On the Brink begins with a consideration of Kant's treatment of time as representation and of Hegel's treatment of the writing of history and the end of art, all while taking up other key figures in the history of philosophy. The book then moves to an exploration of language in a variety of manifestations, from translation to complaint and greeting. It concludes by analyzing political and social questions that continue to haunt us today--the conception of work, not least in National (...) Socialism, and our relationship to democracy. Taken together, Werner Hamacher's essays offer trenchant historical, political, and rhetorical interventions into the history of philosophy, literature, and our contemporary political situation. (shrink)

d'avec: mutations, mutismes (ad Nancy) -- N'essance (ad Derrida) -- Das Nicht im Satz der Identität -- Le sans de l'etre (ad Derrida) -- Lingua amissa : Vorwort zur spanischen Ausgabe -- Lingua amissa : vom Messianismus der Warensprache -- Messianisches Nicht -- Ou, Séance, touche de Nancy, ici (I) -- Ou, Séance, touche de Nancy, ici (II).

Since Hegel, philosophy cannot stop thinking its end. The violent transformations which Hegel's philosophy has uncovered and caused in the structure of philosophical terms and in the terms under which philosophy is possible is Hamacher's topic. Starting from Hegel's commentaries on biblical scripture, Hamacher traces the genealogy and unfolding of Hegel's thought into his mature works--the Phenomenology of Spirit, the Encyclopedia, the Philosophy of History--focusing throughout on the limits and borders, the limitations and extremities of its conceptual and (...) textual movements. Because the concept for Hegel is the end of the thing--the point where it peaks--because it occurs by severance from its representational content, the trace of this splitting appears imprinted into its discursive articulation. The Hegelian text is punctuated by a series of terms and topics that operate according to the logic of the turning point: one function activating its opposite, they serve as pores between mutually exclusive experiences and establish their unity. This dialectical procedure falters, its unity dissolves, the pores turn into aporias, wherever conceptual exigencies surpass the reality they have instilled. Hamacher shows that dialectics, proceeding by way of aporias, remains unable to account for its own movement. Hegel's system must be read from the point where its rupture fails to converge with its end. Analyzing both the historical and the systematic aspects of Hegel's philosophy, addressing Kant and religious fetishism, Nietzsche and the impossible repetition of the same, Marx and the aroma of religion, Freud and the hysterical body, Hamacher's argument is directed toward what in Hegel's philosophy of spirit resists spiritualization and defeats philosophy. Aspiring to be the last philosophy, speculative idealism has to incorporate all previous systems and spiritualize its incorporation. Its logic of ingestion must, however, reject with repulsion and nausea everything that resists appropriation. Emphasizing Hegel's claim to present the political theology of modern society, Hamacher shows that the mechanism of nausea meant to keep the system intact is in fact itself a mechanism foreign to its body; it averts the promised incorporation, defeats idealization, leaves the body politic disintegrated, and voids the claim of the most powerful ontology of modern society to mark the end, the completion and plenitude--the pleroma--of philosophy and history. What remains--the indigestible, the unreadable, the nondiscursive--demands yet another kind of discourse and another practical gesture: toward a pleroma other than Hegel's. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Guilt History:Benjamin's Sketch "Capitalism as Religion"Werner Hamacher (bio)Translated by Kirk Wetters (bio)History as Exchange EconomySince history cannot be conceived as a chain of events produced by mechanical causation, it must be thought of as a connection between occurrences that meets at least two conditions: first that it admit indeterminacy and thus freedom, and second that it nonetheless be demonstrable in determinate occurrences and in the distinct form (...) of their coherence. Relations can thus be called historical and can be recognized as historical only if they are determined by neither necessity nor chance, and if their causality is of a different order than the mechanical. The temporal structure of history can therefore be characterized on the one hand by the distinct connection of its elements—and on the other hand by the dissolution of all connections that do not assist these elements in achieving their independence.A temporal nexus that clearly does not satisfy these conflicting requirements has been characterized in one of the oldest texts of occidental philosophy as the time of guilt. According to the sentence of Anaximander (from about 500 BC), handed down by Simplicius in his commentary (530 AD) on Aristotle's Physics, the origin and end of all things is subordinated to the law of necessity (katà tó kreòn). "They must pay penance and be judged for their injustice, according to the order of time (katà tèn tou chrónou táxin)"—so the fragment reads in the translation offered by Nietzsche in his treatise "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks." According to Anaximander, the sequence of time orders the rise and fall of all things and orders them in accordance with the law of guilt and punishment so that becoming (génesis) is a guilt (adikía) that must be expiated in perishing. Time and more precisely its táxis, the positing of time, is thought in Anaximander's sentence as an order of guilt and retribution, debt and payback. It is a time of economy in the sense that it is the time of law—and precisely a law that is valid for all beings, a táxis, a decree, an ordinance and an ordering—in which the unavoidable incurring of guilt is atoned in an equivalent penance that is just as unavoidable. The strict coherence of guilt and penance is ascertained by the principle of their equivalence. Time is therefore conceived here as a double process of coming into being and perishing, [End Page 81] a process that occurs in such a way that the genesis is erased in its passing away—so that time is thus erased by time itself.In Anaximander's sentence, however, time is not only the double-process of coming into being and passing away, it is—as a táxis—the common and constantly enduring medium of the exchange of the contrary but equivalent motions of coming into being and perishing. It is the time of the quid pro quo of everything that is generated and passes away within time. Its measure is a justice that represents itself as a táxis and thereby as the positing and the law of all becoming and vanishing, the law of physis and its demise as an onto-economic law. This taxiological order of time places every realm of the natural and human world under a law of substitution without exception; this also allows ethical, juridical, and economic concepts to substitute for one another within this order. The ethical dimension of justice, thus circumscribed by the order of time, is reduced to the juridical dimension of the decree, and both now define themselves according to the calculus of "an exchange economy in an eternally unchanging household of nature."1 It can only, however, be a matter of an ethics of time to the extent that this ethics, already juridified and economized, is subordinated to the schema of exchange, trade, and the equivalence of guilt and retribution. The time of history, ethical time, is thus interpreted in Anaximander's sentence as a normative time of inculpation and expiation. Whatever enters this táxis of time is thereby already guilty and can... (shrink)

