This book takes up one of the most important themes in Chinese thought: the relation of pleasurable activities to bodily health and to the health of the body politic. Unlike Western theories of pleasure, early Chinese writings contrast pleasure not with pain but with insecurity, assuming that it is right and proper to seek and take pleasure, as well as experience short-term delight. Equally important is the belief that certain long-term relational pleasures are more easily sustained, as well as potentially (...) more satisfying and less damaging. The pleasures that become deeper and more ingrained as the person invests time and effort to their cultivation include friendship and music, sharing with others, developing integrity and greater clarity, reading and classical learning, and going home. Each of these activities is explored through the early sources (mainly fourth century BC to the eleventh century AD), with new translations of both well-known and seldom-cited texts. (shrink)

Confucius and Zhuangzi are the two most famous thinkers in all of Chinese history, aside from Laozi, the Old Master. They occupy positions in the history of Chinese thinking roughly comparable to those held by Plato and Epicurus in the Western narrative of civilisation, in that they offer visions of the engaged political life and the engaged social self to which later political theorists and ethicists invariably return. For the last century or so, if not longer, Sinologists and comparative philosophers (...) have been apt to name Confucius the ‘founder’ of a Confucian ‘school’, and Zhuangzi, one of two ‘founders’ of a rival Daoist ‘school’, despite the lack of evidence for sectarian factions in early China. What is at stake in this essay is nothing less than a recasting of the entire early history of Chinese thinking in ways both bracing and potentially troubling to modern academics. (shrink)

Despite the scathing criticisms leveled at Han philosophy by orthodox Neo-Confucians and their latter-day scholastic followers, the most accurate characterization of many extant pieces of Han philosophical writing would be "critical" (rather than "superstitious") and "probing" (rather than "derivative"). In defense of this statement, three major Han philosophical works are examined, with particular emphasis on the treatment in these works of classical tradition and classical learning. The three works are the "Fa yen" (ca. A.D. 9) by Yang Hsiung, the "Lun (...) heng" (ca. A.D. 80) by Wang Ch'ung, and the "Feng su t'ung yi" (ca. A.D. 200) by Ying Shao. All three works are profoundly critical of beliefs and practices endemic to mainstream state-sponsored Confucianism in the Han. Good reasons lead Yang Hsiung, Wang Ch'ung, and Ying Shao to employ the dialogue, rather than the expository essay. Also, the particular styles of dialogue chosen by Yang, Wang, and Ying directly relate to the specific content of their varying critiques of contemporary forms of Confucian theorizing and practice. (shrink)

