresake sinister interests. The other is the relative immaturity of behavioral science, an immaturity which will be eliminated by patient progress. (shrink)

Uobbes calls the perfected method of “logistica.” His definitive explication method is in an inaccessible text. It relates intricately to technicalities elsewhere in his system, and it belies our accusation that he reduces other sciences to geometry by misapplying this method. This paper reprints that text, appending detailed commentary, often word by word. These annotations show (1) precise characteristics of geometrical method as Hobbes understood it, (2) specifics differentiating logistica from methods in physics, philosophi a prima, or humane studies, and (...) (4) adjustments to logico-mathematical categories which we moderns must make in order to reassess his pronouncements. Only with these modified understandings are we able to appreciate the subtlety of his formulation and to correct misapprehensions of his systematic ingenuity. (shrink)

Uobbes calls the perfected method of “logistica.” His definitive explication method is in an inaccessible text. It relates intricately to technicalities elsewhere in his system, and it belies our accusation that he reduces other sciences to geometry by misapplying this method. This paper reprints that text, appending detailed commentary, often word by word. These annotations show (1) precise characteristics of geometrical method as Hobbes understood it, (2) specifics differentiating logistica from methods in physics, philosophi a prima, or humane studies, and (...) (4) adjustments to logico-mathematical categories which we moderns must make in order to reassess his pronouncements. Only with these modified understandings are we able to appreciate the subtlety of his formulation and to correct misapprehensions of his systematic ingenuity. (shrink)

In spite of our own philosophic commitments, we often piously protest that there are a variety of possible philosophies. For we feel vague obligations to tolerate dissensions, and we hope that other people are not as foolish as our disagreements with them suggest. Hence we are forced in more reflective moments to admit that there are various modes of philosophizing and various resultant kinds of scientific endeavor. Also, in the world of modern communication we feel hampered by our lack of (...) means for understanding alternative basic intellectual schemes without writing them off too simply or turning all disagreement into polemics. But we rarely assume full responsibility for our pluralistic insights. For if we did, we should provide some classification of philosophies which is meaningful and more than a mere rhetorical propaedeutic to our own assertions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza by Michael Della RoccaWilliam SackstederMichael Della Rocca. Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp xiv + 223. Cloth, $39.95.A first virtue in elucidating any great philosopher is stating exactly the project the commentator undertakes, showing what is to be concluded, and how, and what of necessity must be omitted. Here, Della Rocca’s success is (...) exemplary.I cannot do better than to paraphrase, with running quotations, his remarkably succinct preliminaries. He undertakes two problems “crucial to Spinoza’s philosophy of mind,” first, “the requirement for having a thought about a particular object,” and second, “the traditional problem of whether or not the mind is identical with the body.” These inquiries are to be interconnected systematically by showing their dependence on Spinoza’s “denial of causal or explanatory or conceptual relations between the mental and the physical.”With exceptions I note later, the nine chapters of this book follow precisely. Chapter 1 prepares basic concepts and claims, along with formulation of the principle indicated, now called “the barrier between thought and extension.” Chapters 2 through 5 present and question Spinoza’s “theory of representation” (the first problem, as in the title) with its consequences respecting the announced principle. Chapters 7 and 8 turn to insights on “the mind-body problem” (the second problem), as illuminated by these investigations and secured by the governing principle. Della Rocca tidily exemplifies ruling expository virtues, but I question whether this very exactitude does not inhibit a needed species of escapement. Any commentator is obliged to acknowledge and detach himself from his own assumptions, from mannerisms and jargon current in the profession, from his present status or mannered tics, and from accidental skewing subsequent to current practices of language and translation. For such commitments also govern his treatment and they may often occlude his or our understanding. Let me be picky in initial illustration. [End Page 136]On pages 25f., the author correctly warns about pitfalls occasioned by lack of articles, definite or indefinite, in Latin. Thus, as he is aware, both interpretation and translation are queasy and infected with responses and glosses insinuated by demands from our own language, especially our prevailing fondness for definite articles, for solidity, univocal designation, and instantiation. So far, so good. But I invite my readers here to reflect whether Della Rocca’s own pervasive use of the definite article in the quotations I indulged in surveying his task does not distort his whole conception of that project. Momentum from the word the converts issues and verbalisms entertained into furniture of the world.Perhaps even more insidiously, Della Rocca invokes a peculiar itemization whereby recent formulations impose “at least one” and “for any x” on all quantified inferential usages. Moderns need rather liberation from membership suggestions in set theory and its associated logic. His remarks about “extension” and “intension” help, but they do not remedy modernist ineptness regarding Spinoza’s use of ipse, per se, and in se. Further, like precision obscures care about subordinate and causal differentiations. A sort of subsumed merging under a unit whole simple in nature is dear to Spinoza, though such moves are uncongenial to us.My earlier account scanted chapters 6 and 9, which also follow from the basic project, though not as tidily. Chapter 6, “Falsity,” “solves certain thorny problems” in the account of that and its opposite; Chapter 9 gathers ruling materials to shed light on “substantive monism.” Their arrangement ought to assist our perplexities about involvement and simple grasp, whereas 6 is noticeably brief and 9 sketchy. Together, they scant (rather than illuminate) subtlety in Spinoza’s investigations of intellect and its involvment in the nature of things.Expository clarity also shows in current fashions for multiple cross-references between indented and numbered claims, paraphrases, inferential premisses, and glosses by others. But beyond hiding preference for propositional reductions, and beyond hindering smooth reflection, such dismemberment prejudices against modes of reasoning tracing “some certain sort of eternity” or “what is common to all and equally in part and whole.”Efforts to work rigorously with made-up words or adapted phrases only... (shrink)