This book provides both an introduction to the philosophy of scientific modeling and a contribution to the discussion and clarification of two recent philosophical conceptions of models: artifactualism and fictionalism. These can be viewed as different stances concerning the standard representationalist account of scientific models. By better understanding these two alternative views, readers will gain a deeper insight into what a model is as well as how models function in different sciences. Fictionalism has been a traditional epistemological stance related to (...) antirealist construals of laws and theories, such as instrumentalism and inferentialism. By contrast, the more recent fictional view of models holds that scientific models must be conceived of as the same kind of entities as literary characters and places. This approach is essentially an answer to the ontological question concerning the nature of models, which in principle is not incompatible with a representationalist account of the function of models. The artifactual view of models is an approach according to which scientific models are epistemic artifacts, whose main function is not to represent the phenomena but rather to provide epistemic access to them. It can be conceived of as a non-representationalist and pragmatic account of modeling, which does not intend to focus on the ontology of models but rather on the ways they are built and used for different purposes. The different essays address questions such as the artifactual view of idealization, the use of information theory to elucidate the concepts of abstraction and idealization, the deidealization of models, the nature of scientific fictions, the structural account of representation and the ontological status of structures, the role of surrogative reasoning with models, and the use of models for explaining and predicting physical phenomena. (shrink)

This article aims to present a Free Dialogic Logic [FDL] as a general framework for hypothesis generation in the practice of modelling in science. Our proposal is based on the idea that the inferential function that models fulfil during the modelling process (surrogate reasoning) should be carried out without ontological commitments. The starting point to achieve our objective is that the scientific consideration of models without a target is a symptom that, on the one hand, the Applicability of Logic should (...) be considered among the conditions of adequacy that should take into account all modeling process and, on the other, that the inferential apparatus at the base of the surrogate reasoning process must be rid of realistic assumptions that lead to erroneous conclusions. In this sense, we propose as an alternative an ontologically neutral inferential system in the perspective of dialogical pragmatism. (shrink)

En este artículo delineamos una propuesta para elaborar una lógica de las ficciones desde el enfoque lúdico del pragmatismo dialógico. En efecto, centrados en una de las críticas mayores al enfoque clásico de la lógica: la esquizofrenia estructural de su semántica, recorremos los compromisos ontológicos de las dos tradiciones mayores de la lógica para establecer sus posibilidades y límites en el análisis del discurso ficcional, y la superación desde una perspectiva lúdico pragmática.

El objetivo de este artículo es proponer una justificación lógica del proceso de razonamiento sustitutivo en la práctica del modelado en ciencia. Para ello, definimos la generación de hipótesis como la creación de un diálogo interactivo y formal entre el modelo y el sistema objetivo. Para describir esta idea desde un punto de vista lógico, nos basaremos en el enfoque pragmático de la Dialógica como marco ideal para ilustrar las interacciones lógicas.

Recent literature on dialogical logic discusses the case of tonk and the notion harmony in the context of a rule-based theory of meaning. Now, since the publications of those papers, a dialogical version of constructive type theory has been developed. The aim of the present paper is to show that, from the dialogical point of view, the harmony of the CTT-rules is the consequence of a more fundamental level of meaning characterized by the independence of players. We hope that the (...) following paper will contribute to a better understanding of the dialogical notion of meaning. (shrink)

En el presente artículo reflexionamos en torno a qué significa, a partir de un modelo, generar hipótesis sobre los fenómenos. Swoyer define esto último como razonamiento sustituto (1991, p. 449) y creemos que presenta desafíos que es necesario confrontar. En nuestro artículo nos detendremos en uno que creemos de la mayor relevancia: el carácter inferencial de la _sustitución_ que opera entre el modelo y su sistema objetivo.

In this paper we argue, from an inferential approach, that the inferential role played by a model, during modeling practice, is independent of the notion of representation engaged with the chosen modeling approach. Indeed, we believe that the notion of surrogative reasoning is neither subsidiary nor founded on the notion of representation and that it will only find its foundations in logic itself. Neither the notion of representation is an inferential notion nor FIM is a type of representation-based thinking.

