This phenomenological case study investigates how planning community-centered civics inquiries can prepare elementary pre-service teachers to better address inequities facing rural communities, including those located on Indigenous reservations. Specifically, the study addresses this research question: How does community-centered planning inform pre-service teacher readiness to support place-conscious and anti-colonial civics education within elementary contexts? Findings suggest that guided, community-centered planning leads to enhanced pre-service teacher confidence in preparing to facilitate equity-oriented elementary education, particularly as related to evolving understandings of civics content (...) competence, relational commitments, and responsibilities of rural teachers. (shrink)

There are a number of passages in Kant’s political writings in which he appears to deny to citizens any right whatever to resist political authority. Thus, in the essay, “Concerning the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory But Does Not Hold in Practice,” Kant argues that even when such authority is exercised in a way which violates what Kant himself takes to be the fundamental principles of justice, any act of resistance to it is a punishable act.

In discussing this work I will proceed as follows. First, I will describe briefly its aims and method. I will then criticize three ideas Adler uses to order and clarify the discussion of freedom. These are the idea of controversy and the related distinction between real and merely verbal disagreement; the idea of a generic understanding of freedom; and the idea of analogy used by Adler to suggest a solution to part of the controversy about freedom. Apart from their intrinsic (...) interest these ideas are a clue to understanding why Adler finds less rational discussion of the issues than expected; they are also a clue to his hope that "If the ideal of rational debate were... more fully approximated in the various controversies about freedom, that might lead to the resolution of some age-old issues or at least enable us to see why they are irresolvable". Finally, I will attempt a general appraisal of the work. (shrink)

The following are some of the entries received in the contest presented in our March, 1960 issue. The starred essays were judged as winners and were awarded $25.00 prizes.

I argue that its appearing to you that P does not provide justification for believing that P unless you have independent justification for the denial of skeptical alternatives – hypotheses incompatible with P but such that if they were true, it would still appear to you that P. Thus I challenge the popular view of ‘dogmatism,’ according to which for some contents P, you need only lack reason to suspect that skeptical alternatives are true, in order for an experience as (...) of P to justify belief that P. I pursue three lines of objection to dogmatism, having to do with probabilistic reasoning, considerations of future or hypothetically available justification, and epistemic circularity. I briefly sketch a fall-back position which avoids the problems raised. (shrink)

Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are versions of ‘‘weak awareness internalism’’ that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the ‘‘Subject’s Perspective Objection’’ horn of the dilemma. Second, we show that there are versions of ‘‘strong awareness internalism’’ that do not fall prey to the dilemma’s ‘‘vicious regress’’ horn. We note along the way that (...) these versions of internalism do not, in avoiding one horn of the dilemma, succumb to the dilemma’s other horn. The upshot is that internalists have many available strategies for avoiding dilemmatic defeat. (shrink)

Argues that the only way to understand the Confucian vision of the consummate moral life is to take the tradition on its own terms.

Book Information Life's Intrinsic Value: Science, Ethics\nand Nature. By Nicholas Agar. Colombia University Press.\nNew York. 2001. Pp. x + 200. Paperback,\n{Â}\textsterling17.00.

I believe that Tom is the proud father of a baby boy. Why do I think his child is a boy? A natural answer might be that I remember that his name is ‘Owen’ which is usually a boy’s name. Here I’ve given information that might be part of a causal explanation of my believing that Tom’s baby is a boy. I do have such a memory and it is largely what sustains my conviction. But I haven’t given you just (...) any causally relevant information, I’ve given my grounds for my belief. I’ve given reasons that might justify me in supposing that Tom’s baby is a boy. Less naturally, the question might be taken as a request for a broader causal explanation of my holding this belief. Appropriate answers might cite all manner of facts concerning the evolution of the human race, why I chose to pursue philosophy and hence came to know Tom, the mechanisms of email transmission, the firing of various neurons, the circumstances of concept formation as a result of which I’m able to grasp the thought that Tom’s baby is a boy, and so on. It is an interesting question what distinguishes the narrower set of answers that I first suggested. I won’t pursue that here. I assume you have a good enough sense of the distinction I’m drawing. We might call the narrower set of answers justifying reasons, the kind of reasons I might cite in justifying my belief. Answers of the first sort are clearly relevant to epistemological evaluation. In assessing whether you know p or are rational in believing it to the degree you do, I will naturally want to consider what reasons you have for your belief. In deliberating myself about whether to believe p, in seeking an answer to the question of whether p, I will naturally consider what reasons or grounds I have to suppose that p. But what I want to focus on here is how explanations of the broader sort bear on such questions as whether to believe p. From a third-person perspective we can ask, ‘In assessing the epistemic status of S’s belief that p, what is the relevance of causal information that lies outside of the realm of justifying reasons?’ From the first-person standpoint we can ask ‘In seeking to answer whether p, how should such causal information affect my deliberations?’ At first it might seem that such broader causal information could have little relevance if any. Like any belief my belief that p can be traced back to innumerable causes from far and wide.. (shrink)

The author investigates ancient shamanic traditions in order to understand what gave birth to civilization and the modern human mind.

This is a three-part exchange on the relationship between belief and credence. It begins with an opening essay by Roger Clarke that argues for the claim that the notion of credence generalizes the notion of belief. Julia Staffel argues in her reply that we need to distinguish between mental states and models representing them, and that this helps us explain what it could mean that belief is a special case of credence. Roger Clarke's final essay reflects on the (...) compatibility of the previously discussed views with dualist and monist interpretations of our mental states and our ways of modeling them. (shrink)

Descartes and the last Scholastics: objections and replies -- Descartes and the Scotists -- Ideas, before and after Descartes -- The Cartesian destiny of form and matter -- Descartes, Basso, and Toletus: three kinds of Corpuscularians -- Scholastics and the new astronomy on the substance of the heavens -- Descartes and the Jesuits of La Fleche: the Eucharist -- Condemnations of Cartesianism: the extension and unity of the universe -- Cartesians, Gassendists, and censorship -- The cogito in the seventeenth century.