Since Hegel, philosophy cannot stop thinking its end. The violent transformation that Hegel's philosophy uncovered and caused in the structure of philosophical terms and in the terms under which philosophy is possible is Hamacher's topic. Starting from Hegel's commentaries on biblical scripture, Hamacher traces the genealogy and unfolding of Hegel's thought into his mature works - the Phenomenology of Spirit, the Encyclopedia, the Philosophy of History - focusing throughout on the limits and excesses of its conceptual and textual (...) movements. Bacause the concept for Hegel is the end of the thing - the point where it peaks - because it emerges by severing itself from its representational content, the discursive articulation of the concept bears the traces of this splitting. The Hegelian text is punctuated by a series of terms and topics that operate according to the logic of the turning point: every term releases its opposite, thus operating as pores between mutually exclusive experiences and establishing their unity. This dialectical procedure falters, its unity dissolves, the pores turn into aporias, wherever conceptual exigencies surpass the reality they have engendered. Hamacher shows that dialectics, proceeding by way of aporias, remains unable to account for its own movement. Hegel's system must be read from the point where its rupture fails to converge with its end. (shrink)

A translation of Werner Hamacher’s essay “Andere Schmerzen,” which he was unable to complete before his death on July 7, 2017. The essay analyzes the connection between pain and language in the work of Pindar, Sophocles, Cicero, Seneca, Kant, Hegel, and Valéry.

A translation of Werner Hamacher’s essay “Andere Schmerzen,” which he was unable to complete before his death on July 7, 2017. The essay analyzes the connection between pain and language in the work of Pindar, Sophocles, Cicero, Seneca, Kant, Hegel, and Valéry.

The text tries to make plausible the necessity in every thought of time to think an un-time—a 'field' without the form of time that only allows for conceiving of time as a form.

It is quite clear to me that there is nothing presently available to rival this book." —Wlad Godzich, University of Geneva "Hamacher's Premises is the heir and successor to the most important theoretical and critical work done in American ...

The text tries to make plausible the necessity in every thought of time to think an un-time—a 'field' without the form of time that only allows for conceiving of time as a form.

L’essai se confronte à la nécessité de rendre plus précise et, par là même, de transformer la notion nancyenne d’être-avec-les-autres. C’est seulement s’il implique un être avec les autres qui ne puisse jamais appartenir à aucune communauté que l’être-avec-les-autres se présente comme la relation absolue et absolument indissoluble : la relation de toutes les relations qui est immédiatement une relation dont le corrélat n’est pas donné. Selon la structure infra-négative de cet être-avec-sans, les communautés ne peuvent se soumettre à des (...) systèmes « symboliques », ni être saisies « comme telles » par elles-mêmes ou par les autres, ni se présenter ou se représenter elles-mêmes dans un corpus philosophique. L’être-avec-les-autres est l’être-sans que l’on appelle « philosophie ». (shrink)

Depuis son commencement chez Platon et Aristote, la philosophie se définit comme phénoménologie : comme un logos se portant lui-même à l'apparaître dans un pur intuitionner. Selon les derniers traits de sa philosophie dans la phénoménologie spéculative de Hegel et dans la phénoménologie transcendantale de Husserl, se signalent sa réduction au phénomène Esprit et la thèse originaire de l'Ego à travers une « relève » et une « époché » qui, elles, ne semblent pas davantage réductibles. À la lecture d'un (...) poème de Paul Celan – Parenthèse ouverte, parenthèse fermée –, il devient clair que la poésie trouve la manière de conduire encore le résidu transcendantal et spéculatif de la phénoménalité, de l' aisthesis et de la thesis à ses plus extrêmes limites, de dépasser celles-ci, d'exposer le résidu dans une aphénoménalité absolue et de parler avec ce reste dépourvu d'apparence et de parole. (shrink)

