El cumplimiento de la determinación puede ser que no tenga, a su vez, determinación independientemente o indiferentemente a la determinación misma: tampoco es posible que esta posible integridad tenga parte en su absolutez de diferencia de la totalidad: en este sentido, que es sentido estrictamente interno a la misma positividad del concepto que de suyo se puede determinar también, pero no solamente, en relación a la determinación, el cumplimiento ya sea también de la determinación, puede quedarse en el signo ambiguo (...) de una no determinada dialéctica de integridad y totalidad por la cual, propiamente, se da que, de la parte de la totalidad, la eventual absolutez de su determinación corresponde a toda la integridad de la diferencia que la divide de la integridad como tal o en cuanto enteramente determinada. (shrink)

How rich should the 1% be? And, most importantly, when does the distance in economic resources between the richest citizens and ‘us’, the average citizenry, become a concern for justice? This volume explores how excessive economic inequality gives the best-off considerably more political influence than average citizens, thereby violating political equality. It argues that the gap between the best-off and the worst-off should not be reduced because it is good, but rather as an inescapable instrument to protect citizens from the (...) risk of material domination. For this reason, it defends the ‘principle of proportionality’: economic inequality should not exceed a certain range or proportion to enable both the best-off and the worst-off to be co-authors of the legal, political, and socioeconomic rules that govern the ‘social’ relations in which they are involved. Further, the book discusses material domination and explains how money influences politics and what are the remedies for this phenomenon; how social justice should face and harmonise power, poverty, efficiency, individual merit, and economic liberties; and, most importantly, how to determine income and wealth limit ratios in a liberal democracy. A thoughtful investigation on the interdependencies of money and justice and their influence our socio-political systems, this volume will be of great interest to students and researchers of political theory, political philosophy, economics and development, economics theory and philosophy, and social policy. (shrink)

This article argues about John Rawls' paradigm shift in contemporary political philosophy. In the article, this paradigm is defined as democratic insofar it claims, among other things, to leave enough room for democratic deliberations and citizens’ political autonomy. On this specific issue, Rawls and Habermas dialogue is still particularly fruitful. Both authors believe that contemporary political philosophy must be modest in some relevant theoretical and methodological aspects but they disagree on which of these aspects should be more or less modest. (...) This article argues that when we look for the legitimate boundaries of the contemporary political philosophy, Rawls and Habermas projects should be seen as closely complementary to one another. On the one hand, the article partially agrees with Habermas’ objections to Rawls that political philosophy should not be too modest in providing orientations for the normative grounds of the political justification. On the other hand, against Habermas, the article remains on Rawls's side on the idea that political philosophy cannot be agnostic regarding the substantive and distributive issues of social justice. (shrink)

The article argues that the possibility of an unlimited gap in income and wealth between the top and bottom segments of society is incompatible with a democratic commitment to political equality. T...

In the current debate on human rights, the political conception is attractive in its ability to try to find solutions to the central questions and problems, which the orthodox conception has difficulties in solving, because of its own nature it does not need a moral foundation that is independent of the recognition established by international law and practice. On the one hand, it is necessary to recognize that the current practice and the international doctrine consider human rights as tools addressed, (...) mainly, to establish the limits of the legitimate sovereignty of the state, thus, recognizing the plausibility of the political conception. On the other hand, the article intends to show that this specific function, while important, should not exhaust all that human rights perform. Therefore, the political conception runs the serious risk of weakening the normative force of human rights and conflating two different agendas, that of human rights and that of global justice. To go through this argument, first of all, the article presents the contemporary genesis of the political conception of human rights based on the work of John Rawls. Secondly, it focuses on the reformulation given by Raz and Beitz’s approaches. Finally, in the third section, I criticize three main assumptions which ground the current paradigm of political conception of human rights. (shrink)