Nuestro objetivo es analizar críticamente el enfoque de la noción de modelo de Alfred Tarski que Patrick Suppes integra en su concepción semanticista de las teorías científicas. En efecto, mostraremos cómo esta noción se configura en Suppes (1969; 1970) desde una revisión formal de la noción de modelo en Tarski (1936), focalizando nuestro análisis en tres ejes principales: i) una crítica a la perspectiva estática del semanticismo; ii) un análisis de las condiciones restrictivas y el lenguaje para la axiomatización de (...) teorías; y iii) la revisión de las nociones de ‘sistema axiomático’, ‘sistema formal’ y ‘método axiomático’. (shrink)

The development of philosophical ideas throughout history has sometimes been assisted by the use of handcrafted instruments. Some paradigmatic cases, such as the invention of the telescope or the microscope, show that many philosophical approaches have been the result of the intervention of such instruments. The aim of this article is to show the determining role that stringed musical instruments with frets had in the crisis and generation of philosophical paradigms. In fact, just as the observations of the moon with (...) the telescope broke more than a thousand years of Aristotelian hegemony, the fretted string instruments, predecessors of the guitar, played a central role in the collapse of one of the most influential approaches in the history of Philosophy: Pythagorism. We focus on the fundamental hallmarks of Pythagorism and on how, during the 16th century and from the fretted string instruments, the mathematical-musical notion of equal temperament emerged, which from the middle of the 19th century will be established as the prevailing philosophical-musical paradigm of the West. (shrink)

The development of philosophical ideas throughout history has sometimes been assisted by the use of handcrafted instruments. Some paradigmatic cases, such as the invention of the telescope or the microscope, show that many philosophical approaches have been the result of the intervention of such instruments. The aim of this article is to show the determining role that stringed musical instruments with frets had in the crisis and generation of philosophical paradigms. In fact, just as the observations of the moon with (...) the telescope broke more than a thousand years of Aristotelian hegemony, the fretted string instruments, predecessors of the guitar, played a central role in the collapse of one of the most influential approaches in the history of Philosophy: Pythagorism. We focus on the fundamental hallmarks of Pythagorism and on how, during the 16th century and from the fretted string instruments, the mathematical-musical notion of equal temperament emerged, which from the middle of the 19th century will be established as the prevailing philosophical-musical paradigm of the West. (shrink)

This paper aims to propose an inferential and dynamic approach to understanding with models in biology. Understanding plays a central role in the practice of modeling. From its links with the other two central elements of scientific research, experimentation, and explanation, we show its epistemic relevance to the case of explanation in biology. Furthermore, by including the notion of understanding, we propose a non-referentialist perspective on scientific models, which is determined by their use.

This paper aims to propose an inferential and dynamic approach to understanding with models in biology. Understanding plays a central role in the practice of modeling. From its links with the other two central elements of scientific research, experimentation, and explanation, we show its epistemic relevance to the case of explanation in biology. Furthermore, by including the notion of understanding, we propose a non-referentialist perspective on scientific models, which is determined by their use.

The aim of this paper is to propose the notion of dialogical assertion as a minimal unit of knowledge in the frame of dialogical pragmatism. We argue that this minimal unity is the dialogue for the p thesis, accompanied by its game of giving and asking for reasons for a winning strategy for the proponent. Thereby, we explore the problem from the semantic framework proposed by Shahid Rahman to present a dialogical definition of that concept. Furthermore, we show how the (...) notion of proposition ceases to be the primordial logical concept and how it is replaced by the notion of assertion as an act in the process of a dialogue game and following the fundamental insights of Brandom and Martin-Löf. This pragmatic approach to logic will abandon the idea that the proposition is the minimum logical unit of true knowledge. (shrink)

