Against the turbulent backdrop of Enlightenment Scotland, Adam Smith lays out a succinct and highly engaging account of Smith's life and times, reviews his work as a whole and traces his influence over the past two centuries. Dispelling myths and debunking caricatures, this book explores his ideas in detail, from ethics to law to economics and government and the impact of those ideas on thinkers as diverse as Karl Marx, Charles Darwin, John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich Hayek. Adam Smith emerges (...) as one of the founders of modern social psychology and behavioural theory, offering a strikingly modern evolutionary theory of political economy, which recognises the often complementary roles of markets and the state. (shrink)

This monograph treats the important topic of the epistemology of diagrams in Euclidean geometry. Norman argues that diagrams play a genuine justificatory role in traditional Euclidean arguments, and he aims to account for these roles from a modified Kantian perspective. Norman considers himself a semi-Kantian in the following broad sense: he believes that Kant was right that ostensive constructions are necessary in order to follow traditional Euclidean proofs, but he wants to avoid appealing to Kantian a priori intuition (...) as the epistemological background for these constructions.Norman's main argument is limited to the thesis that certain Euclidean arguments—in particular, that of Proposition 1.32, the internal-angle-sum theorem—require inferences from diagrams. Interestingly, Norman is not committed to the view that these arguments are proofs. This becomes clear only quite late in the book, when he distinguishes argument from proofs, remarking that the argument he has been focusing on is not rigorous, and so is not a proof. Norman does not, however, explicitly classify all Euclidean arguments as non-proofs. His view is that diagrammatic reasoning can in principle feature in rigorous proofs, but he is not committed to the thesis that any particular argument, Euclidean or otherwise, provides an example of this. Rather than proofs in particular, Norman is more interested in the general issue of justification in mathematics.The argument has three components. First, Norman argues against competing accounts of Euclidean arguments such as empiricism, and ‘Leibnizianism’—the view that diagrams play only a heuristic role. Second, he provides a more direct, or positive, argument that the way we actually follow the standard argument for 1.32 does appeal to the diagram. This is an appeal to the phenomenology of following the argument. Third, he articulates and defends his semi-Kantian position against some objections.The book has a very careful and …. (shrink)

We seem to have strong intuitions that many visual representations -- such as descriptions, depictions and diagrams -- can be classified into different types. But how should we understand the differences between these representational types? On a standard view, the answer is assumed to lie in the presence or absence of a single property. I argue first that this assumption is undermotivated, and offer a particular two-property analysis, which can be used both to differentiate the various types and to understand (...) better what factors affect changes in classification. This in turn can also be used to capture a core idea of perspicuity, and to ground an argument for the general perspicuity of diagrams as a representational type. Finally, I suggest that two complementary and independently plausible theories bearing on the nature of diagrammatic representation can be located within the suggested two-property approach. (shrink)

“We shouldn’t be scared of philosophy. Ideas are always in charge, we might as well get self-conscious about what they are.”.

“We shouldn’t be scared of philosophy. Ideas are always in charge, we might as well get self-conscious about what they are.”.

Thomas Hobbes posited a social contract which legitimates sovereign authority. But what grounds, or could ground, such a contract? Through reflection on Oakeshott, and on Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, the paper argues for a so far unrecognised mode of human association: philic association. It briefly considers a possible expression of philic association in the history of English law, before making the case for programmes of mentoring as a policy both reflective and supportive of this mode. It ends by suggesting that the (...) existence of such a mode shows why Hobbes's social contract theory, however ingenious and influential it has proven to be, is neither sufficient nor necessary for its stated purpose. (shrink)

The Conscious Brain brings neuroscientific evidence to bear on enduring philosophical questions. Major philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness are surveyed, challenged, and extended.