We have been invited to contribute a short assessment of Levine's response to Siderits’ position in the emerging debate between "fusion philosophy" and "comparative philosophy." Perhaps a brief word is in order regarding our backgrounds: Michael Nylan is a student of early China, with strong inter-disciplinary training and interests, who has attempted work in both philosophy and translation. Martin Verhoeven is a historian by training, a translator by avocation, and a Buddhist practitioner. Both of us have committed ourselves (...) for decades to past traditions that can only be accessed through classical Chinese language, and that surely colors our views. At the same time, those views are not identical, but stereophonic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Remembering Herb FingaretteMichael Nylan (bio)Over the years, several people have remarked to me that Herb "disappeared" or "disengaged" after his retirement. His standing, at the time of his retirement, was beautifully captured in the 1999 volume Rules, Rituals, and Responsibility: Essays Dedicated to Herbert Fingarette, edited by his student Mary Bockover.But remembering Herb Fingarette, I recall the first two times I spoke with him, by email and eventually (...) in person. I wrote, while preparing the Norton Critical Edition of the Analects, the brief sketch I had devised, mainly on the basis of Confucius: The Secular as Sacred, in which I described him as a New Confucian and a pragmatist. He promptly wrote back to deny both philosophical affiliations. (Hans Sluga's remarks below suggest that Herb did not see himself as a joiner or partisan.) But I got the rest right, apparently, as my sketch of him circled around the opening to his book, a work that changed many people's lives, including those of two friends of mine, Henry Rosemont and Roger Ames:When I began to read Confucius, I found him to be a prosaic and parochial moralizer. … Later, and with increasing force, I found him a thinker with profound insight and with an imaginative vision of man equal in its grandeur to any I know. … Confucius can be a teacher to us today—a major teacher, not one who merely gives us a slightly exotic perspective on the ideas already current. He tells us things not being said elsewhere; things needing to be said. He has a new lesson to teach.1Herb's contribution in that book lay mainly in his willingness to rethink Confucius from the ground up, "to make him new." To the day before he died, that was Herb, still evolving and reformulating his thoughts. One glimpses this in "Being Ninety-Seven," the documentary about Herb that his grandson Andrew Hasse directed and edited, one short clip of which has drawn no fewer than five million views on YouTube, under the title "The Meaning of Life: A Ninety-Seven Year Old Philosopher Looks at Life."I finally met Herb on a fine spring day in 2010, some three years after he had moved to Berkeley, when Henry Rosemont, Jr. happened to be in town. Henry insisted I meet Herb, and he was plainly immensely proud of being the first to write a good review of Herb's work, which so many [End Page 857] Click for larger view View full resolutionHerbert Fingarette, 1921–2018. Photo © Thomas H. Hahn.eminent Sinologists had panned (Herb being outside the field; Herb saying something that might force a change in their ways of thinking; Herb being so clear about his ideas that there was no academic obfuscation). Herb had always been one of the few gods in my academic pantheon, and I was frankly a bit scared to meet him and sound stupid. But Henry had a genius for bringing people together, and by the end of the first meeting Herb and I were well on our way to becoming fast friends. (It didn't hurt that Herb's only child, Ann Hasse, was about to marry one of the Berkeley colleagues whom I most esteem, Erich Gruen.)A few years later, after his wife Leslie died, I asked him, after a decent interval, whether writing so powerfully about the philosophy of dying had helped him when he was confronting it in the case of Leslie, his beloved wife and astute editor. He said quietly, "Not one bit," and from then on I knew I could absolutely trust him. For such a complex man, he was also a person who embraced radical honesty and full engagement, which meant that Herb, nearly always exquisitely polite, could on rare occasions burst forth with a snarky comment, when particularly frustrated with the world or its inhabitants. He was a human being keenly aware of the responsibility that survival brought, despite the frailties encountered when going through life. One felt always that one was conversing with a lifelong seeker after truths large and small, with the result that many a time he was impatient with my tendency... (shrink)

A new translation of Liu Xiang’s 劉向 Lienü zhuan 列女傳 is long overdue.1 And most of the translation by Anne Behnke Kinney, Exemplary Women of Early China: The Lienü Zhuan of Liu Xiang, is very well done indeed. At the same time, Kinney has made a series of odd and clearly intentional choices when translating the classic, choices worth querying. Most importantly, she insists on translating the classic as if it directly addressed its readers, even if this insistence rides roughshod (...) over the language used in the text, and flies in the face of the early evidence about both the composition of the text and the literary outputs of the woman, Ban Zhao 班昭.. (shrink)

This paper explores two types of investment in the current People’s Republic of China, both of which promote fantasies about the past and future, presumably as a way to forestall uncomfortable conversations about the present. But the author is less interested in state decisions than in what makes an unofficial person “buy into” such fantasies. Her answer is, “misperceptions about tradition”, longstanding cultural preoccupations, and genuine desires to secure honor and glory in an insecure world. Her largely diagnostic paper briefly (...) considers possible responses to the question, “What, in such a dire situation, can be done to introduce more complex notions of sedimented identities?”. (shrink)

This essay takes as it subject Lunyu jindu 論語今讀, Li Zehou’s “translation” from classical into modern Chinese of one of the Four Books, a classic that long-standing tradition claims was generated within the immediate circles of Master Confucius himself. Rather than blandly touting the inherent superiority of whichever brands of Chinese or Confucian “tradition” currently meet the approval of leading PRC figures in establishment politics, academia, and the media—old Daotong 道統 truisms retrofitted for nationalistic purposes 1—Li wants to deconstruct “tradition”. (...) He wants to return our attention to aspects of... (shrink)

