The dualistic structures permeating western culture emphasize radical discontinuity between humans and nonhumans, but receptive attention to nonhuman others discloses both continuity and difference prevailing between other forms of life and our own. Recognizing that agency and subjectivity abound within nature alerts us to our potential for dominating and oppressing nonhuman others, as individuals and as groups. Reciprocally, seeing ourselves as biological beings may facilitate reconstructing our social reality to undo such destructive relationships.

Abstract:In her 2002 essay, "Anthropocentrism, Artificial Intelligence, and Moral Network Theory: An Ecofeminist Perspective," Victoria Davion points out, utilizing Val Plumwood's ecofeminist analysis, the faulty anthropocentric, logocentric assumptions made both within the artificial intelligence (AI) community, generating serious problems in the effort to build "intelligent" machines, and in moral philosophy, its "rule-based picture of moral reasoning" (169) coming under fire from the emerging field of neural net research. Davion demonstrates prescience regarding the direction in which both disciplines eventually move, as (...) they learn important "lessons from nature": that intelligence and moral reasoning are widely distributed throughout the Biosphere and are not based upon what has been taken as paradigmatic—the reductive, linear logic, abstracted from all context, characteristic of only one possible way of approaching the world. I present updates regarding artificial intelligence, neuropsychology, and the philosophical analysis of anthropocentrism, affirming that directing open, respectful attention toward the Other in the real, living world will eventually provide us with the ontological foundation for a nonanthropocentric ethics capable of sustaining truly intelligent and moral ways of living. (shrink)

Whaling is back on the international stage as pro-whaling interests push to reopen commercial whaling by overturning the moratorium imposed in 1986. Proponents of ending the ban are using two strategies: (1) appealing to public sentiment that supports indigenous subsistence whaling by attempting to cloak commercial whaling in the same guise and (2) maintaining that reopening commercial whaling is the “scientific” option. I reject both ploys, and instead shift the focus for global debate to scrutinizing the industrial economic model that (...) Western culture is currently imposing on the rest of the world, a model which ultimately reduces all life forms to mere commodities for the marketplace. (shrink)