In this book by the award-winning author of Just Healthcare, Norman Daniels develops a comprehensive theory of justice for health that answers three key questions: what is the special moral importance of health? When are health inequalities unjust? How can we meet health needs fairly when we cannot meet them all? Daniels' theory has implications for national and global health policy: can we meet health needs fairly in ageing societies? Or protect health in the workplace while respecting individual liberty? (...) Or meet professional obligations and obligations of justice without conflict? When is an effort to reduce health disparities, or to set priorities in realising a human right to health, fair? What do richer, healthier societies owe poorer, sicker societies? Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly explores the many ways that social justice is good for the health of populations in developed and developing countries. (shrink)

How should medical services be distributed within society? Who should pay for them? Is it right that large amounts should be spent on sophisticated technology and expensive operations, or would the resources be better employed in, for instance, less costly preventive measures? These and others are the questions addreses in this book. Norman Daniels examines some of the dilemmas thrown up by conflicting demands for medical attention, and goes on to advance a theory of justice in the distribution of (...) health care. The central argument is that health care, both preventive and acute, has a crucial effect on equality of opportunity, and that a principle guaranteeing equality of opportunity must underly the distribution of health-care services. Access to care, preventive measures, treatment of the elderly, and the obligations of doctors and medical administrations are fully discussed, and the theory is shown to underwrite various practical policies in the area. (shrink)

In this chapter, I outline and defend a version of concept empiricism. The theory has four central tenets: Concepts represent categories by reliable causal relations to category instances; conceptual representations of category vary from occasion to occasion; these representations are perceptually based; and these representations are all learned, not innate. The last two tenets on this list have been central to empiricism historically, and the first two have been developed in more recent years. I look at each in turn, and (...) then I discuss the most obvious objection to empiricism. According to that objection, some concepts cannot be perceptually based because they represent things that are abstract, and hence unperceivable. I discuss two standard examples: democracy and moral badness. I argue that both can be explained using resources available to the empiricist. (shrink)

A timely and uniquely compelling plea for the importance of nurture in the ongoing nature-nurture debate. In this era of genome projects and brain scans, it is all too easy to overestimate the role of biology in human psychology. But in this passionate corrective to the idea that DNA is destiny, Jesse Prinz focuses on the most extraordinary aspect of human nature: that nurture can supplement and supplant nature, allowing our minds to be profoundly influenced by experience and culture. (...) Drawing on cutting-edge research in neuroscience, psychology, and anthropology, Prinz shatters the myth of human uniformity and reveals how our differing cultures and life experiences make each of us unique. Along the way he shows that we can’t blame mental illness or addiction on our genes, and that societal factors shape gender differences in cognitive ability and sexual behavior. A much-needed contribution to the nature-nurture debate, Beyond Human Nature shows us that it is only through the lens of nurture that the spectrum of human diversity becomes fully and brilliantly visible. (shrink)

There seem to be two kinds of emotion the rists in the world. Some work very hard to show that emotions are essentially cognitive states. Others resist this suggestion and insist that emotions are noncognitive. The debate has appeared in many forms in philosophy and psychology. It never seems to go away. The reason for this is simple. Emotions have properties that push in both directions, properties that make them seem quite smart and properties that make them seem quite dumb. (...) They exemplify the base impulses of our animal nature while simultaneously branching out into the most human and humane reaches of our mental repertoires. Depending on where one looks, emotions can emerge as our simplest instincts or our subtlest achievements. This double nature makes emotions captivating, but also confounding. Researchers find themselves picking one side at the expense of the other, or packaging seemingly disparate components into unstable unions. I will defend a more integrative approach. For a more thorough treatment, see Prinz (forthcoming). (shrink)

Writers in the propositions literature consider the Benacerraf objection serious, often decisive. The objection figures heavily in dismissing standard theories of propositions of the past, notably set-theoretic theories. I argue that the situation is more complicated. After explicating the propositional Benacerraf problem, I focus on a classic set-theoretic theory of propositions, the possible worlds theory, and argue that methodological considerations influence the objection’s success.