This essay provides an overview of the prescriptions advanced by the Han-era Documents classic, since it was indisputably the Documents that served as the chief guide to political philosophy in the early empires for members of the elite with the requisite high cultural learning. It presents the authoritative pronouncements of the Documents on a number of key issues, such as, Who has the legitimacy to rule? How shall the good ruler and his officials act to retain legitimacy? What is the (...) best form of government? How are punishments to be applied? How are taxes and tribute, domestic and foreign policy, to be administered? It prescribes actions to further the virtues of foresightedness, compassion, and fairness. (shrink)

This essay argues that the Guodian citations relating to the Documents classic, when read together with other evidence regarding early manuscript cultures in China, contradict the dominant scholarly view in the present-day People’s Republic of China, which imagines not only a single Urtext for the pre-Qin Documents classic, but also a single textual community familiar with the same masterworks and Classics across the entire swathe of land held by the modern nation-state of China. Contrary to this view, the early transmission (...) of manuscripts, both oral and transcribed, generated multiple variants that allowed small textual communities to adapt their authoritative texts to local concerns and agendas and current affairs. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Transformations of the Confucian Way, and: Histoire de la pensáe chinoiseMichael NylanTransformations of the Confucian Way. By John H. Berthrong. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998. Pp. xiv + 250.Histoire de la pensáe chinoise. By Anne Cheng. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1997. Pp. 650.Reviewing bad books, W. H. Auden once observed, is bad for the character. On the assumption that the reverse must also be true, I am delighted (...) to review not one, but two good books: John H. Berthrong's Transformations of the Confucian Way and Anne Cheng's Histoire de la pensáe chinoise. Each contributes significantly—though differently—to our appreciation of the long history of classical learning in China. [End Page 632]Berthrong, in seven chapters and 250 pages, neatly summarizes the main developments of what he calls the "Confucian Way." As a teaching tool for undergraduates and nonspecialists, the book's strong appeal is based on three factors: (1) the coherence of its narrative (no mean feat for a book covering over 2,500 years of the Way); (2) the respectful approach that it brings to intellectual traditions and the controversies they have engendered over time; and (3) the case that it urges for the relevance of the Confucian Way today to life outside the classroom and outside China. To achieve such coherence, Berthrong divides his story into seven manageable units spanned by "six paradigmatic historical transformations of the Confucian Tradition" (p. 6): (1) the rise of the Confucian tradition in Zhou China; (2) the canonization of the Confucian Classics in Han times; (3) "the defense of the [Confucian] faith" during the third through the tenth centuries; (4) the Neo-Confucian Revival in the Song; (5) reactions to Song Neo-Confucianism in "the turn toward the mind," epitomized by Wang Yangming (1472-1529); (6) the late empires of Qing China, Tokugawa Japan, and Yi/Chosŏn Korea; and (7) Confucianism in the modern world.Berthrong has chosen a sensible approach to his sprawling history, whose scope would leave most scholars cowering. He judiciously draws upon the best scholarship available on each of the transformations (giving full credit where it is due), with the result that even beginning students can quickly gain a sense not only of the important debates in the long history of classical learning but also of prominent scholars working in the field today. As a master of the declarative sentence, Berthrong has no trouble writing the bridging paragraphs required to situate his thinkers neatly within the broader historical trends that Confucian morality has shaped, reflected, or been changed by. His afterword devoted to "Further Readings and Contentious Issues" then leads readers responsibly outside the book to larger worlds, broaching difficult topics with sensibility and grace. Without hesitation, then, I would recommend that this book be assigned in all manner of undergraduate courses, in "rice paddies" as well as in courses on comparative thought and Chinese history— though I would have my own students think of it as an intellectual history of East Asia, not as a history of the Confucian Way (a point to which I return below).To communicate his respect, Berthrong seeks to illustrate "the complexity of the vision, life, conduct, meditation, conflict, compromise, and creativity that is hidden by the generalization of the word 'Confucianism'" (p. 7). To Berthrong's way of thinking, the death of "scriptural Confucianism" (Mark Elvin's phrase) notwithstanding, a tradition so protean in its transformations and so compelling in its advocacy of full humanity (ren) should find a way to renew itself in the near future—especially when his set of thinkers have at least as much light to shed on the philosophical problems encountered by humans as their counterparts among the philosophical masters of Europe and America. Berthrong is therefore at his very best when discussing xing (human nature), li (principle), and xin (heart/mind), comparing and contrasting the epistemology of Shao Yong (1011-1077), the cosmological speculations of Zhou Dunyi (1017-1073), the Cheng brothers on mind and principle (li), or the ruminations on sagehood by Wang Yangming (1472-1529).While such discussions richly convey to even the beginning student of Chinese [End Page 633] thought... (shrink)