Recent literature on dialogical logic discusses the case of tonk and the notion harmony in the context of a rule-based theory of meaning. Now, since the publications of those papers, a dialogical version of constructive type theory (CTT) has been developed. The aim of the present paper is to show that, from the dialogical point of view, the harmony of the CTT- rules is the consequence of a more fundamental level of meaning characterized by the independence of players. We hope (...) that the following paper will contribute to a better understanding of the dialogical notion of meaning.La bibliografía reciente sobre lógica dialógica, estudia el caso de tonk y la noción de armonia en el contexto de una teoría del significado basado en reglas. Ahora bien, desde la publicación de tales textos, la teoría dialógica ha sido vinculada con la Teoría Constructiva de Tipos (CTT). El objetivo principal del presente artículo es mostrar que, desde un punto de vista dialógico, la armonía de las reglas de la CTT es consecuencia de un nivel más fundamental de significado caracterizado por la independencia de los jugadores. Esperamos que el presente trabajo contribuya a una mejor comprensión de la nocion dialógica de significado. (shrink)

A brief examination of the most recent literature in philosophy of science shows that a host of research in this area studies the fictionalist approach to scientific models and related approaches such as van Fraassen's latest book (2008) on scientific representation. Van Fraassen's idea, to put it bluntly, relies on the idea that measurement is the main instrument by the means of which natural sciences achieve the representation aims expressed by scientific models. Moreover, if scientific knowledge is associated with the (...) deployment of some kind of explicative power, this power is closely related to the representation devices developed between the 17 th and 18 th century, when these were conceived as involving specific forms of measurement: measurement locates the target in a theoretically constructed logical space (van Fraassen 2008, p.2). The main objective of our talk is to delve into the logical features of such kind of approaches: the point is to understand the location-mechanism. On one hand we will follow a seminal idea of Olsson and Westlund (2006) that proposed to add to a scientific model a set of open questions (its scientific agenda), and on the other, we will deploy a recent proposal of Rahman/Redmond (2015) to conceive objects of models as functions (dependent-proof objects) of hypothetical judgments as formulated in the frame of constructive type theory. Against such a background, the point is how to relate those functions with the purported targets of the scientific model they constitute. Our main claim is that this achieved by a mapping. The specification mechanism of such a mapping, we claim, is related to those questions that constitute the agenda of the underlying theory and more particularly to the questions related to the relevant measurement theory. (shrink)

While discussing his notion of objective knowledge Popper introduces the idea of dispensability of knowing subjects, the autonomy of knowledge and the argumentative function of language. The main claim of our paper is that, on our view, objective knowledge produced by argumentative interaction is not achieved by dispensing knowing subjects but by differentiating between the play and the strategic levels of argumentation, where a distinction should be drawn between a particular concrete knowing subject engaged in that interaction, say Karl, and (...) an arbitrary one. Moreover, the theory of meaning deployed at the level of plays, the so-called local meaning, provides already some kind of objective knowledge, since it is player-independent and it does not reduce to the purely logical one of the strategy level. In fact, despite our criticism we think that Popper's discussion of the notion objective knowledge still deserves to be reflected on, particularly so in view of new results concerning the formalization of Brouwer’s Creating Subject and the dialogical interpretation of the notion of epistemic assumption. (shrink)

The main aim of the present paper is to show, by means of a dialogical study, that the notion of judgemental equality of Constructive Type Theory, which in this theory furnishes the criterion of identity of a type, can be understood from the game-theoretical point of view as the result of a specific form of dialogical interaction governed by the development rule known as formal rule or Socratic rule, which prescribes the use of copy-cat moves. It will be shown, as (...) an example, how to develop the core of a winning strategy for Per Martin-Löf’s demonstration of the Axiom of Choice, who based his proof in the judgemental equality between the function in the antecedent and the function occurring in the consequent of the axiom. (shrink)

Mediante un estudio dialógico de la noción de igualdad definicional de la teoría constructiva de tipos, se mostrará que tal igualdad, que en la TCT provee el criterio de identidad asociado a un tipo, puede comprenderse, desde el punto de vista lúdico, como resultado de una forma específica de interacción dialógica regida por la regla formal, más conocida recientemente como la regla socrática, que prescribe el uso de jugadas de espejo. Esto se ilustrará con el desarrollo dialógico de las partes (...) esenciales de la demostración del axioma de elección de Per Martin-Löf, quien basó su prueba en la igualdad definicional entre la función que prueba el antecedente y la función que ocurre en el consecuente. (shrink)

