We show that modal logics characterized by a class of frames satisfying the insertion property are suitable for Reiter's default logic. We refine the canonical fix point construction defined by Marek, Schwarz and Truszczyński for Reiter's default logic and thus we addrress a new paradigm for nonmonotonic logic. In fact, differently from the construction defined by these authors. we show that suitable modal logics for such a construction must indeed contain K D4. When reflexivity is added to the modal logic (...) used for the fix point construction then we come to the Marek Schwarz and Truszczyński framework for Reiter's default logic. Our framework, in fact, is appropriate also to the family of modal logics in between S4 and S4f. If, instead, reflexivity is dropped, then we show that a new family of modal logics is gained, namely the modal logics in between KD4 and KD4Z. The upper bound can be extended to the modal logic KD4LZ whenever the propositional language taken into account is finite. (shrink)

Since the earliest formalisation of default logic by Reiter many contributions to this appealing approach to nonmonotonic reasoning have been given. The different formalisations are here presented in a general framework that gathers the basic notions, concepts and constructions underlying default logic. Our view is to interpret defaults as special rules that impose a restriction on the juxtaposition of monotonic Hubert-style proofs of a given logicL. We propose to describe default logic as a logic where the juxtaposition of default proofs (...) is subordinate to a restriction condition . Hence a default logic is a pair (L, ) where properties of the logic , like compactness, can be interpreted through the restriction condition . Different default systems are then given a common characterization through a specific condition on the logicL. We also prove cumulativity for any default logic (L, ) by slightly modifying the notion of default proof. We extend, in fact, the language ofL in a way close to that followed by Brewka in the formulation of his cumulative default system. Finally we show the existence of infinitely many intermediary default logics, depending on and called linear logics, which lie between Reiter's and ukaszewicz' versions of default logic. (shrink)

In this paper we address the problem of combining a logic with nonmonotonic modal logic. In particular we study the intuitionistic case. We start from a formal analysis of the notion of intuitionistic consistency via the sequent calculus. The epistemic operator M is interpreted as the consistency operator of intuitionistic logic by introducing intuitionistic stable sets. On the basis of a bimodal structure we also provide a semantics for intuitionistic stable sets.

How do models represent reality? There are two conditions that scientific models must satisfy to be representations of real systems, the aboutness condition and the epistemic condition. In this article, I critically assess the two main fictionalist theories of models as representations, the indirect fiction view and the direct fiction view, with respect to these conditions. And I develop a novel proposal, what I call ‘the new fiction view of models’. On this view, models are akin to fictional stories; they (...) represent real-world phenomena if they stand in a denotation relation with reality; and they enable knowledge of reality via the generation of theoretical hypotheses, model–world comparisons and direct attributions. (shrink)

Upholders of fictionalism about scientific models have not yet successfully explained how scientists can learn about the real world by making comparisons between models and the real phenomena they stand for. In this paper I develop an account of model-world comparisons in terms of what I take to be the best antirealist analyses of comparative claims that emerge from the current debate on fiction.

How do scientific models represent in a way that enables us to discover new truths about reality and draw inferences about it? Contemporary accounts of scientific discovery answer this question by focusing on the cognitive mechanisms involved in the generation of new ideas and concepts in terms of a special sort of reasoning—or model-based reasoning—involving imagery. Alternatively, I argue that answering this question requires that we recognise the crucial role of the propositional imagination in the construction and development of models (...) for the purpose of generating hypotheses that are plausible candidates for truth. I propose simple fictionalism as a new account of models as Waltonian games of make-believe and suggest that models can lead to genuine scientific discovery when they are used as representations that denote real world phenomena and generate two main kinds of theoretical hypotheses, model-world comparisons and direct attributions. (shrink)

The problem of satisfaction conditions arises from the apparent difficulties of explaining the nature of the mental states involved in our emotional responses to tragic fictions. Greg Currie has recently proposed to solve the problem by arguing for the recognition of a class of imaginative counterparts of desires - what he and others call i-desires. In this paper I will articulate and rebut Currie's argument in favour of i-desires and I will put forward a new solution in terms of genuine (...) desires. To this aim I will show that the same sort of puzzling phenomenon involved in our responses to tragic fictions arises also in a non-fictional case, and I will offer a solution to the problem of satisfaction conditions that dispenses with i-desires. The key to the explanation is in the notion of condition-dependent desires triggered by fictions. (shrink)