Biological systems are highly complex, and for this reason there is a considerable degree of uncertainty as to the consequences of making significant interventions into their workings. Since a number of new technologies are already impinging on living systems, including our bodies, many of us have become participants in large-scale “social experiments”. I will discuss biological complexity and its relevance to the technologies that brought us BSE/vCJD and the controversy over GM foods. Then I will consider some of the complexities (...) of our social dynamics, and argue for making a shift from using the precautionary principle to employing the approach of evaluating the introduction of new technologies by conceiving of them as social experiments. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Introduction:Beyond Nature/Culture Dualism: Let's Try Co-Evolution Instead of "Control"Ronnie Hawkins (bio)In the original call for papers for this special issue, nature/culture dualism was characterized as a way of thinking that holds human culture and nonhuman nature to be radically different ontological spheres, hyperseparated and oppositional, or, as Val Plumwood maintains in her essay, an orientation that assumes "separate casts of characters in separate dramas." In the human (...) sphere, individuals are unique and their lives are precious (at least theoretically), with concerns understood "from the inside," in terms of experience, intention and agency. In the sphere of nature, on the other hand, nonhuman beings are seen "from the outside," at best as replaceable members of species or populations needed for ecosystem functioning and, at worst, as unagentive, thinglike objects open for unbridled human exploitation. With our vast information and communication systems now largely in place, however, our human "noösphere" is rapidly enlarging to place us firmly within the biosphere (which, of course, in the imagery of Venn diagrams, must make up the larger circle on the screen), illuminating "both casts in both dramas," or perhaps joining all actors on the stage in a many-act, multidimensional play, the denoument of which, whether or not the extant lifeforms on this [End Page 1] planet will continue to evolve, remains as yet unwritten. The five essays in this collection speak to these points, and together they develop an alternative vision to our present dualistic impasse, seeing multiple natural agencies engaged with humanity in ongoing co-evolution and, as Freya Mathews suggests, raising the hope for a synergistic restructuring of lifeways that may yet save us from anthropogenic catastrophe.In "The Culture of Nature As Seen Through Mississippian Geographies," Jeff Baldwin shows us the broad scope of interacting agents, human and nonhuman, biological and geological, in what he terms "the nature-culture of the Mississippi River," as highlighted by the recent devastation of human habitation along the Gulf Coast of the United States wrought by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. By enacting a role in which we "believe [our]selves to rule over a mechanistic world," we humans have, over the last century or so, stemmed the natural flooding of the Mississippi, rerouting the sediments that maintained and extended the delta, funneling them into the sea and thereby bringing about the subsidence and erosion of hundreds of square miles of coastal land. Concomitantly, we have let agricultural runoff from the huge Mississippi drainage basin eject excess nutrients into the Gulf of Mexico, stimulating algal blooms and die-offs, depleting the water of oxygen so as to create a hypoxic "dead zone" that is now the size of Massachusetts, and (though Baldwin does not discuss this aspect of the problem) we have released enough petrochemical pollution in the area to have earned the lower reaches of the River the name "Cancer Alley" decades ago. A failure to grasp the import of these large anthropogenic effects is, sadly, evident in calls for rebuilding the New Orleans area according to the same mechanistic model that has already proven so inadequate. Baldwin observes that the earth changes wrought through human cultural innovation often occur so rapidly, or have their negative feedbacks technologically so displaced through time and space, that their eventual impacts on the larger system may initially go unappreciated. His vision of "the culture of nature," however, is ultimately an optimistic one, since his functional understanding of culture is that it ultimately works toward mutualism, promoting increasingly appropriate relationships among all interacting components, and he finds evidence of a growing effort to establish an "intentional co-evolution," a conscious alignment of human projects with the ongoing projects of a living nature that encompasses them. [End Page 2]If Baldwin's essay helps us see our human activities "from the outside"—not just "from within" prevailing human culture, where they seem taken-for-granted necessities given a certain form of social construction, but as they alternatively appear inside biospherical space, often as inappropriate, exploitative interferences and intrusions—Stacey Sowards' essay, "Identification Through Orangutans: Destabilizing the Nature/Culture Dualism," explores the potential for our connecting with nonhuman life "from the inside," relating... (shrink)

The ecofeminist critique of dualism is applied to a consideration of two alternative paths that we might take in transplantation medicine: the utilization of organs and tissues taken from nonhuman animals, and/or further development of techniques for employing human organs and tissues, including human fetal tissue. It is concluded that from an evolutionary perspective, the assumption of a vast value disparity between human and nonhuman life is untenable, and from a moral point of view the establishment of yet another institution (...) based on a dualistic opposition between human life, postulated to be of ultimate value, versus devalued, disposable "other" life is unacceptable. We are urged to forego xenotransplantation and instead take responsibility for whatever manipulations we choose, respectfully, to make with life that is already valued as "self" rather than "other.". (shrink)

Val Plumwood's criticism of the ecologically irrational p-centric logic of rationalism, which neglects or denies its dependence on all that is not-p, undercutting its own biological base while denying the illness of the culture it has spawned, is juxtaposed with the clinical picture of the linguistic left hemisphere acting without benefit of input from the more real-time-and-space-centered right. Exploring the metaphor suggests that visual gestalts depicting actual relationships might be effective in drawing our industrial culture's collective attention away from its (...) fascination with endless lines of alphabetic characters and abstract numbers multiplying their way toward infinity, bringing it back to reality and ecological rationality. In illustration, ongoing habitat destruction wrought on the ground as humans follow the detached logic of economic rationalism is seen to reflect, rather than the illusion of eternal "growth" conveyed by Cartesian axes, the relentless finitude of fractal geometry's Sierpinski gasket. (shrink)