Recent work on the development of a dialogical approach to the logic of fiction stresses the notion of existence as choice. Moreover, this approach to existence has been combined with the notion of ontolog-ical dependence as deployed by A. Thomasson’s artifactual theory of fiction. In order to implement such a combination within the dialogical frame several predicates of ontological dependence have been de-fined. However, the definition of such predicates seems to lean on a model-theoretic semantics for mod-al logic after all. (...) The main aim of the present paper is to set a dialogical frame for the study of fictions in the context of the dialogical approach of CTT recently developed by S. Rahman and N. Clerbout where a fully-interpreted language is unfolded. We will herewith develop the idea that in such a setting fiction-al entities are understood as hypothetical objects, that is, objects (functions) the existence of which is dependent upon one or more hypotheses that restrict the scope of choices available. We will finish the paper by suggesting that this provides both a natural and genuinely dialogical way to understand R. Frigg’s take on scientific models as fictions and a new perspective on Thomasson’s notion of generic ontological dependence. Keywords: fiction, dialogues, dialogical logic, hypothetical objects, scientific models. (shrink)

With this volume of the series Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science edited by S. Rahman et al. a challenging dialogue is being continued. The series’ first volume argued that one way to recover the connections between logic, philosophy of sciences, and sciences is to acknowledge the host of alternative logics which are currently being developed. The present volume focuses on four key themes. First of all, several chapters unpack the connection between knowledge and epistemology with particular focus on (...) the notion of knowledge as resulting from interaction. Secondly, new epistemological perspectives on linguistics, the foundations of mathematics and logic, physics, biology and law are a subject of analysis. Thirdly, several chapters are dedicated to a discussion of Constructive Type Theory and more generally of the proof-theoretical notion of meaning.Finally, the book brings together studies on the epistemic role of abduction and argumentation theory, both linked to non-monotonic approaches to the dynamics of knowledge. (shrink)