Of all the major philosophical works, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is one of the most rewarding, yet one of the most difficult. Norman Kemp Smith's Commentary elucidates not only textural questions and minor issues, but also the central problems which arise, he contends, from the conflicting tendencies of Kant's own thinking. Kemp Smith's Commentary continues to be in demand with Kant scholars, and it is being reissued here with a new introduction by Sebastian Gardner to set it in (...) its contemporary context. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titles: Introduction Innerism and Outerism Are Some Concepts Inside‐Out? Millikan's Concepts.

A series of interviews with people from various backgrounds, showing how people's personal experiences influences their politics.

We seem to have private privileged access to our own minds through introspection, but what exactly does this involve? Do we somehow literally perceive our own minds, as the common idea of a 'mind's eye' suggests, or are there other processes at work in our ability to know our own minds? Rethinking Introspection offers a new pluralist framework for understanding the nature, scope, and limits of introspection. The book argues that, contrary to common misconceptions, introspection does not consist of a (...) single mechanism but rather a diverse range of mental states and cognitive processes with a broad spectrum of epistemic properties. Building upon this revised conception of introspection, the book illustrates and analyzes the variety of ways in which we introspectively grasp the contents of our own minds, from the immediate phenomenal knowledge generated by conscious experience to the self-deceptive possibilities enabled by certain kinds of inner speech. (shrink)

This volume makes a welcome contribution to the burgeoning philosophical scholarship on human rights by foregrounding methodological and meta-philosophical issu.

This chapter contains sections titled: Born to Be Good? Are There Moral Universals? Is There a Morality Acquisition Device? Morality Without Innateness Appendix: Moral Anti‐nativism and Moral Relativism References.

Acquisitions : an overview -- Assemblages of access -- Assemblages of discovery -- Assemblages of feedback -- The acquisitions assemblage : putting it all together.

Leibniz, Husserl and the Brain is about the structural relations between phenomenological and neurophysiological aspects of perception, consciousness and time. Its focus lies with auditory perception, since nearly all perceived qualities in hearing - such as pitch, rhythm and the localization or origin of a sound - are most intimately related to temporal patterns and regularities. Here striking analogies are shown between the structural features of perceptual states, as dealt with in philosophical phenomenology, and of their physical counterparts, as dealt (...) with in neurophysiology. Accordingly, the comprehensive and consolidating references to the work of Leibniz and Husserl are not for philological reasons, but, rather, to work towards philosophical orientation in a conceptual maze. They allow for a fresh view on several issues in contemporary philosophy of mind and also in psychophysics - in particular, on the transition from unconscious to conscious states and on the constitution of time consciousness. (shrink)

This is the first book to gather the key writings of the distinguished political theorist Norman Geras into a single volume, providing a comprehensive overview of the thinking of one of the most important Marxist philosophers in the post-war era. Among the essays included here are 'The Controversy about Marx and Justice', 'The Duty to Bring Aid', 'Primo Levi and Jean Amery: Shame' and the contentious 'Euston Manifesto', which lays down a set of central principles for the democratic left (...) in the twenty-first century. The reader is rounded out with several posts from Geras's much-loved and widely read 'Normblog', as well as companion essays by Alan Johnson and Terry Glavin, which explore how Geras's philosophical concerns led to his more recent, trenchant critiques of the direction of left-wing politics. (shrink)

This comprehension interpretation of Plato’s Euthyphro illuminates the necessary tension between tradition and autonomy in human and political life. Norman J. Fischer II argues that the dialogue defends Socrates by revealing the weaknesses of his opponents’ understanding of piety and the human soul, implicitly arguing for a Socratic alternative.