Translator's Abstract: The right to have rights was never a right to be had. Hannah Arendt's famous formulation of the most elementary right of all, the right to participate in the definition of rights, is not a description of a given right that belongs to one or the other form of law, but an indictment of a deficit in the construction of legality on the basis of the right to withdraw legal protection from members of a community, and therefore to (...) refuse rights. The one and only human right thus turns out to be ungrounded in anything but the idea of its being had: a " property right " that traces back to the legal, philosophical and linguistic definitions of " one's own " since antiquity. Only the gift of the incalculable and of that which cannot possibly be legitimated can ground the autarchic self-relation of having: ungrounded in the rationally organized nature of any given, possessing the right to membership in a political community turns out to be permission to freely transfer this possession to another, without expectation of a return. (shrink)

Werner Hamacher's thought, despite its relevance and scope in other languages, has had a rather tenuous reception in the Spanish-speaking world to date. It is even possible to speak of the obstruction, in some of its points, of the circulation of his thought, as a product of the complexity of its translation. These difficulties, far from being reducible to a merely technical problem, are discussed hand in hand with the comparative reading of some of his texts in Spanish. (...) His thought from and in the language, sometimes despite it, illustrates the relevance of considering translation as a key operation for the philosophical debate in general and in Spanish-speaking countries in particular. (shrink)

This text pays tribute to Werner Hamacher’s work. It contemplates Hamacher’s thought about language, especially his criticism of views that measure language according to its propositional and referential functions. Instead, Hamacher foregrounds the importance of language’s interruptions, strikes and disorders, in which language operates independently of anything but itself, thus revealing its innermost core. The text examines Hamacher’s “The Second Inversion,” “Afformative, Strike,” and “Other Pains.”.

This text pays tribute to Werner Hamacher’s work. It contemplates Hamacher’s thought about language, especially his criticism of views that measure language according to its propositional and referential functions. Instead, Hamacher foregrounds the importance of language’s interruptions, strikes and disorders, in which language operates independently of anything but itself, thus revealing its innermost core. The text examines Hamacher’s “The Second Inversion,” “Afformative, Strike,” and “Other Pains.”.

Le 17 juillet 2017, Werner,Werner, toi ici avec nous, toi si proche et si lointain, aussi lointain que proche,Werner, plus loin…Werner je suis sans parole – et tu dis aussitôt : « Qui est sans parole a dans sa privation même quelque chose de la parole ».Quelque chose ou peut-être tout vas-tu dire car on ne parle qu’à partir du manque de parole et on cherche sa propre disparition.Parce que je suis sans parole, je me trouve (...) là où tu veux. Là où il est question de « l’aphasie structurelle du lan... (shrink)

El artículo analiza el problema del comprender a partir de las nociones de des-alejamiento, partida y trauma. Mientras que la comprensión tradicionalmente ha sido abordada desde una noción clásica de representación, asociada a la presencia y la disponibilidad, aquí se explora una vía del comprender que recoge ciertos aportes del pensamiento de Werner Hamacher y Sigmund Freud, que arrancan de una reformulación de la noción predominante de representación. La lectura minuciosa, apegada al texto, de un poema de Rilke, (...) que implica además su traducción, permite poner a prueba dichos aportes y desarrollar las ideas de sustracción, partida y des-alejamiento sobre el trasfondo del célebre juego freudiano del Fort/Da. Todo esto, con el fin de esbozar las consecuencias de tal ejercicio para una comprensión detraída del comprender a partir del antecedente de los autores mencionados. (shrink)

The paper is a modest attempt at a careful assessment of Werner Hamacher’s version of deconstruction as a reading strategy which centers upon the idea of the afformative caesura. In order to probe the potential and the possible limits of Hamacher’s strategy, the author presents a Hamacherian reading of one of Paul Celan’s poems, titled “Mauerspruch,” a poem brimming with references to Walter Benjamin’s work. In the first part of the paper the author shows the effectiveness of (...) Hamacherian perspective. In the second part, however, following suggestions of the poem itself, the author shows that the perspective should be extended in order to include two crucial categories: the category of the image and the category of memory. Thus, ultimately, the assessment of Werner Hamacher’s strategy results in a praise and a modest proposal of its amendment. (shrink)