PREFACEProf. Göran Sundholm of Leiden University inspired the group of Logic at Lille and Valparaíso to start a fundamental review of the dialogical conception of logic by linking it to constructive type logic. One of Sundholm's insights was that inference can be seen as involving an implicit interlocutor. This led to several investigations aimed at exploring the consequences of joining winning strategies to the proof-theoretical conception of meaning. The leading idea is, roughly, that while introduction rules lay down the conditions (...) under which a winning strategy for the Proponent may be built, the elimination rules lay down those elements of the Opponent's assertions that the Proponent has the right to use for building winning strategy. It is the pragmatic and ethical features of obligations and rights that naturally lead to the dialogical interpretation of natural deduction.During the Visiting Professorship of Prof. Sundholm at Lille in (2012) the group of Lille started delving into the ways of implementing Per Martin-Löf's Constructive Type Theory with the dialogical perspective. In particular, Aarne Ranta's (1988) paper, the first publication on the subject, was read and discussed during Sundholm’s seminar. The discussions strongly suggested that the game-theoretical conception of quantifiers as deploying interdependent moves provide a natural link between CTT and dialogical logic. This idea triggered several publications by the group of Lille in collaboration with Nicolas Clerbout and Juan Redmond at the University of Valparaíso, including the publication of the book (2015) by Clerbout / Rahman that provides a systematic development of this way of linking CTT and the dialogical conception of logic. However the Clerbout / Rahman book was written from the CTT perspective on dialogical logic, rather than the other way round. The present book should provide the perspective from the other side of the dialogue between the Dialogical Framework and Constructive Type Theory. The main idea of our present study is that Sundholm's (1997) notion of epistemic assumption is closely linked to the Copy-Cat Rule or Socratic Rule that distinguishes the dialogical framework from other game-theoretical approaches. One way to read the present book is as a further development of Sundholm’s extension of Austin's (1946, p. 171) remark on acts of assertion to inference. Indeed, Sundholm (2013, p. 17) gave the following forceful formulation: When I say therefore, I give others my authority for asserting the conclusion, given theirs for asserting the premisses.Per Martin-Löf, in recent lectures, have utilized the dialogical perspective on epistemic assumptions to get out of a certain circle that threatens the explanation of the notions of inference and demonstration. A demonstration may be explained as a chain of (immediate) inferences starting from no premisses. That an inference J1... Jn—————Jis valid means that the conclusion J can be made evident on the assumption that J1, …, Jn are known. The notion of epistemic assumption thus enters in the explanation of valid inference. We cannot, however, in this explanation understand 'known' in the sense of demonstrated, for then we are explaining the notion of inference in terms of demonstration, whereas demonstration has been explained in terms of inference. Martin-Löf suggests that we here understand 'known' in the sense of asserted, so that epistemic assumptions are judgements others have made, judgements for which others have taken the responsibility; that the inference is valid then means that, given that others have taken responsbility for the premisses, I can take responsibility for the conclusion:The circularity problem is this: if you define a demonstration to be a chain of immediate inferences, then you are defining demonstration in terms of inference. Now we are considering an immediate inference and we are trying to give a proper explanation of that; but, if that begins by saying: Assume that J1, …, Jn have been demonstrated – then you are clearly in trouble, because you are about to explain demonstration in terms of the notion of immediate inference, hence when you are giving an account of the notion of immediate inference, the notion of demonstration is not yet at your disposal. So, to say: Assume that J1, …, Jn have already been demonstrated, makes you accusable of trying to explain things in a circle. The solution to this circularity problem, it seems to me now, comes naturally out of this dialogical analysis. […]The solution is that the premisses here should not be assumed to be known in the qualified sense, that is, to be demonstrated, but we should simply assume that they have been asserted, which is to say that others have taken responsibility for them, and then the question for me is whether I can take responsibility for the conclusion. So, the assumption is merely that they have been asserted, not that they have been demonstrated. That seems to me to be the appropriate definition of epistemic assumption in Sundholm's sense. One of the main tenets of the present study is that the further move of relating the Socratic Rule rule with judgemental equality provides both a simpler and more direct way to implement the constructive type theoretical approach within the dialogical framework. Such a reconsideration of the Socratic Rule, roughly speaking, amounts to the following. 1.A move from P that brings-forward a play-object in order to defend an elementary proposition A can be challenged by O. 2.The answer to such a challenge, involves P bringing forward a definitional equality that expresses the fact that the play-object chosen by P copies the one O has chosen while positing A. For short, the equality expresses at the object-languaje level that the defence of P relies on the authority given to O to be able to produce the play-objects she brings forward. More generally, according to this view, a definitional equality established by P and brought forward while defending the proposition A, expresses the equality between a play-object (introduced by O) and the instruction for building a play-object deployed by O while affirming A. So it can be read as a computation rule that indicates how to compute O's instructions. Let us recall that from the strategic point of view, O's moves correspond to elimination rules of demonstrations. Thus, the dialogical rules that prescribe how to introduce a definitional equality – correspond – at the strategic level – to the definitional equality rules for CTT as applied to the selector-functions involved in the elimination rules. So, what we are doing here is extending the dialogical interpretation of Sundholm's epistemic assumption to the rules that set up the definitional equality of a type.The present work is structured in the following way:•In the Introduction we state the main tenets that guide our book•Chapter II contains a brief overview of Constructive Type Theory penned by Ansten Klev with exercises and their solutions. •Chapter III offers a novel presentation of the dialogical conception of logic. In fact, the first two sections of the chapter provide an overview of standard dialogical logic – including solved exercises, slightly adapted to the content of the present volume. The rest of the sections develop a new dialogical approach to Constructive Type Theory. •Chapters IV and V contain the main body of our study, namely the relation between the Socratic Rule, epistemic assumptions, and equality. The chapter provides the reader with thoroughly worked out examples with comments. •After the Final Remarks the book containsa.An appendix containing a an overview of all the rules for the new formulation of dialogical approach to constructive type theory developed in the book; b.a brief outline of Per Martin-Löf's informal presentation of the demonstration of the axiom of choice.c.two examples of a tree-shaped graph of an extensive strategy. Acknowledgments: Many thanks to Mark van Atten (Paris1), Giuliano Bacigalupo (Zürich), Charles Zacharie Bowao (Univ. Ma Ngouabi de Brazzaville, Congo), Christian Berner (Lille3), Michel Crubellier (Lille3), Pierre Cardascia (Lille3), Oumar Dia (Dakar), Marcel Nguimbi ((Univ. Marien Ngouabi de Brazzaville, Congo), Adjoua Bernadette Dango (Lille3 / Alassane Ouattara de Bouaké, Côte d'Ivoire), Steephen Rossy Eckoubili (Lille3), Johan Georg Granström (Zürich), Gerhard Heinzmann (Nancy2), Muhammad Iqbal (Lille3), Matthieu Fontaine (Lille3), Radmila Jovanovic (Belgrad), Hanna Karpenko (Lille3), Laurent Keiff (Lille3), Sébastien Magnier (Saint Dennis, Réunion), Clément Lion (Lille3), Gildas Nzokou (Libreville), Fachrur Rozie (Lille3), Helge Rückert (Mannheim), Mohammad Shafiei (Paris1), and Hassan Tahiri (Lisbon), for rich interchanges, suggestions on the main claims of the present study and proof-reading of specific sections of the text. Special thanks to Gildas Nzokou (Libreville), Steephen Rossy Eckoubili (Lille3) and Clément Lion (Lille3), with whom a Pre-Graduate Textbook in French on dialogical logic and CTT is in the process of being worked out – during the visiting-professorship in 2016 of the former. Eckoubili is the author of the sections on exercises for dialogical logic, Nzokou cared of those involving the development of CTT-demonstrations out of winning-strategies. Special thanks also to Ansten Klev (Prague) for helping with technical details and conceptual issues on CTT, particularly so as author of the chapter introducing CTT. (shrink)