The way in which the theory of “group selection” was treated as a heresy in evolutionary biology during the latter part of the twentieth century is considered as itself being an emergent group phenomenon, and some possible reasons why this particular theory had to be repudiated by the dominant group are explored. Then the process of “heresy-hammering” in general is examined as a behavior that can block important feedback, allowing the group to engage in a form of collective selfdeception, and (...) is therefore judged to be epistemically irresponsible and potentially maladaptive in terms of the group’s long-term survival. Some possible methods of foiling this process—which seems to operate largely below the level of full conscious awareness—are proposed. (shrink)

This paper queries why we are more reluctant to perform stem cell research on human than on nonhuman embryos, given their remarkable similarities together with the former's greater promise for addressing human illnesses. I begin by examining two leading arguments for prohibiting stem cell research on human embryos. The first type of argument suggests that we should not interfere with the potential for human life. This argument, advanced in different ways by both utilitarians and religious believers, inadequately grapples with the (...) moral complexities raised by current technologies, such as IVF and cloning. Moreover, it fails to address the significant adverse effects of human overpopulation to both human and nonhuman well-being. The second line of argument addressed here suggests that we are morally prohibited from "playing God." This argument overlooks the various ways in which we do—indeed, we must—make life and death decisions. Further, the argument rests on an undefended assumption that we are only prohibited from making such decisions with regard to human life, while remaining free to make such decisions with regard to animals without apparent moral qualms. On the contrary, I argue that, from a fully ethical Darwinian standpoint, we must treat both human and nonhuman life with respect. Far from requiring us to abstain from difficult moral decision making, an attitude of respect toward all life requires human willingness to take responsibility for making difficult—indeed, sometimes excruciating—moral decisions. (shrink)

: There has been a marked expansion in our human knowledge in recent decades, and much of this new information about ourselves and our world has yet to be integrated into our human self-image. I maintain that understanding how we fit within the spectrum of lifeforms as the primates that we are will enable us to take a more active role in choosing ecologically responsible behavior and will allow us to address more effectively our major problems of overpopulation, overconsumption, and (...) militarism. (shrink)

With increasing appreciation that the Y2K problem may turn out to have unpredictable and potentially far-reaching effects, we are faced with what in some ways resembles the looming global ecological crisis, only this time what is at stake are not vital ecosystem services but rather the vital structures of our highly complex socially constructed reality—and this time we have a date-certain deadline for the onset of the crisis. Regardless of what actually happens when the calendar turns from 1999 to 2000, (...) this period of waiting for the millennium bug can be a productive one if it induces some of us to contemplate what things we actually depend upon to sustain our lives and, utilizing John Searle's analysis, in what ways we might reconstruct our social reality if faced with the opportunity—and why we haven't begun to do so sooner. (shrink)

With increasing appreciation that the Y2K problem may turn out to have unpredictable and potentially far-reaching effects, we are faced with what in some ways resembles the looming global ecological crisis, only this time what is at stake are not vital ecosystem services but rather the vital structures of our highly complex socially constructed reality—and this time we have a date-certain deadline for the onset of the crisis. Regardless of what actually happens when the calendar turns from 1999 to 2000, (...) this period of waiting for the millennium bug can be a productive one if it induces some of us to contemplate what things we actually depend upon to sustain our lives and, utilizing John Searle's analysis, in what ways we might reconstruct our social reality if faced with the opportunity—and why we haven't begun to do so sooner. (shrink)

The literature of economic theory, like that of philosophy, abounds in prefaces and prolegomena. Methodology and analysis of concepts take an important place in a science which has not found the sure path of development. But there is no sure path for methodology either. The selfconscious methodology of social science has been largely a borrowing from that of physical science, where procedures have developed to a stage of considerable maturity. But the analogy falls down where guidance is most needed, at (...) the points where social science is most likely to develop new concepts and new types of structure. Philosophers have not been lacking, indeed, to belittle the entire enterprise, and to deny the possibility of anything that could strictly be called social science. (shrink)

