Results for 'Merrie Bergmann'

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  1.  50
    An Introduction to Many-Valued and Fuzzy Logic: Semantics, Algebras, and Derivation Systems.Merrie Bergmann - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
    Professor Merrie Bergmann presents an accessible introduction to the subject of many-valued and fuzzy logic designed for use on undergraduate and graduate courses in non-classical logic. Bergmann discusses the philosophical issues that give rise to fuzzy logic - problems arising from vague language - and returns to those issues as logical systems are presented. For historical and pedagogical reasons, three-valued logical systems are presented as useful intermediate systems for studying the principles and theory behind fuzzy logic. The (...)
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  2.  43
    The Logic Book.Merrie Bergmann - 2003 - Mcgraw-Hill.
    This outstanding book is a leading text for symbolic or formal logic courses. All techniques and concepts are presented with clear, comprehensive explanations and numerous, carefully constructed examples. Its flexible organization (all chapters are complete and self-contained) allows instructors the freedom to cover the topics they want in the order they choose.
  3.  30
    Eva Feder Kittay: Metaphor Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure. [REVIEW]Merrie Bergmann - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (1):112-115.
    Taking into account pragmatic considerations and recent linguistic and psychological studies, the author forges a new understanding of the relation between metaphoric and literal meaning. The argument is illustrated with analysis of metaphors from literature, philosophy, science, and everyday language.
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  4.  56
    On a Three-Valued Logical Calculus and its Application to the Analysis of the Paradoxes of the Classical Extended Functional Calculus.D. A. Bochvar & Merrie Bergmann - 1981 - History and Philosophy of Logic 2 (1-2):87-112.
    A three-valued propositional logic is presented, within which the three values are read as ?true?, ?false? and ?nonsense?. A three-valued extended functional calculus, unrestricted by the theory of types, is then developed. Within the latter system, Bochvar analyzes the Russell paradox and the Grelling-Weyl paradox, formally demonstrating the meaninglessness of both.
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  5. Metaphorical Assertions.Merrie Bergmann - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (2):229-245.
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  6. How Many Feminists Does It Take to Make A Joke? Sexist Humor and What's Wrong with It.Merrie Bergmann - 1986 - Hypatia 1 (1):63 - 82.
    In this paper I am concerned with two questions: What is sexist humor? and what is wrong with it? To answer the first question, I briefly develop a theory of humor and then characterize sexist humor as humor in which sexist beliefs (attitudes/norms) are presupposed and are necessary to the fun. Concerning the second question, I criticize a common sort of argument that is supposed to explain why sexist humor is offensive: although the argument explains why sexist humor feels offensive, (...)
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  7.  12
    Finite Tree Property for First-Order Logic with Identity and Functions.Merrie Bergmann - 2005 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 46 (2):173-180.
    The typical rules for truth-trees for first-order logic without functions can fail to generate finite branches for formulas that have finite models–the rule set fails to have the finite tree property. In 1984 Boolos showed that a new rule set proposed by Burgess does have this property. In this paper we address a similar problem with the typical rule set for first-order logic with identity and functions, proposing a new rule set that does have the finite tree property.
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  8.  45
    Presupposition and Two-Dimensional Logic.Merrie Bergmann - 1981 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (1):27 - 53.
  9.  3
    The Logic Book.Merrie Bergmann, James Moor, Jack Nelson & Merrie Bergman - 1982 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (4):915-917.
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  10.  13
    Logic and Sortal Incorrectness.Merrie Bergmann - 1977 - Review of Metaphysics 31 (1):61 - 79.
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  11.  33
    Cross-Categorial Semantics for Conjoined Common Nouns.Merrie Bergmann - 1982 - Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (3):399 - 401.
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  12.  36
    Conjunction-Based Sorites: A Misguided Objection to Degree-Theoretic (Fuzzy) Solutions to Sorites Paradoxes. [REVIEW]Merrie Bergmann - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (1):1 - 4.
    In 1987, Crispin Wright argued that degree-theoretic (fuzzy) solutions to the Sorites paradox fail because the solutions do not work when the paradox is restated using a conjunctive major premise. I show that Wright is incorrect: degree-theoretic solutions also work when the paradox is stated with a conjunctive major premise.
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  13.  11
    Conjunction-Based Sorites: A Misguided Objection to Degree-Theoretic Solutions to Sorites Paradoxes.Merrie Bergmann - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (1):1-4.
  14.  9
    Expressibility in Two-Dimensional Languages for Presupposition.Merrie Bergmann - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (4):459-470.