Mark Siderits, Michael Nylan and Martin Verhoeven were invited to respond to Michael Levine’s discussion paper ‘Does Comparative Philosophy Have a Fusion Future?’ This paper documents Levine’s reply to their responses.

In this vast and ambitious tome, Michael Nylan aims to "trace the evolution of pleasure theories in early China over the course of a millennium and a half", roughly from 400 BCE to 1100 CE. This involves dissecting the discourse surrounding a single graph, le 樂, which Nylan translates as pleasure, and actively distinguishes from other states such as happiness and joy. Nylan understands such pleasure as "deeper satisfactions" realized in long-term commitments and often relational in (...) nature. In texts, pleasure is often associated with "objects of consequence" such as intimate friends, Heaven, graceful and charismatic acts and family profession or heritage (p.... (shrink)

This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author rebuts all the major objections to this theory and shows that the alternative theories about the nature of ethics all face grave difficulties.

The first edition of The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy took the dialogue of science and philosophy from Aristotle through to Newton. This second edition adds eight chapters, taking the dialogue through the Enlightenment and up to Darwin. This anthology is an attempt to help bridge the gap between the history of science and the history of philosophy.

Part I: The representation of life -- Can life be given a real definition? -- The representation of the living individual -- The representation of the life-form itself -- Part II: Naive action theory -- Types of practical explanation -- Naive explanation of action -- Action and time -- Part III: Practical generality -- Two tendencies in practical philosophy -- Practices and dispositions as sources of the goodness of individual actions -- Practice and disposition as sources of individual action.

Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...) on scientific or theoretical beliefs as the ideal, insist that such awareness is required for justification. Externalists, who think children's ordinary beliefs in obvious facts are paradigm cases of justified belief, say it isn't required. Michael Bergmann's book offers a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism. (shrink)

Externalist theories of justification create the possibility of cases in which everything appears to one relevantly similar with respect to two propositions, yet one proposition is justified while the other is not. Internalists find this difficult to accept, because it seems irrational in such a case to affirm one proposition and not the other. The underlying internalist intuition supports a specific internalist theory, Phenomenal Conservatism, on which epistemic justification is conferred by appearances.

At the University of Sheffield during 2011 and 2012, a leading group of philosophers, psychologists, and others gathered to explore the nature and significance of implicit bias. The two volumes of Implicit Bias and Philosophy emerge from these workshops. Each volume philosophically examines core areas of psychological research on implicit bias as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology is comprised of two parts: “The Nature of Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, (...) and Stereotype Threat,” and “Skepticism, Social Knowledge, and Rationality.” The first part contains chapters examining the relationship between implicit attitudes and “dual process” models of the mind; the role of affect in the formation and change of implicit associations; the unity (or disunity) of implicit attitudes; whether implicit biases are mental states at all; and whether performances on stereotype-relevant tasks are automatic and unconscious or intentional and strategic. The second part contains chapters examining implicit bias and skepticism; the effects of implicit bias on scientific research; the accessibility of social stereotypes in epistemic environments; the effects of implicit bias on the self-perception of members of stigmatized social groups as rational agents; the role of gender stereotypes in philosophy; and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning. (shrink)

In this engaging and spirited text, Michael Lynch argues that truth does matter, in both our personal and political lives. He explains that the growing cynicism over truth stems in large part from our confusion over what truth is.