The traditional Square of Opposition consists of four sentence types. Two are universal and two particular; two are affirmative and two negative. Examples, where ‘S’ and ‘P’ designate the subject and the predicate, are: ‘every S is P’, ‘no S is P’, ‘some S is P’ and ‘some S is not P’. Taking the usual sentences of the square of opposition, quantifying over their predicates exhibits non-standard sentence forms. These sentences may be combined into non-standard Squares of Opposition , and (...) they reveal a new relationship not found in the usual Square. Medieval logicians termed ‘disparatae’ pairs of sentences like ‘every S is some P’ and ‘some S is every P’, which are neither subaltern nor contrary, neither contradictory nor subcontrary. Walter Redmond has designed a special language L to express the logical form of these sentences in a precise way. I will use this language to show how Squares of Opposition, standard and non-standard, form a complex network of relations which bring to .. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that if an agent acts intentionally, she must know what she is doing. Although the scholarly consensus for many years was to reject the thesis in light of presumed counterexamples by Donald Davidson, several scholars have recently argued that attention to aspectual distinctions and the practical nature of this knowledge shows that these counterexamples fail. In this paper I defend a new objection against the thesis, one modelled after Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. Since this argument relies on (...) general principles about the nature of knowledge rather than on intuitions about fringe cases, the recent responses that have been given to defuse the force of Davidson’s objection are silent against it. Moreover, the argument suggests that even weaker theses connecting practical entities with knowledge are also false. Recent defenders of the thesis that there is a necessary connection between knowledge and intentional action are motivated by the insight that this connection is non-accidental. I close with a positive proposal to account for the non-accidentality of this link without appeal to necessary connections by drawing an extended analogy between practical and perceptual knowledge. (shrink)

Evidentialism and Reliabilism are two of the main contemporary theories of epistemic justification. Some authors have thought that the theories are not incompatible with each other, and that a hybrid theory which incorporates elements of both should be taken into account. More recently, other authors have argued that the resulting theory is well- placed to deal with fine-grained doxastic attitudes (credences). In this paper I review the reasons for adopting this kind of hybrid theory, paying attention to the case of (...) credences and the notion of probability involved in their treatment. I argue that the notion of probability in question can only be an epistemic (or evidential) kind of probability. I conclude that the resulting theory will be incompatible with Reliabilism in one important respect: it cannot deliver on the reductivist promise of Reliabilism. I also argue that attention to the justification of basic beliefs reveals limitations in the Evidentialist framework as well. The theory that results from the right combination of Evidentialism and Reliabilism, therefore, is neither Evidentialist nor Reliabilist. (shrink)

I argue for a theory that combines elements of reliabilism and evidentialism.