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  15. A Presuppositional Theory of Semantic Categories.Merrie Bergmann & Ont Toronto - 1976 - [S.N.].
     
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  16. Briefe Franz Brentanos an Hugo Bergmann.Hugo Bergmann & Franz Brentano - 1946 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 7 (1):83-158.
  17.  6
    Book Review:The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism Gustav Bergmann[REVIEW]Gustav Bergmann - 1955 - Philosophy of Science 22 (2):166-.
  18.  2
    Bergmann, Hugo, Dr. phil. Untersuchungen zum Problem der Evidenz der inneren Wahrnehmung.Hugo Bergmann - 1908 - Kant-Studien 13 (1-3).
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  19.  5
    Bergmann, Ernst, Dr., Privatdozent. Die Begründung der deutschen Aesthetik durch Alex. Gottlieb Baumgarten und Georg Friedrich Meier. [REVIEW]Ernst Bergmann - 1911 - Kant-Studien 16 (1-3).
  20.  9
    Review: Merrie Bergmann, James Moor, Jack Nelson, The Logic Book; Merrie Bergman, James Moor, Jack Nelson, Solutions to Selected Exercises in the Logic Book. [REVIEW]Christopher S. Hill - 1982 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (4):915-917.
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  21.  6
    Bergmann Merrie, Moor James, and Nelson Jack. The Logic Book. Random House, New York 1980, Ix + 459 Pp.Bergmann Merrie, Moor James, and Nelson Jack. Solutions to Selected Exercises in The Logic Book. Random House, New York 1980, 252 Pp. [REVIEW]Christopher S. Hill - 1982 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (4):915-917.
  22. Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...)
  23. In Defence of Sceptical Theism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy.Michael Bergmann & Michael C. Rea - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):241 – 251.
    Some evidential arguments from evil rely on an inference of the following sort: 'If, after thinking hard, we can't think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some horrific evil then it is likely that there is no such reason'. Sceptical theists, us included, say that this inference is not a good one and that evidential arguments from evil that depend on it are, as a result, unsound. Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy have argued (in a previous issue of this journal) (...)
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  24. Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution.Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists on challenges to moral and religious belief from disagreement and evolution. Three main questions are addressed: Can one reasonably maintain one's moral and religious beliefs in the face of interpersonal disagreement with intellectual peers? Does disagreement about morality between a religious belief source, such as a sacred text, and a non-religious belief source, such as a society's moral intuitions, make it irrational to continue trusting (...)
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  25.  6
    New Foundations of Ontology.Gustav Bergmann - 1992 - University of Wisconsin Press.
    This posthumous work by Gustav Bergmann was essentially complete before his death in 1987.
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  26.  94
    The God of Eth and the God of Earth.Michael Bergmann & Jeffrey E. Brower - 2007 - Think 5 (14):33-38.
    Stephen Law has recently argued (Think 9), using a dialogue set on the fictional planet Eth, that traditional belief in God is . Bergmann and Brower argue that theists on Earth should not be convinced.
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  27. In Defence of Sceptical Theism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy.Michael Rea & Michael Bergmann - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):241.
    Some evidential arguments from evil rely on an inference of the following sort: ‘If, after thinking hard, we can't think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some horrific evil then it is likely that there is no such reason’. Sceptical theists, us included, say that this inference is not a good one and that evidential arguments from evil that depend on it are, as a result, unsound. Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy have argued that Michael Bergmann's way of developing (...)
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  28.  12
    Memories of the Vienna Circle Letter to Otto Neurath.Gustav Bergmann - 1993 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 1:193-208.
    On March 12, 1938 the German army crossed the border into Austria. By the following September Gustav Bergmann had managed to send his first wife, Anna, and his daughter, Hanna, to safety in England. In October he managed to leave Austria himself. He first went to the Hague in the Netherlands to see Otto Neurath, who gave him enough money to assist his passage to New York. Bergmann’s prospects were quite uncertain at that time and it was not (...)
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  29. Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements.Michael Bergmann - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436.
    Internalists tend to impose on justification higher-level requirements, according to which a belief is justified only if the subject has a higher-level belief (i.e., a belief about the epistemic credentials of a belief). I offer an error theory that explains the appeal of this requirement: analytically, a belief is not justified if we have a defeater for it, but contingently, it is often the case that to avoid having defeaters, our beliefs must satisfy a higher-level requirement. I respond to the (...)
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  30. Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709–727.
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  31. Skeptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument From Evil.Michael Bergmann - 2001 - Noûs 35 (2):278–296.