What is the relationship between negative experience, artistic production, and prudential value? If it were true that (for some people) artistic creativity must be purchased at the price of negative experience (to be clear: currently no one knows whether this is true), what should we conclude about the value of such experiences? Are they worth it for the sake of art? The first part of this essay considers general questions about how to establish the positive extrinsic value of something intrinsically (...) negative. The second part emphasizes the importance of various distinctions within the realm of the negative. We must distinguish between adversity (which is non-mental) and negative mental states, and between negative thoughts (or attitudes) and negative affect. Within the realm of negative affect, we must distinguish between negative emotions and moods, on the one hand, and negative affective perspectives on the other, and then between mildly negative affective perspectives and severely negative ones (for which I reserve the term ‘suffering’). These distinctions matter greatly, since different types of negative experience have very different degrees of prudential disvalue. Although many types of negative experience may be “worth it”—because their positive extrinsic value outweighs their negative value—this is rarely true of severe suffering. (shrink)

The Map of Consciousness Explained is an essential primer on the late Dr. David R. Hawkins's teachings on human consciousness and their associated energy fields. Using muscle testing, Dr. Hawkins conducted more than 250,000 calibrations during 20 years of research to define a range of values, attitudes, and emotions that correspond to levels of consciousness. This range of values-along with a logarithmic scale of 1 to 1,000-became the Map of Consciousness, which Dr. Hawkins first wrote about in (...) his New York Times bestseller, Power vs. Force. In this book, readers will gain an introduction and deeper understanding of the Map, with visual charts and practical applications to help them heal, recover, and evolve to higher levels of consciousness and energy. (shrink)

The Liezi is the forgotten classic of Daoism. Along with the Laozi (Daodejing) and the Zhuangzi, it's been considered a Daoist masterwork since the mid-eighth century, yet unlike those well-read works, the Liezi is little known and receives scant scholarly attention. Nevertheless, the Liezi is an important text that sheds valuable light on the early history of Daoism, particularly the formative period of sectarian Daoism. We do not know exactly what shape the original text took, but what remains is replete (...) with fantastic characters, whimsical tales, paradoxical aphorisms, and philosophically sophisticated reflection on the nature of the world and humanity's place within it. Ultimately, the Liezi sees the world as one of change and indeterminacy. Arguing for the Liezi's historical, philosophical, and literary significance, the contributors to this volume offer a fresh look at this text, using contemporary approaches and providing novel insights. The volume is unique in its attention to both philosophical and religious perspectives. (shrink)

How can finite creatures know an infinite God? How do the limits of our intellect and language impact how we know God and talk about God? This book explores a doctrine called divine incomprehensibility in hopes to seek how a proper understand of God's incomprehensibility protects us from both a theological despair in which there is no hope for Christian theology and a theological idolatry in which we are tempted to believe we can capture the essence of God with our (...) thoughts or words. (shrink)

There is a strong appetite in ‘the wild’ (i.e., beyond the academy) for public philosophy. There are myriad forums available, from magazines and online publications to podcasts and YouTube videos, for those who wish to engage in philosophy in a non-academic context. For academic philosophers, this has raised methodological and metaphilosophical questions like: ‘what is the best way to engage in public philosophy?’ and ‘what are our aims when we engage in public philosophy?’ But what do ‘the public’ want? If (...) public philosophy is philosophy written for a public audience, what is it, exactly, that it can or might do for them? Several answers have been proposed by philosophers, but less attention has been paid to how the public themselves might answer that question. The aim of this essay is to try and put together at least the beginning of an answer. In June 2022 we put out a survey in the hope of eliciting views from ‘the public’ on issues relating to the nature and aims of both philosophy (more generally) and public philosophy. In doing so, our aim was to take a ‘democratic’ approach to answering the question: What is public philosophy? (shrink)

This accessible introduction to formal, and especially Montague, semantics within a linguistic framework, presupposes no previous background in logic, but takes students step-by-step from simple predicate/argument structures and their interpretation to Montague's intentional logic.