Theoretical models are widely held as sources of knowledge of reality. Imagination is vital to their development and to the generation of plausible hypotheses about reality. But how can imagination, which is typically held to be completely free, effectively instruct us about reality? In this paper I argue that the key to answering this question is in constrained uses of imagination. More specifically, I identify make-believe as the right notion of imagination at work in modelling. I propose the first overarching (...) taxonomy of types of constraints on scientific imagination that enables knowledge of reality. And I identify two main kinds of knowledge enabled by models, knowledge of the imaginary scenario specified by models and knowledge of reality. (shrink)

What are theoretical models and how do they contribute to a scientific understanding of reality? In this chapter, I will argue that models are akin to fictional stories in that they are human-made artifacts created through the imaginative activities of scientists. And I will suggest that the sort of imagination involved in modeling is make-believe and that this is constrained in three main ways which, together, enable knowledge of reality. I will conclude by addressing recent criticisms against the fiction view (...) of models and the relevance of scientific imagination in modeling put forward by Weisberg and Knuuttila. (shrink)

The problem of intersubjective identification arises from the difficulties of explaining how our thoughts and discourse about fictional characters can be directed towards the same (or different) characters given the assumption that there are no fictional entities. In this paper I aim to offer a solution in terms of participation in a practice of thinking and talking about the same thing, which is inspired by Sainsbury's name-using practices. I will critically discuss a similar idea that was put forward by Friend (...) in terms of participation in what Perry calls a notion-network. I will then argue in favor of Sainsbury's baptism-based approach against Perry's information-based approach and I will answer some recent objections that Friend put forward against the former. (shrink)

In this entry I present one of the most hotly debated issues in contemporary analytic philosophy regarding the nature of fictional entities and the motivations that might be adduced for and against positing them into our ontology. The entry is divided in two parts. In the first part I offer an overview of the main accounts of the metaphysics of fictional entities according to three standard realist views, fictional Meinongianism, fictional possibilism and fictional creationism. In the second part I describe (...) two main kinds of arguments for or against positing fictional entities into our ontology. The first kind is traditionally inspired by the linguistic data coming from our talk about fictional characters. The second kind is more recent and it builds on genuine ontological considerations. (shrink)

Fiora Salis compares the fictional and the artifactual views of models. She argues that both accounts contain several deep insights concerning the nature of scientific models but they also face some difficult challenges. She then puts forward an account of the ontology of models intended to incorporate the benefits of both views avoiding their main difficulties. Her key idea is that models are human-made artifacts that are akin to literary works of fiction. In this view, models are complex objects (...) that are constituted by a model description and the model content generated within a game of make-believe. As per the fiction view, model descriptions are construed as props in a game of make-believe, where props are concrete objects that prescribe certain imaginings. As per the artifactual view, model descriptions are construed as concrete representational tools that enable and constrain a scientist’s cognitive processes and provide intersubjective epistemic access to their imaginings. (shrink)

According to Millianism, the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent. According to anti-realism about fictional entities, there are no such entities. If there are no fictional entities, how can we explain the apparent meaningfulness of fictional names? Our best theory of fiction, Walton’s theory of make-believe, makes the same assumptions but lacks the theoretical resources to answer the question. In this paper, I propose a pragmatic solution in terms of two main dimensions of meaning, a subjective, psychological (...) dimension and an intersubjective, public dimension. The psychological dimension builds on the notion of mental files; the public dimension builds on Stalnaker’s notion of common ground. The account is coherent with two main theoretical principles, parsimony and uniformity. Furthermore, it satisfies three explanatory conditions posed by the intentionality of our thought and discourse about fiction, object-directedness, counterfictional imagining and intersubjective identification. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

This article addresses two main questions: what is excellence and should epistemic excellence be the main purpose of education? Though references to excellence have become increasingly frequent in the UK education policy, these questions are perhaps especially important in Scotland where the curriculum is explicitly for excellence. Following Hirst and Peters, it is hypothesised that if the term ‘education’ implies possession of a certain breadth of general knowledge and understanding, then the term ‘excellence’ may imply a deep grasp of a (...) specific body of knowledge. However, after consideration of Dewey's suggestion that being present in the moment is an excellence of childhood, it is concluded that the development of epistemic excellence should be regarded as an educational purpose rather than the only educational purpose and pupil engagement with public traditions of knowledge provides necessary but not sufficient conditions for education. (shrink)

This article explores the themes of trust and ethical conduct in social research, with particular attention to the trust that can develop between the members of a research team as well as between researchers and the researched. The authors draw upon a three-year empirical study of destinations and outcomes for young people excluded from alternative educational provision. They also make reference to a contemporary exposition of Aristotle's writing on friendship in order to explore two sets of relevant distinctions that have (...) a bearing upon our understanding of relationships that emerge in the context of social research projects. These distinctions are between impartiality and selectivity on the one hand, and between universality and particularity on the other. The authors attempt to demonstrate that these distinctions influence the development of trust and the conduct of ethical research, arguing that the latter is not synonymous with compliance to ethical guidelines. (shrink)

This paper explores the reasons why the notion of 'evidence-based' practice has gained prominence in educational research. The ascendancy of 'evidence-based' practice is attributed to a crisis of legitimation in educational research. The paper offers a critical exegesis of a systematic review conducted under the auspices of the Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) subgroup of the Cochrane Collaboration.