An accessible and enjoyable introduction to Zen Buddhist practice--in a reader-friendly question-and-answer format--by two highly regarded teacher-writers. The question-and-answer format makes this introduction to Zen especially easy to understand--and also to use as a reference, as you can easily look up just the question you had in mind. The esteemed Zen teacher Norman Fischer and his old friend and teaching colleague Susan Moon (both of them in the lineage of Shunryu Suzuki, author of Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind) give this (...) collaborative effort a playful tone: Susan asks a question on our behalf, Norman answers it, and then Sue challenges him. By the time you get through their conversations, you'll have a good basic education in Zen--not only the history, theory, and practice but also the contemporary issues, such as gender inequality, sexual ethics, and the tension between Asian traditions and the modern American reality. (shrink)

This is a reproduction of the original artefact. Generally these books are created from careful scans of the original. This allows us to preserve the book accurately and present it in the way the author intended. Since the original versions are generally quite old, there may occasionally be certain imperfections within these reproductions. We're happy to make these classics available again for future generations to enjoy!

Let me offer an early disclaimer. I know exactly who the Founders were. I know exactly the crimes against humanity that they were responsible for and those they inherited and were not responsible for. I do not spend time extolling the virtues of Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Adams, Mr. Franklin, and Mr. Madison. Nothing in this work or in my experiment (my life's work) can change the fact or alter the history of the debasement of humanity that preceded the Declaration of (...) Independence (1776), the Constitution (1787), and the Bill of Rights (1791) they were a part of and the obvious fact that the major accomplishment of the Founders' theories about self-government did not apply to African Americans and Native Americans, women, and specifically Black women in their thinking. Still, there exists in their theological imagination infinite hope for their experiment. This work seeks to identify the evidence that shows and suggests that some of them were aware of a grand architectural experiment and design for the nation and its future. Every cracked, broken, and imperfect vessel can be used to bring forward hope. I am a personal witness to this fact of human existence. (shrink)

The moral domain is broader than the empathy and justice concerns assessed by existing measures of moral competence, and it is not just a subset of the values assessed by value inventories. To fill the need for reliable and theoretically grounded measurement of the full range of moral concerns, we developed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire on the basis of a theoretical model of 5 universally available sets of moral intuitions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. We present evidence for the (...) internal and external validity of the scale and the model, and in doing so we present new findings about morality: Comparative model fitting of confirmatory factor analyses provides empirical justification for a 5-factor structure of moral concerns; convergent/discriminant validity evidence suggests that moral concerns predict personality features and social group attitudes not previously considered morally relevant; and we establish pragmatic validity of the measure in providing new knowledge and research opportunities concerning demographic and cultural differences in moral intuitions. These analyses provide evidence for the usefulness of Moral Foundations Theory in simultaneously increasing the scope and sharpening the resolution of psychological views of morality. (shrink)

Virtue and deontological ethics are now commonly contrasted as rival approaches to moral inquiry. However, I argue that neither metaethical party should seek complete, solitary domination of the ethical domain. Reductive treatments of the right or the virtuous, as well as projects that abandon the former or latter, are bound to leave us with a sadly diminished map of the moral territories crucial to our lives. Thus, it is better for the two parties to seek a more cordial and equal (...) relationship, one that permits metaethical pluralism, and acknowledges mutual dependence. I do not seek to prescribe how that relationship should look: this essay offers less a positive metaethical position than a prolegomenon to such a position, one that attempts to head off harmful attempts to reduce the territory of the aretaic to that of the deontic, or that of the deontic to the aretaic. (shrink)

Much earlier work claims that appositives and expressives are invariably speaker-oriented. These claims have recently been challenged, most extensively by Amaral et al. (Linguist and Philos 30(6): 707–749, 2007). We are convinced by this new evidence. The questions we address are (i) how widespread are non-speaker-oriented readings of appositives and expressives, and (ii) what are the underlying linguistic factors that make such readings available? We present two experiments and novel corpus work that bear directly on this issue. We find that (...) non-speaker-oriented readings, while rare in actual language use, are systematic. We also find that non-speaker-oriented readings occur even outside of attitude predications, which leads us to favor an account based in pragmatically-mediated perspective shifting over one that relies on semantic binding by attitude predicates. (shrink)

