We all think that science is special. Its products—its technological spin-off—dominate our lives which are thereby sometimes enriched and sometimes impoverished but always affected. Even the most outlandish critics of science such as Feyerabend implicitly recognize its success. Feyerabend told us that science was a congame. Scientists had so successfully hood-winked us into adopting its ideology that other equally legitimate forms of activity—alchemy, witchcraft and magic—lost out. He conjured up a vision of much enriched lives if only we could free (...) ourselves from the domination of the ‘one true ideology’ of science just as our ancestors freed us from the domination of the Church. But he told us these things in Switzerland and in California happily commuting between them in that most ubiquitous product of science—the aeroplane. (shrink)

Originally published in 1980. What is time? How is its structure determined? The enduring controversy about the nature and structure of time has traditionally been a diametrical argument between those who see time as a container into which events are placed, and those for whom time cannot exist without events. This controversy between the absolutist and the relativist theories of time is a central theme of this study. The author's impressive arguments provide grounds for rejecting both these theories, firstly by (...) establishing that 'empty' time is possible, and secondly by showing, through a discussion of the structure of time which involves considering whether time might be cyclical, branching, beginning or non-beginning, that the absolutist theory of time is untenable. This book then advances two new theories, and succeeds in shifting the traditional debate about time to a consideration of time as a theoretical structure and as a theoretical framework. (shrink)

SummaryEllis, Jardine and Putnam have argued that the would‐be scientific realist can only avoid being a metaphysical realist by becoming an “internal realist” . While metaphysical realism is unattractive, the approaches to truth offered by Ellis, Jardine and Putnam are quite unacceptable. However, the is no reason to think that one who wishes to be a scientific realist is limited to these two options.

First published in 1985. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The point of departure for all discussions of nonstatistical explanation in the philosophy of science has been the deductive‐nomological or covering law model of explanation that was given its most influential exposition by Carl Hempel, who was also the pioneering figure in the discussion of statistical explanation (see statistical explanation). On this account, to explain a particular event, we cite other particular events together with a general law or laws which "cover" what we want to explain. For example, we might (...) explain why a balloon expanded when placed on a radiator, by citing the fact that the radiator was hot together with the relevant laws relating heat to expansion. (shrink)

David Hume is the greatest figure in the empiricist tradition in philosophy and was a particular source of inspiration for the logical positivists (see logical positivism). Hume was born in 1711 and entered Edinburgh University at the age of 12. After graduating, he had a varied career in commerce, diplomacy, as a librarian, and as a writer of history. Twice he was secretary to General St Clair and on one occasion set off with him on an expedition to drive the (...) French out of Canada. Forced back by the wind, it was decided instead to make a brief incursion on the coast of Brittany. This failed, for the expedition had maps of Canada, but none of Brittany. During a three‐year stay in France he wrote his major philosophical work Treatise of Human Nature. It appeared in 1739 and, in his own words, “fell dead‐born from the Press.” His Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, which was intended to be a more popular version of book I of his Treatise, was published in 1748 but was only a little more favorably received. His six‐volume History of England, on the other hand, was a great success. He died in 1776, never having succeeded in his ambition to be appointed to a professorship of philosophy in Scotland, due to his religious skepticism. (shrink)

It is a familiar fact in the practice of science that the available observational evidence may not decide between rival hypotheses or theories. For instance, at the time of Copernicus it was widely held that his theory and the Ptolemaic theory did not differ in their predictions in regard to the available astronomical data. This situation can be illustrated by an analogy. Imagine a finite number of dots on a page of paper representing the available evidence. It will always be (...) possible to draw more than one curve connecting the points. How do we decide which curve or theory to adopt? A standard response is to look to some area where the theories make different predictions. We then seek new evidence, perhaps by conducting an experiment, to determine which theory's prediction is correct and opt tentatively for that one. If it is not feasible to gather this evidence, we can be agnostic for the moment on the question of which it is best to adopt. Or, more likely, we will look to factors other than tit with the data to assist us in resolving the matter (see pragmatic factors in theory acceptance). We will call this phenomena weak Underdetermination of theories, or WUT. (shrink)

We think that science is special: its products ‐ technological spin‐offs ‐ dominate our lives. Sometimes it enriches our lives; sometimes it impoverishes them or even takes them away. For better or for worse, no institution has had more impact on the character of our existence this millennium than science. Penicillin, computers, atomic bombs make modern life modern life.