Death is ironic; as the archi-semiotician and first historian, death fixes object and meaning in a semiotic complex, separates non-sensuous meaning from bare physical existence, but thereby exposes meaning to the capriciousness of interpretation and tradition. The pause, however, conserves that which does not happen in repose, yet does not interrupt history, and lets history emerge in a movement in which all determination of meaning is suspended. This essay is written in memory of Werner Hamacher, whose life in (...) writing shaped language around its distance and delay from the fixity of sound and sense, which, as he argued, are the subliminal conditions to every communication, presentation, and form in general: formative limits that separate and conjoin that which is and the surplus of un-actuality and incompletion that accompanies each instant of our intentional lives. (shrink)

En este trabajo me ocuparé de reconstruir los diferentes paradigmas de lectura de Zur Kritik der Gewalt de Benjamin que proponen Jacques Derrida y Werner Hamacher alrededor de 1989. En primer lugar, se analizará cómo de diferente manera ambos autores definen la violencia en los términos de la performatividad del lenguaje: Derrida como una “fuerza diferencial” y Hamacher con el concepto de “afformativo”. En segundo lugar, cómo estos conceptos de performatividad consideran dos ejemplos políticos contrapuestos de la (...) Kritik: la “policía” y la “huelga general proletaria”. Finalmente, cómo el estrecho diálogo entre Derrida y Hamacher, más allá de la Kritik benjamineana, interroga los alcances ético-políticos del método de la deconstrucción. (shrink)

Im 82. Brief an Lucilius führt Seneca den Versuch, mittels Dialektik in Form eines Syllogismus von der Todesfurcht zu befreien, durch seine eigene unnachahmliche Art der Psychagogie ad absurdum. Der bisher im Einzelnen noch nicht hinreichend erklärte Text wird durch eine ausführliche Einleitung und einen Kommentar (mit durchgängiger interpretierender Übersetzung) erschlossen. Die Einleitung ordnet den Brief in die dialektische Tradition der Stoiker ein, beleuchtet römische Einschätzungen der Dialektik und versucht auf dieser Basis Senecas durchaus differenzierte Position herauszuarbeiten. Den Hauptteil bildet (...) ein detaillierter Kommentar mit textkritischen, sprachlichen und sachlichen Erläuterungen. (shrink)

Plato's dialogues frequently criticize traditional Greek myth, yet Plato also integrates myth with his writing. Daniel S. Werner confronts this paradox through an in-depth analysis of the Phaedrus, Plato's most mythical dialogue. Werner argues that the myths of the Phaedrus serve several complex functions: they bring nonphilosophers into the philosophical life; they offer a starting point for philosophical inquiry; they unify the dialogue as a literary and dramatic whole; they draw attention to the limits of language and the (...) limits of knowledge; and they allow Plato to co-opt cultural authority as a way of defining and legitimating the practice of philosophy. Platonic myth, as a species of traditional tale, is thus both distinct from philosophical dialectic and similar to it. Ultimately, the most powerful effect of Platonic myth is the way in which it leads readers to participate in Plato's dialogues and to engage in a process of self-examination. (shrink)

Big data biology—bioinformatics, computational biology, systems biology (including ‘omics’), and synthetic biology—raises a number of issues for the philosophy of science. This article deals with several such: Is data-intensive biology a new kind of science, presumably post-reductionistic? To what extent is big data biology data-driven? Can data ‘speak for themselves?’ I discuss these issues by way of a reflection on Carl Woese’s worry that “a society that permits biology to become an engineering discipline, that allows that science to slip into (...) the role of changing the living world without trying to understand it, is a danger to itself.” And I argue that scientific perspectivism, a philosophical stance represented prominently by Giere, Van Fraassen, and Wimsatt, according to which science cannot as a matter of principle transcend our human perspective, provides the best resources currently at our disposal to tackle many of the philosophical issues implied in the modeling of complex, multilevel/multiscale phenomena. (shrink)

According to an optimistic view, affective empathy is a route to knowledge of what it is like to be in the target person’s state (“phenomenal knowledge”). Roughly, the idea is that the empathizer gains this knowledge by means of empathically experiencing the target’s emotional state. The literature on affective empathy, however, often draws a simplified picture according to which the target feels only a single emotion at a time. Co-occurring emotions (“concurrent emotions”) are rarely considered. This is problematic, because concurring (...) emotions seem to support a sceptical view according to which we cannot gain phenomenal knowledge of the target person’s state by means of affective empathy. The sceptic concludes that attaining the epistemic goal of affective empathy is difficult, in practice often impossible. I accept the sceptic’s premises, but reject the conclusion, because of the argument’s unjustified, hidden premise: that the epistemic goal of affective empathy is phenomenal knowledge. I argue that the epistemic goal of affective empathy is phenomenal understanding, not knowledge. Attention to the under-explored phenomenon of concurring emotions clarifies why this is important. I argue that this is the decisive epistemic progress in everyday cases of phenomenal understanding of another person. (shrink)