Some scholars believe that only governments or those who uphold governmental policies can be human rights violators. Others argue that private individuals are also able to violate human rights. The two positions have come to be known in the literature as the institutional interpretation and the interactional interpretation of human rights respectively. This paper critically analyzes an exemplary case: Thomas Pogge’s institutional conception of human rights as presented in World Poverty and Human Rights: Second Edition. This paper focuses on some (...) of the negative consequences implicit in his approach. First of all, it shows that Pogge does not provide an adequate explanation of the reason why human rights should be conceived as claims on coercive social institutions and on those who uphold such institutions but not on single individuals, independently of their commitment to institutions. Secondly, it shows that official disrespect rather than violation as a criterion to evaluate the respecting of human rights is unsuccessful or at least insufficient. It sees in Pogge the same perspective mistake that infects Rawls’ conception of human rights, namely that of expanding unduly one of the functions human rights perform - establishing the limits of legitimate sovereignty - into their very essence. Therefore, this paper puts in question the way in which Pogge’s institutionalism mix the conception of human rights with the conception of distributive justice. The conclusion to which the whole paper comes to is that proponents of the institutional interpretation misconstrue human rights because they conflate two philosophical agendas, that of human rights and that of global justice. (shrink)

This paper argues that the future of capabilities approach lies on the theoretical development of the democratic political structure. For this purpose, we take into account Martha Nussbaum’s late theoretical works. Firstly, we argue that the capability approach can be divided into two main models: the top down and the bottom up. Nussbaum, for example, endorses a top-down model, which it begins from an abstractive theory of partial justice and then draws the issue of institutional implementation. On the other hand, (...) Amartya Sem advocates the bottom-up model, which starts from the immanent demands of justice from public sphere and then up to normative and abstract questions (like his “idea of justice”). In the second part of this paper, we present Nussbaum’s partial theory of justice, arguing that it is mainly composed by four issues: (a) the elaboration of the list of capabilities, (b) the process of normative evaluation, (c) arguments for stability, (d) the implementation of the model. About this last topic, we argue in the third part that the current theoretical advance of the capabilities approach lies on the issue of the democratic political structure. In other words, the future of capabilities approach depends on the interaction between its own theory and a theory of democracy. Finally, in the last section we provide a re-elaboration of Nussbaum’s threshold level of capabilities (the list) in order to make it more adherent with the democratic political structure. (shrink)

Number 13 of Dei verbum, by means of the analogy of the incarnation and the perspective of the συγκαταβασιζ, invites us to look at the vast theological and historical-salvific background against which the Word of God, expressed in human language, is outlined. The present article, first, attends to the text of Dei Verbum 13 and its treatment in various commentaries on the dogmatic constitution as well as in official texts . Next, it focuses on the συγκαταβασιζ, in its relation to (...) oικoνoμíα and θεωρια, that is, to the modality of the divine salvific intervention in history and the contemplation of God which is granted to those who receive the manifestation of the condescension of the Saviour, attested to by Scripture. Third, the article develops the theme of συγκαταβασιζ in its profound relation to God's coming to men, from a Trinitarian point of view, in the light of the Verbum abbreviatum and the verbum scriptum, in the perspective of the action of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of the faithful. The conclusions draw attention to the light that a person sees when, in the experience of his finitude, he listens to the Verbum abbreviatum which, in its συγκαταβασιζ, has become one with humanity. (shrink)

A soteriological perspective is not altogether absent in the christological hymn of Phil 2:6-11, even though the salvific value of the death and resurrection of Jesus does not receive in it special emphasis. In fact, W. Kasper and J. Moltmann - who are considered critically in the article as examples of contemporary christological/soteriological reflection - find in the hymn some hints for a soteriological reflection, which sometimes stresses a paschal perspective, sometimes an incarnational one. Both Kasper and Moltmann, however, show (...) more interest in what they must make the hymn say than in the meaning which they may discover in the hymn or receive from it. While adopting either a paschal or an incarnational perspective, this article intends to take its starting point from the meaning offered by the scriptural text, following for this the «consensus exegeticus». Two elements are brought to light in view of an implicit soteriological reflection: 1. the salvific aspect of the mystery of Christ in its entirety, from the kenosis in the incarnation to the self-emptying of the death on the cross , in Phil 2:6-8; 2. the universal salvific Lordship of Christ in Phil 2: 9-11, understood in the sense of the Lordship of Yahweh, explicitly qualified as salvific in Is 45:20-25, which is the background of the second part of the christological hymn. (shrink)

The formative events -- Bulgakov's method and sources -- Russian Mariology and Bulgakov -- Theological anthropology and Mary -- Bulgakov's Mariology -- Critics and the reception of Bulgakov's Mariology -- Conclusion.