Nesta entrada irei apresentar uma nova taxonomia sistemática das nossas capacidades imaginativas, coerente com os tratamentos convencionais em ciência cognitiva, filosofia da mente e estética. Em particular, irei distinguir entre a imaginação não-proposicional e a imaginação proposicional, o que inclui ainda outras subvariedades, como a imaginação objectual, a imagética, a imaginação experiencial, a suposição, o faz-de-conta e outras.

In this entry I will offer a systematic novel taxonomy of our imaginative abilities coherent with standard treatments in cognitive science, philosophy of mind and aesthetics. In particular, I will distinguish between the non-propositional imagination and the propositional imagination, which include several further sub-varieties such as the objectual imagination, imagery, experiential imagination, supposition, make-believe and more.

In this entry I will offer a survey of the contemporary debate on fic- tionalism, which is a distinctive anti-realist view about certain regions of discourse that are valued for their usefulness rather than their truth.

We consider academic freedom in the context of broader developments in higher education. We suggest that the tenor of contemporary debates on the subject is a manifestation of pervasive forms of authoritarianism that undermine the university as a home of adventure, a place and space that is conducive to the conduct of free inquiry.It is evident that some champions of academic freedom engage in dangerously polarized forms of spectacle, engendered by a management culture that embraces showmanship and routinely favours talking (...) over listening. As such, they represent a force for conformity rather than dissent; division rather than collective action. These forms of spectacle jeopardize rather than promote the principles of academic freedom by polarizing the terms of the debate for maximum ‘impact’. We explore the implications of conceptualizations of academic freedom that focus on the rights of everyone in the university. We also suggest that the notion might usefully be extended to those on precarious contracts, and to students facing normative expectations about what constitutes ‘progress’ in academic practice. Drawing upon Timothy Snyder’s On Tyranny. Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century and an essay by Vaclav Havel, we reassess the notion of the ‘pursuit of truth’ that underlies conventional definitions of academic freedom.We conclude with a brief vignette, a rousing endorsement of the ineffable and irreducible qualities of friendship. This entails slaying a fictitious, three-headed dragon and embracing a form of spectacle that transcends attempts to capture why it moves us. We leave the reader with warm-blooded traces of energy, curiosity, liveliness, and quiet determination. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the hypothesis that constrained uses of imagination are crucial to economic modeling. We propose a theoretical framework to develop this thesis through a number of specific hypotheses that we test and refine through six new, representative case studies. Our ultimate goal is to develop a philosophical account that is practice oriented and informed by empirical evidence. To do this, we deploy an abductive reasoning strategy. We start from a robust set of hypotheses and leave space (...) for the generation of further hypotheses and theoretical claims based on the qualitative analysis of new empirical data. (shrink)

Against standard descriptivist and referentialist semantics for fictional reports, I will defend a view according to which fictional names do not refer yet they can be distinguished from one another in virtue of their different name-using practices. The logical structures of sentences containing fictional names inherit these distinctions. Different interpretations follow.

Review essay of How to do science with models. A philosophical primer. Springer briefs in philosophy, Axel Gelfert., 129, Price € 49,99 softcover, ISBN: 978-3-319-27954-1.