In response to an accusation of having said something inappropriate, the accused may exploit the difference between the explicit contents of their utterance and its implicatures. Widely discussed in the pragmatics literature are those cases in which arguers accept accountability only for the explicit contents of what they said while denying commitment to the implicature. In this paper, we sketch a fuller picture of commitment denial. We do so, first, by including in our discussion not just denial of implicatures, but (...) also the mirror strategy of denying commitment to literal meaning and, second, by classifying strategies for commitment denial in terms of classical rhetorical status theory. In addition to providing a systematic categorization of our data, this approach offers some clues to determine when such a defence strategy is a reasonable one and when it is not. (shrink)

This book traces the translation history of German philosophy, with long and well-justified layovers in Paris, proposing an innovative translation strategy toward addressing the long-standing difficulties in its translation. The volume discusses the context around why German philosophy, whose profundity is often understood to lie in German's iconic polysemous vocabulary, has been so difficult to translate. To best grapple with its complexity, Hawkins outlines a strategy of "differential translation," which involves translating conceptually dense German terms with multiple different terms (...) in the target text, rather than the conventional standard of selecting one term and using it consistently. The book explores how this strategy, which runs counter to the expectation of readers and translators, has played out in debates across both the French-language and English-language translation landscapes, with well-known translators such as Adam Phillips and Joan Stambaugh boldly in favor and others such as Jean Laplanche polemically against it. The book encourages researchers and translators to continue to question norms in translation practice and write translations that do justice to the multifarious meanings in Germanic vocabulary. This book will be of interest to researchers interested in the German language, translation studies, philosophy, and intellectual history. (shrink)

For anyone looking to understand Chinese philosophy, here is the place to start. Introducing this vast and far-reaching tradition, the longest continuous heritage of philosophical reflection in our existence, Ronnie L. Littlejohn tells you everything you need to know about those Chinese thinkers who have made the biggest contributions to the conversation of philosophy. From the Han dynasty to the present, he leads us into the indigenous philosophical traditions of Confucianism, Daoism and the uniquely modified forms of Buddhism in (...) China and introduces: - The six classical schools of Chinese philosophy (Yin-Yang, Ru, Mo, Ming, Fa and Dao-De) - The arrival of Buddhism in China and its distinctive development - The central figures and movements from the end of the Tang dynasty to the introduction into China of Western thought - The impact of Chinese philosophers ranging from Confucius and Laozi to Tu Weiming on their equivalents in the West. Weaving together key subjects, thinkers and texts, we see how Chinese traditions have profoundly shaped the institutions, social practices and psychological character of not only East and Southeast Asia, but the world we are living in. Praised for its completely original and illuminating thematic approach, this new edition includes updated features such as reading lists, a comparative chronology of Western and Chinese philosophers, and additional translated extracts. (shrink)

What is the best way to account for the badness of pain and what sort of theory of welfare is best suited to accommodate this view? I argue that unpleasant sensory experiences are prudentially bad in the absence of contrary attitudes, but good when the object of positive attitudes. Pain is bad unless it is liked, enjoyed, valued etc. Interestingly, this view is incompatible with either pure objectivist or pure subjectivist understandings of welfare. However, there is a kind of welfare (...) theory that can incorporate this view of the badness of pain and which is very, very close to being a form of subjectivism. Moreover, this hybrid account of welfare is entirely compatible with the deep motivations of subjectivism. I therefore argue that those who lean towards welfare subjectivism should adopt this account of pain, and that we should revise our understanding of subjectivism to count such theories as subjective. (shrink)