Munch-Jurisic’s account of perpetrator disgust raises important new questions concerning the complexity of emotions and their connection with moral actions. In this commentary, we discuss this account by applying some of the author’s ideas to the case of anger. We suggest that just as the relations between disgust and moral action are much more nuanced than previously thought, as Munch-Jurisic explains, analyses of anger can also profit from a more careful approach to such connections. Specifically, we propose that contextual factors (...) can affect the moral character of anger reactions, which in turn can provide them with moral value. We also argue that the contextual view deployed to study disgust reactions can also support distinctions between core forms and socio-moral forms of the same emotion, which in turn raises interesting questions concerning different forms of anger. Lastly, we extend the contextual approach to problems of emotion individuation and theories in emotion science, showing how current scientific emotion theories can learn from a detailed examination of disgust, anger, and other context-sensitive emotions. We aim to highlight some important contributions of Munch-Jurisic’s work to broader discussions on emotions, morality, and how to theorize about emotions overall. (shrink)

This introduction to a special issue of Thesis Eleven devoted to science fiction begins by exploring the way the genre has been handled by German and French critical theory and their Anglophone equivalents. It proceeds to a discussion of the historical sociology of the genre and, thence, to an account of what it terms the dialectic of science fiction endangerment. Finally, it concludes with a brief overview of the various contributions to the issue.

El pensamiento vivo de Juan Luis Vives, por Joaquín Xirau.--Páginas escogidas de Juan Luis Vives: De concordia y discordia. Tratado del alma. Introducción a la sabiduría. Del socorro de los pobres. Tratado de la enseñanza.

The founding operation of the American States involves a mediating mechanism that enables the connection between the ideals supporting it and the intent for its popularization among people. Such is the function assigned to the founding heroes, which is analyzed as a cultural operation that aims to enshrine these ideals, thereby eliding the violence contained in the formation of modern States.

In the international sphere, sovereignty and fundamental rights are often at odds, giving these rights little space for action and, in general, only after crisis has led to tragedy, and tragedy to disgrace. International Law, on the other hand, consistently succumbs to forms of domination and power, and its scope of action is often limited to certain codifications which are frequently suspended by political exception. Sixteenth century Dominican theologian, Francisco de Vitoria, established the principles for a Law of the people, (...) based on secular civil power that, while still exercising internal sovereignty, could defend and privilege the “rights of all men” over the exercise of power and private interest. This article focuses on this dispute to show Vitoria’s position, who long preceded the great declarations of human rights of the 18 th century, presenting an original doctrine within the framework of an emerging globalization and based on the defense of fundamental rights. (shrink)

What if what is permissible and acceptable today is anathema tomorrow? There is a whole canon of scholarly ethics books written with the express purpose of telling you what is RIGHT and what is WRONG. This is not one such book. Juan Enriquez wants to make it easier for us to talk to one another, to prod one another, to understand and guide one another without an everlasting certainty of strict RIGHT v WRONG.

"Spinoza", à quoi ça sert? Et comment s'en servir? En particulier, comment penser la mise à l'épreuve du rationalisme spécifique dont il est le nom? L'objectif de ce travail est de contribuer à une réévaluation non seulement du rôle de la pratique dans la pensée de Spinoza, mais encore du système lui-même, de sa capacité à s'adapter et à communiquer avec des domaines tels que les sciences expérimentales, l'histoire, la politique ou la médecine. A travers les concepts et problèmes, tels (...) qu'ils sont formulés dans ses textes, mais également leur utilisation contemporaine, il s'agit ici d'analyser l'articulation de la philosophie de Spinoza au champ de l'action humaine, dans ses dimensions éthique, sociale, cognitive et affective - et d'apprécier la puissance de la rationalité qui en est le fondement. Les auteurs viennent d'horizons différents : professeurs, docteurs, doctorants, étudiants ou érudits originaires de divers pays, ils proposent dans les articles ici présentés des approches variées et originales des problèmes qu'ils traitent, offrant ainsi au lecteur un aperçu de la vitalité des réflexions que suscite aujourd'hui l'oeuvre de Spinoza. (shrink)