The aim of this article is to explore what the concept of interdisciplinarity can bring to our developing understanding of education as a field of enquiry. We shall draw upon some recent writing on the disciplines of education in order to explore the potentially negative consequences of the way in which the disciplines are institutionalised and territorialised. We also assign some prominence to a personal account of an eminent anthropologist's perambulations through a disciplinary landscape in order to put forward an (...) initial, tentative view of interdisciplinary endeavour. Nietzsche's essay 'Schopenhauer as educator' and the distinction between measurable time (chronos) and lived time (kairos) are the vehicles through which the authors explore the nature of intellectual inquiry. They also consider the implications of the prevalence of spatial and cartographic metaphors in scholarship in this area of enquiry, and reflect on the contrasting notions of habitation and occupation. They put forward the view that the key to understanding the role of the disciplines of education is in exploring the reciprocal relations between the lives of academics and the institutions of the disciplines (books, articles, reports, societies, journals, conferences, networks), between personal narrative and grand narrative, and in attempting to reconcile full-bodied being and the ghostly life of 'pure knowledge'. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is threefold: to offer a vision of human flourishing in the academy premised upon ‘living in truth’, embracing lived experience and being in relation; to explore counterfactual thinking across the life-course, from the period of compulsory schooling to the end of life, with the emphasis on the latter; and to critique the practice of drawing upon philosophy to provide an interpretative framework through which to address the arts, drawing upon the work of Cora Diamond. The (...) movement towards death is explored through three vignettes, focusing on the lived experience of three ‘characters’ facing the prospect of their imminent demise: the philosopher Richard Rorty, the English television dramatist and screenwriter Dennis Potter and a consultant physician (the father of one of the authors). Drawing upon the work of the historian Timothy Snyder, the relevance of the claim made by Vaclav Havel that ‘essence precedes existence’ is explored in relation to the climate of the contemporary education system. The primacy of essence over existence is also a key feature of the vignettes of the lives of the three players that form the centrepiece of the article. These enable us to ‘think without thinking’, which is perhaps a counterfactual claim par excellence. (shrink)

This article offers a critique of the notion of ‘capacity building’ in educational theory. Are the intentions behind the latter enterprise as benign and altruistic as they first appear? How is the term ‘capacity building’ to be understood? The article presents a radical and daring alternative for re-invigorating educational research that foregrounds the ethical engagement of the researcher by exploring the expressive, cognitive and imaginative possibilities of language. Drawing on the Calvino's idea of the ‘lightness of thoughtfulness’, I suggest that (...) the emphasis accorded to the notion of ‘capacity building’ may detract attention from the equally significant role of incapacity in helping us to move the discussion forward in a responsive and ethical way. (shrink)

Telling stories is a basic human activity. It enables us to organise, evaluate and transform what we see going on around us. It allows us to make sense of what is happening, to defy what is ephemeral in our experience. In short, it helps us to read the signs and between the lines. In the story that follows, we shall watch how Little Monster struggles with the apparently random and inexplicable and strives to make order out of chaos. He is (...) fortunate to have a mother who regards story-telling as a significant determinant of his psycho-social well-being. Indeed, there are those who would argue that engaging in the construction of narrative is a precondition for literacy development, academic success and enhanced life chances. Our second story begins here, as we exploit the potential of narrative to function as a developmental turning-point in our understanding of contemporary debates on early literacy acquisition in the context of the National Evaluation of the Early Intervention Programme in Scotland. (shrink)

Telling stories is a basic human activity. It enables us to organise, evaluate and transform what we see going on around us. It allows us to make sense of what is happening, to defy what is ephemeral in our experience. In short, it helps us to read the signs and between the lines. In the story that follows, we shall watch how Little Monster struggles with the apparently random and inexplicable and strives to make order out of chaos. He is (...) fortunate to have a mother who regards story-telling as a significant determinant of his psycho-social well-being. Indeed, there are those who would argue that engaging in the construction of narrative is a precondition for literacy development, academic success and enhanced life chances. Our second story begins here, as we exploit the potential of narrative to function as a developmental turning-point in our understanding of contemporary debates on early literacy acquisition in the context of the National Evaluation of the Early Intervention Programme in Scotland. (shrink)

For three years in a row, an international group of philosophers of education came together to reflect and promote a conception of philosophy as a lived experience. This book is a result of their discussions and makes an original contribution to the field. The book presents conceptual and critical works relevant to the current theoretical developments and debates within the fields of philosophy and education. The articles contribute both to philosophical clarifications and the advancement of research with solid arguments for (...) theoretical and practical redirections. To deploy their arguments, the contributors draw on classical thinkers - such as Plato, Kant, and Dewey - and on contemporary prominent theorists - such as Derrida, Badiou, and Deleuze - with fresh and critical perspectives. (Series: Studies on Education - Vol. 3). (shrink)

Philosophy as Interplay and Dialogue is an original and stimulating collection of essays. It covers conceptual and critical works relevant to current theoretical developments and debates. An international group of philosophers of education come together each summer on a Greek island. This book is the product of their diligent philosophical analysis and extended dialogues. To deploy their arguments, the authors draw on classical thinkers and contemporary prominent theorists, such as Badiou and Malabou, with fresh and critical perspectives. This book thus (...) makes an original contribution to the field. (Series: Studies on Education, Vol. 5) [Subject: Philosophy of Education]. (shrink)