This ground-breaking textbook focuses on the use of play techniques and games to facilitate the positive behavioral, social, and emotional development of children with and without special needs. The chapters in this book center on the use of games and play to facilitate emotional expression, develop friendships and encourage appropriate behaviors in community contexts, such as schools, that are critical to children's adaptation in the world. For example, there are chapters explaining the importance of playground interactions for children, role play (...) to develop social skills and learn to express emotions, games to facilitate appropriate behavior and prosocial development in the classroom, and play as an outlet for the expression of emotion and development of children with special needs, including medical and mental health conditions. Readers will learn skills for coaching positive behaviors in individual and group settings, and will learn strategies to enhance social skills and help children develop emotionally in a variety of contexts (e.g., classrooms) and circumstances (e.g., having chronic illnesses or coping with mental health issues that make social engagement more challenging). Important "take-home" messages and critical techniques for fostering children's skills will be presented, and the engaging material presented in the chapters will facilitate knowledge of what to do and how to improve children's social and emotional development through play techniques and games. -- Back cover. (shrink)

Decision-Making Capacity First published Tue Jan 15, 2008; substantive revision Fri Aug 14, 2020 In many Western jurisdictions the law presumes that adult persons, and sometimes children that meet certain criteria, are capable of making their own medical decisions; for example, consenting to a particular medical treatment, or consenting to participate in a research trial. But what exactly does it mean to say that a subject has or lacks the requisite capacity to decide? This question has to do with what (...) is commonly called “decisional capacity”, a central concept in health care law and ethics, and increasingly an independent topic of philosophical inquiry. -/- Decisional capacity can be defined as the ability of subjects to make their own medical decisions. Somewhat similar questions of capacity arise in other contexts, such as capacity to stand trial in a court of law and the ability to make decisions that relate to personal care and finances. However, the history behind the more general legal notions of capacity to stand trial and capacity to manage one’s life is different and operates somewhat differently in law (Roth, Meisel, & Litz 1977; Zapf & Roesch 2005). For the purposes of this discussion the notion of decisional capacity will be limited to medical contexts only; most notably, those where decisions to consent or to refuse treatment or participation in clinical research are concerned. (shrink)

What is the best way to account for the badness of pain and what sort of theory of welfare is best suited to accommodate this view? I argue that unpleasant sensory experiences are prudentially bad in the absence of contrary attitudes, but good when the object of positive attitudes. Pain is bad unless it is liked, enjoyed, valued etc. Interestingly, this view is incompatible with either pure objectivist or pure subjectivist understandings of welfare. However, there is a kind of welfare (...) theory that can incorporate this view of the badness of pain and which is very, very close to being a form of subjectivism. Moreover, this hybrid account of welfare is entirely compatible with the deep motivations of subjectivism. I therefore argue that those who lean towards welfare subjectivism should adopt this account of pain, and that we should revise our understanding of subjectivism to count such theories as subjective. (shrink)

This is the second of four volumes in the CARE-ing for Integral Development series, focused on CARE: Community activation, Awakening consciousness, innovation driven institutionalized Research and transformative Education. In this book, the author focuses on ways and means of developing, in an explicitly integral way, a particular organization or society, one in relation to another, locally-globally, building on prior, local community activation. He draws on two decades of experience and illustrates how such an awakening of integral consciousness can run alongside (...) innovation driven institutionalized research and transformative education, as well as community activation, at undergraduate and post-graduate levels. In the process he addresses such topics as how to embed development in a particular society locally, how in relation to the rest of the world globally, as well as how to consciously evolve as an individual, organization or society, as such, from one particular developmental perspective - southern (relational), eastern (renewal) or north/western (reasoned/realization) - or another. The overall integral approach, or rhythm that the author draws upon, and has used in the field for the past decade, is that of recognizing and releasing what he terms GENE-ius, through local Grounding, local-global Emergence, newly global Navigation and ultimately global-local Effect, encompassing nature, culture, technology and enterprise. Moreover, he offers a body of integral theory that has been developed in twelve separate volumes, related to different aspects of integral development. This book on awakening integral and developmental consciousness - from an African, Asian or Euro/American perspective - is unique. Moreover, and specifically as such, the author offers an alternately relational ("southern"), renewal ("eastern") and reasoned ("north-western") perspective on such development. (shrink)