    Skeptical theists endorse the skeptical thesis (which is consistent with the rejection of theism) that we have no good reason for thinking the possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there are. In his newest formulation of the evidential arguments from evil, William Rowe tries to avoid assuming the falsity of this skeptical thesis, presumably because it seems so plausible. I argue that his new argument fails to avoid doing this. Then I defend that skeptical thesis (...)
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  32. Rational Disagreement After Full Disclosure.Michael Bergmann - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):336-353.
    The question I consider is this: -/- The Question: Can two people–who are, and realize they are, intellectually virtuous to about the same degree–both be rational in continuing knowingly to disagree after full disclosure (by each to the other of all the relevant evidence they can think of) while at the same time thinking that the other may well be rational too? -/- I distinguish two kinds of rationality–internal and external–and argue in section 1 that, whichever kind we have in (...)
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  33. Externalist Justification and the Role of Seemings.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):163-184.
    It’s not implausible to think that whenever I have a justified noninferential belief that p, it is caused by a seeming that p. It’s also tempting to think that something contributes to the justification of my belief only if I hold my belief because of that thing. Thus, given that many of our noninferential beliefs are justified and that we hold them because of seemings, one might be inclined to hold a view like Phenomenal Conservatism, according to which seemings play (...)
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  34. Internalism, Externalism and the No-Defeater Condition.Michael Bergmann - 1997 - Synthese 110 (3):399-417.
    Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. Roughly speaking, the I-E debate is over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. But what is the sense of internal here? And of which conditions of (...)
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  35.  34
    Science, Perception, and Reality.Logic and Reality.Wilfrid Sellars & Gustav Bergmann - 1965 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (3):421-423.
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  36. Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong.Gustav Bergmann - 1967 - University of Wisconsin Press.
  37.  8
    Philosophy of Science.Gustav Bergmann - 1957 - Greenwood Press.
  38. Is Klein an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification?Michael Bergmann - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):19 - 24.
    This paper is a response to Peter Klein's "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning". After briefly discussing what Klein says about the requirement, for doxastic justification, that a belief be formed in the right way, I'll make the following three points: Klein's solution to the regress problem isn't an infinitist solution, Klein's position on doxastic justification faces a troubling dilemma, and Klein's objection to foundationalism fails.
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  39. A Theistic Argument Against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and Divine Simplicity).Michael Bergmann & Jeffrey E. Brower - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:357-386.
    Predication is an indisputable part of our linguistic behavior. By contrast, the metaphysics of predication has been a matter of dispute ever since antiquity. According to Plato—or at least Platonism, the view that goes by Plato’s name in contemporary philosophy—the truths expressed by predications such as “Socrates is wise” are true because there is a subject of predication (e.g., Socrates), there is an abstract property or universal (e.g., wisdom), and the subject exemplifies the property.1 This view is supposed to be (...)
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  40. (Serious) Actualism and (Serious) Presentism.Michael Bergmann - 1999 - Noûs 33 (1):118-132.
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  41.  45
    Phenomenal Conservatism and the Dilemma for Internalism.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. pp. 154.
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  42.  9
    Interpretive Bias in Social Phobia: An ERP Study with Morphed Emotional Schematic Faces.Iris-Tatjana Kolassa, Stephan Kolassa, Sandra Bergmann, Romy Lauche, Stefan Dilger, Wolfgang Hr Miltner & Frauke Musial - 2009 - Cognition and Emotion 23 (1):69-95.
  43.  11
    Operationism and Theory in Psychology.G. Bergmann & K. W. Spence - 1941 - Psychological Review 48 (1):1-14.
  44. What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):161–165.
    One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially--i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified (or unjustified) belief. In some recent publications, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing foundationalist. In this paper, I will explain why his objections to foundationalism (...)
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  45. Externalism and Skepticism.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):159-194.
  46. A New Argument From Actualism to Serious Actualism.Michael Bergmann - 1996 - Noûs 30 (3):356-359.
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  47. Rational Religious Belief Without Arguments.Michael Bergmann - 2012 - In Louis Pojman & Michael Rea (eds.), Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology. Wadsworth. pp. 534-549.
     
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  48.  61
    Bonjour’s Dilemma.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):679-693.
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  49.  59
    Externalist Justification Without Reliability.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):35–60.
  50. Divine Responsibility Without Divine Freedom.Michael Bergmann & J. A. Cover - 2006 - Faith and Philosophy 23 (4):381-408.
    Adherents of traditional western Theism have espoused CONJUNCTION: God is essentially perfectly good and God is thankworthy for the good acts he performs . But suppose that (i) God’s essential perfect goodness prevents his good acts from being free, and that (ii) God is not thankworthy for an act that wasn’t freely performed.
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