Dignity plays a central role in current thinking about law and human rights, but there is sharp disagreement about its meaning. Combining conceptual precision with a broad historical background, Michael Rosen puts these controversies in context and offers a novel, constructive proposal. “Penetrating and sprightly...Rosen rightly emphasizes the centrality of Catholicism in the modern history of human dignity. His command of the history is impressive...Rosen is a wonderful guide to the recent German constitutional thinking about human dignity...[Rosen] is in (...) general an urbane and witty companion, achieving his aim of accessibly written philosophy.” —Samuel Moyn, The Nation “[An] elegant, interesting and lucid exploration of the concept of dignity...Drawing on classical, liberal and Catholic traditions, Rosen hopes to rehabilitate dignity to its rightful place near the centre of moral thought...Rosen's admirable book deserves wide attention from political theorists, jurisprudes and political philosophers.” —Simon Blackburn, Times Higher Education “Dignity deserves to be widely read, not only for its intrinsic interest, but also as a corrective to the habit of discussing such topics in abstraction from their social context. Whether or not one agrees with Rosen's arguments, there can be no doubt he has widened our horizons.” —Rae Langton, Times Literary Supplement. (shrink)

Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief—the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss.

edition (unseen), $12.95. traditions, bringing into being new modes of understanding. Paper Anthropology, and particularly ethnography, is torn between two quests, one to capture the diversity of social life and the other to discover universal principles structuring that diversity. Jackson examines these quests within the context of ethnographic fieldwork, focusing on the relationship between ethnographers and the people they study. He is concerned with defining the anthropological project as something more than the projection of the anthropologist's traditions and concerns onto (...) an alien culture. Rather, he would have the project open a genuine dialogue between people from different cultures or Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

At the heart of ethics reside the concepts of good and bad; they are at work when we assess whether a person is virtuous or vicious, an act right or wrong, a decision defensible or indefensible, a goal desirable or undesirable. But there are many varieties of goodness and badness. At their core lie intrinsic goodness and badness, the sort of value that something has for its own sake. It is in virtue of intrinsic value that other types of value (...) may be understood, and hence that we can begin to come to terms with questions of virtue and vice, right and wrong, and so on. This book investigates the nature of intrinsic value: just what it is for something to be valuable for its own sake, just what sort of thing can have such value, just how such a value is to be computed. In the final chapter, the fruits of this investigation are applied to a discussion of pleasure, pain, and displeasure and also of moral virtue and vice, in order to determine just what value lies within these phenomena. (shrink)

While philosophers hold that it is patently absurd to blame robots or hold them morally responsible [1], a series of recent empirical studies suggest that people do ascribe blame to AI systems and robots in certain contexts [2]. This is disconcerting: Blame might be shifted from the owners, users or designers of AI systems to the systems themselves, leading to the diminished accountability of the responsible human agents [3]. In this paper, we explore one of the potential underlying reasons for (...) robot blame, namely the folk's willingness to ascribe inculpating mental states or "mens rea" to robots. In a vignette-based experiment (N=513), we presented participants with a situation in which an agent knowingly runs the risk of bringing about substantial harm. We manipulated agent type (human v. group agent v. AI-driven robot) and outcome (neutral v. bad), and measured both moral judgment (wrongness of the action and blameworthiness of the agent) and mental states attributed to the agent (recklessness and the desire to inflict harm). We found that (i) judgments of wrongness and blame were relatively similar across agent types, possibly because (ii) attributions of mental states were, as suspected, similar across agent types. This raised the question - also explored in the experiment - whether people attribute knowledge and desire to robots in a merely metaphorical way (e.g., the robot "knew" rather than really knew). However, (iii), according to our data people were unwilling to downgrade to mens rea in a merely metaphorical sense when given the chance. Finally, (iv), we report a surprising and novel finding, which we call the inverse outcome effect on robot blame: People were less willing to blame artificial agents for bad outcomes than for neutral outcomes. This suggests that they are implicitly aware of the dangers of overattributing blame to robots when harm comes to pass, such as inappropriately letting the responsible human agent off the moral hook. (shrink)