Psychologism is defined as “the doctrine that the laws of mathematics and logic can be reduced to or depend on the laws governing thinking” (Moran & Cohen, 2012 266). And for Husserl, the laws of logic include the laws of meaning: “logic evidently is the science of meanings as such [Wissenschaft von Bedeutungen als solchen]” (Husserl ( 1975 ) 98/2001 225). I argue that, since it is sufficient for a theory to be psychologistic if the empiricistic theory of abstraction is (...) employed, it follows that neural networks are psychologistic insofar as they use this theory of abstraction, which I demonstrate is the case (Husserl ( 1975 ) 191/2001 120). It’s sufficient for psychologism because, according to Husserl, the theory in question reduces one’s phenomenological ability to intend types (or universals) to one’s past history of intending tokens (or particulars), usually amalgamated in some fashion (classically via associations; recently via autoencoders) (ibid; Kelleher, 2019 ). Similarly dynamical systems theory entails psychologism. For dynamical systems theory ties content to the temporal evolution of a system, which, according to Husserl, violates the fact that intentionality toward validities and objectivities does not pertain to "particular temporal experience[s]" (Husserl ( 1975 ) 194/2001 121). It follows that neither the species (neural networks), nor the genus (dynamical systems), can avoid psychologism and intend objects "in specie" (ibid). After critiquing these two approaches, I proceed to give an account based on the essentialist school of cognitive psychology of how we may intend objects "in specie" while avoiding the empiricistic theory of abstraction (Keil, 1989, Carey, 2009, Marcus & Davis, 2019 ). Such an account preserves the type-token distinction without psychologistic reduction to the temporal evolution of a dynamical system (Hinzen, 2006 ). This opens the way toward a truly unifying account of Husserlian phenomenology in league with cognitive science that avoids Yoshimi's ( 2016 ) and neurophenomenology's psychologistic foundation (herein demonstrated) and builds upon Sokolowski's ( 2003 ) syntactic account of Husserlian phenomenology. (shrink)

We analyse Hutto & Myin's three arguments against computationalism [Hutto, D., E. Myin, A. Peeters, and F. Zahnoun. Forthcoming. “The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation In Its Place.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by M. Sprevak, and M. Colombo. London: Routledge.; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2012. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2017. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]. The Hard Problem (...) of Content targets computationalism that relies on semantic notion of computation, claiming that it cannot account for the natural origins of content. The Intentionality Problem is targeted against computationalism using non-semantic accounts of computation, arguing that it fails in explaining intentionality. Theion Problem claims that causal interaction between concrete physical processes and abstract computational properties is problematic. We argue that these a... (shrink)

The present article examines how people’s belief in an afterlife, as well as closely related supernatural beliefs, may open an empirical backdoor to our understanding of the evolution of human social cognition. Recent findings and logic from the cognitive sciences contribute to a novel theory of existential psychology, one that is grounded in the tenets of Darwinian natural selection. Many of the predominant questions of existential psychology strike at the heart of cognitive science. They involve: causal attribution (why is mortal (...) behavior represented as being causally related to one’s afterlife? how are dead agents envisaged as communicating messages to the living?), moral judgment (why are certain social behaviors, i.e., transgressions, believed to have ultimate repercussions after death or to reap the punishment of disgruntled ancestors?), theory of mind (how can we know what it is “like” to be dead? what social-cognitive strategies do people use to reason about the minds of the dead?), concept acquisition (how does a common-sense dualism interact with a formalized socio-religious indoctrination in childhood? how are supernatural properties of the dead conceptualized by young minds?), and teleological reasoning (why do people so often see their lives as being designed for a purpose that must be accomplished before they perish? how do various life events affect people’s interpretation of this purpose?), among others. The central thesis of the present article is that an organized cognitive “system” dedicated to forming illusory representations of (1) psychological immortality, (2) the intelligent design of the self, and (3) the symbolic meaning of natural events evolved in response to the unique selective pressures of the human social environment. (shrink)

Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality: moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection. In the first half of the book, Jesse Prinz defends the hypothesis that morality has an emotional foundation. Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are (...) merely expressing our emotions. Prinz argues that these emotions do not track objective features of reality; rather, the rightness and wrongness of an act consists in the fact that people are disposed to have certain emotions towards it. In the second half of the book, he turns to a defense of moral relativism. Moral facts depend on emotional responses, and emotional responses vary from culture to culture. Prinz surveys the anthropological record to establish moral variation, and he draws on cultural history to show how attitudes toward practices such as cannibalism and marriage change over time. He also criticizes evidence from animal behavior and child development that has been taken to support the claim that moral attitudes are hard-wired by natural selection. Prinz concludes that there is no single true morality, but he also argues that some moral values are better than others; moral progress is possible. Throughout the book, Prinz relates his views to contemporary and historical work in philosophical ethics. His views echo themes in the writings of David Hume and Friedrich Nietzsche, but Prinz supports, extends, and revises these classic theories using the resources of cutting-edge cognitive science. The Emotional Construction of Morals will stimulate and challenge anyone who is curious about the nature and origin of moral values. (shrink)

"In his study of Philo Mr. Bentwich has done good service by demonstrating this characteristically Jewish combination of qualities in the spirit of the great Alexandrine, and by vindicating the claim of Philo to rank among the great teachers of Judaism." -The Jewish Review "Philo, the chief light of Hellenistic Judaism, by a strange fate was rejected and forgotten by his own people, while he was taken up by the Christians and almost adopted as one of their own. This difference (...) of attitude towards him on the part of Jews and Christians is easily explained. Philo was alien in spirit to the narrow rabbinical Judaism which became universal among the Jews in the second century after Christ, and hence was suspected as unorthodox and put under the ban. On the other hand, his philosophy and exegetical method appealed to the early Fathers, especially those of the Alexandrian school, and even much of his religious teaching was more in sympathy with Christian than with later Jewish thought. In modern times, however, Jewish sentiment towards this illustrious coreligionist has undergone considerable change. In the volume before us Mr. Norman Bentwich has undertaken to make him better known among his own people, and to remove any prejudice that might still exist against him by showing that, after all, he was a true Jew. Though the work is written for Jews, and, as the author frankly tells us, from a Jewish standpoint, by reason of its subject it is likely to attract also some Gentile readers." -America "Having specialized in Jewish history and literature, Mr. Bentwich was eminently fitted to undertake the work on Hellenism. It is this movement in Judaism which Mr. Bentwich has set himself to describe. During the last two or three centuries before the common era the Jewish people came in close contact with the Greek-speaking world, and naturally, could not entirely escape its influence. Greek thought prevailed throughout the Eastern world, and Hellenism, or the culture of Greece, for which Hellas is the older name, dominated the intellectual activity of men. Although the Jews were always opposed to foreign influences which conflicted with their mode of thinking, the Greek culture nevertheless penetrated Jewish life in one way or another....The struggle of Judaism with Hellenistic culture marks one of the most fundamental conflicts in the march of civilization, and as a result, Hellenistic Judaism is one of the most remarkable contributions to Jewish genius to the world's thought....The author treats this subject from the Jewish point of view. Others are chiefly interested in the relation of Hellenism to Christianity. The school of writers contrast the broad universalism of Hellenistic Judaism with the supposed narrow legalism of the Pharisees which eventually prevailed in Palestine. Mr. Bentwich combats this attitude. The present volume is popular in character and the author has not refrained from pointing out parallels in modern Jewish life....Mr. Bentwich apart from giving historical descriptions of the various phases of Hellenism in Palestine and in the Diaspora, fully describes the literature produced by the Jews during that period. He graphically and minutely describes the life and works of Philo, Josephus and other important Jewish writers. He gives a fine resume of the wisdom of Ben Sira and also, deals with the influence of the Septuagint and the attitude of the Jewish Rabbis toward it. The book will appeal to the cultured layman who wishes to be informed on the various movements of Judaism." -The Advocate: America's Jewish Journal. (shrink)