Erving Goffman's distinctive contribution to an understanding of others was grounded in his information control and ritual models of the interaction process. This contribution centered on the forms of the interaction order rather than self-other relations as traditionally conceived in phenomenology. Goffman came to phenomenology as a sympathetic but critical outsider who sought resources for the sociological mining of the interaction order. His engagement with phenomenological thinkers (principally Gustav Ichheiser, Jean-Paul Sartre and Alfred Schutz) has to be understood in these (...) terms. The article traces basic differences in analytical focus through a range of phenomenological critiques of Goffman and a comparison of salient aspects of Schutz's and Goffman's writings. While the contrasts have perhaps been overplayed, I conclude that Goffman's thinking about others probably owed more to his pragmatist roots than to his later encounters with phenomenology. (shrink)

What determines whether an action is right or wrong? Morality, Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader explores for students and researchers the relationship between consequentialist theory and moral rules. Most of the chapters focus on rule consequentialism or on the distinction between act and rule versions of consequentialism. Contributors, among them the leading philosophers in the discipline, suggest ways of assessing whether rule consequentialism could be a satisfactory moral theory. These essays, all of which are previously unpublished, provide students in (...) moral philosophy with essential material and ask key questions on just what the criteria for an adequate moral theory might be. (shrink)

v. 1. Nicomachean ethics. Politics. The Athenian Constitution. Rhetoric. On Poetics.--v. 2. Logic.--v. 3. Physics. Metaphysics. On the soul. Short physical treaties.--v. 4. On the heavens. On generation and corruption. Meteorology. Biological treatises.

Examines the relationship between making objects and knowing nature in Europe from the mid-15th to mid-19th centuries.

Goldstein attempts to establish a middle position between the idealist and the realist arguments concerning truth and fact in history. Though fact serves as the touchstone of truth, we cannot verify propositions, especially historical propositions, in terms of fact. Nowell-Smith argues that Goldstein cannot acknowledge the importance of reality for everyday affairs, while denying its importance in history. Goldstein could have avoided such problems by realizing that if he is an opponent of historical realism, he must be a supporter (...) of historical idealism. He could resolve Nowell-Smith's objections by adopting the Kantian argument which contrasts two types of judgment; judgment proper and particular attempts at judgment. Statements of objective fact, including historical facts, would be considered judgment proper. This would still allow for some judgments which did not fulfill objective criteria, but could count as knowledge. (shrink)

© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.Genetic studies have identified single nucleotide polymorphisms associated with the risk of prostate cancer. It remains unclear whether such genetic variants are associated with disease aggressiveness. The NCI-SPORE Genetics Working Group retrospectively collected clinicopathologic information and genotype data for 36 SNPs which at the time had been validated to be associated with PC risk from 25,674 cases with PC. Cases were grouped according to race, Gleason score and aggressiveness. Statistical analyses were used to compare the frequency (...) of the SNPs between different disease cohorts. After adjusting for multiple testing, only PC-risk SNP rs2735839 was significantly and inversely associated with aggressive and high-grade disease in European men. Similar associations with aggressive and high-grade disease were documented in African-American subjects. The G allele of rs2735839 was associated with disease aggressiveness even at low PSA levels in both European and African-American men. Our results provide further support that a PC-risk SNP rs2735839 near the KLK3 gene on chromosome 19q13 may be associated with aggressive and high-grade PC. Future prospectively designed, case-case GWAS are needed to identify additional SNPs associated with PC aggressiveness. (shrink)

REMARKS ON EVOLUTION AND TIME-SCALES, Graham Cairns-Smith; HODGSON'S BLACK BOX, Thomas Clark; DO HODGSON'S PROPOSITIONS UNIQUELY CHARACTERIZE FREE WILL?, Ravi Gomatam; WHAT SHOULD WE RETAIN FROM A PLAIN PERSON'S CONCEPT OF FREE WILL?, Gilberto Gomes; ISOLATING DISPARATE CHALLENGES TO HODGSON'S ACCOUNT OF FREE WILL, Liberty Jaswal; FREE AGENCY AND LAWS OF NATURE, Robert Kane; SCIENCE VERSUS REALIZATION OF VALUE, NOT DETERMINISM VERSUS CHOICE, Nicholas Maxwell; COMMENTS ON HODGSON, J.J.C. Smart; THE VIEW FROM WITHIN, Sean Spence; COMMENTARY ON HODGSON, Henry (...) Stapp. (shrink)